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Prefazione / Preface
M L*
Intentionality is one of the most crucial areas of inquiry in both sci-
ences and the humanities. The different disciplines explore it through
various approaches. In semiotics, and especially in structural semi-
otics, intentionality is investigated in relation to the concept of text. If
a text is a portion of meaning that a culture isolates as peculiarly sig-
nificant in relation to its context, the issue of intentionality essentially
bears on the origin of textual significance and meaning. We realize
that there is meaning in a text. But where is it from? In semiotics, the
problem of intentionality comes down to asking meaning the same
question that is usually addressed to a stranger: where are you from,
meaning? The different disciplines of meaning, as well as the different
branches of semiotics, answer this question in discrepant ways.
For some, meaning essentially comes from the reader, the listener,
the spectator, etc. The one who receives a text becomes its master,
and injects into it, or even onto it, one’s subjective desire for mean-
ingfulness. According to this perspective, the meaning that I find in
the Divine Comedy, for instance, ultimately depends on what I, con-
sciously or unconsciously, decide to project on its signifying surface.
Ultimately, I am Dante, I am Virgil, I am Beatrice, I am the God of the
text.
An alternative approach answers the same question “where are you
from, meaning?” in a radically different way. It looks for indexical
links between the surface of the text, that is, the way in which a
roman, a fresco, a symphony, etc. appears, and those agencies that
have caused this surface to be phenomenologically arranged as it is.
The intentionality that matters in the creation of meaning, according
∗ Shanghai University / University of Turin.

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to this perspective, is not that of the reader but that of the author.
Ultimately, it is the author’s mind that I look for when I peruse a text.
The novelty of the semiotic approach, and especially of Umberto
Eco’s point of view, has consisted in suggesting that a third kind of
intentionality exists between that of the reader and that of the author. It
is the intentionality of the text itself. The author arranges the text as
she or he pleases, yet this arrangement takes place within a grammar
and, even more importantly, within a culture. In creation, the author is
never entirely free, not only for it draws the communicative materials
from a socially shared deposit of semiotic forms but also for, once these
forms are set, they entail meaningful consequences that usually escape
the author’s intentional control. A text means because of its author but
also and above all beyond and sometimes even despite such author,
especially as regards complex artistic texts. When this third approach
faces the question: “Where are you from, meaning?”, it looks for an
answer neither in the subjective response of the receiver nor in the
objective impulse of the author but in the inter–subjective encyclopedia
of cultural relations that, shared by a community of interpreters, begets
the grid of meaningful determinations through which a text is read.
Umberto Eco’s solution, however, does not solve the problem
of the intentionality of meaning but elegantly displaces it toward a
different domain, that of cultural semiotics. How and, even more
crucially, why does a community of interpreters take shape, bringing
about a certain configuration of the socially shared deposit of forms
and meaning that guides the correct interpretation of texts within
the community? Even more mysteriously, if the intention of a text is
inter–subjectively set by a society’s hermeneutic culture, how does it
change? And how do individual interpretations, including the wrong
ones, influence this process?
The deep nature of textual intentionality, moreover, must be in-
vestigated not only theoretically but also historically, with an eye to
considering the way in which it is affected by changes in communica-
tion technology. For example, how is a “community of interpreters”
established in a society that, increasingly globalized, circulates mean-
ing across traditional ethno–cultural and linguistic boundaries? Can
such a thing as a “global community of interpreters” exist?
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L’auteur peut–il mourir ?**
J Z*
 : Can the Author Die?
: The relation between a text and its author represents a recurring
problem in modern and contemporary scholarship. From Russian for-
malism through structuralism to deconstruction, the traditional idea of
this relation was completely reversed in the literary and hermeneutical
theory of the contemporary West. The “intentional sophism” of the
new criticism, Roland Barthes’s concept of the “death of the author”,
and Michel Foucault’s speculation on “what is an author” follow each
other like a guideline that determines the exclusion and the negation of
the author, leading to the disruption of its relation with the text, and to
its definition as an independent object. Such perspective has turned into
a general trend nowadays. To this regard, however, a question arises: if
the text is created by the agency that writes it, can such relation between
the creator and the creature be erased by the text’s interpreters? The
article claims that the author or the writer of a text exists, that it exists
in the text, and that the interpretation must recognize its objectivity,
indipendenlty from its hermeneutic bias.
: Author; Text; Interpretation; Identity of the Writer; Structural-
ism; Imposed Hermeneutics.
. Le texte est celui de l’écrivain
Le texte est la production de l’écrivain, c’est un fait objectif et indé-
niable. Un texte déterminé ne peut s’établir que par un écrivain précis,
c’est l’écrivain qui produit ce texte, qui fait exister le texte. Le texte
∗ Académie chinoise de sciences sociales.∗∗ Trad. française du chinois par Mingjie Tang.

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n’existe pas sans la production de l’écrivain. L’existence gravée sur le
parchemin est touchable, consultable et tenable, c’est l’existence maté-
rielle indiscutable. C’est cette existence fondamentale qui permet de
comprendre et d’interpréter. Au sens historique, le texte produit par
ce qui l’écrit est un fait déterminé. Hamlet est le produit personnel de
Shakespeare, cela est indéniable, personne ne peut le disputer ; sa signi-
fication classique ne se définit d’une certaine manière qu’à partir de cet
auteur. On ne peut pas dire qu’il est l’œuvre de quelqu’un d’autre sans
preuve archéologique, sinon, on tombe dans le nihilisme de l’histoire.
Au sens du droit d’auteur, on doit respecter l’auteur et son droit sur le
texte ; si l’on déclare sa mort avant qu’il soit mort, ce n’est qu’une vio-
lation de droit. Certaines critiques posent la question comme ceci : qui
est l’auteur d’une épopée nationale ou d’une légende mythologique
dans l’histoire archaïque? Par exemple, la mythologie grecque n’a pas
d’auteur précis, et cela serait une preuve de la futilité de l’idée d’auteur.
Mais ce raisonnement n’est qu’une erreur. En tant que texte spirituel
dans l’histoire, la mythologie grecque est le produit collectif du peuple.
L’histoire est créée par rhapsodes au moment de grands événements
historiques ; à travers les vérifications, les raffinements et les façonne-
ments de l’histoire et du peuple, les textes d’aujourd’hui se produisent,
ceux qui correspondent au besoin du peuple sont intégrés et amplifiés,
ceux qui trahissent les intérêts et les traditions du peuple sont éliminés
ou corrigés. Qui est l’auteur du texte ? Ce sont les peuples collectifs
(ou bien le peuple singulier, ou bien l’unité de peuples multiples) à
l’époque grecque. L’époque et le peuple créent la mythologie grecque,
ils expriment leurs volontés et leurs esprits par la mythologie. Notre
interprétation du texte ne se fait pas pour le savoir ou l’admirer, mais
pour connaître et comprendre sa progression et son élaboration par
l’époque et le peuple. C’est aussi le sens de l’existence de l’auteur, la
raison de ne pas le nier ou le supprimer.
Selon la théorie traditionnelle, on écrit pour s’exprimer, l’écrit de
l’écrivain se fait pour exprimer le sentiment et la pensée, de lui–même
ou de la société. Par la construction des mots en texte, le phénomène
spirituel s’objective en existence matérielle, le sentiment et la pensée
se figurent en état du texte et se transfèrent aux autres. C’est un proces-
sus de concentration et de diffusion. L’esprit de l’auteur se concentre
dans le texte qui devient son objectivation, sa matérialisation, son
moyen de réaliser et de conserver sa propre vie. L’auteur parle avec
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d’autres à travers son texte, il s’y présente et sa pensée s’y prolonge
sans fin. La mort physique de l’auteur est inévitable, mais son esprit
ne meurt pas, il s’enracine dans le texte qui le conserve. Comme le dit
le philosophe italien Emilio Betti, le texte ou l’œuvre est « une chose
objectivée de l’esprit » de l’auteur. Et puis, un philosophe chinois
Derong Pan se demande : « qu’est–ce que cette chose objectivée de
l’esprit ? », il se répond : « l’écriture, les chiffres codés, le symbole
de l’art, la représentation du langage et de la musique, l’expression
du visage et le comportement, etc., ce sont les formes du sens, les
choses objectivées de l’esprit qui se présentent et se reconnaissent ».
Cependant, cette chose objectivée se distingue du sens et du contenu
de lui–même : « la chose objectivée appartient au domaine “ phy-
sique ”, mais le sens et le contenu qu’elle emporte sont au domaine
“ spirituel ”. La connaissance de phénomène spirituel se fait par la
connaissance de chose objectivée, autrement dit, la connaissance de
son sens et de son contenu ». (Derong Pan , pp. ). Ainsi, au
point de vue de Betti, le texte est avant tout le produit de l’auteur,
autrement dit, il est le produit objectivé de l’esprit de l’auteur. Le
produit spirituel que l’auteur nous offre n’est pas reproductible ni
remplaçable. C’est dans ce produit personnalisé que l’auteur et le texte
fusionnent : l’auteur assigne sa pensée et son esprit dans le texte, le
texte s’en charge et devient le producteur du sens. La négation de
l’auteur est une négation du texte, l’existence du texte ainsi produite a
donc un sens et une valeur tout autres.
Au point de vue foucaldienne, l’écriture n’est pas une expression,
« l’écriture d’aujourd’hui s’est affranchie du thème de l’expression » ;
l’écriture n’exprime plus le sentiment, la pensée ou la valeur de
l’écrivain, elle n’est qu’un jeu ou une pratique des mots, l’accumulation
et la multiplication silencieuses des signes, où il n’y a pas de signi-
fiants ni de signifiés, et qui n’a aucun rapport avec l’écrivain, « Dans
l’écriture, il n’y a pas de la manifestation ou de l’exaltation du geste
d’écrire; il ne s’agit pas de l’épinglage d’un sujet dans un langage; il
est question de l’ouverture d’un espace où le sujet écrivant ne cesse
de disparaître » (Foucault , pp. ).
Nous ne commentons pas le sens ou la valeur de ce jugement,
regardons seulement son discours, nous avons trois points à discu-
ter. En premier lieu, si l’écriture n’est qu’un jeu des mots, et qu’elle
n’exprime pas l’intention de l’écrivain, alors le jeu propre n’est–il pas
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une expression ? S’il en est, qui exprime cette expression ? Comme
Foucault le dit, le joueur est le sujet de l’écriture, c’est le joueur qui
joue. En ce sens, l’écrivain ou le joueur existe. Quand il dit que «
l’ouverture d’un espace où le sujet écrivant ne cesse de disparaître »,
le concept de « sujet écrivant » témoigne déjà de son existence. En
second lieu, si l’écriture est un jeu pur qui n’exprime pas la pensée
du sujet, le produit du jeu, la sélection et la juxtaposition des signes,
la structure et la déconstruction des mots, sont–ils pas une écriture
autonome du joueur ? Cet acte n’est–il pas une action consciente du
sens ? On joue de cette manière et non pas d’autres, c’est le sentiment,
la pensée et la valeur de l’auteur qui y fonctionnent, qui y expriment
l’existence de l’auteur, qui définissent ce « jeu » des mots comme
tel, qui impliquent la volonté de l’écrivain. Tous ceux–là ne sont pas
effaçables ni éliminables. En dernier lieu, « la création d’un espace
de disparition pour le sujet d’écrire » laisse en effet la trace de sujet
écrivant. Si le sujet écrivant doit disparaître, cette disparition est un
processus progressif, le sujet se disparaît progressivement dans le jeu,
même la manière et le chemin de disparition se multiplient selon le
sujet différent. Sinon, il n’y a plus de différents styles du texte.
En plus, concernant le problème de l’existence de l’auteur, Foucault
le montre de façons différentes. Dans « Qu’est–ce qu’un auteur ? »,
Foucault substitue le fonctionnement de l’auteur à l’auteur, et il in-
dique ses quatre manières, et puis il donne un concept surprenant —
« fondateurs de discursivité »,
mais il me semble qu’on a vu apparaître, au cours du e siècle en Europe,
des types d’auteurs assez singuliers et qu’on ne saurait confondre ni avec
les “ grands ” auteurs littéraires ni avec les auteurs de textes religieux
canoniques, ni avec les fondateurs de sciences. Appelons–les, d’une façon
un peu arbitraire, “ fondateurs de discursivité ”. Ces auteurs ont ceci de
particulier qu’ils ne sont pas seulement les auteurs de leurs œuvres, de leurs
livres, ils ont produit quelque chose de plus: la possibilité et la règle de
formation d’autres textes. En ce sens, ils sont fort différents, par exemple,
d’un auteur de romans, qui n’est jamais, au fond, que l’auteur de son propre
texte. Freud n’est pas simplement l’auteur de la Traumdeutung ou du Mot
d’esprit; Marx n’est pas simplement l’auteur du Manifeste ou Capital : ils
ont établi une possibilité indéfinie de discours. (Foucault , p. )
À notre avis, il y a un conflit évident. Foucault propose générale-
ment la disparition de l’auteur, mais dans ce texte, il assigne l’auteur à
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n’importe quel producteur du texte. De ce fait, le producteur du texte
ne peut être que l’auteur, il n’a pas d’autres titres. Le plus important
est que les auteurs comme Freud et Marx, ils sont non seulement les
auteurs de leurs œuvres, mais aussi « fondateurs de discursivité ». Un
auteur du discours n’est–il pas « fondateur de discursivité » ? Comme
Foucault le dit,
quand je parle de Marx ou de Freud comme “ instaurateurs de discursi-
vité ”, je veux dire qu’ils n’ont pas simplement rendu un certain nombre
d’analogies possible, ils ont rendu possible (et tout autant) un certain nombre
de différences. Ils ont ouvert l’espace pour autre chose qu’eux et qui pour-
tant appartient à ce qu’ils ont fondé. (Foucault, pp. )
Un « fondateur de discursivité » est chargé donc de fonction im-
portante, il est l’auteur de ses œuvres, car il a une influence pro-
fonde et permanente, et cette influence continue à fonctionner dans
l’expansion et la multiplication de ses œuvres. Il est impossible que
l’auteur ne soit rien. Dans le fonctionnement de « fondateurs de dis-
cursivité », l’auteur est immortel.
. L’identité de l’écrivain
L’identité est un problème important dans les études contempo-
raines de cultures et de philosophies. Il semble que la discussion
sur l’existence ou la disparition de soi, l’affirmation ou la négation
du sujet et la question « qui suis–je ? » ou « qui es–tu ? » manifestent
l’affaiblissement de soi ou du sujet. Mais en effet, c’est le sentiment
de soi faible et le souci de cette faiblesse qui suscite la recherche et
le questionnement de soi, qui mettent en cause la pensée et l’acte
théorique de soi. Personne ne veut abandonner le soi. À partir de la
deuxième moitié du e siècle, la tendance philosophique d’éliminer
et de déconstruire le sujet est destinée à l’échec.
Alors comment l’écrivain envisage–t–il le problème de sa propre
identité ? Il y a trois rapports entre le texte et l’écrivain : d’abord,
l’œuvre est l’autobiographie ou la demi–autographie de l’auteur ;
ensuite, l’expérience de l’écrivain influence profondément l’écriture,
et le texte est la représentation de son expérience ; enfin, le texte n’a
aucun rapport avec l’auteur lui–même, il est complètement fictif. Les
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deux premiers ne sont pas en question, ce genre de textes possède une
grande proportion dans l’histoire littéraire. Ce qui est problématique
est le troisième rapport dans lequel il n’y a aucun rapport entre le
texte et l’auteur, et l’auteur déclare « le degré zéro de l’écriture » où
aucun sentiment, pensée ou jugement de l’écrivain ne soit lancé dans
le texte. Le texte littéraire, surtout les romans fictifs, y correspond
mieux. Pourtant, même dans ce genre de textes, le spectre de l’auteur
se trouve partout. Il est certainement difficile à le prouver dans le texte
philosophique et historique. Par exemple, dans « Qu’est–ce qu’un au-
teur ? » de Foucault, l’influence personnelle de Foucault, sa disposition
politique, sociale et culturelle, sa conception du monde et de sa valeur
ne contribuent–elles pas à aucune influence ? Foucault n’est–il pas
dans son discours ? Peut–on ignorer Foucault comme l’auteur de ses
discours ?
Commencer par Beckett. Foucault amorce sa discussion à partir
d’une phrase de Samuel Beckett, « peu importe qui parle ». Ainsi,
regardons comment Beckett envisage l’identité de l’auteur dans le
texte, autrement dit, comment il envisage le rapport entre texte et
auteur, comment il s’y confirme. En tant que grand dramaturge fran-
çais du théâtre de l’absurde, Beckett présente au monde son idée et sa
pratique théâtrale d’une manière expérimentale, abstraire et absurde,
son style simple, abstrait et fantastique est étonnant et impressionnant.
Il semble qu’il n’y ait aucune marque de l’auteur, qu’il laisse de grands
espaces pour les interpréteurs. Mais ce n’est qu’une connaissance
superficielle. Si l’on approfondit, on voit que Beckett comme auteur
du texte n’est jamais séparé de son œuvre. Sa mémoire, sa pensée,
son sentiment, son langage, son point d’origine de l’existentialisme
s’enroulent entre les lignes comme un spectre.
La preuve directe est que l’implication de son enfance, sa jeunesse,
son amour, sa famille et son corps se trouve dans la plupart de ses
œuvres. Le plus remarquable repère est sa mémoire d’enfance qui
réside partout dans son texte en se manifestant distinctement à la ma-
nière de lui–même. Beckett soulignait et admirait « la mort de l’auteur »
de Roland Barthes, mais il ne peut pas nier l’usage de sa propre expé-
rience de la vie dans le texte, en pleine image et détail, le texte devient
la vérification de son expérience, « un homme avec son fils, main dans
la main, traverse les montagnes », « une larche se transforme en vert
toujours plus tôt que les autres », « les résonnances de carrière hantent
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au–dessus des montagnes de sa maison ». Comment s’y envisage–t–il ?
Il ne peut que l’admettre, « il est impossible de leur échapper » (Knowl-
son , pp. ). Ce sont les choses qui doivent apparaître dans le
texte, car elles sont l’esprit le plus dynamique du texte.
La preuve indirecte est l’usage du langage. Le langage du peuple
dublinois se trouve souvent dans le texte de Beckett. Le rythme lent
avec plein de pauses fait apparaître l’identité irlandaise de l’écrivain,
« Dans Watt, Beckett utilise pour la première fois son style particulier :
la syntaxe conservatrice et incertaine, nier et affirmer les autres possi-
bilités, l’usage extraordinaire de virgule » (Cronin , pp. ). Ce
style du langage se manifeste particulièrement dans la Fin de partie :
Clov: (les yeux stagné, le ton plat et étroit) fin, c’est la fin, ce sera la fin, ce
sera peut–être la fin. (Pause) Les grains tombent sur les grains, un par un,
un jour, tout à coup, il devient une pile, une petite pile, une pile ennuyeuse.
Il ne peut plus me punir. (Beckett , , pp. –)
Cette forme d’expression du langage avec la répétition, la pause
et l’incertitude, est non seulement celle du peuple dublinois, mais
aussi celle de la mère de Beckett. Sa mère, en tant que descendante
d’aristocrate en décadence, est connue comme une protestante dévo-
tieuse. Elle enseigne elle–même son fils, et le conduit sur le chemin
pour comprendre la Bible, le protestantisme et le langage. Ce sont
ces éléments généraux de la culture qui constituent la figure de Be-
ckett, qui laissent ensuite leurs traces dans ses textes, et deviennent
finalement le sujet que le lecteur rencontre dans ses textes.
Beckett était troublé par le problème de l’absence et de la présence
de l’auteur, « si je peux, où je vais ? Si je peux, qui je serais ? Si j’ai
de la voix, de quoi parlerais–je ? Qui parle de ça en disant que c’est
moi qui parle ? », « Je ne suis pas dans sa tête. Je ne suis pas dans son
corps ancien. Mais je suis encore là, puisqu’il est là, avec lui. Tout
est en désordre ». « Il suffisait d’avoir lui, je n’aurais pas présenté.
Mais ce n’est pas comme ça, il me demande d’être là, avec la figure,
avec le monde, comme lui, peu importe qu’il soit comment, je suis
tout, comme il est rien ». « Et puis, l’histoire commence, tout est
commencé, je suis encore de loin. Je suis loin de mon histoire, en
attendant son départ, en attendant sa fin, il est impossible que ce soit
ma voix » (Beckett , pp. –).
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Beckett formule le rapport entre lui–même et “ lui ” qui flotte
sur ses œuvres par un langage poétique. Il expose une sorte de frag-
mentation de l’esprit sous le rapport entre “ moi ” et “ lui ” : c’est
“ moi ” qui est dans la vie, c’est « lui » qui écrit comme l’auteur ; “ lui ”
force sans cesse “ moi ” de parler, il parle à ma place ; il m’accuse
de mal exprimer ; et il faut que “ moi ” se sépare de “ lui ”. Mais
est–il possible de les séparer ? C’est à cause de l’impossibilité de les
séparer que “ moi ” insiste à les séparer. “ Moi ” et “ lui ”, on est le
même. Sa souffrance est la mienne, ma morte est la sienne. Ainsi, il
faut que je prenne mes distances avec lui, avec l’œuvre, en sorte que la
souffrance de mémoire disparaisse. Le geste beckettien de s’éloigner
de l’identité de l’auteur décèle exactement la profondeur du rapport
entre l’auteur et le texte, et qu’il est si difficile à le supprimer. En tant
que grand dramaturge, Beckett attache une importance particulière à
« l’intention de l’auteur ». Dans sa série de Quad, quatre personnages
traversent la place de quatre coins comme des fous, ils semblent at-
tentifs, ils évitent soigneusement de passer par le centre de la place.
James Knowlson demande à Beckett : est–ce que ce centre dangereux
désigne « le milieu calme » dans le taoïsme ? Beckett lui répond : « Non,
au moins, ce n’est pas mon intention première ». En effet, ce qu’il veut
relever, c’est « l’humeur nerveuse agitée sans cesse dans l’existence
de l’homme » (Hamynes et Knowlson , pp.). Cette fâcheuse
« intention de l’auteur » n’est pas facile à supprimer, c’est l’identité
qu’il faut chercher et prouver non seulement pour l’auteur, mais aussi
pour le lecteur.
Retournons ensuite à Foucault. Ce qui fait distinguer les œuvres
de Foucault avec celles d’autres théoriciens, c’est son attachement
fort à la pratique de vie, parfois personnelle, et plus exactement, ses
œuvres principales s’achèvent souvent sous l’influence de ses propres
expériences et observations. Le motif d’écrire l’Histoire de la folie est
qu’il est invité par les amis à travailler dans l’hôpital Sainte–Anne,
dans les prisons parisiennes, si bien qu’il lui est possible d’observer
à profondeur. Comme il dit, « Je me sens que je suis proche des
malades, peu de différences avec eux ». Ces expériences le stimulent à
« écrire l’histoire de la psychiatre de manière de critique historique ou
d’analyse structurelle » (Beicheng Liu , pp. ). En , Foucault
témoigne « une scène inoubliable dans la vie », c’est celle de carnaval
avec la participation des fous de l’hôpital psychiatrique. Foucault dit,
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le jour de carnaval, les fous — évidemment ce ne sont pas les fous de
maladie grave — se consument et entrent dans le village. Ils sont dans la
fête, mais les résidents s’éloignent d’eux en les regardant anxieusement.
Après tout, c’est extrêmement horrible. Parce qu’ils ne peuvent sortir que
ce jour–là, et ils doivent jouer réellement les fous en ce jour.
Beicheng Liu commente, « dans les œuvres à la suite, surtout
concernant les images sur la fête des fous dans l’Histoire de la folie, on
peut voir les traces de cette mémoire » (Beicheng Liu , pp. –).
Un autre exemple est celui de Surveiller et punir qui est écrit entre
 et . Dans cette période après mai , il y a des mouvements
politiques de féministes, d’homosexuels, de réforme des prisons, de la
protection de l’environnement, d’antipsychiatrie, etc., qui s’enlèvent
partout. Foucault en est l’un des activistes, surtout dans le mouvement
de réforme des prisons. Il lance ses « expériences de limite » dans son
propre champ politique : en , il fonde le Groupe d’information
sur les prisons (GIP) pour permettre aux prisonniers de s’exprimer
sur les conditions de leur incarcération ; le premier mai , Foucault
organise une assemblée devant la porte de prison pour supporter
le mouvement des prisonniers, et il se fait attaquer et arrêter par la
police ; le  janvier , avec Sartre et Deleuze, Foucault organise un
sit–in dans le hall du ministère de la Justice, ils sont expulsés dans la rue
par les CRS ; le  mars , Foucault et Mauriac marchent au premier
rang de la manifestation [. . . ] (Beicheng Liu , pp. –) Les
professeurs du Collège de France en sont étonnés et mécontents, mais
Foucault n’avait pas arrêté ses recherches et créations intellectuelles,
« bien que Foucault perde du temps dans les mouvements sociaux
et politiques, mais il en profite pour ses recherches », « ce sont les
expériences comme ce que dit Nietzsche “ le plaisir de détruire ”, il est
aussi ce que Foucault appelle “ les expériences de limite ” » (Beicheng
Liu , p. ) Cela explique comment Foucault écrit Surveiller et
punir, comment ses expériences propres contribuent à ses œuvres.
En tant qu’écrivain, Foucault trouve son identité dans le texte, il
s’exprime et se justifie par le texte. En ce sens, on lui rend hommage
en disant, « ainsi, on voit Foucault comme tel — une figure troublante
qui se produit, se détruit et se découvre, une figure qui “ recule dans
la forme de représentation de ses œuvres ” », Foucault « déverse son
impulsion la plus folle dans ses œuvres, il s’efforce de le comprendre,
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l’interpréter et l’exprimer ». « Plutôt, ses œuvres sont la représentation
commune de ses livres et sa vie » (Miller , pp. , , ). C’est
l’identité de Foucault, c’est les actions nécessaires d’un écrivain res-
ponsable, c’est la correspondance entre la pratique et la pensée, entre
l’acte et l’écriture, c’est la recherche et le réel de l’identité de l’écrivain.
Dès lors, on ne peut plus dire que « peu importe qui parle ». S’il n’y
a pas de Foucault, il n’y a pas de ses textes ; les textes sans Foucault
perdent aussi leurs sens significatifs. Le rapport entre eux est donc :
Foucault est le texte, le texte est Foucault. Si le texte n’est pas mort,
l’auteur non plus.
. Réflexion sur la raison de la mort de l’auteur
L’auteur est mort, et le texte ne lui appartient plus. Comment ce thème
ridicule au sens commun devient–il une proposition importante de
la philosophie et de l’herméneutique ? Cela nous fait réfléchir. Il
est évident qu’il a une sorte d’hégémonisme du discours. L’auteur
existe, sa pensée existe. Pourquoi les formalistes, Barthes et Foucault
disent–ils que l’auteur est mort ?
La raison des formalistes est simple. C’est pour se dégager de la cri-
tique dominante de la société et de l’histoire à partir du e siècle. La
renonciation de l’auteur est une sorte d’insurrection, de progrès. Sous
l’influence longue de la critique sociale et historique, la littérature se
trahit d’elle–même. Elle se justifie par la sociologie, l’histoire et la vie
de l’auteur. Par conséquent, elle perd sa liberté et son indépendance.
La critique littéraire devient donc l’écho de la proposition sociale
et historique. La littérature doit retourner à la littérature. C’est une
suggestion simple et charmante. L’énonciation de Roland Barthes est
plus profonde et compliquée. « La mort de l’auteur » n’est qu’une
métaphore, un relèvement du problème. Dans l’arrière–plan, c’est
l’avertissement structuraliste pour contre le sujet, le centrisme et
le rationalisme, c’est la violente expansion déconstructiviste dans le
champ de la théorie littéraire et de l’herméneutique. « Qu’est–ce
qu’un auteur ? » de Foucault est plutôt systématique. En appuyant
sur « la mort de l’homme », Foucault avance la nécessité de « la mort
de l’auteur ». Il analyse la fonction du discours et la condition de la
pratique du discours, il transforme le slogan splendide en théorie sé-
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rieuse. Néanmoins, en dépit de ces spéculations philosophiques et de
ces revendications sociales et politiques, qu’est–ce que le but essentiel
de ces slogans et discours au sens de l’herméneutique ?
L’enjeu du problème se trouve dans le pouvoir et le critère du dis-
cours sur l’interprétation du texte. À côté du pouvoir de l’interprétation,
si l’auteur est mort, le lecteur devient naturellement l’interprétateur
supérieur et le reproducteur du texte. Dans l’espace multidimension-
nel du sens de texte, les interprétations de toutes sortes deviennent
possibles. Le lecteur ordinaire comme le commentateur professionnel
peut produire sa conclusion à sa propre volonté. À côté du critère de
l’interprétation, le sens perd sa source lorsque le texte perd son auteur.
L’interprétation ne se détermine plus par un seul sens, mais par la com-
pétition et le dialogue entre multiples imaginations et expériences, tout
est possible. Cependant, est–ce que l’intention première de l’auteur
peut arrêter les interprétations sans limites ? Même l’auteur lui–même
n’est plus le juge dernier du sens, puisque son écriture trahit souvent sa
propre intention, et parfois, il n’a même pas d’intention.
Lorsqu’on pense que l’auteur a un pouvoir créatif sans limites, notre pra-
tique de lecture et de critique le met au bourrier du langage qui renferme
les sens et les significations de manière unique sans divergences. De ce fait,
Foucault dit, “ L’auteur est donc la figure idéologique par laquelle on conjure
la prolifération du sens ”. On désire un auteur cohérent, puisqu’un tel auteur
nous plaît avec son idée du sens concret du texte. (Andrew Bennett, Nicholas
Royle, pp. )
L’explication de Barthes est plus claire,
on sait maintenant que le texte n’est pas un rang des mots qui délivre le
sens unique de théologie (les informations provenant de l’auteur–dieu),
mais un espace multidimensionnel où les écritures différentes s’y mêlent
et s’y contredit, sans origine. Le texte est l’entrelacement des désignations
provenant de multiples centres de cultures [. . . ] Une fois que l’auteur est
exclu, l’interprétation de la proposition du texte devient inutile. Imposer un
auteur au texte, c’est le contraindre arbitrairement, c’est imposer le signifié
définitif, c’est enfermer l’écriture. (Bennett et Royle , pp. –)
A partir de la moitié du e siècle, cette idée de l’interprétation
et cette théorie de l’auteur font apparaître une tendance de « l’inter-
prétation imposée ». Le champ de l’interprétation devient le terrain
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d’essai où les différentes théories se mettent en jeu et en compétition.
« L’interprétation imposée désigne la trahison du discours de texte et
la suppression de la signification littéraire. L’interprétation se fait par
l’intention et la conclusion du lecteur, en supposant la position et le
modèle préexistant » ( Jiang Zhang). La popularisation de “ l’interpré-
tation imposée ” provient primordialement de la théorie formaliste
de l’auteur.
Le développement de la théorie littéraire du e siècle se fait par
plein de tours et de détours. Le fil directeur de la transformation de
trois types théoriques est probablement clair. Selon l’ordre du temps,
il y a le centrisme de l’auteur, du texte et du lecteur qui se nient et
se déplacent l’un par l’autre. Après la décadence de la critique tradi-
tionnelle de la sociologie apparaissent les théories originales comme
l’intuitionnisme de Croce, la psychanalyse de Freud et l’archétype
mythologique de Jung. Mais elles sont toutes le centrisme de l’auteur.
Le “ formalisme russe ” présenté par Jakobson, la “ critique nouvelle ”
présentée par Ransome et le “ structuralisme ” présenté par Barthes
tournent au centrisme du texte. La “ phénoménologie de lecture ”
à l’initiative d’Ingarden, l’herméneutique de Gadamer et la “ récep-
tion critique ” fondée par Austen et Iser présentent le centrisme du
lecteur. Cette classification verticale est d’une certaine manière rai-
sonnable. Dans une période particulière, la théorie à la mode et plus
impactant devient donc la tendance générale. Mais si l’on réfléchit en
profondeur, il y a un pouvoir plus puissant qui fonctionne derrière
ces phénomènes. Ce pouvoir se manifeste à toutes les stratégies et
méthodes possibles, il pousse la théorie littéraire vers d’autres che-
mins pour la constitution d’un centre nouveau. Ce pouvoir est celui
de la théorie propre. La domination purement théorique détermine
l’orientation et le statut essentiel de la théorie littéraire. Le critère de
théorie est rigide, elle corrige la réalité, et le réel est subordonné à la
théorie. La production automatique de la théorie conduit au foison-
nement illimité théorique. La vérification de la théorie elle–même
devient le critère de la vérité théorique. Au champ de la littérature,
après le centrisme de l’auteur, du texte et du lecteur, il y a donc celui
de la théorie. Toutes les interprétations se font autour de la théorie,
le seul fondement de l’interprétation du texte est la théorie. Néan-
moins, le texte n’est pas fait pour la théorie, il est né pour lui–même.
De ce fait, la domination théorique oblige d’en faire l’interprétation
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imposée, l’auteur de la théorie se transforme donc en l’auteur du
texte. Il n’y a presque aucune idéologie qui peut s’échapper de ce
stéréotype. C’est la raison réelle de la mort de l’auteur. Jameson avait
une phrase pour expliquer la source heideggérienne d’œuvres litté-
raires, « on sait que dans les dernières années d’Heidegger, il est un
peu mystérieux. Qu’est–ce que le sens exact de ses phrases ? Mon
interprétation est extrêmement démesurée. Mais on a le droit de les
interpréter de différentes manières, puisqu’il est déjà mort » ( Jameson
, p. ). Le motif de supprimer l’auteur apparaît évident. Il n’y
a aucune importance de la mort vraie ou fausse, ce qui compte est
le pouvoir et le critère de l’interprétation, et qui possède ce pouvoir.
Quand l’histoire et l’auteur sont éliminés, on a donc l’espace et la
liberté de l’interprétation imposée, la violence et la suprématie de la
théorie deviennent donc possibles.
Certes, dans la profondeur de l’histoire, la “ mort de l’auteur ” n’est
qu’une élaboration de la “ mort de Dieu ”. Le slogan nietzschéen se
fait pour la négation définitive de la raison humaine, de la métaphy-
sique traditionnelle. À ce titre, “ la morte de Dieu ” et “ la réévaluation
des valeurs ” détermine l’orientation essentielle de la philosophie et
la littérature contemporaine de l’Occident. Le déconstructiviste pré-
senté par Derrida en joue à l’extrême. Dieu est mort, la connaissance
s’ouvre à tous les hommes ; l’auteur est mort, le texte s’ouvre à toutes
les interprétations. Quel est donc le fondement de la connaissance et
de l’interprétation ? Il n’est plus les choses elles–mêmes ou le texte
propre, ni la raison ou la règle, mais l’impulsion de la vie et la volonté
du pouvoir, “ la volonté constituée ” et “ la volonté assimilée ”. De
cette façon, on a ces nombres idées et valeurs à distinguer et expliquer,
notre question “ l’auteur peut–il mourir ” est inclue. C’est un thème si
large que nous ne pouvons pas le résoudre dans une seule discussion.
Il faut plus de recherches profondes et réalistes au champ des théories.
 Jiang Zhang
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: This article tries to explore the meaning of the famous polemic of
the Sixties in which Barthes and Foucault supported the “nonexistence
of the author”, showing its ideological and non–scientific character and
the link with an anti–humanistic project whose philosophical roots are
found in Heidegger and the political ones in Marxism. It is further
argued that semiotics, in light of its competence on narrative syntax,
has the tools to show the scientific groundlessness and the pretentious
character of the controversy.
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.
As Leo Strauss () masterfully showed, when we find in a strong
theoretical work a thesis which is evidently inconsistent and baseless,
it is worth asking why this proposition was inserted in the text. There
are three main answers to this question. The first and more traditional
one is that these are mistakes, imperfections, confusions, maybe bad
transcriptions, or that we ourselves have not understood and misinter-
preted a correct thesis. According to all these hypotheses, the author
is not responsible for the error. The second answer, that of Strauss,
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proposes the idea that in these cases, in order to save himself from
possible persecution and repression, the author is purposely hiding his
own positions, pretending “in front of the masses” to support points
that he does not share, but he is purposely leaving in his work trivial
errors and inconsistencies in order to let the “wise few” understand
that his secret opinion is very different. Strauss has shown that this
situation is often found in the history of philosophy, for example in the
cases of Maimonides and Spinoza: this is an important contribution
to the technique of interpretation, which semiotics should assimilate.
But there is also a third possible reason: a bold ideological stance,
a political attitude which defies good sense, with the conviction of
obtaining consent (even from oneself ) precisely because of its tough
groundlessness: credo quia absurdum. Someone can make absurd his
position, just in order to solicit faith. Ideology can be defined exactly
as the decision not to let the wretched empirical facts obscure his own
sublime convictions. Someone can not wrongly believe that farther
from the empirical facts is his position, the more it can become the
object of ideological belief. Call it “intellectual provocation”: épater
le bourgeois is always a good communication strategy in order to
acquire the precious status of original thinker and maitre à penser.
And if there are some people who don’t buy the thesis, this fact will
be considered not a demonstration of its own weakness, but the clear
proof of how reactionary and evil is the position of those who refuse
the “revolutionary truth”.
The mechanism is the same of the beginning of famous Andersen’s
fable The Emperor’s New Clothes: the scammers who sell to the emperor
non–existent clothes at a high price are careful to point out before
their show that only the wicked ones will not see their marvelous
product. This is a powerful ideological device: you need being an
“innocent” kid in order to dare to tell that the king is naked. And it is
not useless to add that in many circumstances to say a truth contrary
to ideology is expensive. This third case of “faith test” is the most
likely when the baseless position is not an individual one, but it is
collectively shared by some group or intellectual sect.
This is clearly the case of “postmodernism”. There is a huge
anomaly, a real pragmatic self–contradiction, when Michel Foucault
writes that «it is meaningless to speak in the name of — or against —
Reason, Truth, or Knowledge» (in May , p. ) or «All my analyses
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are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence» or
again that «reason is the ultimate language of madness» (, p. );
or when Stanley Fish confesses happily, «relieves me of the obligation
to be right [. . . ] and demands only that I be interesting» (, p. ).
What these authors tell is the exact denial of what they do, namely
theoretically arguing. The closest ancestor of these positions was Niet-
zsche’s thesis that «there are no facts, only interpretations» (–,
p. ; for more general criticism, see Ferraris ), paradoxically
presented in turn as a fact. These texts are plain, easy to interpret,
and the timing does not allow the hypothesis of transcription errors.
Postmodernists lived in democratic and open societies, even if they
preferred to deny it, and had a prominent position in the intellectual
system, such that no one could think of repressing them and they
had no need to mystify their opinions, according to the Straussian
hypothesis.
Examples of this inconsistency could be multiplied ad lib, but these
are enough for understanding that any discussion would be futile in
these terms. Postmodernism is a form of self defeating nihilistic intel-
lectual religion — unless it is the opposite, under a Strauss strategy:
the demonstration of the rational impossibility of relativism or rather
and more probably a rhetoric device for legitimizing a bankruptcy,
subversive politic stance already discarded by history (Hicks ) —
but for sure this was not the intention of their authors. With postmod-
ernism, what is true is the third hypothesis, that of the mechanism of
ideology; not the Straussian one, implying the existence of a message
to be kept secret to all, except for a select few. There is no message,
only the totalitarian will to use their speech to make that of dissenters
impossible and win the admiration of self–hating bourgeois.
This is not the place for discussing this movement or intellectual
stance in all its implications. But semiotics is directly called into ques-
tion by this discourse. Let us start there from some very common
although rarely explicitly expressed thesis of postmodernism and cul-
tural studies. I will express them in the most direct and therefore the
most naive and uncritical form:
a) there is not such a thing as the meaning of an expression. Mean-
ing is just interpretation and in general it depends on strength
relationships;
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b) there is not such a thing as the author of a text. Authorship is
just a social invention and an interpretation;
c) interpretation is free, not bound to some principle. However, it
reflects the interpreter’s position, i.e. his or her gender, ethnicity,
race, sexual orientation, political affiliation, etc.
The polemical object of these theses is evidently the diligent analy-
sis of the texts, that aims at the purpose of clarifying their meaning
and their intentionality (or their intentionalities in the plural, if we
accept the hypothesis of Eco []) with the purpose of replacing it
with voluntarily “subversive” political readings, deconstructing the
European cultural tradition and replacing it with a “revolutionary”
hegemony.
The main strategy used by postmodernist for justifying this stance
is limiting oneself to the textual level, which after all is the one on
which the theoretical discussions are rewoven. Over a textual surface
you can find no meaning, of course, because a text always works
as a sign in the Peircean sense «A sign is an object which stands for
another to some mind» (Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological
Edition, vol. : –, p. ), and the referred or signified object, be
it some concrete or abstract thing, is always another, something not
present in the text. And not even the author, of course, can be in the
text, because the “I” that stands for him is never more than a trace. As
Charles Baudelaire wrote (Lettre du Voyant, à Paul Demeny,  Mai )
«Je est un autre». External to the text must also be its interpretation,
since no text can include its entire interpretation, without falling into
a regression, in which the interpretation would in turn be interpreted
and so on to infinity.
So, from a postmodernist point of view, those entities that could
have an ontological external existence in front of the text, namely
author and meaning, literally do not exist, because the analysis must
be limited to the surface of text. So texts are always enclosed in them-
selves as windowless monads. On the other hand, they can not claim
the same nonexistence with regard to interpretation, just because post-
modernist practice takes always the shape of analysis of previous texts
and therefore their discourse is always somehow an interpretation
(thus in an eminent manner in the case of Derrida). But all interpreta-
tion of a text is another text, which is again a windowless monad. The
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new text of course “exists”, but as such is “groundless” (not by chance
the same way as the “Being” of Heidegger ) and therefore is not
bound by any rule to any external reality, including the commented
text. It has no responsibility towards anyone or anything, it must not
even be intellectually loyal to his object, because at its textual level
it has no reference, object or meaning. What is worth noting here
is that these ideas depend on a “closure of the text” that may seem
common to some aspect of the semiotic theory (Marrone ). Let’s
examine this point better.
One of the first axioms of postmodernism is indeed «il n’y a pas
de hors text», «there is nothing outside of the text» (Derrida , p.
) and this seems something very close to the very known and so
often quoted exclamation of Algeirdas Greimas «There is no salva-
tion outside the text!». In fact, this last proposition is not found in a
well thought written text, but only orally pronounced by Greimas
answering questions at the end of an important conference dedicated
to him (Marrone ). Its metaphorical and provocative character
immediately emerges from the wording: Greimas is not denying the
“existence” of anything beyond text, but the possibility of “salvation”
in it. In the expression it is obvious reading a clearly autoironic refer-
ence to Catholic theology, namely to te well known sentence of St.
Cyprian in Epistle  to Pope Stephen «Salus extra ecclesiam non est».
But what could be “salvation” for a scholar of texts, a semiotic? Of
course only a method can be the guarantee of disciplinary work.
It is worth emphasizing again the difference between these two
expressions. Beyond the formal similarity, the point is that the expres-
sion of Derrida has a gnoseologic, if not metaphysical claim, where
Greimas speaks at epistemological level. Derrida’s thesis (as the other
postmodernist principle that I have quoted) should be read as an
elaboration of Gorgias famous stance elaborated in the lost book On
Nature or the Non–Existent:
a) nothing exists;
b) even if something exists, nothing can be known about it; and
c) even if something can be known about it, knowledge about it
can’t be communicated to others
d) even if it can be communicated, it cannot be understood. (Sprague
B.–)
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On the contrary, Greimas is not denying (nor stating) anything
about the structure of the reality or about its knowability. He is just
proposing some methodological limits to the specific semiotic work,
namely: in order to perform a pure semiotic analysis, one should not
rely on extratextual knowledge, but the analysis must be limited to
exploring in depth the internal structures of the text. This is what
is called, not by chance, “the principle of immanence”. Semiotics
does not deny in principle that other researches around texts, for
example historical, sociological, psychological and even neurological
investigations, can be well founded and scientifically useful. However,
according to Greimas’ proposal (from which it is legitimate to dissent
and many in fact disagree), it limits its investigations to the extent of
the text. Indeed it makes the rational definition of these boundaries
(usually called “decoupage”) the first result and at the same time the
prerequisite of the research.
There are very obvious consequences of this difference in principle.
Semiotics absolutely does not deny the existence of meaning, on
the contrary it investigates how the text produces meaning effects,
because it is well aware of the Saussurian principle for which never
we can find pure signs, namely meaningless signifiers, but in order
something being a sign it must always be a “two–sided entity” where
signifier and meaning cannot be separated without destroying the
sign effect (and even more so for the text, which is a complex fabric
of signs held together by some general meaning relation). On the
contrary, the objectivity of the signifier that is materially present in
the analysis is what allows us to investigate how are produced the
meaning effects that make its communicative value. This is exactly
the heart of semiotic work.
While also semiotics recognizes that the author is necessarily al-
ways absent from its work, it takes into consideration the act of enun-
ciation as transcendental horizon of the text, necessarily presupposed
in every enunciate and therefore it seeks in every text traces of the
enunciation, its simulacra, its more or less explicit masks. The author
is not in the text, but every text speaks of him/her, shows his/her
activity, recalls his/her Encyclopedy. These two levels of research to-
gether constitute the mechanism of intentionality of the text, and their
correlative investigation is part of every semiotic study. But instead of
focusing on these well–known research methodologies, it is worth-
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while here to study the peculiar notion of author, which is perhaps
peripheral to the nihilism of postmodernism, but has a peculiar and
not fully explored semiotic interest.
.
Let us start from the definition of the word “author” In the Mer-
riam–Webster (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/au
thor). We find two main meanings:
— a person who starts or creates something (such as a plan or
idea);
— a person who has written something; especially: a person who
has written a book or who writes many books.
Other authoritative dictionaries as Cambridge (https://dictionary.
cambridge.org/dictionary/english/author), Collins (https://www.col
linsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/author), or Oxford dictionar-
ies (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/author) mention
more or less the same definitions, often with the same exact words.
Renouncing for the moment to analyze these definitions in depth,
it is worthwhile to integrate them with some etymological informa-
tion, which will allow us to quickly enter into a theoretical discussion
about this concept. In fact in this word there is something much
more than the craftsmanship of the director or writer. Again the
Merriam–Webster suggests this derivation:
Middle English auctour, from Anglo–French auctor, autor, from Latin auctor,
promoter, originator, author, from auge¯re, to increase.
More details are found in one etymological dictionary:
Mid–c., auctor, autour, autor “father, creator, one who brings about, one
who makes or creates” someone or something, from Old French auctor,
acteor “author, originator, creator, instigator” (c., Modern French auteur)
and directly from Latin auctor “promoter, producer, father, progenitor;
builder, founder; trustworthy writer, authority; historian; performer, doer;
responsible person, teacher”, literally “one who causes to grow”, agent
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noun from auctus, past participle of augere “to increase”, from PIE root
*aug– () “to increase”.
From late c. as “a writer, one who sets forth written statements, original
composer of a writing” (as distinguished from a compiler, translator, copyist,
etc.). Also from late c. as “source of authoritative information or opinion”,
now archaic but the sense behind authority, etc. In Middle English the word
was sometimes confused with actor. The –t– changed to –th– c., on model
of change in Medieval Latin, on mistaken assumption of Greek origin and
confusion with authentic. (https://www.etymonline.com/word/author)
This is the commonly accepted etymological path. But the great
linguist Émile Benveniste () was not entirely satisfied with this
explanation:
Cet ensemble rattaché à augeo s’est ensuite disloqué en cinq groupes : ) au-
geo, augmentum ; ) auctor, auctoritas ; ) augur, augurium ; ) augustus ; )
auxilium, auxilior, auxiliaris. Mais « le sens premier de augeo se retrouve par
l’intermédiaire de auctor dans auctoritas » : « Toute parole prononcée avec
autorité détermine un changement dans le monde, crée quelque chose » ;
elle a le pouvoir qui fait surgir les plantes, qui donne existence à une loi. Et
« augmenter » n’est donc qu’un sens secondaire et affaibli de augeo, non pas
celui dont dérivent auctor et auctoritas. « Des valeurs obscures et puissantes
demeurent dans cette auctoritas, ce don réservé à peu d’hommes de faire
surgir quelque chose et — à la lettre — de produire à l’existence ».
So, calling “creator” an author is not just a metaphor. The only
true Author, following this linguistic path, is only God. According
to this concept, which lasted undisputed until the full affirmation
of modernity, but of which we have traces still today, also the great
masters (in literature, arts etc.) are not only just artists but somehow
real Authors (with capital letter) although their authorship belongs to
a second level, originating from the primary divine creation. Also the
notion of “possible world”, widespread in philosophy after Leibniz
. This set attached to augeo was then broken up into five groups: ) augeo, augmentum;
) auctor, auctoritas; ) augur, augurium; ) augustus; ) auxilium, auxilior, auxiliaris. But «the
primary meaning of augeo is found through auctor in auctoritas»: «Every word pronounced
with authority determines a change in the world, creates something»; it has the power that
makes plants appear, which gives existence to a law. And “to increase” is therefore only
a secondary and weakened sense of augeo, not the one from which auctor and auctoritas
derive. «Dark and powerful values remain in this auctoritas, this gift reserved for few men
to bring out something and — literally — to produce existence» [my translation, U.V.].
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and today widely used in logic, semiotics and above all in narratology,
responds to this logic: who invents a story, an image, a movie, but
also who imagines, desires, promises, fears something, “is creating”
a “possible world” that has the characteristics described in the text.
The metaphor of “artistic creation” triumphs in the romantic age,
but the idea of “inspiration” (by a Muse, a personal Genius, by the
Talent or directly by the Omnipotent) is as old as Homer and the
Bible. “Inspiring” (namely “blowing in” some material to give it life),
is the divine action, as seen for example in Genesis .
This small etymological analysis serves to establish that the notion
of author, that seems so natural, because it describes an indispensable
condition for the production of any work, that is the existence of
someone who designed and executed it, is also a social institution
whose specific determinations are cultural. Authorship entails also a
certain way of thinking about the production and authority of texts,
which has not always been there, has changed in different cultures
over time. But can we say that the postmodernist refusal of the notion
of author is limited to this line of “creationist” thinking about the
author? It is worthwhile to briefly explore its development to better
understand this point. Let us make a very simple historical scheme.
In a first phase, extended to a good part of the so–called primitive
societies and at the beginning of our ones, we know no authors, in
the simplest sense of some identified producers of the text. There is
no historic and identifiable author for the Pentateuch, for the Egyptian
Book of the Dead, for Iliad and Odyssey, for Gilgamesh (even if they
can have mythical authors like Homer or the very complex figure of
Moses – see Volli ).
The second phase begins in the so–called “axial epoch”, between
the th and th centuries, with the Hebrew prophets, Hesiod and
the Greek lyric etc. The authors assert themselves by writing about
themselves, becoming characters of themselves. Isaiah tells of his own
vocation, Sappho of her love. The full “author” is born with the use of
the first person at least in part of the text. But in semiotic terms, what
we describe as author (the “external” or “real” one, but always a social
figure) is here a product of the narrator (the internal one, a semiotic
essential device, which is an implicit part of every text). This does
not mean that the author is not there, but only that its appearance in
the text is the result of a social convention that authorizes it. In the
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same way the painters, as authors of the images, have always been
there from the earliest figurations on the neolithic caves. But only
at a certain point did they begin to sign their paintings and perhaps
depict themselves in them. It is a social innovation that concerns the
representation of the author, not his existence.
The author is therefore born by writing “I”, or something “we”:
to say it with a motto that became famous with the Renaissance, et
in Arcadia ego: to be an author means becoming part of a literary
republic, albeit very competitive and in pastoral version. As noted
by Detienne (), this passage is contemporary and parallel to the
signature of works of art and in a similar way it develops in a habit of
professionalism: Pindar gets paid as Zeusi. But they are paid by those
exalted in their works, not by general public. In Rome the authors
sold their text to the “publishers” of the time, giving them all rights.
In the Middle Ages we witness for a long time a return to a situation
similar the first phase. The new literature and European art is born
anonymous and the only recognized authors are those of the past.
The intellectual production in theology and philosophy are organized
in a kind of scale of authority. In medieval scholastic Latin, auctoritas
is defined as the affirmation or the doctrine of a doctor authenticus
(or auctor), which can be used as the foundation of a demonstration.
The auctor is therefore who guarantees the will or the affirmations
of others. In a more restricted sense, auctor is properly considered a
philosopher, a writer, a poet who has the power of persuasion and
can serve as a guide and a witness, generating an opinion worthy of
being followed.
For instance Uguccione da Pisa distinguished between auctor as
augmentator, a word which also comes from augeo, and author as
inventor artium, who must be a person of great authority. Uguccione
did however derive the word author (as a poet, and with the same
auctoritas), from the verb auieo = ligare, in a step certainly known
and followed by Dante (Alighieri –) in the Convivio (Banquet), ,
, –. In the same work the term authority appears several times
. Cf. Alighieri D. (–) Il convivio (eng. trans. The Banquet, https://digitaldante.co
lumbia.edu/text/library/the-convivio/); (–) De vulgari eloquentia (eng. trans.
http://alighieri.letteraturaoperaomnia.org/translate_english/alighieri_dante_de_vulgari_elo
quentia.html).
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(e.g. , , : «congiungasi la filosofica autoritade con la imperiale»),
and in the important place of the book , , – Dante tries to rely
on Aristotle’s “authority” in order to demonstrate his right to the
supreme moral predominance. Auctor therefore (although Dante
does not designate this figure with this name but, as for Virgil, he
calls him “my teacher” in , , ) here means “dignissimo di fede e
d’obedienza”. On the contrary, in the De vulgari eloquentia (, , )
auctores are poets. In Inf. ,  by calling Virgil “my author”, he wants
to qualify him as someone who, by his example, inspires the actions of
others and is “guide”, “creator”, “promoter”. In The Divine Comedy
Inf. ,  «di grande autorità ne’ lor sembianti», the term “author”
assumes the value of “great influence” due to the wisdom, honor,
magnanimity of the characters mentioned. Of God, supreme auctor,
inspirer of the divine auctoritas (the Scripture) and source of truth,
Dante speaks in Par. ,  «Sternel la voce del verace autore, / che
dice a Moisé, di sé parlando: / “Io ti farò vedere ogne valore”». This is
maybe the most important literary proclamation in European culture
that God is “the true author”. Said by a poet who was perhaps the
first in Middle Age to claim for himself an almost prophetic role, it is a
definitively influential idea. Not so much in its direct form, which will
slowly be made weaker by the process of secularization that develops
in Europe from Humanism onwards, but in the conversational form
that derives from it culturally if not logically. We can summarize it
this way: if the only true author is the Creator, then also the authors
(at least the great authors, who are also somehow true Authors too)
must be creators. The pretention of a “creativity” of artists and writers
goes hand in hand with the claim of their “authorship”, beyond the
fact that the professional status of the author remains substantially
unprotected for twenty centuries up to the thresholds of bourgeois
society.
The firsts of these “privileges” which assign legal rights to works of
authorship date back to the at the beginning of the th century, and
they generally protect printers, not authors. Aldo Manuzio is perhaps
. «Join the philosophical authority with the imperial».
. “Very dignified of faith and obedience”.
. «Of great authority in their appearances».
. «The voice of the true author, / who tells Moses, of himself speaking: / “I will
show you every value”».
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the first printer to enjoy such rights having obtained in  a ruling
by Venice Republic granting him the exclusive right to print Ariosto’s
poems. In following centuries there will be authors obtaining similar
privileges in first person, like Rabelais, but they would be exceptions.
In fact, the basis of copyright, namely the distinction between the
physical object (the book) and the “work”, is mostly ignored for
centuries even after the invention of the technical reproducibility of
the literary work. The owner of the object (book) owns also of what
is written on it and can do with it what he wants, for example print
it again or copy it, except for an explicit sovereign privilege. The first
theorist who made this difference was Immanuel Kant in a small essay
of  entitled The illegality of counterfeiting of books.
After the Enlightenment and the establishment of bourgeois so-
ciety, with its strong ethic of work, literature becomes institution,
writing (or painting, composing music etc.) becomes a work without
ceasing to be “creation”, and the author finds protection and social
role. It is a period that lasts just over a century, until the advent of the
cultural industry, which, due to productive and economic necessity,
practices forms of collective authorship, while in some cases main-
taining the ideology of “creation”. But this ideology is less and less
aware of itself and less demanding on the theoretical level. Gradually,
the author’s qualification extends to every productive activity and the
theological notion of “creation” becomes trivialized in the advertising
one of “creativity”. Anyone can be an author, but above all anyone
must be creative: the tailor and the cook, the craftsman and the jour-
nalist, the gardener and the barman. The relationship with the divine,
however, passes from the figure of the author to that of the interpreter.
The actors, the musical performers, the models become “stars”, or,
as some prefers, “godlike”. All this story and sociology of the social
presence of the author, and the many details that could and should
be added here, however, do not concern the existence of the author,
but his cultural consideration, the way in which the different societies
have thought of a role that in itself has always existed.
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This is where Barthes’s analysis intervenes, arguing not against the
theological remains of authorship, and not even against the ambiguous
notion of “creativity” but against the individual character of authorship,
the idea that there is a personal relationship between author and text.
Barthes struggles to replace it, this author as productive and ex-
planatory principle of literature, with impersonal and anonymous
language.
Un texte est fait d’écritures multiples, issues de plusieurs cultures et qui en-
trent les unes avec les autres en dialogue, en parodie, en contestation ; mais il
y a un lieu où cette multiplicité se rassemble, et ce lieu, ce n’est pas l’auteur,
comme on l’a dit jusqu’à présent, c’est le lecteur [. . . ] l’écriture est la de-
struction de toute voix, de toute origine [. . . ] un texte n’est pas fait d’une
ligne de mots, dégageant un sens unique, en quelque sorte théologique
(qui serait le “message” de l’Auteur–Dieu), mais un espace à dimensions
multiples, où se marient et se contestant des écritures variées, dont aucune
n’est originelle: le texte est un tissue de citations, issues des mille foyers de
la culture. [. . . ] Donner un Auteur à un texte, c’est imposer à ce texte un
cran d’arrêt, c’est le pourvoir d’un signifié dernier, c’est fermer l’écriture.
The author, according to Barthes, is replaced by the scripteur, ie
the copyist, whose only power is that of «mêler les écritures, de les
contrarier les unes par les autres, de façon à jamais prendre appui sur
l’une d’elles». Precisely the opposition between écrivain, which in
the article is synonymous with auteur, and the scripteur plays a fun-
damental role in understanding the autonomous and trans–historical
character of the literary language to which Barthes submits all the
activities produced around literature.
. «A text is made of multiple writings, coming from many cultures and entering into
dialogue, parody, contestation; but there is a place where this multiplicity comes together,
and this place is not the author, as we have said so far, it is the reader [. . . ] writing is
the destruction of every voice, of every origin [. . . ] a text is not made of a line of words,
giving off a unique sense, somehow theological (which would be the “message” of the
Author–God), but a space with multiple dimensions, where marry and disputing various
writings, none of which is original: the text is a tissue of quotations from the thousand
homes of culture. [. . . ] To give an author to a text is to impose on this text a deterrent, it is
to provide it with a last signified, it is to close the writing».
. «To mix the writings, to annoy them one by the other, so as to ever rely on one of
them».
 Ugo Volli
First of all, Barthes’ theory on the “death of the author” shows the
pretension to be an empirical statement: nowadays, in the bourgeois
world, there were authors, he says, but now there is no such an entity.
Or. . . maybe it never existed, not even in the example form what
the article of Barthes takes its beginning: a short fragment of one of
the most bourgeois writers of the French literature, Balzac’s novel
Sarrazine, where a certain “psychological” evaluation of a character is
given. Barthes declares himself unable to understand who is uttering
this judgment:
In his story Sarrasine, Balzac, speaking of a castrato disguised as a woman,
writes this sentence: «It was Woman, with her sudden fears, her irrational
whims, her instinctive fears, her unprovoked bravado, her daring and her
delicious delicacy of feeling».
Who is speaking in this way? Is it the story’s hero, concerned to ignore the
castrato concealed beneath the woman? Is it the man Balzac, endowed by his
personal experience with a philosophy of Woman? Is it the author Balzac,
professing certain “literary” ideas of femininity? Is it universal wisdom?
or romantic psychology? It will always be impossible to know, for the
good reason that all writing is itself this special voice, consisting of several
indiscernible voices, and that literature is precisely the invention of this
voice, to which we cannot assign a specific origin: literature is that neuter,
that composite, that oblique into which every subject escapes, the trap
where all identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of the body that
writes.
Let me say: this is a bad (or rather: a rhetoric) question; hence there
is no right answer to it. After Bakhtin we know that in many novels
there is polyphony; after Genette that there are different degrees of
distance and presence of the Author/Narrator in the story. Semiotics
tell us that never the Narrator (which is always a function of the text,
which can be more or less personalized) should be confused with
the empirical Author. Almost every description, every psychological
characterization, every perception of events in all literary texts it is
characterized by the same uncertainty; it is almost never possible to
say whether the judgment is of a character, of the narrator, of the
author, of his Encyclopedia. This is the rule of the game of diegesis,
as opposed to mimesis, according to a theorization that goes back to
Aristotle (Poetics, .a, pp. –). In the diegetic form of narrative
there is a programmatic ambiguity between narrating voice, author,
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characters, bystanders, which in mimesis, for example in theater and
in painting, is missing. On stage only the characters speak and the
author has no word; in each narration, instead, the tone of the nar-
rator’s voice, identified or not with a character or with the author,
is always present. This is not an argument neither for nor against
the existence of the author, it is a necessary feature of third person
narrative form. Except when some narrative devices of detachment
is acting — a circumstance that is always possible, as when Leporello
says «Signor, il padron mio. . . / badate ben. . . non io. . . / vorria con
voi cenar. . . », the text is always ultimately taken over by the Narrator.
Barthes could not be unaware of such a basic feature of every
narration and therefore here its mention is just instrumental and
specious. The problem is not to know if a certain expression of the
text “belongs” to the Narrator or to the Author, to a character or to the
general Encyclopedia. It must always be attributed to “the Narrator”,
even if this expression “betrays” the author’s personal opinions or
refers to the current ideology or to certain literary stereotypes or even
if it in some way exudes from a character. In every narration there is
always the Narrator, if only as an implicit anchor of the adopted point
of view. The Narrator is part of the structural characteristics of every
story, even in “authorless” narratives, as the existence of a purpose
within the story, of the one who pursues it, of its obstacles, etc. A text
without Narrator, even if it is implicit and not figurativized, is not a
story.
Furthermore the indisputable fact that behind a text there is always
an empirical author, or more than one, of which identity we may
or may not have knowledge, depends on a very general feature of
the world. That is, from the fact that texts are constructed objects.
And of course all the artfacts or constructed objects are works of
people (usually human beings but we can also imagine that they are
gods, animals, angels, extraterrestrials builders or in this case authors).
Those who build those particular works that are the texts are defined
authors. It does not matter if we know them or not, if we can identify
parts of the text with their beliefs or if we think that what is written
in the text does not correspond to the “true” thoughts of the author.
. Don Giovanni, Act , : «Sir, my owner. . . / mind you well. . . not me. . . / would
like to have dinner with you. . . ».
 Ugo Volli
This is a problem of criticism or biography, but from the point of view
of the theory of communication this question and also the inability to
answer cannot delete the fact of the existence of the author.
Perhaps in order to avoid having to give his justification in front of
these obvious questions, which could reveal so weak and dogmatic a
position that it obliges us to think of the explanation of Leo Strauss,
Barthes quickly goes on to examine the historical question of the
author. But also the historical approach of this text is very poor. Let
us read some lines:
The author is a modern figure, produced no doubt by our society insofar as,
at the end of the middle ages, with English empiricism, French rationalism
and the personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the
individual, or, to put it more nobly, of the “human person” Hence it is
logical that with regard to literature it should be positivism, resume the
result of capitalist ideology, which has accorded the greatest importance to
the author’s “person”.
It is a very arbitrary reconstruction that ignores important histori-
cal facts. I have already provided elements that contradict this scheme,
but it is worth mentioning a couple more: What about Augustin
Confessions? Or about Dante Alighieri’s Commedia, with its apparent
interlacement between life and work? It would be superfluous (and
boring) to continue the analysis of this text in detail. Just I want to
show his conclusions:
The reader has never been the concern of classical criticism; for it, there is
no other man in literature but the one who writes. We are now beginning
to be the dupes no longer of such antiphrases, by which our society proudly
champions precisely what it dismisses, ignores, smothers or destroys; we
know that to restore to writing its future, we must reverse its myth: the
birth of the Reader must be ransomed by the death of the Author.
Has “the” Reader now to be born? Really? Needs he to be protected
against the Author? At the price of the “death” of this last figure? This
is too fanciful and arrogant a conclusion to be taken seriously. And in
fact the article of Barthes is just seven pages, it was no expanded nor
even republished in a book until the death not of some abstract figure
of Author, but of its empirical author Roland Barthes. This one did
not bother even of reconsidering his problem with Balzac while, three
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years after this paper, he analyzed the same novel in a whole book,
SZ, with very different analytical tools and also results. We should
conclude that Barthesian “Death of the Author” is just an intellectual
provocation, a stance in favor of the experimental literature of those
years, similar to what we read in the just as weak and contradictory
distinction between “pleasure” and “enjoyment” in The Pleasure of the
Text.
Or rather it should be read as a philosophical and political stance
against the individual responsibility and autonomy that are implicit in
the notion of author. The main (and in my opinion very superficial)
idea here is that the “author” is essentially a “bourgeois” figure and
that the (post)modernity is the occasion for destroying it together with
all the “bourgeois ideology”. The first and more original supporter of
this idea was Walter Benjamin, who, thirty years before Barthes (),
claimed that mechanical reproduction of art was a good thing above
all because it constituted the technical condition capable of abolishing
the “aura” of artwork (and therefore the charismatic figure of the
author) with the militant presence of the masses, as was the case (in
his opinion) for Soviet cinema.
I cannot elaborate this point, but there are clues in the same direc-
tion also for the second main source for this “death of the author”,
the more serious essay of Michel Foucault What is an author? ().
Foucault is interested in the author as a “function” and in the produc-
tion/proliferation of sense:
The author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the
author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle
by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by
which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free
composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are
accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging
of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the
opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an ideological product, since
we represent him as the opposite of his historically real function. When a
historically given function is represented in a figure that inserts it, one has
an ideological production. The author is therefore the ideological figure by
which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.
These ideas are not isolated in Foucault’s production. For instance
he writes that the author is «the superficial effect of larger units»
 Ugo Volli
(b, p. ). And referring to himself: «Do not ask me who I am
and do not ask me to stay the same: it’s a civil status morality; reigns
on our documents. Leave us at least free when it comes to writing»
(a p. ). The author for Foucault is therefore:
— the person responsible for the speech (i.e. legally punishable,
expressing property);
— the guarantor of sense (for knowledge of tradition or for divine
inspiration, expressing credibility);
— the designer of a speech (coherent in style and ideas, expressing
constancy in value and unity of style);
— the bearer of a simulation of different subjects who talk at the
same time (the one who does the job, the one who in the work
takes a shared position, the one who tells the same work inside
other past and future works).
Foucault, less provocatory, but in a much ideological and subver-
sive way, has in common with Barthes the idea of a link between
authorship and “humanism”. Foucault and Barthes are both against
the author because it is a principle of responsibility (also in theoretical
sense proposed by Hans Jonas) and their political objective is over-
throw not just “capitalism” but in a much wider sense humanism, or
the principle of individual responsibility, which is one of its important
prerequisites. There is a source for this move: it is Heidegger, who
was much popular in France at this time. The reference goes to his
“Letter on humanism” but also to “On the way to language”. Barthes
writes: «for Mallarmé, as for us, it is language which speaks, not the
author». This is clearly an open quotation of Heidegger ():
Language speaks. What about its speaking? Where do we encounter such
speaking? Most likely, to be sure, in what is spoken. For here speech has
come to completion in what is spoken. The speaking does not cease in
what is spoken. Speaking is kept safe in what is spoken. In what is spoken,
speaking gathers the ways in which it persists as well as that which persists
by it–its persistence, its presencing. But most often, and too often, we
encounter what is spoken only as the residue of a speaking long past.
This is not the occasion of deepening this relation between post-
modernism and the anti–humanistic ideology of Heidegger and other
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intellectual supporters of Nazism. For performing this task, it should
be necessary considering other points of contact, for instance the fig-
ure of Paul De Man. But it is clear enough here that the theory of the
“Death of the Author” is not a literary or communicational empirical
theory; it is something much more self referential and ideological.
Postmodernism is not interested in discovering how literary, artistic
and general communication text really work. What is called “theory”
in the United States and in the cultural periphery of it, is just a self
centered discourse, used as a rhetorical device for challenging the
tradition of humanism, more than to understand literature.
This idea of theory as a device for subverting the humanistic tra-
dition of Europe naturally entails the other ideas of postmodernism:
absence of an autonomous meaning of the work and forced interpre-
tations of literature, art etc., in order to expose its secret oppressive
(namely patriarchal, colonialist, classist, homophobic, etc.) character.
It intends to use the instruments of the critic as weapons for de-
constructing the European political and cultural tradition of liberal
thought. Deconstructionism is of course indifferent to a fair lecture of
texts. It was not invented by Derrida, but by Heidegger and it has al-
ways been a political weapon. The result of this push are the so called
“cultural studies”. In the definition of these disciplines is included the
programmatic engagement to exclude any form of objectivity require-
ment, replacing it with a melting of writing and militancy, academia
and political commitment
Italian semiotics, and in general semiotics does not belong to this
“theory”. As general semiotics it thinks itself as a part of philosophical
epistemology; as applied semiotics as empirical research characterized
by a “scientific vocation” as Greimas used to tell. The semiotic who
felt more the duty of confronting the degeneration of this “Theory”
was Umberto Eco, maybe also because his experience as an author.
There are three books of Eco about this point: Lector in fabula (),
I limiti dell’interpretazione (), Interpretation and Overinterpretation
(). Let me quote some line from this last book (p. ):
To say that interpretation (as the basic feature of semiosis) is potentially unlim-
ited does not mean that interpretation has no object [. . . ]. Some contemporary
theories of criticism assert that the only reliable reading of a text is a misread-
ing, that the only existence of a text is given by the chain of responses it
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elicits, and that, as maliciously suggested by Tzvetan Todorov (quoting Georg
Cristoph Lichtenberg apropos of Jakob Boehme), a text is only a picnic where
the author brings the words and the reader brings the sense. Even if that were
true, the words brought by the author are a rather embarrassing bunch of
material evidences that the reader cannot pass over in silence, or in noise. If I
remember correctly, it was in this country [England] that somebody suggested,
years ago, that it is possible to do things with words. To interpret a text means
to explain why these words can do various things (and not others) through
the way they are interpreted. But if Jack the Ripper told us that he did what he
did on the grounds of his interpretation of the Gospel according to Saint Luke,
I suspect that many reader–oriented critics would be inclined to think that he
read Saint Luke in a pretty preposterous way.
It may seem that the author’s theme is secondary. After all, Barthes
and Foucault do not deny that in fact a certain person has written Hamlet
or the Divine Comedy, they limit themselves to arguing against its unity or
uniqueness and against the link that the work would maintain with these
composers, rejecting a paradigm that we could to call the “intentionality”
of the work. An intentionality that must be understood in a complex
manner, as Umberto Eco has already shown, and which is even more
problematic in contemporary digital society (Leone ).
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Textual Intentionality in Art and Literature
Y Z*
 : L’intenzionalità testuale nell’arte e nella letteratura
: Intentionality, the speculation projected by an consciousness to-
wards an object, is the starting point for the creation of meaning. It
includes the intentionality of the sender of the text, that of the receiver,
and the seemingly subject–less “textual intentionality” that occurs be-
tween the sending and receiving. The sender’s intentionality consists of
both the artist’s and, more importantly, the demonstrator’s intentions.
Demonstration reveals the cultural category of the text and, therefore,
exercises a more decisive influence on the interpretation. During the
reception of an artistic or literary text, the “textual intention” is a crucial
step, determining the “artefacthood” and the intrinsic quality of the text.
In the texts of art and literature there are huge amounts of intentional
traces that call for interpretive intentionality. The more “meaning inde-
terminants” there are in a text, the higher the interpretative tension and
the greater the need for interpretation.
: Intentionality; Demonstration; Text; Textual Intentionality.
. Intentionality in Art and Literature
Meaning is found where consciousness meets the material world.
Consciousness, as the starting point and the initiating component
of meaning, projects intentionality, which maintains the relationship
between consciousness and object. No discussion of meaning can ever
obscure compound intentionality, which includes both the sender’s
and receiver’s intention; between them is a third, more complicated
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kind of intentionality, i.e. textual intentionality. The text itself has nei-
ther consciousness nor intention, yet within it are scores of intentional
traces left by its sender that are the object of the receiver’s intention.
The interaction of the conflicting intentionalities of the sender and the
receiver and those traces plays a vital role in generating the meaning
of art and literature.
Consciousness divides the world into at least two parts: things
(including substances, events and others’ intentions) and their texts,
which can be represented in any medium. For the three types of inten-
tionality discussed above, only the sender deals with things directly.
The receiver merely interacts with the texts, which are not the things
themselves, but the mediatised texts of symbols. This paper does not
avoid discussions of the intentionality in texts of art and literature; just
the opposite, it directly addresses “textual intentionality”, the most
daunting problem in the field.
First, the demonstrator’s intention is re–evaluated so that the sender’s
intentionality, which is somehow easily neglected, is included. How
does a receiver know whether he or she is facing a piece of art and
literature? The receiver can only be prepared for the necessary interpre-
tive intentionality if the demonstration indicates textual intentionality.
The creator’s intentionality becomes subordinate to the demonstrator’s
intentionality.
For nearly half a century, the heated debate on how to define art
and literature has considered the status of intentionality. The Dispute
over Kafka’s Intentions has appropriately revealed the difficulties of this
puzzle.
As Jorrold Levinson () has pointed out, “artefacthood” is not
only the embodiment of artistic symbols in texts, it is also the link
between texts and cultural histories (p. ). Such a link places intention-
ality within the objects, making them art. This is what Levinson meant
by proposing to “define art historically”: some texts are considered
artworks because they are «something which is intended for regard or
treatment as previous art works have been regarded or treated» (Oppy
, p.). Here the word “intended” refers to textual intentionality,
and “as” refers to the same category. The genre of art and literature
texts “requires” that the receiver identify the object as art.
Kolak (), instead of taking textual intentionality seriously, gave
a seemingly straightforward example of its unimportance in his Art
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and Intentionality: in his will, Kafka asked his friend Brod to burn the
manuscripts of his novels Der Prozess and Das Schloss, suggesting these
texts should have no intentionality, and should not be linked to his
“previous artworks” (p. ). These works, however, are monuments
in literary history. Levinson refutes Kolak’s argument by pointing out
that regardless of what Kafka thought before dying, the art intention-
ality was already in Kafka’s texts, never to be erased, even by his final
will. Livingston (), who also contested the idea of intentionality,
argued that undoubtedly Kafka had had contradictory intentions for
his novels; however, the issue was whether his novels were truly artis-
tic texts, and this decision was unaffected by anyone’s intention (p.
). For Livingston, the actefacthood was determined by the text’s
quality, which was unrelated to the sender’s intention.
It can be seen that the intentionality of art and literature is much
more complicated than is generally recognised. The author’s own in-
tention is not equal to the text’s intention. Initially, Kolak and Levinson
debated Kafka’s intention, but their discussion eventually considered
whether demonstrators, in this case publishers, can replace the au-
thor’s intention with their owns. A clearer illustration of this point
than Kafka’s novels is the piggy “Picasso” in South Africa. The “art
circle” seemed to treat the works of this South African pig as art and
they were sold at a price of  thousand yuan. Similarly, the paintings
of the deceased famous orangutan Congo were reportedly sold for
thousand yuan.
Biological communities have so far not decided whether animals
can have the intention to create art, yet the intention of demonstra-
tors (like galleries and auction houses) is clear; demonstration injects
artistic intention into texts, forcing us to interpret the pig’s works
according to the intention of “fine arts”. So, when faced with a sym-
bolic text, the interpreter is confronting competing and coordinating
intentions from more than one subject. In that case, the intention of
Brod, Kafka’s executor, mattered more than Kafka’s stated intention.
The concept of “art” itself, in both Chinese and Western languages,
suggests artificiality: the word “art” is defined by Western cultures
as “human skill or workmanship as opposed to nature”. The Chinese
. See: http://collection.sina.com.cn/dfz/henan/yj/--/doc-ifxyawmp
.shtml (last accessed  November ).
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character “G” initially meant “to plant”; “”, in the top left, stands
for plants and the right part of the character means to cultivate by
hand. In ShuowenJiezi, a Chinese wordbook analysing the form and
origin of Chinese characters the character, “ö” is explained as “the
path in a city”, or a “way” or “approach”. Evidently, the initial meaning
of this concept was almost the same in both Chinese and Western
languages, i.e. manual skills. This observation highlights the question
of intentionality. In Western languages, the word “art” has retained
a pretty clear connotation of “artificial”, as it shares the same word
root; in Chinese the artificiality of art has to be highlighted.
Artworks, as artefacts, are meant to possess artistic intentions. The
scribbles of apes or elephants, even if they are very similar to some
work created by true artists, are rejected by many, as animals can
never have the intention to create art. Nonetheless, these symbolic
texts are given artistic intentions when they are displayed as some
artworks. Once demonstrated (for example, in an auction house),
they immediately gain cultural co–textual pressure; once they are
considered artworks, they are incorporated into the category of art.
As Levinson argued, they are intended for regard or treatment as
previous art works have been regarded or treated, thus interpreters
must interpret them according to the expectations for real art.
An unavoidable question is this: can nature not produce artworks?
Or, isn’t it true that natural things or events have often been seen
as art? Although there is a long history of describing natural ob-
jects as «the miraculous masterwork of the nature», geological pro-
cesses or biological evolution can never have artistic intentions, unless
one believes in deities. There is only one way to turn completely
natural things into art: through artistic demonstration. Tree roots,
strange–looking stones or human bodies are not artworks until in-
tentionality has been injected into them by demonstrators. However,
even mountains or rivers can be placed within a demonstrative frame,
or displayed in a “sight–viewing way”. Therefore, demonstration gen-
erates intentionality, and although it may sometimes be hidden nor
ignored, it must always exist in artworks. Demonstrated things are no
longer purely natural things, for artistic intention has been added.
A mediatised text will undoubtedly become an artwork if the
boundaries between intentional meaning, textual meaning and in-
terpretive meaning are clear. The author of this paper believes that
Textual Intentionality in Art and Literature 
in human societies and cultures it is artistic demonstration (rather
than creation) that gives the texts their final intentionality, because
demonstration activates the cultural mechanism and places the texts
in the network of arts.
Artistic demonstration is a form of intention with a strong tendency
towards sociability: caves of primitive murals, medieval churches, edi-
tors’ compilations, and contemporary galleries and art festivals are all
significant mechanisms to construct literary and artistic intentionality.
Music performers and singers, for instance, realise the essence of mu-
sic by adding a “hyper–intentionality” to the intentions of the lyricists
and composers. All of these examples prove that, as a “second–order
intentionality” the demonstration intention can outweigh the original
intention, which may not exist at all (as in the example of animal
“painters”) or can no longer be found (such as Homeric Hymns) or be
overshadowed by demonstration intention (as in Kafka’s final will).
Readers often do not recognise that it is the social and cultural
intentionality added to a text that forces them to examine the object
as an artwork. A poem, for example, will not be read as a poem
if it is not written on separate lines or with rhymes, or if there is
no title or subtitle indicating that it is a poem. Without these codes,
readers will not seriously interpret the object as a poem. Some people,
perhaps sentimentally, consider the text itself to have “deep meanings”.
However, if they read a text as a poem, they will find deep meanings
even if there is actually no meaning. Hence, the artistic intentionality
of artists does not ensure the generation of art. Only demonstration
can precisely position a symbolic text as a work of literature or art.
As the mechanism of demonstration supports the whole process,
receivers have no opportunity to conduct a pure assessment free
of cultural conventions. As Louis Althusser () said, the viewers
are “interpellated” by the cultural mechanism into the position of
artistic interpreters. This “interpellated” force works because our
interpretations have been “formatted” by our culture.
Artistic demonstration, by forcing interpretation, is the mechanism
that “locates” texts in a culture. As the title of Chinese aesthetician
Zhu Qingsheng’s book says, «No One Is an Artist, and No One Is
Not an Artist» (). From the perspective of demonstration inten-
tionality, this could be changed to «No text is absolutely an artistic
text, and no text is definitely not an artistic text». Perhaps artworks
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are waiting to be set free from rigid physicality; otherwise both vases
and sculptures are sealed off from interpretation, keeping interpreters
outside. Only in the field of arts can the irreconcilable antagonism
between subjectivity and objectivity be set aside. In sum, a sender’s
intention does not determine whether a symbolic text belongs to art
or literature; what plays the decisive role in this determination is the
intention to demonstrate the work as an artistic or literary work.
. Textual Intentionality
The academic history of intentionality shows the gradual evolution
of this vital concept. It was originally seen as a psychological activity,
then understood as a presentation of pure consciousness, then a mode
to form meaning in the world, and eventually an interpretive way to
construct cultural communities.
The concept of intentionality was first proposed by the German
philosopher Brentano in the th century. According to Brentano,
intentionality is an object–oriented psychological activity (, p. ).
His student, Husserl, who saw intentionality as the cornerstone of
modern phenomenological philosophy, accepted Brentano’s opinion
that an intention is directive, but refuted its psychological structure.
For Husserl, simply put, intentionality is meaningful, because it is
expressed as an abstract connotation structure of consciousness.
To understand “textual intentionality”, it is necessary to ask how a
text, a non–subject, can have intentions. One easy answer is that the
creative subject’s intention can be recognised in the text. However,
textual intentionality is beyond the control of an individual subject,
meaning that it does not belong to a single writer or painter. As
discussed, a social element is added to the text by the demonstrator,
therefore textual intentionality is a product of social and historical
subjectivity. This combination of assorted elements verifies that texts
gain intentionality from cultural history.
Actually, except for performances where some of the creators di-
rectly face the receivers, these two groups do not meet during the
interpretation process of most literary or artistic texts. Instead, re-
ceivers or interpreters directly face the texts and are influenced by
textual intentionality rather than the creators’ intentionality. In the
Textual Intentionality in Art and Literature 
literature, there has not been any straightforward discussion ofthe
concept of textual intentionality, yet many scholars, particularly an-
alytic philosophers, have discussed similar concepts. Many believe
that intentionality is the core issue of phenomenology; in fact, it is
semioticians who are most concerned with the intentionality present
in texts. Thus, it is semiotics that underpins the arguments in this
paper.
The semiotician Eco (), for example, put forward the con-
cept of a “text’s intention”, believing that the intention must be
present in texts to be interpreted. Kaye Mitchell (, p. ) called it
the”intention of the form”, which is the intentionality carried in the
textual form. Important contributions to the discussion were made in
Mukarovsky’s Intentionality and Unintentionality in Art () and the
language philosopher Searl’s masterpiece Intentionality ().
Mukarovsky classifies various elements in a text as “intentionality
elements” and “nonintentionality elements”. The former areelements
generated by the “writer’s intentionality”. However, Mukarovsky be-
lieves that signs created for literature and art differ from those created
for practical use, which he calls “signs for communication”. These
signs are not created for the purpose of effectively conveying a certain
meaning. What matters most in artworks, therefore, is the unified sig-
nificance that is composed of both intentionality and nonintentionality
elements. He further clarifies that the so–called “nonintentionality
elements” are not intended by the author; that is, they are the parts of
a text that are not part of the creator’s intention. These elements form
interpretive obstacles that need to be supplemented by the perceivers.
In this way, Mukarovsky echoes Ingarden’s “indeterminacy” from the
perspective of semiotics. The splendid explanation of intentionality
given by Searl is quite close to the idea of “textual demonstrator’s in-
tentionality” used in this paper. To make a text literary or artistic, one
represents it as literature or art. For this reason, in phenomenology,
textual intentionality, namely the creative and demonstrative intention
embodied in symbolic texts, is more of a cultural characteristic than
an individual intention (McIntyre, and Woodruff Smith ).
Although it seems abstract, textual intentionality is part of the con-
crete classification of texts into genres, so it is a vital part of the “textual
metalanguage”, which operates along with a kind of text–imposed cul-
tural pressure on interpretation. In the understanding of artistic texts,
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textual intentionality dwarfs the criteria of “artistic quality”, as the
genre classification, which is a cultural form, and decides the textual
meaning. Similarly, in terms of the expression of textual intentionality,
the form category matters more than the content.
In the history of modern thought, there is abundant discussion
of intentionality; the role of textual intentionality in art has been
a focus of both phenomenology and analytic philosophy. However,
each field uses exclusive terms, and there is a lack of a straightforward
illustration of the intentionality of textual demonstrators. To support
the arguments in this paper, it is necessary to scrutinise the statements
of different schools of thought.
. Demonstration and “Indeterminacy”
How does textual intentionality guide the interpreted artistic mean-
ing? One example is Husserl’s analysis of Dürer’s copper etching
Knight, Death and the Devil. First, the viewer takes the etching as an
“image carrier”; then, the viewer identifies some images created by
the lines, namely “the knight on the horse”, “Death”, “the Devil”, etc.
Lastly, artistic reflections form at the third layer, where viewers see the
substantiality of the images formed by black lines: a flesh and blood
knight. These three processes (image vehicle – image object – image
subject) cannot proceed without imagination. Husserl offers a vivid
description of the viewer’s movement from perception to recognition.
He believes that the generation of meaning requires the blending of
the viewer’s intentionality (Husserl , pp. –).
Ingarden (, p. ), a literary theorist in the phenomenological
field, expands Husserl’s ideas: the artwork that an interpreter faces
is neither a physical object nor a conceptual one, but a pure inten-
tional object that is a combination of the two. Ingarden argues there
are four hierarchical levels of a literary work: sounds and phonetic
composition; sense–groups and sentences; schematic outer appear-
ance though which appear various images described in the work; and
objects described by the events of intentionality (p. ).
The contribution made by Ingarden lies in his emphasis on how
interpreters “fill–in” artistic texts. This occurs in the consciousness of
interpreters at the third hierarchical level; as Ingarden points out, this
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schematic level can impossibly represent every aspect of the real object.
There are, in this layer, a series of “indeterminants”, where meaning
is incomplete or unclear. Ingarden called the process through which
interpreters supplement these ambiguities «the concretization of the
intended objects» (p. ).
This type of «intention tension caused by indeterminants» [Missing
page number for quotation.] is exactly what activates interpretation.
Literary and artistic texts use the maximum number of “indetermi-
nants” to form tension in the interpretive process. Therefore, these
texts are able to activate the meaning intentionality of the interpreters,
and encourage them to pursue meaning. For example, untitled music,
abstract art and avant–grade drama are all equipped with numerous
“indeterminants”, forcing the interpreters to search for meaning. Writ-
ers and artists who do not know this theory may apply it instinctively,
creating works with an increasing number of “indeterminants” until
they nearly dominate the works. Thus, literary and artistic texts al-
most require interpreters to reconstruct them, thus turning the pieces
into examples of “open meaning”.
Although they have different terms and approaches, many schol-
ars have identified the same process. Culler, for example, raised the
concept of “naturalization” (, p. ). The German narratologist
Monica Frudnick further proposed, in her book Establishing a “Nat-
ural” Narratology (), that the criteria for achieving “natural” is
oral expression. That is, once a narrative text can be expressed by its
readers as a “natural” oral presentation, then the turbulences in this
text have been straightened out and intelligibility has been achieved.
Frudnick’s comments have made “secondary narrative” a heated de-
bate once again; a group of scholars such as Richardson have strongly
opposed the ideaand proposed the alternative “unnatural narratology”
(Alber et al., , p. ). They believe that many narratives cannot be
expressed as “natural” oral presentations, and are “unable to be clear
and coherent”. In response, the author of this paper has proposed four
approaches to the problem of “secondary narratives”: correspondence,
collation, compromise, and creation (Zhao ). These approaches
cannot be achieved without the intentionality of the interpreters, and
all are part of readers’ intentional responses to the “indeterminants”
in artistic texts. Only by reconstructing intentionality can literature
and art become meaningful.
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The ancient Chinese may have shown a more in–depth understand-
ing of “indeterminants” than modern scholars. The poetics of Zen
Buddhism consider the “barrier of a text”: i.e., it recognises that words
in a text both facilitate and hinder understanding. They may advance
the interpretation, but are more likely to obscure the meaning. Tang
Xianzu, a writer in the Ming Dynasty, once made the following excel-
lent remark: «When Dharma came from India, from heart to heart he
imparted Buddhist spirit to his disciples». As the five scriptures of Zen
Buddhism emerged and prevailed, the use of words again became
popular among monks. It was probably after Buddhism spread to
China that the majority of Buddhists acquired its spirit by listening
to explanations of the doctrine. Alternatively, the heart–to–heart ap-
proach may have fallen into a rut; for example, instead of directly
explaining doctrines, the Buddha just picked a flower while another
saint smiled (Xianzu ). In the Zen tradition, which is a branch
of orthodox Buddhism, the kasaya, a vestment worn by monks, is
used as a token of imparted doctrines. However, due to their tradition
of using words to express ideas, the Chinese people tried to remove
barriers to understanding words, as they sought the sudden enlighten-
ment hoped for in Zen Buddhism (Fuzi , p. ). Another scholar
from the end of the Ming Dynasty elaborated on the function of
“indeterminants”: «If meaning is made clear, it is good; if not, better:
where there is ambiguity, there is space for interpretation» [Missing
citation].
Therefore, “indeterminants” in literary and artistic texts are the
traces left by the sender’s intentionality; they summon the inter-
preter’s intentionality. The combination of the two types of intention-
ality makes literature and art objects of pure intent.
For example, prose and poems are read differently; to read poems
is to perceive deeper symbolic meaning, as gaps in meaning need to
be filled. A short text is prose when put in an anthology. A poem is a
poem when among other poems; but when it is read as prose, even
the same words can have a totally different meaning. Once produced,
a text is interpreted according to its genre — that is the “expectation”
caused by textual intentionality.
This is even more the case for other forms of art. What makes
Duchamp’s Fountain and Warhol’s Brillo Boxes “art” is their place-
ment in art exhibitions; performance art must be performed by the
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artist. Similarly, animals’ paintings may be considered fine art if they
are exhibited as fine art. There are jokes about installation art, which
involve”ignorant” housekeepers who throw out collections worth
millions of dollars as garbage. Art consists of mediatised texts of sym-
bols created by humans. An interpreter can immediately understand
the genre intentionality of the text based on its demonstration context.
Then, he or she will use prior experiences to evoke a”prior under-
standing” of the genre. Thus, an agreement is reached between the
interpreter and a cultural tradition: to interpret an object in accor-
dance with some existing genre category. The interpreter may not be
aware of this process, for the interpreting model is nearly intuitive,
scarcely requiring any effort to apply.
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Experiencia, postmemoria e intencionalidad
J E F*
Y luego tenemos el otro (tiempo), que
es el presente del pasado, que se llama
memoria.
B J.L.**
 : Experience, Post–Memory, and Intentionality
: In the following paper we propose a Semiotic approximation
to the concept of postmemory formulated by Hirsch (), for which
we suggest to examine it amidst other concepts which contribute to
outlining its structure. In this sense, postmemory is approached from
Semiotic concepts of memory, of experience and of intentionality. Later,
the concepts of altered bodies and altered worlds are introduced, con-
tributing to show some processes of incarnation in postmemory. The
theoretic discussion is exemplified with two audiovisual texts; La teta
asustada (), from Claudia Llosa, and the Spanish series Pulsaciones
().
: Postmemory; Experience; Body.
. Introducción
Los procesos semióticos que constituyen la experiencia y la memoria
han despertado un creciente interés entre los investigadores de las
ciencias de la significación. Se trata de fenómenos cuyo estudio exige
∗ Universidad de Lima.∗∗ B J.L. () “El tiempo”, en Id. () Borges oral, Emecé Editores, Editorial
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una visión interdisciplinaria, de modo que su análisis y sistematiza-
ción sea lo más completa posible. Para la semiótica, cuya vocación
interdisciplinaria es conocida, los fenómenos experienciales y memo-
rísticos plantean retos enormes y, en consecuencia, debe apoyarse
sobre aportes previos de otras disciplinas.
Así mismo, el estudio semiótico de los procesos de postmemoria
deben inscribirse en el marco del estudio de la experiencia, pues es
en los distintos niveles experienciales donde contenidos de experien-
cias anteriores se filtran, se re–viven como recuerdos, emociones y
acciones. Una visión fenomenológica, en la que sujetos insertos en el
mundo actúan, generan experiencias que dinámicamente alimentan la
memoria con contenidos que se procesan, se conservan, se olvidan o
se modifican, evitaría la a–contextualización de los procesos de sentido
que, en el mundo, los sujetos dan a tales experiencias.
. Memoria y postmemoria
En  Marianne Hirsch, en su libro Family Frames: Photography, Narra-
tive, and Postmemory, utilizó por primera vez el término “postmemoria”
para referirse a «las relaciones de la segunda generación con poderosas
y a menudo traumáticas experiencias que precedieron su nacimiento
pero que, no obstante, le eran transmitidas tan profundamente que
parecían constituir memorias en su propio derecho» (, p. ). De
acuerdo con esta definición, se trata de fenómenos psicológicos que se
generaban gracias a historias contadas en familia, fotografías, filmes,
diarios, etc. En una entrevista que se le realizara en , Hirsch agregó:
«Comme je la conçois, la connection avec le passé que je définis comme
postmémoire ne s’opère pas au travers d’une forme particulière de
remémoration, mais d’un investissement imaginaire, d’une projection
et d’une création» (, p. ).
Podría decirse que, en cierto modo, la postmemoria es una cuasi–fic-
cionalización construida a partir de relatos, sean estos verbales o visuales,
sobre hechos reales, relatos que pasan por el tamiz de la experiencia y la
memoria de un sujeto que cuenta y de la memoria y las experiencias de
uno o varios sujetos que los reciben. En esas relaciones intersubjetivas,
entre narrador y receptor, relaciones mediadas por mensajes y medios
concretos, es donde se sitúan el “imaginario”, la “proyección” y la “crea-
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ción” que Hirsch menciona. Es la “variación imaginaria”, como dice
Merleau–Ponty (), lo que detona, en el marco de variables experien-
ciales y memorísticas, un conjunto de proyecciones y creaciones.
Con mayor o menor éxito heurístico, numerosos trabajos de investi-
gación y análisis se han realizado a partir del concepto de postmemoria,
tanto en la literatura y el arte como en la psicología y el psicoanálisis,
pasando por la historia y las ciencias políticas; entre ellos, cabe mencionar
los de Bayard (), Aubin, para quien «l’espace urbain s’avère le lieu
privilégié de l’expression de la postmémoire puisqu’il accueille en même
temps qu’il performe les enjeux mémoriaux contemporains» (, p.
); Imbroscio (), quien se refiere a la postmemoria y su impacto
en la formación de identidades; Hernández Martínez (), relaciona la
postmemoria con la biografía familiar. También Edurne Portela ()
vincula la postmemoria con dispositivos propios del discurso literario, lo
mismo que Varas (), Ennis (), Gómez (), Constales () y
Parra Rojas (); mientras que Álvarez–Sancho () y Kramer ()
aplican ese concepto a la realización fílmica, y Outeirinho () a la
historia. Quílez Esteve () relaciona el concepto con la novela gráfica,
la fotografía y el documental. Por su parte, Sarlo considera innecesario el
concepto de postmemoria, «algo que pertenece al orden de lo evidente»
(, p. ), parte de lo que llama “inflación teórica” (p. ), que solo por
su carácter subjetivo se diferencia de la construcción de memoria que rea-
liza el historiador o el arqueólogo. También Ciancio () problematiza
el concepto a partir de otros como performatividad y género.
. Postmemoria y memoria discursiva
Para mejor cernir el concepto de postmemoria es importante distin-
guirlo de lo que algunos analistas de discurso han llamado memoria
discursiva:
Nous introduisons ainsi la notion de mémoire discursive [. . . ] : toute formula-
tion possède dans son « domaine associé » d’autres formulations, qu’elle répète,
réfute, transforme, dénie. . . , c’est–à–dire à l’égard desquelles elle produit des
effets de mémoire spécifiques ; mais toute formulation entretient également
avec des formulations avec lesquelles elle coexiste (son « champ de concomi-
tance », dirait Foucault) ou qui lui succèdent (son « champ d’anticipation »)
des rapports dont l’analyse inscrit nécessairement la question de la durée et
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celle de la pluralité des temps historiques au coeur des problèmes que pose
l’utilisation du concept de Formation Discursive. (Courtine , p. )
Otros se han referido a un fenómeno similar como memoria inter-
discursiva, definida como aquella que se realiza «lorsqu’il y a réelle-
ment allusion aux dires de l’autre, on serait dans l’ordre de la mémoire
interdiscursive» (Moirand ).
Sin embargo, más allá de las memorias discursivas e interdiscursivas
es necesario tomar en cuenta lo que el propio Moirand llama memo-
ria–saber: «lorsque le mot évoque des faits, tels par exemple Tchernobyl,
il s’agirait plutôt pour moi de connaissances, de représentations liées à
des savoirs et à des événements de l’histoire» (, ). Así, la memo-
ria–saber son los relatos que evocan hechos históricos, individuales o
sociales, los que, a su vez, se transforman en lo que Hirsch llama post-
memoria, lo que implica una transición de las memorias de un sujeto
hacia otro y que este otro las toma como vivencias propias.
Más cercana a la noción de postmemoria es la conceptualización
elaborada por Paveau, quien en  proponía los términos dememoria
y amemoria como parte de los procesos de transmisión de discursos.
A la primera la define así:
J’appelle démémoire discursive un ensemble de phénomènes de discours
qui permettent la révision des lignées discursives, c’est–à–dire des transmis-
sions sémantiques culturellement et socialement assurées par les outils de
la technologie discursive (les plaques de rues par exemple). (, p. )
Luego define amemoria:
Je parle donc d’“ amémoire discursive ” pour désigner, non plus, comme pour
la démémoire, une révision, mais un effacement, conscient ou inconscient,
d’un passé ou d’un legs discursif, de “ formulations–origines ” (Courtine) dont
le locuteur ne voudrait plus rien avoir à dire, mais qui se disent quand même,
par le biais de l’inconscient et de la somatisation, d’autres manières, dans les
langages infiniment innovants du symptôme. (Ibidem)
. Semiótica y experiencia
Desde un punto de vista de la significación hemos definido la experiencia
como el resultado de las prácticas que afectan la conjunción dinámica
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de textos y contextos realizada por un sujeto semiótico (Finol ). Sin
embargo, para la conformación, organización y jerarquización de las
experiencias son necesarios procesos previos que parten del mundo de
lo sensible, se continúan en el mundo de lo perceptible, lo cual ya supone
una primera etapa de organización de significados, y se prolongan hacia la
memoria, la cual se vincula y obtiene su sentido a partir de los contextos
en los cuales esos procesos se han dado. A la semiótica de la experiencia
le interesa lo vivido en las relaciones, siempre dinámicas y cambiantes,
entre el sujeto y el mundo, relaciones en las cuales es posible identificar
al menos cuatro vectores: espacio, tiempo, acción y sujeto. En cuanto al
componente espacial, como dice Riera Jaume, «Todo ocurre como si
el espacio vivido fuese también nutriente de sentido, vínculo umbilical
que nos une al mundo, pacto natural fuera del cual se siente uno a la
intemperie, matriz afectiva de ciertos lugares» (, p. ).
Así mismo, el tiempo es un factor que, de diversos modos, marca
las experiencias de lo vivido, lo que Braudel llamó «la dialectique de la
durée» (, p. ), pues estas solo se realizan dentro de variables tem-
porales que le dan sentidos específicos a tales vivencias. Las acciones
que los seres humanos realizan son siempre modos de modificar el
mundo donde ellas se realizan, modos que incluyen no solo la acción
propiamente dicha sino también el reposo. Finalmente, es el sujeto
quien, al transformar el mundo gracias a sus acciones, y al hacerlo
en un tiempo y en un espacio determinado, va a consumar sus expe-
riencias, vistas estas no como procesos solipsistas sino como hacer
compartido en el mundo de las relaciones intersubjetivas.
La experiencia, pues, va más allá de lo meramente sensible e, incluso,
de lo meramente perceptible, pues ella supone acumulación de signi-
ficaciones, memoria y sentido. Una semiótica de la Experiencia trata,
justamente, sobre los procesos de significación que se generan en las
relaciones entre sujetos y el mundo, entre un conjunto de sensaciones y
. Edéline y Klinkenberg llaman anasemiosis al conjunto de estímulos que vienen del
mundo exterior y catasemiosis a la dimensión pragmática que se expresa en las acciones del
sujeto sobre el mundo, las cuales parten de un proceso previo de interpretación: «nos organes
périphériques reçoivent et organisent les stimulus en provenance du monde extérieur [. . . ] Ceci
constitue un premier moment du processus expérientiel de formation du sens, ou anasémiose.
[. . . ] Le sens peut retourner au monde sous forme d’action, un second type d’expérience.
Ce processus — que nous appelerons catasémiose — part lui–même de l’interprétation [. . . ]:
partie de la corporéité de l’expérience, la sémiose retourne à cette autre corporéité qu’est
l’action» (, p. d).
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percepciones y de las acciones o no–acciones que se fundan desde ellas y
a partir de ellas.
En la construcción de sentidos en los procesos experienciales inter-
viene un principio de pertinencia que permite a los sujetos, en el marco
de contextos determinados, privilegiar unos sobre otros. Como afirma
Rastier, «La légitimité de l’interprétation dépend du problème de la per-
tinence, qui commande toute identification d’unités» (, p. a). En
otras palabras, en las operaciones semióticas que van de lo meramente
sensible y perceptible a la configuración de una memoria interviene
un principio de relevancia que tiene que ver con marcos experienciales
anteriores, cuya influencia es decisiva para las nuevas prácticas de la vida
social. La memoria, entendida no como un mero depósito de recuerdos,
significados y experiencias, es un sistema dinámico que opera dialéctica-
mente entre los contextos situacionales y circunstanciales presentes y los
contextos históricos pasados.
En las realizaciones concretas el principio de pertinencia puede vincu-
larse con la categoría semiótica de intencionalidad que Greimas toma de
la fenomenología y que él diferencia de la motivación y de la finalidad.
De este modo, la intencionalidad «permet ainsi de concevoir l’acte com-
me une tensión qui s’inscrit entre deux modes d’existence: la virtualité
et la realisation» (, p. ).
. Semiótica y postmemoria
Para la Semiótica es importante analizar cómo se producen los mecanis-
mos discursivos en la construcción de postmemoria, mecanismos median-
te los cuales una historia basada en vivencias y recuerdos se transforma
en vivencias y recuerdos del sujeto que la oye, ve o, en general, recibe.
Hirsch se ha referido, sobre todo, a una experiencia individual compartida,
en la que un Sujeto comunica, diferida en el tiempo, una acción vivida
por él a un Sujeto, bien sea en comunicación directa o indirecta, mediada
o cara a cara, lo que convierte a esa acción vivida en acción narrada. En
esa narración, mientras el Sujeto actúa como objeto de una experiencia
— que también lo convierte en testigo, depositario y narrador de un saber
experienciado, como producto de una vivencia —, el Sujeto vendrá a
actuar como fiduciario, como heredero o legatario; proceso narrativo que
luego convierte la acción narrada en acción recuperada.
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Lógicamente, no se trata de procesos lineales sino de operaciones
semióticas que se desplazan en diversas direcciones entre Sujeto y
Sujeto, y que hacen intervenir complejas variables actoriales, espa-
ciales y temporales. Usualmente las acciones vividas y las acciones
narradas ocurren en lugares distintos; los dispositivos narrativos para
la construcción de acciones recuperadas también ocurren en lugares
diferentes a las acciones vividas. Del mismo modo, el proceso de cons-
trucción de postmemoria implica variables temporales que atraviesan
las acciones vividas, narradas y recuperadas.
Ahora bien, la construcción y articulación de postmemoria, como
ya se sugirió, supone un principio de pertinencia que se actualiza al
distinguir memorias y recuerdos gratificantes o “positivos” de aquellos
que son traumáticos o “negativos”. Esos procesos de marcaje parten
de dispositivos como los que Schutz y Luckmann han denominado
“ámbito finito de sentido” y Cassirer () “acento de sentido”. Para
los primeros «un ámbito finito de sentido consiste en experiencias
de sentido compatibles entre sí» (, p. ), lo que en el caso de
la postmemoria significaría una homologación coherente entre la
memoria vivida por un Sujeto, con experiencias en determinados
tiempos y espacios, y la asumida por un Sujeto en tiempos y espacios
diferentes. Si bien Schutz y Luckmann señalan la imposibilidad de
compatibilizar dos ámbitos diferentes de sentido, también arguyen
que «la transición de un ámbito de sentido a otro solo puede realizarse
mediante un “salto” [. . . ] este salto no es sino el cambio de un estilo
de vivencia por otro» (p. ), que es exactamente lo que ocurre al
Sujeto cuando asume como propias las memorias del Sujeto; en
otros términos, para que la postmemoria funcione necesita de una
compatibilidad de sentido con la memoria original; se trata del “salto”
de una memoria propia a una memoria ajena, un proceso que implica
operaciones semióticas de focalización, recuperación y apropiación
de sentidos tomados de relatos, fotografías y textos que expresan
recuerdos de un otro distante en espacio y tiempo. Es entonces cuando
en ese proceso interviene también un mecanismo de acentuación de
sentido, pues cuando el Sujeto selecciona como pertinentes unos
recuerdos sobre otros, pone énfasis en estos últimos para, entonces,
. Para ver la aplicación del concepto de “acento de sentido” al rito de la misa católica,
ver Blanco (). Zilberberg () lo utiliza para su análisis de lo sagrado.
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asumirlos como recuerdos propios, como inscritos en su memoria. Si,
como dice Blanco, el «acento de sentido no es otra cosa que “acento
expresivo”, es decir, afectivo» (, p. ), vemos que, justamente,
en las operaciones de construcción de postmemoria interviene un
aspecto pasional que tiene que ver con el afecto hacia aquella persona,
el Sujeto, de la cual el Sujeto asume su memoria.
Entre experiencias vividas, constituidas por acciones concretas en
espacios y tiempos concretos, y experiencias re–vividas se establecen
diferencias cualitativas determinantes, específicamente en el sentido
de la historicidad de ambas. Mientras las primeras responden a dis-
cursos corporales, pertenecientes a un orden pragmático — cuerpos
que ejecutan acciones, físicas o mentales, sobre otros cuerpos —, las
segundas responden a discursos narrativos (relatos, fotografías, etc.)
pertenecientes a un orden narrativo.
Esquema . Experiencia, memoria y postmemoria.
Ese complejo proceso de generación de postmemoria afecta no
solo el ámbito individual sino también ámbitos colectivos, pues ambos
se entrecruzan y cabalgan sobre las historias propias, tal como lo
señalara Halbwachs:
Si la mémoire collective tire sa force et sa durée de ce qu’elle a pour support
un ensemble d’hommes, ce sont cependant des individus qui se souviennent,
en tant que membres du groupe [. . . ] chaque mémoire individuelle est un
point de vue sur la mémoire collective, que ce point de vue change suivant
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la place que j’y occupe, et que cette place elle–même change suivant les
relations que j’entretiens avec d’autres milieux. (, pp. –)
Sin embargo, en comparación con la memoria individual la memo-
ria colectiva supone dispositivos narrativos más complejos, tal como
ocurre, por ejemplo, cuando los museos, entendidos como macro
dispositivos discursivos y textuales, provocan que algunos individuos
re–vivan experiencias cuyas memorias asumen como propias.
. Postmemoria como proceso semiótico
Como ya dijimos, para mejor comprender los fenómenos que se
agrupan en torno a la denominación de postmemoria, es necesario
colocarlos en el marco de otros procesos mucho más complejos de
los cuales ella forma parte. En tal sentido, proponemos ver la postme-
moria como un proceso semiogenético, dinámico, transformativo y
transformador, que se sitúa en el marco de variables como las que
se presentan en el esquema , el cual hemos utilizado en un trabajo
anterior (Finol ), y que aquí hemos desarrollado un poco más.
Esquema . La construcción semiogenética de la experiencia y de la postmemoria.
A pesar de la rígida linealidad del esquema anterior, es posible
visualizar en él algunas de las variables fundamentales que intervienen
en los procesos corporales, experienciales, memorísticos y postme-
morísticos, cuyos entrecruzamientos e interacciones son inevitables.
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Todos ellos deben verse en los marcos temporales, espaciales y ac-
toriales que los constituyen y sin los cuales la inteligibilidad de los
mismos queda limitada; marcos que también son lugares de anclaje
de la memoria.
Desde el punto de vista semiótico, la postmemoria es, en una pri-
mera aproximación, un conjunto de significaciones caracterizadas
por su opacidad y su desorganización, lo que a veces conduce a su
dificultad para interpretarlas. Sin embargo, los sucesivos procesos de
acumulación de información y de interacciones testimoniales, tanto
en círculos comunicativos cercanos como en referencias históricas,
van decantando y acotando significados y limitando los sentidos de las
narrativas compartidas y, en consecuencia, los sujetos van asumien-
do como propias las experiencias de otros. En la configuración de
la postmemoria hay, para decirlo con términos de Merleau–Ponty,
procesos semióticos centrífugos y centrípetos, los cuales afectan tanto
los mecanismos intersubjetivos como los de la memoria en el marco
de las variables contextuales.
Para mejor ilustrar lo que hemos venido diciendo, vamos a analizar
brevemente dos ejemplos de historias ficcionales, la primera de las
cuales, no obstante, está inspirada en hechos reales a los cuales también
nos referiremos.
.. La Teta asustada, de Claudia Llosa
En la película peruana La teta asustada expresión traducida del que-
chua Mancharisqa Nuñuun, un ejemplo clásico de representación
ficcional de la postmemoria, encontramos expresada esa relación diná-
. La teta asustada (); Duración:  min.; País: España–Perú; Idioma: español,
quechua sureño; Directora: Claudia Llosa; Guion: Claudia Llosa; Música: Selma Mutal;
Fotografía: Natasha Braier; Productora: Vela Producciones, Wanda Visión S.A., Oberón
Cinematográfica S.A., CONACINE de Perú; Montaje: Frank Gutiérrez; Distribuidora:
Wanda Visión S.A.; Reparto: Magaly Solier (Fausta), Susi Sánchez (Aída), Antolín Prieto
(Hijo de Aída), Efraín Solís (Noé), Marino Ballón (Tío Lúcido), Bárbara Lazón (Perpetua),
María del Pilar Guerrero (Máxima), Delci Heredia (Carmela), Karla Heredia (Severina),
Fernando Caycho (Melvin), Edward Llungo (Marcos), Marco Antonio Ramírez (Soldado ),
Doris María Ramírez (Soldado ). Premios:  Festival Internacional de Cine de Berlín;
 Festival Internacional de Cine de Guadalajara;  Asociación de Críticos de Cine de
Québec;  Festival de Lima;  Festival de Cine de Bogotá;  Festival de Cine de
la Habana;  Asociación Peruana de Prensa Cinematográfica;  D–World Awards
(Vallejo ).
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mica que caracteriza su organización y donde intervienen las cuatro
macro–dimensiones que consideramos fundamentales para su análisis
e interpretación: cuerpo→ experiencia→memoria→ postmemoria.
En La teta asustada, Fausta, la protagonista, cree que a través de la
leche materna ha recibido en carne propia las consecuencias de la
violación de su madre durante la guerra en Perú (–), entre las
fuerzas armadas peruanas y el grupo guerrillero Sendero Luminoso,
un conflicto sangriento en el cual se produjeron numerosos asesinatos
y violaciones de mujeres, muchas de ellas indígenas.
Theidon ha recogido testimonios que revelan el proceso mediante
el cual hay un tránsito corporal entre madre e hija y que lleva a la
primera a transmitir, a través de la leche materna, sus sufrimientos a
la segunda:
Mi hija nació al día siguiente de la matanza de Lloqllepampa. Estaba es-
condida en una choza. Le tuve que botar a mi esposo porque si venían los
militares le hubieran matado. Solita me atendí. Ese tiempo escondiéndonos,
ni siquiera tenía leche para darle a mi bebé. ¿De dónde le iba a dar si no
comía? Un día me habían dicho: «Si le dejas a tu hija en el cerro, le puede
pachary se puede morir». Recordando eso le dejé en un cerro para que se
muera. ¿Cómo ya iba a vivir así? Yo le había pasado todo mi sufrimiento con
mi sangre, con mi teta. La veía de lejos, pero como lloraba mucho tenía que
regresar a recogerla porque si los soldados escuchaban, hubieran venido
a matarme. Es por eso que digo que mi hija está ahora traumatizada por
todo que le he pasado con mi leche, con mi sangre, con mis pensamientos.
(Mujer quechua hablante. En Theidon , pp. –)
En su investigación, Theidon se interesa por
la transmisión intergeneracional de las memorias tóxicas, en un sentido
literal. [. . . ] la transmisión al bebé del sufrimiento y del susto de la madre,
sea esta transmisión en el útero o por medio de la sangre y la leche. Se
dice que la teta asustada puede dañar al bebé, dejando al niño o niña más
propensos a la epilepsia. (, p. )
La teta asustada comienza con la madre de Fausta rememorando,
en medio de un intenso monólogo, cómo fue violada:
A esta mujer que les canta, esa noche le agarraron, le violaron. No les dio
pena de mi hija no nacida. No les dio vergüenza. Esa noche me agarraron,
me violaron con su pene y con su mano. No les dio pena que mi hija les
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viera desde dentro y no contentos con eso, me han hecho tragar el pene
muerto de mi marido Josefo. Su pobre pene muerto sazonado con pólvora.
Con ese dolor gritaba: «Mejor mátame y entiérrame con mi Josefo. No
conozco nada de aquí». (Llosa )
Fausta cree que su madre, violada mientras estaba embarazada, le
ha transmitido, a través de su leche, el acontecimiento vivido y, por
lo tanto, asume para sí el mismo miedo, la misma experiencia, lo que
la llevará a colocar una papa en su vagina para evitar ser violada; esa
suerte de escudo vegetal impediría que pueda ser penetrada, «con su
pene y con su mano», por otros violadores. Como se ve, la madre
de Fausta no solo le transmite una memoria a través de un relato sino
también a través de una conexión corporal; se trata de una postmemoria
corporalizada no solo en su origen sino también en sus efectos.
La película nos narrará los procesos mediante los cuales, poco a
poco, Fausta vence sus miedos y traumas y después de enterrar a su
madre transforma su cuerpo en un nuevo espacio para la fecundación,
lo que la película simboliza, al final, con una planta cuya forma fálica
(Cabrejos ) representa la fertilidad y, por esa vía, el renacimiento.
En esta representación ficcional de la postmemoria se reproducen expe-
riencias reales que Theidon ha recogido en Ayacucho, región peruana
donde la guerrilla de Sendero Luminoso prosperó, y donde guerrille-
ros y soldados cometieron crímenes terribles. Representación fílmica
y hecho histórico comparten el tránsito que hemos mencionado: cuer-
po→ experiencia→memoria→ postmemoria.
Desde un punto de vista semiótico podría decirse que se trata, en fin
de cuentas, de la correlación dialéctica entre hechos que pertenecen,
el primero, a una dimensión histórica y, el segundo, a una dimensión
ficcional.
.. La memoria del corazón
Un caso similar ocurre en la serie española Pulsaciones, en la cual
durante diez capítulos se cuenta cómo un médico (Alex) recibe el
. Para una detallada relación del conflicto armado ver el Informe Final de la Comisión
de la Verdad y Reconciliación de Perú ().
. Pulsaciones (). España. Dirección: Emilio Aragón, David Ulloa, David Victori.
Guion: Emilio Aragón, Francisco Roncal, Carmen Ortiz, Ángela Obón, Adriana Rivas,
Ramón Tarrés, Juan María Ruiz Córdoba. Música: Juan Carlos Cuello. Fotografía: David
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corazón de un periodista asesinado (Rodrigo), lo que obliga al primero
a vivir como propias las emociones, vivencias y recuerdos que el
segundo había experimentado y, además, a cumplir las tareas que dejó
pendientes al ser asesinado. Para algunos, la serie de ficción tiene
fundamentos en la realidad, pues varios investigadores, después de
examinar testimonios de diez recipientes de trasplante de corazón y
de los padres y amigos de donantes y receptores, han señalado que
existe una memoria sistémica que podría ser comunicada a quienes
reciben tales órganos: «Living systems theory explicitly posits that all
living cells possess “memory” and “decider” functional subsystems
within them» (Pearsall, Schwartz y Russek , p. ); una conclusión
que se apoyaría en la teoría de los sistemas dinámicos de energía.
Como en La teta asustada también en Pulsaciones la memoria se trans-
mite corporalmente y no a través de fotografías, relatos o cartas; en
la primera, la comunicación de la memoria, como se ha señalado, se
realiza a través de la leche materna y en la segunda a través de un co-
razón ajeno. No obstante, en una hay una cercanía consanguínea en la
segunda esta no existe. En Pulsaciones el corazón, una vez más, aparece
con una densidad simbólica extraordinaria; ya no se trata del lugar de los
sentimientos o de las emociones sino de la memoria acumulada por el
Sujeto y que se transmite al Sujeto. Pero también la leche es un denso
símbolo de vida, especialmente si esta es de origen maternal.
Ahora bien, mientras en La teta asustada no opera una intenciona-
lidad, en tanto considerada como finalidad o como motivación de la
Omedes. Reparto: Pablo Derqui, Leonor Watling, Meritxell Calvo, Ingrid Rubio, Juan
Diego Botto, Fernando Sansegundo, Javier Lara, Alberto Berzal, Antonio Gil, Manel Dueso,
Carolina Lapausa, Ana Marzoa, Juan Blanco, Aitor Merino, Nacho Marraco, Amparo Vega
León, Cristina Marcos, María Mercado, Martin Aslan, Julia Lara, José Pedro Carrión,
Rubén Fulgencio, Nicolás Gaude, Anna Gonzalvo, Alex Navarro, Carolina Clemente, Òscar
Rabadan, Aroa Madurga, Naia Madurga. Productora: Atresmedia y Globomedia. Género:
Serie de TV. Thriller psicológico (Filmaffinity ).
. Una intensa discusión se ha desarrollado sobre el concepto de memoria celular, con
posiciones que van desde el extremo escepticismo, como la de quienes prefieren suicidarse
antes que cambiar su punto de vista sobre el tema, pasando por la de Carroll, quien adversa
la teoría pero considera: «Even so, the stories are intriguing and may lead to some serious
scientific investigation at some time in the future» (, s/p); hasta Dossey quien propone
como alternativa el concepto de nonlocal mind: «I suggest that the consciousness of a donor
is fundamentally united with the consciousness of a recipient via nonlocal mind, and
that it is this connection that makes possible informational exchanges between the two
individuals, which take the form of posttransplant phenomena» (Dossey , p. ).
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acción, ya que la madre que transmite su memoria a Fausta no busca
un fin determinado, en Pulsaciones podría decirse que opera la inten-
cionalidad considerada en tanto finalidad, ya que Rodrigo, donante
del corazón, buscaría que Alex, receptor del órgano, cumpla las tareas
que el primero no pudo realizar, lo que resuelve la tensión narrativa
entre virtualidad (Rodrigo) y realización (Alex) a favor del segundo.
. Corporalización de la memoria
La signification anime la parole comme le
monde anime mon corps. (Merleau–Ponty
, p. )
Cuerpo y memoria son sistemas significantes que interactúan y se
conforman recíprocamente, como expresión de las relaciones activas
entre sujeto y mundo. Es por ello que las alteraciones dialécticas del
mundo se expresan también en las alteraciones corporales, pues este
no es ajeno al mundo sino objeto y sujeto del mismo; son «l’exercice
de notre corps et de nos sens» los que «nous insèrent dans le monde»
(Merleau–Ponty , p. ). Como se ha dicho con frecuencia, nuestro
cuerpo, “sistema de sistemas”, es nuestra forma de semiotización del
mundo. Además, como dicen Schutz y Luckmann, «los límites de mi
cuerpo frente un mundo cuyos objetos le ofrecen resistencia, y las
funciones rutinarias del cuerpo en el mundo, son la base de lo primero
que se toma como “obvio” en el acervo del conocimiento» (, p. ).
En un trabajo anterior hemos dicho que los mundos alterados «se
caracterizan por una disrupción capaz de modificar sustancialmente
las relaciones sociales, políticas y económicas de convivencia en de-
. Para nosotros es cuerpo es la base de nuestra semiotización del mundo; es decir, de la
generación de procesos de sentido. Al respecto ver, entre otros, Martin–Juchat (); Rosales
Cueva (); Contreras (); Finol (). Para Fontanille, por ejemplo, «el cuerpo puede
ser definido como el operador de la semiosis» (, p. ).Edéline y Klinkenberg, definen
lo que es la semiotización: «Dans son geste élémentaire, l’opération de sémiotisation peut
se définir par la formule: sémiotiser c’est (d’abord) segmenter et regrouper. En un seul mot:
discriminer» (, d).
. «Il faut donc reconnaître sous le nom de regard, de main et en général de corps un
système de systèmes voué à l’inspection d’un monde, capable d’enjamber les distances, de percer
l’avenir perceptif, de dessiner dans la platitude inconcevable de l’être des creux et des reliefs,
des distances et des écarts, un sens [. . . ]» (Merleau Ponty , . Cursivas nuestras).
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terminadas sociedades; son mundos trascendentemente rotos» (Finol
); y que los cuerpos alterados son «aquellos que se apartan abierta-
mente, por un lado, de los cánones de la proporción, entendida como
la relación equilibrada entre las partes y el todo; y, por el otro, de los
cánones contemporáneos de la belleza» (ibidem). Creemos que estos
dos conceptos, a pesar de su generalidad, son aplicables a los dos ca-
sos de ficción que hemos mencionado. En efecto, en La teta asustada
encontramos la alteración profunda de la vida política peruana, como
consecuencia de la terrible guerra emprendida por la guerrilla Sendero
Luminoso contra las instituciones del Estado, fenómeno del cual los
traumas corporales del síndrome de la teta asustada aparecen entre
numerosas víctimas de violaciones y torturas. En la serie española Pul-
saciones el mundo alterado se expresa en el asesinato del periodista, la
casi muerte del médico y el impacto que ambas situaciones llevan sus
respectivos entornos familiares, pero, principalmente, se expresa en la
oscura trama de corrupción y crimen que afecta a más de cuarenta
víctimas cuyo sistema inmunológico se implanta en otras personas. Ese
mundo alterado que la serie presenta también altera el cuerpo de Alex
no solo porque recibe un corazón trasplantado sino también por las
memorias de Rodrigo que ese órgano lleva consigo.
Como se ve, tanto en La teta asustada como en Palpitaciones, la post-
memoria es también una historia del cuerpo o, si se prefiere, una
corporalización de la memoria, la cual, al ser asumida y vivida como
propia, conduce a la postmemoria. Recordemos que, como decía Mer-
leau–Ponty, «Malgré la diversité de ses parties, qui le rend fragile et
vulnérable, le corps est capable de se rassembler en un geste qui domi-
ne pour un temps leur dispersion et impose son monogramme à tout
ce qu’il fait» (, p. ).
. Conclusiones
Podemos deducir del análisis anterior que la espesura del cuerpo y la
densidad de la memoria se articulan en los ejemplos presentados para
forjar y resolver tensiones y generar nuevos sentidos en los procesos de
semiotización del mundo, pues, en fin de cuentas, se habita la memoria
como se habita el cuerpo y uno y otro habitan el mundo. El Sujeto
al instalarse en las memorias del otro, también semiotiza su mundo
 José Enrique Finol
y, de retorno, semiotiza sus propios recuerdos, les da nuevos sentidos,
modifica experiencias y re–vive sus memorias. Las acciones de los sujetos
resuelven la tensión intencional realizando alguna de las posibilidades
virtuales generadas, como en un abanico, por las tensiones y conflictos
del mundo.
La definición semiótica de la memoria y la postmemoria nos obliga a
buscar su origen en los procesos experienciales, donde cuerpo y mundo
interactúan, se redefinen sin cesar y se articulan a acciones y tensiones
que provocan transformaciones semióticas recíprocas, sentidos nuevos
que dinamizan la cultura, las relaciones sociales, el cuerpo y el mundo.
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 : Il valore della volontà nel senso: a proposito di signifi-
cazione e intenzionalità
: In the present paper, an attempt is made to study the concepts
of natural sign and given sign from Augustine of Hippo (–) to
contemporary semiotics. The enquiry is primarily concerned with three
issues: ) to expound and interpret the notions of natural and given signs
and to unravel problems of terminology; ) to discuss the argument
of intentionality considered as a criterion by which this division was
originally based; ) to review the contemporary debate within semiotics
on the notions of natural and intentional signification.
: Intentionality; Intentions; Theory of Signs; Natural / Intentional
Meaning; Division of signs.
. Introduction
Reviving an ancient subject, in this essay I propose a study of the divi-
sion between “natural” and “given” signs from Augustine of Hippo
(–) to contemporary semiotics. Although the distinction of nat-
ural and intentional meaning in its various formulations is pervasive
in the history of philosophy (Chisholm ; Rollin ) and it rep-
resents a milestone in the disciplinary field of semiotics (Deely ;
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
 Remo Gramigna
Ullmann ; Todorov ), the concepts of natural and given signs
have often been misunderstood. The drift of the present paper is, thus,
threefold: ) to unravel the notions of natural and given signs and
to explain the basic terminology associated with these concepts; )
to discuss the argument of intentionality considered as the criterion
by which the division of natural/given signs is based; ) to provide a
critical review of the contemporary debate within semiotics on the
notions of natural and intentional semiosis.
Because the doublet natural/given sign is rooted in the thought of
Augustine, I will first discuss the concepts and terminology as found
in his works. Moreover, the paper provides a review of the contempo-
rary debate on natural and given meaning with a keener eye to the
implications of this division for the theory of signs. In order to do so, I
will explore some contemporary interpretations of the distinction of
natural and given signs. With this purpose, I will discuss Engels’ (),
Markus’ (), and Jackson’s () interpretations of the issue.
. Augustine’s Definitions of Signs: Signa Naturalia and Signa Data
The root of the division between “natural signs” (signa naturalia)
and “given signs” (signa data) is spelled out with clarity in the works
of Augustine. This distinction is epitomized in the second book of
the De doctrina christiana (). Here Augustine first distinguishes
signs (signa) and things (res). Signa are things used in order to signify
something and res are things that are not employed in order to signify,
that simply exist. After laying out the distinction of signa and res,
Augustine provides a definition of sign (signum) that became canonical:
«Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud
aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem uenire» («A sign is a thing which
causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself
makes upon the senses»).
. In the present study, I will not discuss the concept of intentionality beyond the
semiotic threshold of human agency. For an overview of the debate on intentionality in
biosemiotics, see Hoffmeyer ; Favareau and Gare .
. De doctrina christiana was composed in two times. Books – ,  were written in
. Books – were penned in –.
. Doctr. chr. ,  (eng. trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, ).
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The second essential branching concerning signs is the division be-
tween signa naturalia and signa data. Augustine defines signa naturalia
as follows:
Naturalia sunt quae sine voluntate atque ullo appetitu significandi praeter
se aliquid aliud ex se cognosci faciunt, sicuti est fumus significans ignem.
Non enim volens significare id facit, sed rerum expertarum animadversione
et notatione cognoscitur ignem subesse, etiam si fumus solus appareat.
By bringing forth the class of signa naturalia, Augustine is referring
to an existing debate that was a commonplace when he was writing
and, for this reason, it could not be entirely dismissed. Although Au-
gustine, in passing, makes reference to the topic of natural signification
as a part of the division of signs, the subject falls outside the scope of
the inquiry as not directly relevant (alia quaestio).
Augustine includes among the genus of signa naturalia several
examples:
a) the smoke as a sign of fire;
b) the tracks (vestigia) of an animal in the environment;
c) the face of an angry or a sad man or any other “movement of
the soul” that unwillingly manifest itself through the physiog-
nomics.
It is revealing that Augustine’s illustrations are not exclusively con-
fined to the realm of natural events or phenomena, but he also refers
to what today goes under the rubric of non–verbal communication.
Indeed, Augustine includes among natural signs the expressions of
an angry or sad man as involuntary cues of one’s emotions (anger or
sadness) that are interpreted by an onlooker for whom such cues be-
comes meaningful. Thus, the examples provided show the reference
to an ancient debate on natural semiosis.
. ([Natural signs are] those which, without any desire or intention of signifying, make
us aware of something beyond themselves, like smoke which signifies fire. It does this
without any will to signify, for even when smoke appears alone, observation and memory
of experience with things bring a recognition of an underlying fire); Doctr. chr. ,  (eng.
trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, ).
. On the large bibliography available on the tradition of the medics and their view
on natural semiosis, see Stough  and Shands and Melzer .
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Signa data, the second branching of the division of signs outlined
in the De doctrina christiana, are defined as follows:
Data vero signa sunt quae sibi quaeque viventia invicem dant ad demon-
strandos quantum possunt motus animi sui vel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet.
Nec ulla causa est nobis significandi, id est signi dandi, nisi ad depromen-
dum et traiciendum in alterius animum id quod animo gerit qui signum dat.
Horum igitur signorum genus, quantum ad homines attinet, considerare
atque tractare statuimus, quia et signa divinitus data quae scripturis sanctis
continentur per homines nobis indicata sunt qui ea conscripserunt.
Thus, signa data are thought of as deliberate and intentionally
given signs. Augustine provides numerous examples that illustrate
this species of sign. He classifies signs used by men according to the
sense to which they belong. In other words, signs are arranged from
the standpoint of sensory modality:
Sight. Among visual signs Augustine includes:
— nodding;
— the motions of the hands;
— gestures and the movements of their members by actors and pan-
tomimes;
— banners and military ensigns and standards (vexilla).
— written words as visual signs of spoken words.
Sound. Among the many signs that pertain to the sense of hearing, Augus-
tine lists:
— spoken words;
— the sound of the trumpet, the flute, and the harp.
Smell. Among olfactory signs he includes the following:
— the odor of the ointment with which Jesus’ feet were anointed.
Taste.
— The Eucharist.
. «Given signs are those which living creatures show to one other for the purpose
of conveying, in so far as they are able, the emotions of their spirits or something which
they have sensed or understood. Nor is there any reason for signifying, or for giving signs,
except for bringing forth and transferring to another mind the action of the mind in the
person who gives the sign. We propose to consider and to discuss this class of signs in so
far as men are concerned with it, for even signs given by God and contained in the Holy
Scriptures are of this type also, since they were presented to us by the men who wrote
them» (Doctr. chr. , [trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, –, slightly modified]).
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Touch.
— The reference is to the healing of a woman who touches the hem of
Jesus’ garment.
Among such a great variety of signs, words have the first place.
Indeed, words are thought of as the signs par excellence. In contrast
to all the other signs, words are both quantitatively and qualitatively
predominant. Not only words are larger in number and widely used as
compared to other signs but they also possess a wider semiotic capacity,
as it were: «Words have come to be predominant among men for
signifying whatever the mind conceives if they wish to communicate
it to anyone». Language is thought of as a system of signs and it is set
aside from other signs systems because it can be used to signify and
describe all other sign systems. This feature is unique to language. No
other sign systems, except for language, can be employed to describe
all the other systems of signs. This makes language logically superior
to the other systems and, in this respect, more powerful.
. Problems of Terminology: Engels’ Interpretation of the Terms
Signum Naturale/Signum Datum
To J. Engels is due the merit of having established and worked out the
clarification of terms involved in Augustine’s division of signs. Indeed
— at least until Engels’ seminal study La doctrine du signe chez Saint
Augustin () — the division between signa naturalia and signa data
was not been properly understood. Since this branching has been a
source of confusion, let us first elucidate Augustine’s use of the terms
by reviewing Engels’ argument.
Unfortunately, there is no equivalent English translation for Au-
gustine’s terminology. The first member of Augustine’s branching —
signum naturale — has been generally translated into English as “natu-
ral sign”, while the second — signum datum — has been a hard nut to
crack for the translators. Regrettably, the history of such a term is a
quite infelicitous chapter in the history of ideas. Indeed, signum datum
. Doc. chr. ,  (eng. trans. Robertson, pp. –).
. I have treated this subject elsewhere in more details. See Gramigna .
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has been generally translated as “conventional sign”. Robertson (),
for instance, in his English translation of Augustine’s treatise, used the
term “conventional” as opposed to “natural”. Likewise, Combès and
Farges (, p. ) in the French translation S. Augustin, Le Magistère
Chrétien translated Augustine’s terms according to the opposition nat-
ural/conventional. Many other scholars translated Augustine’s terms
along the same lines (Cenacchi , p. ). As a result, these studies
bring Augustine’s division naturalia/data under the larger rubric of
natural versus conventional signs.
Yet J. Engels () pointed out that translating Augustine’s termi-
nology signa naturalia and signa data as “natural signs” and “conven-
tional signs” is inaccurate and profoundly misleading. Engels aptly
argued that such a translation is a misconception because it conceals
the rationale of Augustine’s own division of signs. Engels realized
that Augustine, with the distinction naturale/datum, did not intend
to follow the motivated/unmotivated opposition (natural vs conven-
tional), which had become traditional from Plato’s Cratylus onwards.
Instead, it was apparent that Augustine’s intention was to determine
such opposition in virtue of the presence or absence of intentionality
in the emission of signs. Engels suggests “given sign” (donnés) as a
more appropriate term for translating Augustine’s signum datum. He
correctly interprets Augustine’s division of signa naturalia and signa
data as opposition between non–intentional versus intentional signs. I
endorse Engels’ thesis because it preserves Augustine’s original inten-
tion. Jackson , Todorov , and Deely  all acquiesce with
Engels’ conclusion.
. The Intentionality Argument
In light of the terminological clarification discussed above, we can now
proceed with a more detailed discussion of the division. For Augustine,
signa naturalia are «those which, without any desire or intention
of signifying, make us aware of something beyond themselves, like
smoke which signifies fire». Natural signs, thus, signify independently
from the will or desire to signify something else (sine voluntate atque
. Doctr. chr. ,  (eng. trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, ).
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ullo appetitu significandi). In other words, natural signs are “preformed
things of physical nature” and belong to «the analogical network of
nature. [. . . ] They are not made by man, but rather they are said to be
discovered» (Leckie , pp. –).
Signa data, on the contrary, are «those which living creatures show
to one other for the purpose of conveying, in so far as they are able,
the emotions of their spirits or something which they have sensed
or understood». This class of sign is the product of a voluntary
operation.
Thus, it is in plain sight that the discriminating factor for discerning
the bifurcation of the two kinds of signs is the concept of voluntas (in-
tention). This is pivotal for understanding Augustine’s division of signs.
Signa naturalia signify without the intention to signify (sine voluntate
significandi), thus the will is absent, whereas signa data are given inten-
tionally in order to show or express (ad demostrantum) the movements
of the sign–giver’s mind (motus animi), what one feels or thinks. This
is why Engels argued against the use of the term “conventional signs”
and favored the use of “given signs” because the element of inten-
tionality remains concealed in the opposition natural/conventional,
which is, instead, the distinctive feature of Augustine’s division.
To sum up, the difference between signa naturalia and signa data in
Augustine should be understood as an opposition between willed/not
willed signs, and thus the concept of intentionality is of cardinal im-
portance. With good reason, the theory of signs of the De doctrina
christiana has been called a “volitional theory” (Sirridge ). As I
pointed out earlier, this distinction was initially misunderstood. The
root of this misconception is that the naturalia/data division was ab-
sorbed in the vexed question of nomos and physis (convention versus
nature). The nominalism versus conventionalism debate does not
concern us here, since the position of Augustine does not fit into
this dualism. It suffices to say that the distinction between natural
and conventional meaning has a long pedigree and that this was the
background against which also Augustine’s division was assessed.
Some scholars have expressed perplexity towards Augustine’s divi-
sion of signs. Favareau, for instance, pointed out that
. Doctr. chr. ,  (eng. trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, –).
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Augustine’s distinction raise[s] [sic] as many questions as they propose to
answer. And among these many questions are: For whom do such natural
signs «lead to knowledge of something else» [. . . ] other than those with
«the intention or desire for using them» as such? And must the given signs
that «living beings mutually exchange in order to show [. . . ] the feelings of
their minds» be deliberately and expressly exchanged — or may they be
subconsciously performed and registered? Do animals use signa naturalia or
signa data? And in what relations toward each other do these two categories
of “natural” and “given” sign relations ontologically stand? Perhaps most
importantly of all: Is it “perception” and “awareness” on the part of some
agent that gives a sign its representational efficacy — or does the agent
merely “apprehend” a relation in the world that is already there, regardless
of its apprehension? (Favareau , p. )
Indeed, in his treatise Augustine mentions the naturalia/data divi-
sion and then quickly moves on to the real focus of the De doctrina
christiana, namely, signa data. This point is worth pondering. Because
Augustine explicitly rules out the subject of natural signification from
his treatise, a full assessment regarding signa naturalia in Augustine
cannot be satisfactorily made. The sources for signa naturalia should
be found elsewhere, and this would entail a separate study that tracks
back the debate Augustine was referring to.
As for the apprehension of signs among animals, it is important to
note that throughout Book  of the De doctrina christiana, Augustine
explicitly refers to the use of signs in animals («a cock who finds food
makes a sign with his voice to the hen so that she runs to him. And
the dove calls his mate with a cry or is called by her in turn»).
This is an aspect that deserves attention. Despite the fact that
among signa data, words are the most common and predominant
signs, this does not mean that signa data are an exclusive byproduct
of men. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence that Augustine
conceived of signa data as signs used among animals other than hu-
mans, too. The issue, however, is not treated with precision here, and
it shows Augustine’s hesitation in taking up an issue that is not directly
relevant for his enquiry: «Augustine is uncertain whether or not noises
of animals may be classed as deliberate, signa data» (Atkinson ,
. Doctr. chr. ,  (eng. trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, ). As already pointed
out, however, Augustine rules out a discussion on this subject because it is not immediately
relevant for his enquiry. Thus, both men and animals can employ signa data.
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p. ). Jackson (, p. ) contends that Augustine’s use of terms
like cogitatio and animus may lead to think that signa data have an
anthropomorphic connotation, yet the reference to “living creatures”
he makes in the definition of this type of sign is general enough to
include both men and other animals among the subjects who produce
and employ such signs.
Moreover, it is important to spell out that the issue of intentionality
in the signifying process should be considered from both ends: the
sign–giver and the sign–receiver. While signa naturalia stress the aspect
of volition from the side of the sign–receiver, signa data tend to focus
on the intentionality from the perspective of the sign–giver. We shall
return to this point in our discussion section.
. The Place of Voluntas in Augustine’s Theory of Signs
In what follows, we are concerned with three main questions: )
because the ruling principle underlying the division naturalia/data is
the concept of voluntas, an inquiry about the possible sources of this
concept is relevant; ) to assess whether this is a systematic division or
not in Augustine’s thought; ) to ascertain whether this is a distinction
of types of signs or of source or origin of signs.
The first node is particularly difficult to fathom. The concept of
voluntas in Augustine is very complex and the implications of this
notion to the idea of intentional signification is only one corner of the
issue. Previous studies conducted on Augustine’s theory of signs have
not identified one extant source that stands out for the division natu-
ralia/data but it is clear that there exist many strands of thought that
became confluent in Augustine’s sign theory and were commingled.
Atkinson () regards Aristotle as a plausible source for Augustine
because they share several principles regarding the treatment of words.
Like Augustine, Aristotle also regards words as signs or symbols. It is
worth mentioning Aristotle’s passage of the De interpretatione, where
he discusses words:
. For a treatment of the issue of the place of the signs of animals in Augustine’s
classification, see Eco . See also Sirridge .
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By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention [. . . ]. The limitation
“by convention” was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or
name — it is only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds such as
those which brutes produce are significant, yet none of these constitute a
noun.
Like Augustine, Aristotle conceives of written words as signs of spo-
ken words. Moreover, both concur that words express the “affection
of the soul”. Lastly, there is an apparent analogy between Augustine’s
distinction of signa naturalia and signa data and Aristotle’s distinction
between natural and conventional meaning (Atkinson , p. ).
Despite the numerous analogies between the two thinkers, unlike
Augustine, Aristotle did not include the concept of the will in his
treatment of signs. Nevertheless, there is a good reason to believe that
Aristotle should not be dismissed as a source for Augustine (Atkinson
, p. ). And yet, since Aristotle disregarded the notion of will in
his theory, the question we seek to answer cannot be satisfactorily
determined.
Arguably, there is also a striking analogy between Augustine and
Aristotle with regard to the example of facial expression as natu-
ral signs. In the pseudo–Aristotelian treatise Physiognomica, Aristotle
refers to the «doctrines of the semeiotics of human character» and
writes:
Gesture and the varieties of facial expression are interpreted by their affinity
to different emotions: if, for instance, when disagreeably affected, a man
takes on the look which normally characterizes an angry person, irascibility
is signified.
It is also true that gestures, hands movements, and facial expres-
sions played a crucial role in rhetoric, in which Augustine was well–
versed. A possible source for Augustine reference to gestures and
facial expressions as signs might well be Cicero (Cary ). Likewise,
the illustration of smoke as a sign of fire also shows that Augustine
was particularly cognizant of the Stoic theory of meaning, where this
example is recurrent. Although fire is not visible, common experience
. De int. : a, –.
. “Physiognomica”, eng. trans. by T. Loveday and E.S. Forster, in The Works of Aristotle,
, b, –.
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establishes a connection between visible smoke and (unseen) fire.
Thus, smoke is taken as a sign of fire not by virtue of an arbitrary
determination but because of a common recorded experience among
mankind. In other words, such a knowledge — the inference that if
there is smoke, then there is fire — is acquired from a preexisting
experience that linked one event (smoke) with another (fire). Augus-
tine’s example of the smoke as a natural sign of fire, clearly echoes the
Stoic “admonitive sign”, and he probably shapes the idea of signum
naturale on the model of the Stoics.
The Stoics had a very complex and sophisticated semiotics. The
Stoic theory of meaning identified two classes of beings, namely,
the given and the non–given. The Stoics had a threefold division of
non–given things: ) completely non–given; ) obscure at the time;
and ) obscure by nature (Allen , p. ). The example of smoke
signifying fire — which Augustine reiterates in his own theory —
is catalogued among the second class of non–given things and later
understood as “admonitive sign”.
The Stoics distinguished between the “Indicative sign” and the
“Admonitive sign”:
The object of our knowledge we find distinguished as either evident or
obscure. That we can know of the things evident is plain, but can we know
of the things obscure? Shall this be the case it must be by some sign, by
some thing evident, and this sign be either by its own nature a priori and
absolutely indicative of that which is obscure, or as one of two appearances
formerly remarked by us, in connection and relation one with another,
remind us of the other subject of that relation, now accidentally removed
from apprehension. Thus, motion would be held to be an indicative sign of
the principle of life, and smoke be an admonitive sign of fire, or scar of the
wound. (Prentice , p. )
The point of interest is that Augustine seems to retain the Stoic idea
of the “admonitive sign” and yet he adds to it the factor of volition or
intentionality (voluntas), which he most likely draws from the field of
forensic rhetoric, with which he was acquainted.
To sum up, at present is not possible to identify one particular
extant source for Augustine’s distinction of signum naturale/datum
but rather a bundle of possible sources that are combined in a quite
original way. As it will be seen, the division of signa naturalia and signa
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data, will be taken up in contemporary semiotics, albeit in a slightly
different fashion.
The next point to consider is whether the distinction of natu-
ral/given signs is systematic in Augustine’s thought. E. Martinez
() has argued that such a division is not systematic but pedagogic
in its essence and purpose because the distinction is limited to the De
doctrina christiana and does not recur elsewhere. On closer scrutiny,
however, one may argue that the idea of natural signs is present in the
De trinitate, as Daniels (; ) poignantly remarked. Moreover,
the tenet of the process of signifying understood as an act of giving
signs is found both in the De dialectica and in the De magistro. Despite
the fact that the duet natural/given sign is specific to the De doctrina
chirstiana, there is enough evidence that the principle of the signifying
process, and speaking in particular, is couched in terms of “giving
signs” also in other works.
The third and last issue to ponder is whether the division of natu-
ral/given signs is a division that has to do with the origin of signs or
whether it shows that these are two kinds of signs. B.E. Rollin ()
tackled this pivotal issue. He unraveled this dilemma and concluded that
the distinction between natural and conventional meaning was primarily
intended to mark two sources of meaning [. . . ]. What I also wish to claim
is that a systematic confusion [. . . ] grew out of this aspect of the distinction.
What was meant to mark a difference in origin came to be taken as a
marking a difference in kind. (Rollin , p. )
This point is of paramount importance and it is applicable to the
division we have been discussing up to now. The matrix of the division
of signs in Augustine rests upon the idea that signs have different
sources, and as such, can be differentiated into natural and given.
As we shall see in what follows, the “systematic confusion” that
Rollin referred to is reflected in the debate on natural and conventional
semiosis in the field of semiotics.
. The Contemporary Debate on Natural and Given Signs in Semiotics
A glance at the literature on the history of semiotics testifies to the
same unhappy association discussed above, namely to conceive the
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division of natural/given signs in terms of natural and conventional
meaning. Winfried Nöth, for instance, in his Handbook of Semiotics
writes, «Augustine opposed natural and conventional signs» (Nöth
, p. ). The literature on semiotics that uses a similar distinction
is abundant (Clark , p. ; Danesi , p. ; Jensen , p.; Pelc
).
Moreover, the division between natural signs and given signs is
often taken as an opposition between natural and conventional mean-
ing, leading to the branching of semiotics into two distinct areas:
a “semiotics of signification”, which studies unintentional semiosis,
and a “semiotics of communication”, which focuses on intentional
semiosis. To give a flavour of these two trends, in the first front (the
semiotics of signification) we can include, first of all, R. Barthes (),
who advocates for the inclusion of all sign systems as object of study
of semiology, and J. Ruesch () who extends the study of communi-
cation also to its nonintentional forms. In turn, those who fall into the
“semiotics of communication” trend, rule out nonintentional forms
of expression from the object of semiotics. The most well–known
advocates of this view are Buyssens (), Martinet (), Prieto
(; ), and Segre ().
The original division natural/given signs gave rise to multifarious
vocabularies that most often do not overlap. In certain contexts, the
idea of naturalness was assessed against the background of artificiality,
yielding to the opposition of “natural” versus “artificial” scenarios in
which signs are created and used. Schaff (, p. ), for instance,
distinguishes between “natural signs” and “artificial signs”, also called
“proper signs”. Among the class of natural signs Schaff includes indices
and symptoms. Schaff follows Martinak (), who had distinguished
between “real signs” and “finalistic signs”.
Along the same lines, Jakobson distinguished signs according to
their mode of production and singled out signs produced ad hoc and
things used as signs: «the signs ad hoc produced by some part of the
human body either directly or through the medium of special instru-
ments» and «a semiotic display of ready made objects» ( Jakobson 
[], p. ).
. For a good overview on these two general trends, see Ponzio .
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. Some Contemporary Interpretations of Augustine’s Division:
R.A. Markus
There has been an interesting debate between Markus and Jackson
on the accurate interpretation of Augustine’s distinction between
signa naturalia/data. This specifically concerns Markus’s reading of
Augustine’s natural/given signs.
Augustine’s definition of signum is generally regarded as involving a
triadic relation. Markus (, pp. –) has argued that the three terms
of this relation are: ) the object or significatum; ) the thing itself;
and ) the subject. On the basis of this triadic structure of the sign,
Markus initially interprets the distinction of signa naturalia and signa
data «according to whether the relation of dependence is between the
sign and the object, or between the sign and the subject» (Markus
, p. ). His triadic model of the sign is thus modelled in dyads
in order to account for the distinction. Viewed from this theoretical
perspective, signa naturalia entail a dyadic relation between sign and
object, whereas signa data presuppose a two–term relation between
sign and subject. Moreover, drawing on Peirce’s semiotic terminology,
Markus used the term “symptom” to refer to signa naturalia and
“symbol” for signa data. This is how Markus describes the issue:
I shall call this type of sign [signa naturalia] “symptoms”. A “symptom” [. . . ] is
anything which “goes together with” that of which it is taken to be the sign.
It may be a “symptom” in the conventional sense, a “portent”, or “evidence”
in a more general sense; it might depend on its significatum as an effect on
its cause, as for instance, smoke depends on fire; it might be a part of a total
condition as a rash is of measles; or it might give rise to its significatum, as a
southwesterly wind may both bring and signify rain. (Markus , p. )
A “symbol” in his [Peirce’s] terminology denotes roughly the same
sort of sign as Augustine’s signa data: «A symbol is a sign which refers
to an object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of
general ideas, which operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted
as referring to that object» (Markus , p. ).
We must express some reservations regarding Markus’s interpreta-
tion of Augustine’s distinction. The first point to be addressed is the
claim that a symbol for Peirce amounts to a relation between sign
and interpreter. In point of fact, both types of sign (index and symbol)
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have to do with the relation between the sign to its object. Thus, the
separation of symptom and symbol «according to whether the relation
of dependence is between the sign and the object, or between the sign
and the subject» (Markus , p. ) does not hold, or at least does
not overlap with Peirce’s conception.
More importantly, however, Markus proposes, as the basis of the
division, a ratio that does not overlap with Augustine’s. Markus’s inter-
pretation reduces Augustine’s natural signs to an argument of causality
or real connection between signs and object. We express reservations
towards such a parallel. As shown earlier, the crux of the matter is differ-
ent — namely, whether the source of the sign is natural and involuntary
or voluntary. Finally, Markus claims that «what we are dealing with is
the distinction between the two fundamentally different types of sign»
(Markus , p. ). This view is far from being accurate since what
we are dealing with in Augustine’s division is not a matter or kind but
an explication of the source of signs. Rollin underlined this important
aspect: «The natural–conventional meaning dualism is a mode of classi-
fying the origins of meanings. To argue from a difference in origin to a
difference in kind is mistaken» (Rollin , p. ).
. Jackson’s Interpretation: Significance and Occurrence of Signs
Jackson does not comment upon Markus’s terminology, although he
is critical in relation to Markus’s interpretation of signa data, that is,
Markus’s view that, in the case of signa data, «the thing or event which
is the sign is the product of the sign–maker’s activity and owes its
significance entirely to this» (Markus , p.). Jackson takes issues
with Markus and claims that Markus stretched Augustine’s position to
far by arguing that «signa data depend upon the will of the sign–giver
for their significance» ( Jackson , p. ).
Jackson puts forward an important clarification, although not widely
known, in regard to the discussion of Augustine’s division of signa nat-
uralia and signa data. He singles out two separate aspects that should
be taken into account when discussing such a division. These two
aspects are the “occurrence” and the “significance” of a sign. Jackson
has specified that, when Augustine speaks of signa data, he has solely
in mind the occurrence of a sign: «For all that Augustine says here
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is that signa data depend upon the will of the sign–giver for their
occurrence, not for their meaning» ( Jackson , p. ). Thus, at least
in the first part of his treatise, Augustine is concerned primarily with
the occurrence of signs, which therefore occur willingly (signa data)
or unwillingly (signa naturalia).
For an explication of the additional aspect Jackson singles out,
namely, the “significance” of a sign, we must turn to a further section
of the De doctrina christiana:
Augustine says that certain letters and sounds mean one thing to the Latins,
another to the Greeks, not because of nature but because each society has its
own agreement and consent as to their significance (non natura, sed placito
et consensione significandi, .., – and ff.). Thus, in De doctrina, at
least, Augustine holds that an important class of signs (letters and sounds)
has significance by convention. ( Jackson , p. )
Jackson, thus, concludes that the concept of intentionality in respect
to meaning making is twofold: «Augustine speaks of will with respect
to both occurrence and the significance of signs» ( Jackson , p. ).
I endorse ninety per cent of Jackson’s interpretation. I must, however,
express some criticism towards his argument with regard to natural
signs. As far as Jackson’s argument goes, Augustine refers to the will
in respect to both signa data and signa naturalia and with respect to
both occurrence and significance of signs. Signa data occur willingly
and their significance is established by a covenant in which consent and
agreement are essential. The explication of signa naturalia, however,
leaves something to be desired. It is true that these signs occur naturally,
that is, without will from the side of the sign–giver. However, I am not
completely sure that we can talk about significance by nature in respect
to signa naturalia, as Jackson seems to imply ( Jackson , p. ). I would
rather argue that, although signa naturalia occur without will from the
part of the sign–giver, for their significance we would need a covenant
and a willed consent about the meaning of such signs.
. Conclusions
A recapitulation of the main highlights of the problem of intention in
meaning includes the following points:
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— it is misleading to equate the Augustinian division of signs into
naturalia and data to the doublet “natural” and “conventional
signs”. Although the translation of signa naturalia in “natural
signs” did not cause problems, using “conventional signs” for
signa data obfuscates the distinction;
— for Augustine, signa naturalia are involuntary (occur without
intention of signifying) and signa data are deliberate, are given,
they occur because a living being wills that they do so;
— the division of signa naturalia and signa data is a systematic division;
— such a distinction has to do with the source of signs rather than
with the types of signs;
— semiotics has employed similar distinctions of signs producing
a multifarious terminology that most often does not overlap
and sometimes has distorted the original meaning that such a
division was meant to display.
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 : Il doppio eccesso dell’intenzionalità e la politica del perfor-
mativo in Judith Butler
: This article focuses on Judith Butler’s analysis of linguistic vio-
lence in Excitable Speech (), which connects the American debate on
linguistic violence with the theoretical question of the intentionality of
utterance. The connection is particularly thought–provoking, for it gives
rise to the relation between intentionality and embodiment. The idea
of linguistic violence, indeed, presupposes the power of an utterance
to act on a body, to injure a body exercising a force on it. The article
shows how, in Butler’s thought, this connection between intentionality
and embodiment entails a reformulation of the idea of intentionality
within a horizon in which the subject reacquires a bodily dimension and
a relation with alterity.
: Hate Speech; Speech Act; Intentionality Constitution; Resignifi-
cation.
. Introduction
In this paper, I will dwell on Judith Butler’s analysis of linguistic vi-
olence in Excitable Speech (). In this work, Butler connects the
American debate on linguistic violence, inaugurated by M. Matsuda’s
influential book Words that wound, with the theoretical question
of the intentionality of utterance. This connection is particularly
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thought–provoking because what emerges from it is the relation be-
tween intentionality and embodiment. Indeed, the idea of linguistic
violence presupposes the power of utterance to act on a body, to
injure a body exercising a force on it.
I will show how, in Butler’s though, this connection between in-
tentionality and embodiment entails the exigency of a reformulation
of the idea of intentionality. In this sense, Butler supports Derrida’s
critic of the traditional idea of intentionality and his attempt to over-
come the link between intentionality and the idea of a self–founding,
self–aware and disembodied subject, which masters its act and its
language and that, starting from itself, constitutes and gives sense to
reality by its intentional acts.
In Butler’s perspective, the idea of intentionality should be resigni-
fied in a horizon in which the subject reacquires a bodily dimension
and a relation with alterity.
. The Illocutionary Model of Hate Speech
In Excitable Speech, Butler analyses the illocutionary model of hate
speech as a model according to which the addressee is constituted
as a subordinated subject who is not allowed to renegotiate and to
discuss its subordinated position. In her analysis of hate speech, Butler
makes extensive use of Austin’s theory of speech acts. Her first aim is
to understand if Austin considers hate speech an illocutionary or an
perlocutionary speech act.
As stated by Sbisà (, p. ), in Austin the differentiation between
the perlocutionary and the illocutionary aspect of speech acts is based
on the distinction between nature and culture. In How to Do Things
with Words to Austin argues:
The illocutionary act “takes effect” in certain ways, as distinguished from
producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in
the “normal” way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events. (, p. )
Instead of hinging on the respect of conventional conditions, as in the
case of illocution, the performative effect of a perlocutionary act is linked
to the possibility of producing extralinguistic consequences that have to
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do with the feelings, the thoughts or the actions of the addressee and
that are not necessarily determined by the direct and deliberate will of
the utterer. These extralinguistic consequences take place in the act of
the utterance, therefore they are connected with the locutionary and the
illocutionary aspects of speech acts. For this reason, the perlocutionary
aspect of speech acts is not detached from what Austin calls “total linguistic
situation” that is a set of rules and conventional conditions that a speech
act has to respect to be effective (Sbisà , p. ).
According to Austin, insults are perlocutionary speech acts and, as
Butler highlights, he uses the case of the insult as an example to clarify
that the consequences of a speech act are not always intentional (Butler
, p. ). In Austin’s discourse, as Butler suggests, although hate
speech takes place in the total linguistic situation, it does not depend
on the conventions that the speech act fulfils at the moment of the
utterance. Hence, in Austin’s discourse, hate speech is “individual” and
“occasional”, to the extent that is impossible to foresee with certainty
its consequences (Austin , p. ). Using and, at the same time,
betraying Austin’s theory, Butler analyses the consequences of the
illocutionary model of hate speech.
As Butler observes:
According to this illocutionary model, hate speech constitutes its addressee
at the moment of its utterance; it does not describe an injury or produce one
as a consequence; it is, in the very speaking of such speech, the performance
of the injury itself, where the injury is understood as social subordination.
(Butler , p. )
Hate speech, considered as an illocutionary speech act, does not
simply act on the addressee, but rather it constitutes the addressee at
the moment of the utterance.
Though Butler uses here the phenomenological notion of “consti-
tution”, she distances herself from some of the fundamental principles
of this philosophical tradition.
In phenomenology, the concept of constitution is deeply linked with
the concept of intentionality. Sokolowsky in The Formation of Husserl’s
Concept of Constitution, observes that, according to Husserl (above all
in the Logical Investigations), every intentional act operates a double
constitution: «in every objectivating act, a meaning is constituted and
an object is constituted as meant» (, p. ). In other words, inten-
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tional objectivating acts constitute both a meaning (Bedeutung) and a
referent. In Husserl’s discourse, constitution is «the manner in which
an object is formed and given its particular structure and attributes
by certain a–priori acts of consciousness» (Moran and Cohen , p.
). Therefore, constitution, in Husserl’s thought, does not create but
rather structures the object through an operation in which the object
acquires a meaning. In the phenomenological theory, the concept of
constitution is profoundly connected with the idea of an intentional
consciousness. Indeed, constitution «is an achievement of intentional
consciousness. Husserl thinks of constitution not so much as an active
constructing (Aufbau) by the subject and more as a particular manner
in which meaning is disclosed» (ibidem, p. ).
In an essay titled Performative Act and Gender Constitution: An Essay
in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, Butler writes:
Though phenomenology sometimes appears to assume the existence of
a choosing and constituting agent prior to language (who poses as the
sole source of its constituting acts), there is also a more radical use of the
doctrine of constitution that takes the social agent as an object rather than
the subject of constitutive acts. (Butler , p. )
Unquestionably, this “more radical use of the doctrine of consti-
tution” is influenced by the “constitution of subject” formulated by
Foucault, who remains one of the most important reference points in
Butler’s thought. In Foucault, subject is not the constituent source of
reality, but rather it is constituted by processes of constitution which
have to do both with practices of subjection and with practices of
emancipation (cf. Foucault , p. ).
The main difference between Butler’s idea of constitution and
the phenomenological one is the fact that according to Butler this
operation does not take place in the instantaneity of a present. On the
contrary, for Butler, these processes of constitution take place through
linguistic practices that, because of their ritual–conventional character,
exceeds the presence of the intentional consciousness.
This search of a wider temporal dimension is the main reason for
the displacement of hate speech from the field of perlocution to the
field of illocution.
This displacement, as I will try to show, has significant conse-
quences on the question of intentionality and on its relation to con-
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stitution. Indeed, in the phenomenological thought, the connection
between intentionality and constitution takes place in the presence of
consciousness in which the intentional act occurs.
As Deely points out in Intentionality and Semiotics: «The Husserlian
intentionality begins with the consciousness as being directed toward
or related to its objects» (, p. ). The displacement of the consti-
tutive dimension of hate speech beyond the presence of consciousness
inevitably entails a resignification of the notion of intentionality. The
illocutionary model of hate speech provokes this displacement of the
constitutive dimension of hate speech beyond the present in which
hate speech is uttered. Indeed, according to Austin, on the one hand,
illocutionary acts do what they say in the moment of that saying,
but, on the other hand, their force and their effectiveness is due to
the iteration of conventional, ritual or ceremonial formulas whose
institution precedes and exceeds the present in which an utterance is
uttered.
. Intentionality and Iterability
When Butler states that iterability is the main feature of illocutionary
speech acts, she explicitly refers to Derrida’s Signature, Event, Context,
published in  (cf. Butler , p. ). In this significant essay,
Derrida inaugurates a critical analysis of the theory of speech acts
that will continue with his  work Limited Inc. that is an answer to
Searle’s critic of his interpretation of Austin (cf. Reiterating the Difference.
A Reply to Derrida, pp. –).
In Signature, Event, Context, Derrida calls into question the relation
of speech acts with the presence of the utterer, of the addressee and
of the context. In this work, Derrida disengages speech acts from the
present of utterance and connects them with the idea of writing. If
a speech act is considered as writing, it becomes a part of a produc-
tive machine that works beyond the presence of the utterer, of the
addressee and of the context. The way in which this writing machine
works is the iteration of the utterance. What Derrida calls “writing”
can be defined as the possibility of its iterability which does not need
the presence of the author of the utterance. Written signs, according
to Derrida, are characterised by their force of breaking with their
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context. In other words, they are characterised by their “essential
drifting” (, p. ) that exposes them to the possibility of being
re–written otherwise. This idea of writing, in Derrida’s thought, is
not referred to the written sign in a narrow sense, but it is referred to
every operation that has to do with the construction of a text.
As Moati suggests in Derrida/Searle. Deconstruction and Ordinary Lan-
guage (, p. ), Searle, in his critic of Derrida’s interpretation of
Austin, asserts that since Derrida disregards Austin’s distinction be-
tween perlocutionary and illocutionary speech acts, he does not give
relevance to the conventional force of illocution (cf. also Sbisà , p.
). As a matter of fact, Derrida highlights the conventional aspect of the
illocutionary force of speech acts, showing that the idea of “convention”
is necessarily linked to the idea of repetition and iteration.
This connection of speech acts with their iterability has significant
repercussions on the question of intentionality both in Derrida’s and
in Butler’s thought because it questions the coincidence between the
source of intention and what intentionally the utterer intends to say.
What Derrida calls voloir–dire, which translates Husserl’s Bedeutung,
exceeds the presence of the utterer. This means that intentionality is
no longer situated in the presence of an intentional consciousness that
completely masters its voloir–dire.
Derrida’s connection of speech acts with their iterability does not
question the concept of intentionality, but rather its telos (, p. ).
In the phenomenological concept of intentionality, intentions are not
always fulfilled. Nevertheless, fulfillment is the telos of every intention.
An intention is realised only when it is fulfilled by the presence of
the intentioned object (cf. Derrida , p. ). The iterability of
speech acts questions this relation between intentionality and its telos
and, with it, all the values such as consciousness, presence, original
intention, etc. that the phenomenological thought connects with the
idea of intentionality.
As stated by Derrida, intention «is divided and deported in advance,
by its iterability, towards others, removed (écartée) in advance from
itself» (ibidem, p. ). For Derrida, this division is not provisional as in
the phenomenological idea of intentionality. This situation in which
intentionality is divided and deported becomes in Derrida the con-
dition of possibility of intentionality. Intentionality is, in Derrida’s
thought, the infinite and not provisional deferral of fulfilment.
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The idea of writing as a linguistic machine has often been consid-
ered as a total displacement of the question of intentionality on the
side of the addressee (cf. Eco , p.  et seq.). As a matter of fact,
as Culler highlights, what emerges from the connection of the illocu-
tionary force of speech acts with their iterability is not the absolute
independence of the utterance from the utterer’s intention and from
the context of reference. Rather, what emerges from this connection
is the possibility to “graft” the utterance in another context and the
impossibility to circumscribe the context and to control it in its totality
(cf. Culler , p.  et seq.). In Derrida’s thought, in Culler’s words:
«Meaning is context–bound, but context is boundless» (, p. ).
This possibility of recontextualization, of “grafting”, is fundamental
in Butler’s analysis of hate speech.
. Ritual Aspects of Hate Speech
In Excitable Speech, Butler starts from Derrida’s connection between
the illocutionary force of speech acts and their iterability, but her orig-
inality consists in an attempt to displace the discourse from writing to
body.
In her afterword to The Scandal of Speaking Body by Fellman, Butler
says that Derrida, highlighting the connection between speech acts
and writing, obliterates the relation between speech acts and their
organic and bodily dimension. In other words, according to Butler,
Derrida moves to the background the relation of speech acts with
the physical act of utterance. If, on the contrary, the speech act is
reconnected with its bodily dimension, according to Butler, it «loses
its claim to sovereignty in a different way than it does when recast as
writing» (, p. ).
In Performative Act and Gender Constitution, Butler defines body as
«an intentionally organized materiality», that «is always an embody-
ing of possibilities both conditioned and circumscribed by historical
conventions» (, p. ).
This passage from intentional consciousness to a body intended as an
intentionally organised materiality, is important and crucial because it
displaces the focus on an embodied subject that is not only constituent
but also, and first of all, constituted (cf. Butler , p. ).
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The effect of hate speech, as Butler claims, is the constitution of
this embodied subject as a subordinated subject. The idea of this
constitution implies, as mentioned above, the displacement of hate
speech from the field of perlocution to the field of illocution.
Whereas perlocution produces effects in a consequent future, illo-
cution produces instantaneous effects. But, as Butler points out, these
instantaneous effects depend on the repetition of a ritual–conventional
formula.
Illocutionary acts presuppose, as Butler observes, an authority con-
ferred by an institution or by a tradition which enables someone to
repeat a ritual scene which involves not only verbal but also extra–verbal
elements such as the fact that the utterance should occur in a specific
place, that the utterer has to be dressed in a particular way, etc.
If hate speech is effective, according to Butler, the moment of the
institution of the conventional/ritual formula and its authorization
seems to be coming from an immemorial time which does not have a
place in history.
This impossibility of situating this moment of institution, in which
hate speech receives its force and the possibility to be effective, makes
hate speech appear as not–instituted and hence not–conventional. This
means that to be effective, hate speech has to look like a perlocution,
in other words, it has to pretend to be independent of the institution
of the convention and of the authorization of the utterance.
This perlocutionary semblance of hate speech is, according to Butler,
the primary condition of its force and effectiveness. That the hate speech
seems to be independent from the institution of a convention entails
that its effect seems to depend on a particular situation of the addressee,
on his/her psychological attitudes, for example on his/her particular
sensitivity, or on the occasional relation between the utterer and the
addressee (cf. Sbisà , p. ). This perlocutionary façade of hate
speech consists in the fact that its effects seem to depend on how the
addressee is, that is to say, on the “being” of the addressee. In the illusory
connection with the “being” of the addressee, hate speech occults its
constitutive character, that is to say, the fact that in the moment of the
utterance hate speech constitutes the being of the addressee because it
is «bringing into being what it names» (Butler , p. ).
For Austin, the non–conventionality of perlocution is connected
with its irreversibility. This illusory irreversibility of hate speech is
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what prevents the addressee from reacting and renegotiating the sub-
ordinated position that the hate speech constitutes.
To effectively constitute a subordinated subject, hate speech has to
exercise what Butler calls “sovereignty effect”, that is to say, it should
be able to exclude every possibility of renegotiating the subordinating
relation. For this purpose, this “effect of sovereignty” consists in the
occultation of the constitutive power of hate speech.
If this constitutive power is occulted, the subordinating relation ap-
pears as a natural state of fact, as a situation that is neither changeable
nor negotiable.
Analysing the illocutionary model of hate speech, Butler foregrounds,
firstly, its constitutive aspect, that is to say, the fact that hate speech con-
stitutes a subordinated subject and, secondly, shows that its force and
effectiveness depends on the dissimulation of this constitutive aspect.
Butler describes this dissimulation as the illusory loss of context, the illu-
sory loss of spatial and temporal borders that delimits the effectiveness
of hate speech.
Butler writes:
To be injured by speech is to suffer a loss of context, that is, not to know
where you are. [. . . ] The capacity to circumscribe the situation of the speech
act is jeopardized at the moment of injurious address. To be addressed
injuriously is not only to be open to an unknown future, but not to know
the time and place of injury, and to suffer the disorientation of one’s situation
as the effect of such speech. (Butler , pp. –)
Highlighting its illocutionary aspect, Butler recontextualizes hate
speech. This operation of recontextualization consists in connect-
ing the present in which hate speech is uttered both with the rit-
ual/conventional situation that it iterates and with the moment in
which the authority of uttering the hate speech is conferred.
Butler writes:
Who speaks when convention speaks? In what time does convention speak?
In some sense, it is an inherited set of voices, an echo of others who speak
as the “I”. (Ibidem, p. )
If hate speech is considered as illocutionary, the identification of the
source of its intentionality becomes very difficult because of the rit-
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ual/conventional character of illocution which overcomes the present
of the consciousness.
Butler agrees with Derrida when he considers the conventional
character of illocution as what disengages intentionality from the
presence of consciousness (cf. ibidem, p. ).
Analysing the illocutionary model of hate speech, Butler focuses
her attention both on its conventional/ritual character and on its link
with authority. Both these aspects displace intentionality beyond the
intentional consciousness. Indeed, in the illocutionary model of hate
speech, the uttering subject turns out to be an impersonal, collec-
tive social and political subject. Therefore, the intentionality of hate
speech, which precedes both the utterer and the addressee, on the
one hand, constitutes the utterer as who has the authority to utter
the hate speech and, on the other hand, constitutes the addressee
as a subordinated subject. This means that uttering the hate speech,
the utterer does a double linguistic work. Firstly, he works for itself,
producing a consequent and deferred effect in the addressee. Secondly,
he works for a social order that is reaffirmed and reproduced through
a hidden process of repetition, which ritualises a power relation, thus
freezing it in a time without history and institutive moments. This
function of language, that Rossi–Landi calls “social reproduction” (cf.
, p.  et seq.), is crucial in Butler’s analysis of hate speech because
is the moment in which hate speech works beyond the control both
of the utterer and of the addressee.
. Recontextualization and Resignification
Butler’s analysis of the conditions of effectiveness of hate speech ques-
tions what Derrida indicated as the two fundamental principles of
the phenomenological idea of intentionality, i.e. the fact that inten-
tionality has as source the presence of consciousness, and the telos of
fulfilment.
In the illocutionary model of hate speech, as mentioned above, the
source of intentionality is displaced beyond the presence of the utterer
because of the ritual/conventional character of illocution. Hate speech
works through the dissimulation of its constitutive effect. This dissim-
ulation is what produces, in the case of hate speech, this semblance of
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fulfilment, which hinders every possibility to reinterpret the subordi-
nating relation that hate speech establishes. This effect of fulfilment of
hate speech is one of the main conditions of its effectiveness.
Butler writes:
Even if hate speech works to constitute a subject through discursive means,
is that constitution necessarily final and effective? Is there a possibility of
disrupting and subverting the effects produced by such speech, a faultline
exposed that leads to the undoing of this process of discursive constitution?
What kind of power is attributed to speech such that speech is figured as having
the power to constitute the subject with such success? (Butler , p. )
The problem of the possibility of resistance to linguistic violence is
essential in Butler’s thought. The constitution which hate speech operates
is not final and effective because what it intentions is not an object, but a
living body. Therefore, in Butler’s analysis, body is both what is vulnerable
to linguistic violence, and the possibility to resist to it.
Hate speech inscribes a body in a subordinated social position
through an act of nomination that only apparently is objective and de-
scriptive and in which only apparently the conditions of effectiveness
are individual and occasional.
Thus, the act of calling an injurious name is, as stated by Butler,
«not descriptive but inaugurative» (Butler , p. ) and its reiterative
operation has the effect of sedimenting its “positionality” over time.
In this sense, hate speech, because of its ritual–conventional struc-
ture, turns out to be a political act whose effectiveness is linked to the
dissimulation of this political character.
By the act of the attribution of an injurious name, Butler argues,
what is situated in a system of relations is not a disembodied conscious-
ness but rather a living body. If hate speech is effective it involves body:
hate speech immobilises a body materially depriving it of the freedom
of movement, and, at the same time depriving it of the freedom of
speech, that is to say, of the possibility to question the subordinating
relation that hate speech institutes or confirms.
Because of its illocutionary and performative power, hate speech
is an action of a body on another body. Indeed it, according to illocu-
tionary model, is not only the prefiguration of violence but rather a
violent act, because it can injure a body immobilising it in a subordi-
nate position. For this reason, when we say that the words wound, we
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are not using a metaphorical expression. The hate speech effectively,
and not metaphorically, constitutes an injured subject, constitutes a
body which can have access only to some locations, that have to move
only in a certain way, that has to wear only certain clothes.
The body which hate speech constitutes is forced to perform itself
by the institution of an habitus. But, the moment of this institution is
erased. That’s why this performance does not appear as such. Rather,
it appears as the only “natural” possibility of being of that subject. Is
this the sense in which Butler says that body is constituted by speech
acts as an “intentionally organized materiality”, that «is always an
embodying of possibilities both conditioned and circumscribed by
historical conventions» (Buttler , p. ).
The relation between language and body is a question which is
extremely relevant in the whole theoretical work of Butler, who, on
the one hand, highlights language as constitutive of body and, on the
other hand, never stops reaffirming the impossibility to reduce body
to its linguistic construction.
In Senses of Subject Butler observes:
For my purposes, I think it must be possible to claim that the body is not
known or identifiable apart from the linguistic coordinates that establish
the boundaries of the body— without thereby claiming that the body is
nothing other than the language by which it is known [. . . ]
The body escapes its linguistic grasp, but so, too, does it escape the sub-
sequent effort to determine ontologically that very escape. The very de-
scription of the extralinguistic body allegorizes the problem of the chiasmic
relation between language and body and so fails to supply the distinction it
seeks to articulate. (Butler , pp. –)
In Bodies that Matter, Butler defines this process of linguistic consti-
tution of body as a process of materialization:
The process of that sedimentation or what we might call materialization
will be a kind of citationality, the acquisition of being through the citing of
power, a citing that establishes an originary complicity with power in the
formation of the “I”. (Butler , p. )
Whereas the first cornerstone of intentionality, i. e. its connec-
tion with the presence of consciousness, is questioned by the con-
ventional/ritual character of illocution, the second cornerstone of
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intentionality, i.e. the telos of fulfilment, is questioned by a chiasmic
relation between language and body. In this relation, language materi-
alises body, but, at the same time, body exceeds language and escapes
to every attempt of totalization. Butler writes:
That the speech act is a bodily act does not mean that the body is fully
present in its speech. The relationship between speech and the body is that
of a chiasmus. Speech is bodily, but the body exceeds the speech it occasions;
and speech remains irreducible to the bodily means of its enunciation. (,
pp. –)
In line with Foucault, Butler connects this excedence of body with the
unavoidable relation between subjection and subjectivation. Attributing
an injurious name, hate speech recognises a social group and produces
subjects and the possibility of their agency (, p. ). Butler suggests
that the injurious name is also the name that recognises and, for this
reason, it can be resignified, grafted in another context and thus used as
an instrument of resistance to the subordinating relation.
The possibility of resistance consists in an unauthorised use of lan-
guage, in a process of appropriation and resignification of the words
of power. This process of resignification is not simply a “free inter-
pretation”. It is not the interpretative act of an “external” and disem-
bodied consciousness. On the contrary, this process of resignification
is embodied in that body which is materialised by the processes of
sedimentation of speech acts. When the subordinated subject uses the
injurious word to nominate itself, he/she pronounces the word of
dominant discourse with his/her own voice, starting from the body
itself that the injurious name has materialised.
The subject who acts in this process of resignification, that is the
possibility of resistance to linguistic violence, is an embodied sub-
jectivity, which does not speak starting from itself, which does not
“invent” its own language, which does not self–found itself. On the
contrary, this resistant embodied subjectivity is vulnerable to language
and exposed to recognition. It speaks through the other’s language,
starting from a body constituted by the other, it uses the words of
the dominant discourse, but displacing and recontextualising them. In
this act of resignification, the performative turns out to be not only
reproduction and reiteration of a past but, rather, the production of
the possibility of a radically different future (Butler , p. ).
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This dislocation of the words of the dominant discourse is not
a reappropriation of language, is not a moment in which the sub-
ject takes back the control of intentionality and reaffirms its absolute
freedom of interpretation. Differently, this dislocation is an operation
which works starting from the fact that intentionality exceeds both
consciousness and fulfilment. Butler describes this operation of re-
contextualisation as opened and unforeseeable. And it is rather this
impossibility of control and ultimate fulfilment of this operation of
recontextualization that becomes in Butler the possibility of political
discourse: «the political promise of performative, one that positions
the performative at the center of a politics of hegemony, one that
offers an unanticipated political future for deconstructive thinking»
(Butler , p. ).
Exceeding both consciousness and fulfilment, intentionality is thus
disengaged from the theory of knowledge and from the theory of
representation. It becomes, as Butler says speaking of Sartre’s thought,
«essential structure of the being of human life» (, p. ), that is to
say, the structure of desire and imagination which are, for Butler, the
conditions of possibility of the politics of sense.
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Le intenzioni della memoria
Ipotesi per una teleologia semiotica
da Das Ghetto a A Film Unfinished
B S*
 : The Intentions of Memory: Hypothesis for a Semiotic Tele-
ology from Das Ghetto to A Film Unfinished
: In  a troupe of German servicemen shot a film in the ghetto
of Varsavia which was subsequently found in an archive only in the s.
For over  years historians used this film as a base for their studies of life
in the ghetto. In , however, another reel was discovered containing
elements which had been excluded from the first, and which made it
clear that the situations shown in Das Ghetto were for the most fruit
of a mis–en–scene, staged by the Nazis for purposes of propaganda.
Historians had placed their trust in a text without knowing its context.
In , Israeli director Yael Hersonski produced A Film Unfinished, for
the first time including in the same film Das Ghetto and the revealing 
reel, and editing everything together with testimonies of survivors and
extracts from diaries and documents belonging to those who had lived
in the ghetto. The result is a film of rare complexity, where numerous
layers of intentionality are entwined. The aim of this essay is to propose
an analysis of the dialectic of intentions inscribed in A Film Unfinished
and how this relates to Das Ghetto. Parallel to the narrative and formal
inquiry, it will be necessary to re–examine the paradigm of “textual
autonomy” and define the way in which semiotics can interface with
historical research through intentional analysis.
: A Film Unfinished; Das Ghetto; Documentary Movies; Intentio
Auctoris; Semiotics of Cinema.
∗ Università degli Studi di Torino.
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. A Film Unfinished
Nel  una troupe di militari tedeschi fu assoldata per girare un
documentario sulla vita nel ghetto di Varsavia, istituito nel  e
luogo di prigionia per migliaia di ebrei destinati da lì a essere deportati,
in buona parte al Vernichtungslager — campo di annientamento, ossia
di eliminazione immediata — di Treblinka. Il film era probabilmente
pensato, come pressoché tutto il cinema del Terzo Reich sotto l’e-
gida di Joseph Goebbels, a scopo propagandistico. La pellicola, mai
montata, trabocca di rappresentazioni delle presunte contraddizioni e
infamie degli ebrei all’interno del Ghetto, divisi in benestanti dediti
alla vita più lussuosa e in poveri, ignorati dalla loro stessa gente anche
quando ormai cadaveri nelle strade. Si tratta, in altre parole, del pro-
getto di un vero e proprio mockumentary ante litteram, basato su una
falsificazione programmatica della realtà interna al ghetto.
Le intentiones inscritte nel film erano per l’epoca abbastanza ano-
male.
La storia del girato non è delle più semplici. Una bobina di 
minuti venne ritrovata in un archivio della Germania Est intorno agli
anni ’, fu etichettata semplicemente come Das Ghetto, e divenne
subito prezioso materiale per gli storici nonostante la sua sostanziale
incompiutezza (mancava di colonna sonora e di accreditamenti ini-
ziali e finali, cioè di ogni peritesto), forse dovuta alla liquidazione del
. Sebbene sia stato il contemporaneo regime fascista a porre la massima attenzione
sul cinema come strumento di propaganda (si pensi alla nota locuzione mussoliniana
“un’arma poderosissima”, per approfondimenti cf. Manetti ), l’importanza delle imma-
gini filmate era ben nota anche ai nazisti, come dimostrano film come Triumph des Willens
(Leni Riefenstahl ) o Der ewige Jude (Fritz Hippler, capo sezione cinematografica del
Ministero della Propaganda ). L’ingerenza governativa nella produzione culturale e
cinematografica era massima, com’è tipico nei totalitarismi. Per un’analisi approfondita
della propaganda cinematografica nazista cf. Welch  (poi rivisto nel ). Tuttavia
il tipo di film di propaganda di cui stiamo trattando non è stato mai oggetto di studio
specifico.
. Si adopera qui il lemma latino in accordo con il concetto di intentio così come
formulato da Eco, su cui si focalizzerà la trattazione. La propaganda nazista si era fino
ad allora mossa su altre direzioni, e non aveva dovuto enfatizzare la miseria morale
dell’ebraismo mostrando determinati contrasti; il film in questione segna dunque un
punto di giuntura, che in sede della abietta estetica perseguita dai nazisti portava però
a una impasse, giacché per enfatizzare il contrasto gli operatori erano anche obbligati a
riprendere il volto della fame, delle malattie e della morte ingenerate dal nazismo.
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ghetto. Tuttavia nel  venne scoperto un ulteriore rullo che rivelò
gli inquietanti retroscena dietro al primo reperto, a quasi  anni di
distanza. In esso si vedono chiaramente i membri della troupe nazista
manipolare le situazioni oggetto di ripresa, ma si assiste anche a una
sorta di backstage con diversi outtake, i quali dimostrano la totale arti-
ficiosità del girato e le condizioni di coazione cui erano sottoposti gli
“attori”, probabilmente speranzosi in una qualche forma di salvezza se
avessero collaborato operosamente.
È a partire da questo ritrovamento che prende le mosse A Film
Unfinished (in ebraico Shtikat Haarchion, [Nויכר’ה תקיתש] “archivio
silenzioso”), diretto dalla regista israeliana Yael Hersonski nel  e
basato sulla risemantizzazione di Das Ghetto resa possibile dalla sco-
perta delle scene tagliate. Il risultato è un film di rara complessità, ove
numerosi piani ermeneutici s’intersecano dispiegando molteplici let-
ture e implicando una serie di problematiche semiotiche, riassumibili
in un vorticoso dialogo fra istanze intenzionali, il quale necessita di
essere esplorato.
. Das Ghetto
Fino al  la propaganda antiebraica si sviluppava su programmi
narrativi consolidati: gli ebrei erano una razza dannosa e andavano,
per imperativo morale, epurati:
. Das Ghetto non è l’unico esempio di politica dell’inganno perpetrata dai nazisti attra-
verso il cinema. Un caso particolarmente rilevante è rappresentato dal film Theresienstadt.
Ein Dokumentarfilm aus dem jüdischen Siedlungsgebiet (Kurt Gerron, sotto la supervisione
di Hans Günther e Karl Rahm ). Il film racconta la vita all’interno di Theresienstadt
(città limitrofa a Praga), noto anche come ghetto di Terezin (un vero e proprio campo di
concentramento), in maniera del tutto manipolata, rappresentando il luogo come una sorta
di ghetto–paradiso idilliaco, ove i prigionieri vivevano spensierati e con ogni comodità.
L’idea del film avvenne in seguito a una reale messinscena organizzata per fronteggiare la
visita nel campo di alcuni membri della Croce Rossa Internazionale e del governo dane-
se. L’artificio ebbe successo, anche perché tutte le presenze “ingombranti” nel campo (i
prigionieri visibilmente spossati) erano state fatte deportare preventivamente, e da questo
scaturì l’idea di realizzare un film con una simile “sceneggiatura”, ove Terezin sembrasse
un «regalo di Hitler agli ebrei». Kurt Gerron, il regista, girò il film pensando di ottenere
in premio la salvezza, ma trovò invece la morte ad Auschwitz. Per approfondimenti, si-
gnificativo è Adler  (in tedesco Adler , poi prima ed. in inglese ). A Terezin è
anche dedicato Le dernier des injustes, film documentario di Claude Lanzmann del  che
recupera un’intervista del  al decano dello Judenrat del ghetto Benjamin Murmelstein.
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Soprattutto il cinema veicola un’immagine dell’ebreo fortemente stereoti-
pata. Tre opere paradigmatiche escono in sala nel : Jud Süss (Süss l’ebreo),
di Veit Harlan, Die Rothschilds (I Rothschild), di Erich Waschneck e Der ewige
Jude (L’ebreo errante), di Fritz Hippler.
Nel maggio  a Varsavia si verifica un inevitabile slittamento
di questa prospettiva, per più ragioni. Gli ebrei erano imprigionati
nei ghetti e la guerra stava prendendo una piega non favorevole per
la Germania (si stagliava all’orizzonte la battaglia di Stalingrado, ove
la Wehrmacht cadde rovinosamente contro l’Unione Sovietica). Lo
sterminio nel mentre era di fatto già ben avviato sin dalla conferenza
di Wannsee,  gennaio , con la Endlösung der Judenfrage, e pertan-
to la teoria degli ebrei come causa di tutti i mali si faceva cedevole
di fronte a una guerra che continuava a imperversare nonostante la
loro programmatica eliminazione. Le intenzioni di Das Ghetto vanno
inquadrate in questo preciso contesto storico. Il film avrebbe segnato
uno scarto essenziale rispetto a quelli precedenti di propaganda. Il pro-
blema era di ordine semantico, e consisteva nel modificare i contenuti
del testo a partire da una svolta nel programma narrativo canonico,
in modo da mantenere intatta l’efficacia della propaganda antisemita.
Lo scopo pragmatico restava quindi immutato, ma bisognava marcare
un punto tendenzialmente trasceso: l’ignominia interna alla razza
giudea, incapace nemmeno di provare pietà per il suo popolo. Tale
messaggio doveva passare e gli operatori dovevano certamente se-
guire dei modelli (Hippler forse quello principale, sia come temi sia
come tipologia di sequenze), e nel contempo far fronte a una realtà
imprevista per la sua negatività assoluta (la fame, i cadaveri, la mise-
ria) che andava coniugata con gli stereotipi dell’ebreo primitivo (ma
vivo), ricco, amorale, sporco. In potenza dunque, ossia virtualmente,
il complesso delle riprese propone uno scarto dell’intenzione propa-
. La seguente voce è tratta dalla sezione “La propaganda antiebraica”, www.
ghettinazisti.it, Fondazione Museo della Shoah, ultima consultazione  giugno . Nella
voce si fa riferimento al film di Hippler come modello di una certa narrazione propagan-
dastica, constatazione confermata da molte fonti. Girato all’interno dei ghetti di Łódz´ e
Varsavia il film ad esempio metaforizza gli ebrei europei con immagini come una marea di
topi portatori di malattie che invade il continente, veicolando lo stereotipo dell’ebreo ratto.
L’ultimo in particolare, uno pseudo–documentario girato nei ghetti di Łódz´ e Varsavia,
rappresenta gli ebrei europei attraverso una serie d’immagini metaforiche, come la marea
di topi portatori di malattie che invade il continente, mettendone in rilievo, con piglio
“naturalistico” la presunta natura meschina e subumana.
Le intenzioni della memoria 
gandistica rispetto al canone, come avverrà due anni dopo per il caso
Theresienstadt. La retorica andava virando per mantenere intatta la
perlocuzione.
Laura Fontana, responsabile dell’Italia Mémorial de la Shoah, sostie-
ne () che probabilmente le scene più drammatiche erano destinate
a essere espunte dal montaggio finale. Tuttavia tale ipotesi pare fragile,
poiché non avrebbe avuto senso allora girarle con tale perizia (opera-
zione che, ad esempio, per il caso analogo su Theresienstadt, non fu
fatta). Pare invece che Das Ghetto possa essere letto come un “anello
di congiunzione”, tra la propaganda in stile Ewige Jude, secondo la qua-
le l’ebreo era un danno da estirpare, e quella in stile Theresienstadt,
secondo la quale l’ebreo, pur se arginato, era trattato dignitosamente
anche sotto il nazismo. In questo contesto Das Ghetto è cioè il caso
sintetico di una dialettica intenzionale costretta a calibrarsi in conse-
guenza degli eventi della guerra. Semioticamente il problema che
emerge è come fare dialogare le intentiones di un testo come questo,
incompiuto, con quelle dei suoi autori. Un problema che si amplifica
con la sua risemantizzazione in A Film Unfinished.
. Avviluppamenti intenzionali
A Film Unfinished sovrappone l’enunciazione secondo diversi piani. In
esso si ritrovano le immagini di Das Ghetto così come era stato pensato
dall’intellighenzia nazista, contestualizzate però alla luce del ritrova-
mento del rullo “rivelatore”, ma anche una serie di altri dispositivi
formali utili a definire l’intenzione primaria del film, che non è unica-
mente documentale, ma anche e soprattutto interpretativa. Hersonski
non dispone il girato linearmente, bensì lo monta e lo interpola con
una serie di altri contenuti, allo scopo di dare una lettura aumentata
dell’evento, che comunichi anche una riflessione sull’idea stessa di
ricerca storica e delle sue fonti e, dal punto di vista semiotico, sulla
rilevanza delle intentiones nel testo. Le stesse immagini, se montate
diversamente, parlano diversamente.
Districarsi nella congerie di narrazioni incrociate all’interno del film
non è operazione facile, e il metodo migliore per procedere, almeno
inizialmente, è paratattico, definendo gli strati autoriali e narrativi che
lo compongono, e che restituiscono secondo il film «molti strati di
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realtà». L’idea è di procedure nell’individuazione delle presupposizioni
intenzionali, convinti di questa direzione: «L’analisi narrativa offre una
formulazione sintattica della topica dei mezzi e dei fini, attribuendole
un ruolo più generale nell’analisi dei discorsi dell’azione entro i quali
reintroduce un orientamento teleologico» (Bertrand , p. ).
La base di partenza è Das Ghetto, il cui girato va imputato alla troupe
tedesca di cui non rimangono nomi, se non quello dell’operatore Willy
Wist. Esso nel film costituisce una delle voci narranti attraverso l’attore
Rüdiger Vogler, che lo impersona leggendone — anzi recitandone — la
testimonianza. Wist è nel film la concrezione dell’intera troupe tedesca,
di cui alcuni membri tuttavia compaiono per pochi secondi in qualche
frame; il suo “grado di autorialità” verrà discusso in seguito, date le sue
reiterate dichiarazioni di non essere stato altro che uno strumento, cui
ogni libertà (ivi da intendersi innanzitutto come espressiva) era negata,
e le cui azioni era conseguenti agli ordini di un gerarca soprannomina-
to “Goldpheasant” (letteralmente: “fagiano d’oro”) e allocato al Pałac
Brühla, quartiere generale dei nazisti a Varsavia capeggiati da Auerswald.
Il secondo livello di narrazione è rappresentato da Adam Czerniaków,
capo dello Judenrat del Ghetto, controversa istituzione concepita come
consiglio intermediario fra i nazisti e gli ebrei del ghetto, imposto dal Go-
vernatorato Generale. La voce, recitata da Janusz Hamerszmit, aggiunge
uno strato intenzionale ed è tratta da una serie di diari personali che testi-
moniano di un movimento interno al ghetto desideroso di perpetuarne
l’umanità residua, in misura del tutto clandestina, al di là delle angherie
dei tedeschi. Va infatti precisato come all’interno dei ghetti non esistesse-
ro fonti di informazione (nonostante, come testimoniato anche dal film,
ci fossero rumors di cosa accadesse nei lager, comprese le gassificazioni)
. Questa e le successive citazioni dirette del film sono traduzione nostra dall’inglese.
. Gli Judenräte erano diffusi in tutti i ghetti a partire da una circolare emanata da Reinhard
Heydrich nel . Il loro ruolo era estremamente delicato poiché i membri, tendenzialmente
anziani, dovevano nel contempo sincerarsi che gli ordini delle SS fossero eseguiti e cercare
quanto più possibile di preservare le vite del ghetto. Il più controverso presidente di uno
Judenrat fu Chaim Mordechai Rumkowski, del ghetto polacco di Łódz´, noto per il suo ligio
asservimento ai nazisti e per questo figura storica incerta, le cui azioni da un lato sono lette
come atti collaborazionisti, e dall’altro come disperati tentativi di salvare almeno una parte della
popolazione. Morì ad Auschwitz con la sua famiglia nell’estate del . Lo stesso Murmelstein
costituisce una figura controversa. Sullo Judenrat cf. Trunk .
. Il problema della mancanza di informazione interna ai ghetti non è di poco conto, e
una certa ossessione documentaristica interna, oltre ad assolvere primariamente al bisogno
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se non la Gazeta Zydowska, bollettino ufficiale controllato dai tedeschi.
La cronaca reale che abbiamo a disposizione è quindi dovuta al rischioso
sforzo dei deportati di lasciarsi attraverso memorialistiche segrete, che
nel caso del Ghetto di Varsavia furono programmaticamente raccolte
— e a ogni piè sospinto incoraggiate — dal fondatore dell’Oneg Shabbat
Emanuel Ringelblum (recitato da Eliezer Niborski), fucilato agli inizi del
. Nell’Archivio Ringelblum rimane conservata una storia scritta su
cartacce e carte annonarie, pezzi di giornale e così via, che restituisce il
progetto iniziale del suo fondatore, riportato dal film di Hersonski con
queste parole: «Un ritratto multistrato. . . il ritratto finale». Di questo
ritratto rimangono testimonianze che ci dicono molto sulla prospettiva
degli ebrei prigionieri circa le riprese di Das Ghetto, come quella di Mary
Berg:
Giunta a scuola, ho trovato tutti gli insegnanti e gli alunni alle finestre. Nella
sede della nostra amministrazione, di fronte a noi, si notava un’agitazione
insolita. Anche qui veniva girato il film dei tedeschi. Riflettori potenti erano
stati installati in vari punti dell’immobile e lunghi fili e cavi elettrici si attor-
cigliavano sui pavimenti. Cineprese su rotaie viaggiavano in ogni direzione
con i loro operatori, circondate da una folla di funzionari e da visitatori che
si trovavano per caso negli uffici. Ho visto un tedesco raggruppare diverse
persone intorno al presidente Czerniaków e ai principali funzionari della
comunità. Più tardi, non so per quale motivo, tutti sono stati ammucchiati in
una sala e hanno avuto l’ordine di inginocchiarsi. Naturalmente i cadaveri
abbandonati nelle strade non verranno fotografati e tanto meno i bambini
nudi, moribondi di fame.
I tedeschi hanno certamente deciso di fare uno straordinario sforzo di
propaganda. Recentemente il tono dei loro bollettini di guerra sembra
mutato; parlano di «ritirate strategiche» da varie località russe. Quelli che
sanno leggere tra le righe sono molto sollevati. (Berg , pp. –)
di rimarcare la propria umanità sistematicamente smantellata, può essere letta a un secondo
grado come una controrisposta alla mancanza di informazioni dall’esterno. Su tale tema anche
la finzione si è spesa, come nel romanzo Jakob de Lügner ( Jurek Beker ), poi tradotto
in film prima nel  da Frank Beyer e poi nel  da Peter Kassovitz. La storia è quella
dell’ebreo Jakob che all’interno di un ghetto polacco si fa portatore di speranza attraverso la
diffusione della notizia dell’arrivo delle truppe sovietiche liberatrici, mentendo sul fatto di
avere una radio nascosta e di essere costantemente informato sullo sviluppo della questione.
. Nel merito cfr. ad esempio Costazza .
. Mary Berg, sopravvissuta al ghetto, aveva quando scriveva (lei data queste righe “
maggio ”), sui  anni. Il diario è di immediatezza, quindi con imprecisioni sia nelle
osservazioni che nelle valutazioni. Qui la valutazione “naturalmente i cadaveri. . . ” appare
inesatta, per chi conosce il film (che lei ovviamente non conosceva).
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Czerniaków si suicidò nel , in seguito all’ordine di consegna di
tutti i bambini del ghetto, che furono comunque prelevati e deportati
assieme al pedagogista Janusz Korczac cui Andrzej Wajda dedica un film
nel  attingendo alcune delle immagini, come Hersonski, da Das
Ghetto.
Un terzo livello è quello di Hanna Avrutzki, Luba Gewisser, Jurek
Plonski, Aliza Vitis–Shomron e Shula Zeder, superstiti del ghetto e ora
protagonisti, ma pure in qualche misura autori, di A Film Unfinished,
ripresi nell’atto di guardare le stesse immagini cui è esposto lo spet-
tatore e commentarle con i propri ricordi, smentirle o confermarle,
rifiutarsi di guardarle, gioire per aver ritrovato la forza di piangere —
nel vortice metafilmico di cui è imbevuto, obbligatoriamente, l’intero
film. L’ultimo livello è quello della Hersonski stessa, che monta il film
e ne racconta le vicende tramite il commento di Rona Kenan.
. Intenzioni trasversali
La sintassi autoriale riportata comporta una seria riflessione sulle
istanze intenzionali che reggono il testo filmico. Ricapitolando, verti-
calmente la grammatica autoriale è la seguente:
— Yael Hersonski, “dirige” un film che
— è basato sul lavoro di un troupe, incarnata del cameraman Willy
Wist che
— è stato assoldato da una serie di superiori nazisti, in primis il
cosiddetto “Goldpheasant”, che
— si basano su una serie di programmi narrativi, emblematizzati
dalla politica comunicativa di Joseph Goebbels tesa a dimostrare
la liceità del progetto sterminazionista, che
— incarna l’ideologia nazista, autore simbolico finale di Das Ghetto.
Ma anche sezionando il film trasversalmente è possibile individuare
delle istanze quantomeno meta–autoriali. I superstiti contribuiscono
. «Per esempio, quando alcuni nazisti compiono nel ghetto le riprese, Wajda fa uno stacco
e ripropone nella loro forma originaria le stesse immagini. Esse [. . . ] interagiscono totalmente
con quelle della fiction nel fare da sfondo al frustrante operato del dottore [. . . ]. Lo spettatore è
costretto anche lui a confrontarsi in maniera diretta con la realtà del ghetto» (Gaetani , pp.
–).
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spontaneamente alla creazione di contenuto, risemantizzano le imma-
gini sia caricandole di valenze emotive che enfatizzandone il portato
fortemente revisionista. Particolarmente indicativa in questo senso la
scena in cui una di essi, di fronte alla messinscena di un finto funerale
ebraico che doveva sembrare lussuoso a dimostrazione dell’archeti-
pica opulenza semitica, esclama che non è usanza ebraica quella di
seppellire i propri cari come mostrato dalle immagini. È evidente
dunque che l’intento propagandistico optò, in forza di una maggiore
intelligibilità della rappresentazione revisionista, sulla messinscena di
un rito funebre stereotipizzato.
Ma pure gli ebrei stessi ripresi nel ghetto, consapevoli della ripresa,
non solo attorializzano Das Ghetto ma in qualche modo lo autorializza-
no, ne sanciscono un’intenzione — e cioè una volontà di significazione
— diametralmente opposta a quella della committenza: dal loro lato vi
è la speranza che la collaborazione sia sanzionata con la salvezza, dal-
l’altro vi è il mistificatore progetto dei nazisti. Si tratta qui di un’istanza
meta–autoriale in cui si rintraccia un’intenzionalità. Ricordiamo anco-
ra una volta che un’ulteriore autorialità va tenuta di conto, e cioè quella
della memorialistica di Czerniaków e di alcuni altri prigionieri del
ghetto la cui storia, attraverso diari o simili, compare in prima persona
nel film, come Chaim Aron Kaplan e Reuven Ben–Shem (entrambi
recitati da Alexander Senderovich), Abraham Lewin e Hersh Wasser
(recitati da Mendy Cahan), Jonas Turkow (rec. da Gera Sandler), Rokhl
Auerbakh (rec. da Chava Alberstein). Va però puntualizzato che Czer-
niaków è senz’altro un autore volontario e intenzionale, «un attore
che recita se stesso», come si dice nel film, mentre l’intenzionalità
degli ebrei ripresi in massa nelle principali strade di Varsavia come
Leszno è tutta da dimostrare, e si rivolge a un orizzonte semioetico
particolarmente delicato. L’ipotesi che costoro da “attori” diventino
autori, parzialmente corroborata dalle numerose interpellazioni —
sguardi in camera — presenti nel girato (parzialmente poiché in ogni
caso la situazione doveva apparire quantomeno curiosa), può essere
ad esempio calibrata con le notazioni di Cordesse che, come riportato
da Berta, sostiene quanto segue:
. Per approfondimenti sulla ritualità funebre ebraica cfr. Reif, Lehnardt e Bar–Levav
.
 Bruno Surace
L’autonomia del personaggio divenuto autore è tale che il lettore, in mancan-
za di indicazioni, può incorrere in un corto–circuito comunicativo: ovvero
può attribuire al romanziere ipodiegetico il testo stesso che sta leggendo.
(Berta , p. )
Trattare gli ebrei rinchiusi nel ghetto come dei personaggi e come
dei meta–autori, nonostante sia lecito in sede analitica, richiede delle
cautele che qui ci riserbiamo di mantenere, e anche la tesi di una
loro intenzionalità attoriale–autoriale va contestualizzata. Essi erano
costretti alla ripresa, che pertanto fu un atto violento.
A Film Unfinished è dunque, al di là delle ultime precisazioni, un
testo soggetto a una Gestalt intenzionale, ove la summa autoriale trava-
lica le singole parti che la compongono. Per mettere ordine nell’intrico
è necessario innanzitutto definire con più precisione cosa si intende
per intenzionalità del/nel testo. Una buona definizione operativa è
quella di “volontà di significazione”, che la semiotica tende a definire
come è noto secondo la tripartizione echiana delle istanze dell’autore,
dell’opera e del lettore. Nonostante la disciplina spesso si sia spesa, in
misura quasi assiomatica (si pensi al dogma del “fuor dal testo non
v’è salvezza”), nel rivendicare il principio di autonomia del testo, ci
pare che casi come A Film Unfinished rivelino invece la necessità di
riconsiderare la questione come una complessa negoziazione fra le
tre istanze. Non è possibile sostenere un’interpretazione del testo in
questione a partire unicamente dall’intentio operis, e anzi va sottoli-
neato come sia stata proprio l’autonomia del testo a fornire, fino al
ritrovamento del rullo con gli outtake, un’ermeneutica storica piut-
tosto fuorviante. Non è possibile leggere il film di Hersonski senza
prendere atto delle pretese di significazione che sono innestate nei
suoi sottotesti, e con un ragionamento induttivo si potrebbe avanzare
la seguente ipotesi: ogni testo, contenendo esso stesso una più o meno
marcata componente metatestuale, è innanzitutto una forma di nego-
ziazione di testi precedenti e nello specifico delle loro intenzioni, una
ri–aspettualizzazione. Così Hersonski ribalta le intenzioni del rullo
originale facendolo significare con una luce opposta, rivelandone gli
orrori: il testo poi, in “autonomia”, parla in vece di tutti gli autori che
hanno contribuito a scriverlo.
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. Il documentario interpretante
Ciò nondimeno è comunque il testo infine a dire l’ultima parola, a parla-
re con intenzione propria, e nuovamente A Film Unfinished lo dimostra
chiaramente, se si legge a partire dal suo cuore pulsante, ovvero l’ideolo-
gia nazista: l’intenzionalità autoriale è inscritta nel testo, configurando
«i processi di cooperazione tra l’autore e il suo destinatario» (Eco ).
Ogni stratificazione autoriale comporta uno strato intenzionale aggiunti-
vo, che dialoga in modalità semi–autonoma con gli altri. La committenza
simbolica, cioè il nazismo, ordina un film propagandistico nel ghetto
di Varsavia avendo in mente un risultato, che è decodificato da Goeb-
bels (significante in carne della comunicazione nazista) che è a sua volta
decodificato dai gerarchi in loco, che è decodificato dall’operatore Wist,
la cui mano rintraccia tutte le intentiones che lo precedono, ma pure
aggiunge qualcosa, anche se minimo, di suo al testo. Egli pretende, forse
con intento autoassolutorio, di essere letto dal suo interrogatore (recitato
da Alexander Beyer) come il Serafino Gubbio di Pirandello, operatore
cinematografico che “finii d’esser Gubbio” per diventare mano. Tuttavia
pure ammette di intuire il progetto della committenza, così come fanno
numerosi ebrei nel ghetto, di cui scrive Czerniaków con amara ironia
riferendone come di “star” o “professionisti” con diversi gradi di “qualità
fotogeniche”:
.V. [. . . ] La troupe cinematografica continua a fare foto. Povertà estre-
ma e lusso (i bar). [. . . ] In città continuano a girare voci allarmanti sulla
deportazione. [. . . ] .V. – + °C. La mattina in Comunità. In casa
alle , attendo la troupe. Ho chiesto che vengano assunti un uomo e una
donna che poseranno per le foto. Sono arrivati alle , e hanno girato fino
alle ,. Hanno messo sulla porta una targhetta con non so quale scritta.
Hanno portato in casa due donne e un «primo amoroso». Inoltre un vecchio
ebreo. Hanno girato una scena.
In città continuano le voci sull’espulsione. [. . . ] Nel pomeriggio, la troupe
ha girato nella camera da letto dei vicini di Zabłudowski. Hanno fatto venire
una donna che si è truccata davanti allo specchio. A casa mia la troupe era
entusiasta di una statua di Confucio e della scultura di Ostrzega Maternità.
[. . . ] Durante le riprese in casa mia hanno acchiappato per strada un vecchio
ebreo con la barbetta a punta. È rimasto da me per qualche ora, ma il suo
aspetto fotogenico non è stato sfruttato. Mi immagino cosa sarà successo
quando, tornato a casa, avrà tentato di spiegare a sua moglie che non aveva
guadagnato perché, per tre ore, aveva fatto la star. Chissà, se ti rincontrerò
 Bruno Surace
mai, collega di lavoro! Forse, tutt’e due abbiamo scelto il lavoro sbagliato. In
ogni caso, quando guarderà al cinema qualche scena, si dirà con sarcasmo:
«Come se non lo sapessi fare anch’io». (Czerniaków , pp. –)
Hersonski, pur rivoltando l’intero costrutto di Das Ghetto, non può
che comunque avere a che fare con il suo sedimentato intenzionale,
prenderne atto. Se non lo facesse, semplicemente il suo film non avrebbe
senso: «Senza intenzionalità i “fatti segnici” non possono essere riscattati
al senso» (Basso , p. ). Il film si pone come intenzione quella
di rilevare e rivelare l’abominevole ipocrisia nel rullo iniziale, la sua
intenzione primaria, quella di farsi testo dal forte potere pragmatico e
perlocutivo. Il documentario si fa interpretante nella più peirciana delle
maniere, «un’altra rappresentazione riferita allo stesso oggetto» (Eco
, p. ), intrinsecamente votato alla semiosi illimitata.
Dunque la regista non solo adopera il montaggio per rivelare l’in-
ganno di Das Ghetto, e implicitamente quello della finzione filmica e
del documentario — e del documento — di per se stesso, ma anche si
asserve di una moltitudine di ausili stilistici. Vi è innanzitutto l’utilizzo
dell’audio, che contrasta il girato originale di Das Ghetto, muto. A Film
Unfinished vanta la presenza di tre componenti sonore: la voce degli
attori già citati e del commento, una colonna sonora, e il crepitio quasi
costante del proiettore cinematografico. Su questi ultimi due elementi
vale la pena di soffermarsi. Entrambi si fondono con le immagini in
modo organico a tal punto da costituire un significante tutt’uno. La
colonna sonora composta dall’israeliano Ishai Adar è fatta di toni cupi, e
presenta una particolare analogia con il Theme from Schindler’s List com-
posto da John Williams per il film del  di Steven Spielberg. Non è
facile reperire una partitura del tema di Ishai Adar ma se si ascoltano il
motivo principale di Williams e quello di A Film Unfinished si noterà la
marcata conformità, salvo il viraggio dissonante della seconda. Data la
vicinanza tematica dei film, e la fama mondiale di quello di Spielberg, è
possibile postulare una relazione intenzionale fra le due colonne sonore,
. Nel merito ci si riferisce alla teoria di Andrew Goodwin, che nonostante sia elaborata
su un tema sensibilmente diverso (il videoclip musicale), ci pare particolarmente calzante.
Egli sostiene che «the sound–image fusion is sometimes so great that the two signifiers are
actually one» (Goodwin , p. ).
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e pare — nonostante la passibilità di accusa di sovrinterpretazione —
che la svolta dissonante in Adar possa essere letta come un tentativo di
distaccarsi dall’universo raccontato da Spielberg. Questi infatti, nonostan-
te la tragicità degli eventi, conclude il suo film con la scena a colori degli
ebrei sopravvissuti che posano una pietra a testa sulla tomba di Oskar
Schindler, mentre Hersonski pone alla fine il racconto del suicidio di
Czerniaków, e associa con una similitudine visiva la “fine degli ebrei”
del ghetto con la ricollocazione delle pellicole nel loro archivio (peraltro
in b/n, dopo un breve passaggio a colori poco prima del finale).
Affiancata alla soundtrack come si è accennato la pellicola manifesta
la sua presenza materica durante tutto il film. Il suono del proiettore
man mano che il film avanza si fa sempre meno percettibile, ma rimane
presente, a ribadire la natura innanzitutto testuale della memoria. Ciò è
ribadito da un uso insistito di enunciazioni enunciate. Il film inizia e si
conclude con il maneggiamento stesso della pellicola che lo spettatore
sta per visionare; la visione è inscritta metatestualmente in un quadro
ove è possibile vedere più volte il proiettore; un sistema metaspettatoriale
(i superstiti) fa da contraltare a chi guarda il film creando un ulteriore
cortocircuito.
Figure . Dispositivi metatestuali: il proiettore e la superstite.
. Si precisa l’accreditamento nei titoli di coda del film dei Steven Spielberg Film & Video
archives.
 Bruno Surace
Pertanto nuovamente si ribadisce come la memoria sia un pro-
cesso di costruzione, e come i testi debbano essere decodificati alla
luce delle loro intenzioni, e non come veritieri di per se stessi. L’i-
permediazione (Bolter e Grusin ) è anche nell’uso massivo di
ralenti e fermi immagine, con ulteriori marche enunciative su alcuni
dettagli illuminati (tendenzialmente le immagini dei cameraman fra
gli ebrei). E ancora vi è l’intermittenza semantica mirata a enfatizzare
l’intento di misrappresentazione nazista. A Film Unfinished è montato
intenzionalmente anche quando rispetta il (non)montaggio originale,
capace secondo la regista di “dire l’indicibile”, specie nella prima parte
del film, che in una sorta di climax ascendente contrappone le riprese
di ebrei in condizioni disumane (le case diroccate e i cumuli di feci in
fermo immagine, i bambini malnutriti e i cadaveri. . . ) con immagini
di ebrei facoltosi o ridenti, che partecipano a cene di gala e si allietano
con spettacoli teatrali, ove ralenti e suono enfatizzano le condizioni
del pubblico costretto a ridere fragorosamente per ore e ore di fronte
alla messinscena preparata ad arte dai nazisti.
Figure . Gli operatori fra la folla, illuminati.
A questo montaggio/non–montaggio Hersonski aggiunge e in-
terpola il nuovo rullo, mostrando ad esempio come l’episodio dei
disordini in Smocza fosse stato premeditato, con presenza di came-
raman fra la folla, prima riunita lì e poi dispersa a suon di spari per
aria, o esibendo in sequenza i vari take di una delle tante scene che
ponevano nella stessa inquadratura, con un ottimo senso della co-
struzione plastica dello spazio profilmico, ebrei ricchi ed ebrei poveri.
. In uno di questi spettacoli suonò Ruth Zandberg, piangendo poiché sua madre,
l’artista yiddish Zusha Zandberg, era appena morta di tifo.
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Figure . Una benestante e una mendicante, entrambe ebree (due frame dalla
stessa inquadratura, panoramica verticale).
Si pensi alla scena del negozio di alimentari ove si vede entrare una
benestante signora totalmente noncurante dei due bimbi mendicanti
che osservano affamati il cibo esposto (scena di cui esistono molti take,
con angolazioni e punti di vista diversi).
Figure . Quattro take della stessa scena.
 Bruno Surace
. Conclusioni
Film come Das Ghetto prima e A Film Unfinished poi, ma pure come
Theresienstadt, inquadrano l’importanza di trattare il testo documen-
tale con un’analisi intenzionale, che ne sappia mettere in luce non
solo il funzionamento interno. Gli storici che hanno basato le loro
deduzioni su Das Ghetto hanno, per così dire, aderito con troppo zelo
al paradigma interpretativo dell’autonomia del testo, ritenendo vere
le immagini documentali. È vero da un lato che il principio della
cooperazione interpretativa, quello per il quale un testo «esige dal suo
destinatario di riempire gli spazi del non–detto» poiché «è un siste-
ma di istruzioni» (Magli , p. ), è sacrosanto. Tuttavia i pattern
che esso consente di rilevare non rispondono dell’intenzione che sta
dietro al documento, del perché il documento documenti. Dunque si
necessita, e si è provato a dimostrarlo con questo saggio, in primis
di adottare un approccio semiotico capace di restituire la struttura
formale del documento o del documentario come costrutto, quindi
come interpretazione del mondo non necessariamente veritiera, e
in seguito che questo, almeno per quanto concerne l’apporto della
semiotica alla ricerca storica, possa essere scandagliato con un’analisi
intenzionale, mediante un’apertura all’intentio auctoris (e cioè al con-
testo discorsivo), che in ultima istanza affiora nell’intertestualità. Una
teleologia testuale per la quale la semiotica è più che equipaggiata.
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Fighting without an Opponent
An Analysis of Intentionality in Shotokan kata
B T*
 : Combattere senza un rivale: un’analisi dell’intenzionalità
nello Shotokan kata
: The aim of this paper is exploring how the kata of Shotokan
karate constitute an embodied intentionality. Kata, a traditional way of
training in karate for more than a century, consists in fighting without
the presence of a real opponent. The article enquires about the origin
of its meaning and the way in which its intentionality is expressed. Kata
can be considered a narrative text that tells the story of a fight while
mimicking it in such a way that every pre–established technique bears
a specific meaning. Kata involve time and space because they reflect a
predetermined set of sequential techniques that realize the intentionality
and meaningfulness of a karateka’s practice. During the practice of kata,
the karateka’s bodily attitude, both sensible and sentient, is expressed
through fine–tuning aimed at establishing a causal relationship with an
external, imaginary being, so that intentionality takes on the reflexive
knowledge of the body. Intentionality affects form and strength, ges-
tures and postures, incarnating a combative logic behind each of these
elements. It is a sort of order of consciousness regarding mind and
body, entailing active participation and involvement. It is a reflexive and
discursive consciousness that requires knowledge and interiorization of
the techniques that are embodied by the karateka and memorized in
his/her mind. When performing kata, the karateka masters the conse-
quences of the techniques because he/she appears as the intentional
agent of the action that makes the ideal fighting something that can
be accepted and understood or acknowledged. The paper points out
that the kata’s intentionality concerns both creation of meaning by the
observer — who can reconstruct the fighting between two opponents
— and the original purposes of the master that has designed the scheme
∗ Sapienza – University of Rome.
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of techniques; moreover, it implies the possibility of recognizing that
surplus of sense which legitimizes belonging to a certain culture.
: Body; Culture; Intentionality; Intersubjectivity; Karate; Space.
. Imaginary Fighting as a Text
There is an art that expresses the deep nature of a certain culture but
it is practiced beyond its boundaries, both geographic and linguistic,
social and symbolic. Its name is karate and is a Japanese martial art,
born in Okinawa due to the banishing of weapons that was enforced
twice, the first time during the realm of King Hashi of the Sho¯ dy-
nasty (–), the second around  by the Shimazu, military
governors of the Satsuma clan from Kyushu (Funakoshi , pp.
–). During these two dominions it was necessary to think about
“empty–hand” defense and Okinawan people started to practice a
peculiar form of fighting derived from Chinese kenpo¯, arrived on
the island thanks to the frequent exchanges with the continent. The
precursors of karate, Okinawa–te and To¯–de, originated from these
exchanges. The art of empty–hand fighting as we know it nowadays
were systematized by Gichin Funakoshi, who studied karate with the
two most important masters of the th century, Azato and Itosu.
The word karate is the result of the union of two ideograms, kara
and te, but the first one has the double pronunciation of “China” and
“empty”, the second one that of “hand”. As said earlier, karate has
its roots in the Chinese kenpo¯, but Funakoshi (, p. ) preferred
the second meaning, the one of emptiness, because karate is a purely
Japanese martial art. This etymology usually refers to the fact of fight-
ing with empty (bare) hands, or to not resorting to weapons, although
the same Funakoshi indicated that the real meaning of “emptiness”
consisted in erasing selfishness so as to fortify the physical body. To
this regard, Funakoshi (, p. ) recalls Buddhist texts that contain
sentences about emptiness, like shiki soku zeku, “the matter is empty”,
or ku soku zeshiki, “everything is vanity”. In these two statements,
the syllable ku can be also pronounced as kara, so the emptiness is
in the heart of matter and in its creation. Therefore, Funakoshi was
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sure that emptiness is the true structure of the universe, that can be
perceived only after becoming conscious of the infinity of its forms
and elements. In other words, karate embodies the basis of all mar-
tial arts because its form is equal to emptiness, and viceversa. Kata,
hence, is the most accomplished figurativization of the emptiness
of karate, of its the essential principle. Funakoshi karate–do has also
its cultural roots in Japanese religions like Buddhism, therefore the
word do refers to a chosen path or to a way of spiritual perfection, of
illumination.
Gichin Funakoshi’s karate–do is also known as Shotokan, and it
differs from other karate styles for some changes in techniques and
their applications. Although Funakoshi was opposed to the diversity
of styles because he believed in a universal karate, in addition to his
Shotokan–ryu, he recognized also Goju–ryu and Shito–ryu as legitimate
karate branches. The term “Shotokan” originated from the union of
three kanji, “sho”, “to”, and “kan”, and it literally means mean “pine
wave hall”, or “pinewood breeze hall”. This word appeared for the
first time in  as the name of the first official dojo
Thanks to Funakoshi, karate spread across Japan, attracting the
attention of the government, the imperial family and even of Jigoro¯
Kano¯, the founder of another martial art, judo. Funakoshi’s karate
then gained widespread international recognition in a few years, but
it took longer for it to become an Olympic sport like judo, probably
for the complexity of one of its pilaster, the kata, and its peculiar type
of embodied intentionality, which is the main object of the present
paper.
Kata are the formal exercises of karate, aimed at developing rhythm
and coordination in techniques, forming the three parts of this martial
art training together with kihon, the basic rudiments of this martial
art, and kumite, which consists in fighting with the opponent. Kata is
sort of an untranslatable word, specially if we consider its artistic and
cultural significance in Japanese. Possible translations include “form”,
“style”, “pattern”; this term is used both in karate and in the theater no¯
. A dojo — literally “place of the Way” — is a hall where karate and other martial
arts are practised. of karate, to pay a tribute to Funakoshi, who used to compose poetry
under the pseudonym of shoto, because he was inspired by the breeze blowing among the
pine trees and producing a sound similar to that of the sea waves when they crash on the
shore (cf. Clayton ).
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to describe a scheme of predefined movements to be learned. Before
Funakoshi, the teaching of kata in Okinawa was veiled by secret, so
much so that masters would choose a particularly deserving student
to hand them over. There are, therefore, as many versions of kata as
their various interpretations and alterations in oral transmission.
During Funakoshi’s youth, about a hundred people were practicing
kata, but Master Itosu brought them to fifteen, because he considered
that a smaller group of participants would lead to better awareness of
techniques and their aesthetics (see Funakoshi ).
Funakoshi practiced only one kata to the point of exhaustion, until
reaching the perfection, only to grant the will of his other master
Azato, who pushed him to train hard, recommending to consider the
hands and feet of opponents as swords, because in karate every part
of body is a potential weapon and it is necessary to pay attention. The
original kata were created by unknown masters, and surely those
who came to Funakoshi were subjected to variations attributable to
oral transmission. Kata have been further modified by Funakoshi
to be simpler for being taught in schools and he has also changed
their names to make them more pronounceable for the non–Japanese
people.
Nowadays Shotokan karate includes twenty–six kata, plus three
introductory, developed by Funakoshi from Kanku–Dai, included the
five basic kata called Heian, “peace”, because they are explicitly de-
signed to prepare the karateka to the most complex ones, bringing
him step by step to knowledge, in a “soft” way. Kata are divided into
two categories by convention: the first one is called Shorei–ryu and
it concerns those hard and strong, while the second, Shorin–ryu, the
light and fast ones. There are some correlations between kata be-
cause they are based on variations of a small number of techniques,
strictly speaking the combination of blocks, strikes, punches and kicks.
Their characterizing techniques or their articulation in the space are
reflected in the names of the kata, as we can see in Gojushiho–sho, —
literally “Fifty–four footsteps” —, or in Kanku–dai — “observing the
sky” —, where the first movement of karateka is with both hands in
front and above forehead, similar to when we look at sunlight. Further-
more, there is the kata called Bassai Dai — “breaking the fortress” —
that starts with an uchi–uke, an inward block, expressing the explosive
strength of the irruption, or even Gangaku — “the crane on the rock”
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— totally based on the balance of the defensive stance on one leg, that
produces a sort of zoomorphization of the karateka, whose body con-
stitutes meaning effects because he/she evokes and incarnates a crane,
generating an illusive transformation. Kata are transmitted by master
to student according to the degree of belt and difficulty, and they
are substantially the same since they were designed by Funakoshi,
even if some slight changes are due to the various interpretations by
masters or federations, which depend on how the real application
of techniques is conceived, or on how the fight is imagined. We can
say that kata are a traditional way of training that has been imple-
mented for more than a century, aiming to practice the fundamentals
of karate, showing the spectator a fight without the presence of a real
opponent, that can be intuited from the movements of the karateka,
by the direction of his gaze that precedes, though lasting a fraction of
a second, the technique that assumes a change of direction. Moreover,
certain techniques presuppose the rejection of a weapon and it is said
that there are some secret techniques hidden in many kata, especially
in the simple ones, because they were practiced in secret and, besides,
masters did not want to share advanced knowledge with everyone,
but only with chosen apprentices. On the other hand, contemporary
kata are aimed to be preparatory for kumite, the fight between two
opponents, and serve to convey the meaning of the movements of the
limbs and the bases of attack and defense. Therefore, we can consider
kata as a narrative text that tells the story of a fight while mirroring it,
where every pre–established technique has a meaning
. Embodied Intentionality in Shotokan Kata
Traditional kata are the basis for a good training, and they lead to the
complete understanding of the value of self defense techniques. Kata
imply movements in all directions and the limbs are used to the same
extent, so they are equally trained. In addition, the practice of advanced
kata reveals unknown elements of the basic karate techniques, giving
them new meanings. The important thing is not to memorize the
succession of movements or to perform them fluently, but to impress
the effectiveness of the techniques having their purpose clear in mind,
therefore expressing their intentionality.
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If the do is the path leading to self–improvement, the kata are capa-
ble of transforming innerself structures, developing them, controlling
breathing and energy.
Seriousness in training means always having an opponent in mind,
being committed with heart and soul, aiming at a never–ending im-
provement.
Karate is an introspective martial art, as its kata practice leads to
the experimentation of such concepts first with oneself, then with the
real opponent. Understanding karate does not just mean practicing
kata, but evaluating their meaning.
The kata is rigid, but at the same time flexible because although
the sequence has to be strictly respected, the interpretation depends
on karateka and on its personal style. Karate is like a dress.
All kata have a fixed structure in common, recognizable at the be-
ginning and end of the performance with rei, the ceremonial greeting
in musubi–dachi stance, where the heels are together, which figura-
tivizes humility, respect for the opponent and intentional honesty,
because, as said by Funakoshi, the karate spirit does not exist with-
out courtesy. After greeting by bowing there is the tokui kata — the
declaration of the name of kata with vigor and loud voice using the
diaphragm — and then there is a change of stance that depends on
the chosen kata, called the yoi position — the true starting point of
the execution — which in hachiji–dachi can be with the legs open at
shoulders distance, or with the feet close together in heisoku–dachi.
This is considered as the first movement of kata and is called kamae,
the posture that expresses a state of relaxed but vigilant mind infused
with deep concentration. The karateka performs kata starting from
embusen, the ideal line where every movement departs from and
where he/she must return for a correct execution. Once kata is fin-
ished he/she returns in yoi position and then to musubi–dachi to bow
again, but he/she has to maintain the focus, because this is the phase
named zanshin, which means “remaining mind”. The end of the fight
does not coincide with guard lowering. Kata start and finish in a codi-
fied way, but there is another recurring element called kiai, a potent
. I have to give credit to my karate master Annamaria Iaccarino for this statement.
adapting itself to the body of the practitioner and so one may have high or low positions,
broad or narrow ones, more powerful or flattering movements, all of these elements
depends on the subject.
Fighting without an Opponent 
emission of voice, a loud expiration, generated from the concentration
of strength in tanden — the barycenter — corresponding to two attack
techniques in each kata, the most effective ones, where the karateka’s
power is at its peak. So kiai is the narrative climax, while kamae and
zanshin are respectively the beginning and the end of the story.
. Kinds of Intentionality
Kata are definitely an example of spatial discourse because their tech-
niques are inscripted in the space allowing a discoursivization in terms
of duration and of spatial and temporal aspectualization, giving mean-
ing to slowness and rapidity as the average between the time of the
karateka and that of the observer (cf. Greimas, Courtés , p. ).
Therefore we can consider the sequence of blocks and attacks as an
aspectual configuration because all the aspectual semes are articulated
in kata: the inchoative moment corresponds to rei and yoi position,
the durative one to the sum of techniques, and the terminative one to
zanshin.
Kata involves time and space because it reflects a predetermined
set of sequential techniques that realize the intentionality and mean-
ingfulness of karateka’s practice.
Movements express a certain degree of intentionality, even if we
must be careful to not confuse the intentional nature of the movement
and the fact of expressing it and making it perceptible as its quality.
Barry Allen (, pp. –) has solved this problem with the notion
of expressive intentionality, to highlight the perceptible quality of
martial art techniques, underlining their different aesthetic.
Underneath the intensity of techniques there is obviously violence,
they are designed to be used in a fight, but it must be remembered
that in karate, as in all traditional martial arts, violent purposes are
rejected. So if we distinguish the intentionality of the techniques
from the purpose of action that produces intentional and sequential
movements, such as in kata, we see that the violence is not a question
of wanting to hurt the opponent, but it is an attitude, expressed by
the martial behavior that makes the practice credible.
Intentionality affects form and strength, gestures and postures,
incarnating combative logic behind each of these elements. It is a
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sort of order of consciousness regarding the mind and the body, that
implicates active participation and involvement in doing it.
It is a reflexive and discursive consciousness for which there is a
need for knowledge and an interiorization of the techniques that are
embodied and incorporated, in the limbs of karateka, and obviously
in his mind. During the practice of kata, the karateka’s bodily attitude,
both sensible and sentient, is expressed through fine–tuning aimed at
establishing a causal relationship with an external, imaginary being,
so that intentionality takes on the reflexive knowledge of the body.
The question of the absence of the opponent leads us to reflect on
the abstraction of intentionality, which is inscribed in every technique
in relation to wanting to do and being able to do, which gives the
status of subject to the model opponent.
In carrying out some techniques, the karateka has to use his body
as a unit of measurement, which serves as a reference point for cal-
culating the correct position of his/her hands and feet. In the fourth
kata, for example, called Heian Yondan, it is necessary to fully extend
the arms and hands at face level, as if to grasp back the opponent’s
head. Here, the karateka’s head will coincide with that of the model
opponent, and then we can say that the one to beat is the inner self,
not the real other. Here is one of the fundamental traits of karate:
the constant search for improvement that lasts for life. The model
opponent reflects the self of karateka, contributing to the concrete
construction of time and space of kata, returning the inner world that
produced it to its expression.
Kata are designed to perform any technique depending on a pre-
defined scheme that includes movements in each direction: forward,
back, right, left, and diagonal. According to Fontanille (, p. )
the directions that shape the movement are intentional indications,
immanent to body matter. As Fontanille wrote (ibidem, p. ) it is
precisely the orientation of the gesture to emphasize its intentional
aspect and to emphasize the definition of the form that is produced
by a combination of forces, i.e. a completely overlapping concept to
that of kata. Fontanille refers to tensive and rhythmic forces, and in
karate we can find the first type in the muscle tension at the imaginary
point of impact, while the second in the elegance and fluidity of the
movements punctuated applying strength at the right time to balance
the interaction between the different forces, by calculating the maai,
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the good distance from the absent opponent. In addition to spatial
distance, maai also includes a time factor: in other words, in executing
a kata the karateka has to concentrate on imagining the real opponent
and calculating the right space–time interval to hit the target, giving
form to an imaginary battle field, making a convocation of subjectivity
and of actantial forms, and also of their interaction manifesting vigor,
delicacy and speed at the same time with natural movements and
gestures. This is the difference between the true interpretation of
the kata and its execution following the manual, respecting only the
rhythm and order of the techniques. So practicing kata is not only a
question of memorization and of technical perfection, but it is also
about to figuring out their real meaning.
The signification of gestural discourses in kata appears in form
of «programmed texts thus undergirded by an implicit intentionality,
and as theatrical utterances, produced in function of an observer»
(Greimas, Courtés , p. ), and therefore it is doubly meaningful.
If we look at kata through intentionality lenses it «can be conceived
as a tension which is inscribed between two modes of existence: the
modes of virtuality and of realization», close to the idea of modal
competence (ibidem, p. ).
According to Fontanille (, p. ), intentionality is a stratification
of semiotic modes of existence: the first is the virtualized one where
the karateka has the fighting spirit, the motivation to perform kata,
knowing that it is necessary to measure himself against the model
opponent; then there is the potentialized mode, the one regarding
beliefs, which is triggered when karateka can evoke the imaginary
battle. The representation of the opponent is completed providing his
own simulacrum and the kata as act of enunciation can be actualized
through rei and ceremonial greeting. The karateka knows that there
is an opponent in front of him, and he/she can intensify his fighting
intents because he/she knows that an attack is coming. This is the
last mode of existence, the realization one, where the kata is always
starting with a blocking technique, because «there is no first attack in
karate» is one of the main Funakoshi’s teachings. The fight comes to
reality thanks to model opponent pressure, that requests defense.
 Bianca Terracciano
. Creation and Surplus of Meaning
Intentionality connects the different instances of discourse of kata
and resides in every gesture and technique, so that sensomotricity is
the real link with intentionality (cf. ibidem, p. ). This is how the
body gives meaning to the world, and originates actancial structures,
constituting as the vector of the prehension, the place of symbolic
elaborations.
In the interaction between matter and energy, the kata itself is
generated, the form, transforming the karateka’s body into the one of
the model opponent.
In this way, following Greimas and Courtés (), we can consider
kata’s intentionality as an orientation towards the world, a transitive
relation from which the subject builds itself and the world as object.
According to Fontanille (, p. ), in the canonical narrative
scheme, we can find a posteriori the intentionality of the concate-
nation of actions and their meaning, although direct and sensitive
perception is not always possible due to the contextual variations gen-
erated by culture. This a posteriori recognition through the scheme is
not only for searching for an object of value, but also for the meaning,
which is to be recognized with the analysis. The meaning produces
value, structural by difference and phenomenological by intentional-
ity, which both coincide with the aesthetic appreciation of the world
(Fabbri and Marrone , p. ). If we apply the canonical narrative
scheme to kata, we see that karateka is manipulated by his master and
his colleagues because he/she has to perfect herself/himself and then
he/she has to practice techniques to obtain the competence to have a
great kata performance, which is judged, sanctioned, by the master, or
the arbiter in case of competition, or even by an object, the embusen,
the ideal line where he/she has to return at the end of the kata.
When performing kata, the karateka has control of the conse-
quences of the techniques because he/she appears as the intentional
agent of the action that makes the ideal fight something that can be
accepted and understood, or acknowledged. Also in kata intentional-
ity concerns both the creation of meaning by the observer, who can
reconstruct the fighting between two opponents, and the original pur-
poses of the master that has designed the scheme of techniques, but it
is also the possibility of recognizing that surplus of meaning which le-
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gitimizes the belonging to a certain culture. Regarding this last point
we are in the field of cultural, aesthetic and historic intentionality,
which has shaped kata embodying in them the background and cir-
cumstances of their native Japanese culture, establishing a connection
with other cultures involved.
Kata intentionality activates intersubjectivity that is a semiotic
frame of construction and sharing of meaning where habits, inten-
tions, points of view are embodied and sedimented during the history
of karate. Therefore, on the one hand we have the authorial instance
that oscillates from the master who created the kata, i.e. Funakoshi, to
the karateka who executes it, rewriting it starting from his body, who
builds the model opponent in its image and likeness; on the other
hand there is the spectator who must evoke the fighting scenario by
projecting his simulacrum in place of the opponent. In addition to
these, there are the various cultures involved, geographically distant
semiospheres, but united by karate in which kata and techniques have
the same name everywhere, where the rule of interpreting tradition,
which is embodied in the body itself, is applied. Karate is a cultural
universal, where intentionality is deduced and reconstructed, based
on rules, idealizations, passions, interests and purposes.
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Schematismo e figura
Il testo come mediatore intenzionale del giudizio
E A*
 : Schematism and Figure: The Text as Intentional Mediator of
Judgement
: The article comments on the critique of Franz Brentano, Ed-
mund Husserl, and Immanuel Kant proposed by Bernard Stiegler. It
describes its implications for a theory of intentionality. It focuses, in
particular, on the notion of “tertiary retention”. Thanks to this notion,
Stiegler rehabilitates the first version of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.
The article concentrates on the relation between the notion of exter-
nalized retention and the Kantian notion of schema. It underlines its
consequences on how the role of imagination is conceived in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason. Hence, a parallelism emerges with Erich Auerbach’s
hermeneutical notion of figura as found in biblical and later on also in
non–biblical hermeneutics. Kant’s notion of schema and the notion of
figura, indeed, share some common functions and features. They both
refer to intermediate entities whose role is to bridge two incommen-
surable realms: the former connects sensibility and concepts; the latter,
umbrae and veritas. Thanks to Stiegler’s lesson on tertiary retentions
and schema, it can be argued that schema and figura share not only the
same essence and function, but also the same formal genesis. The article
concludes with a focus on the rhetorical setting of both the Critique of
Pure Reason and the Bible, showing that they put on stage a common
scenario.
: Schematism; Figuralism; Retentions; Kant; Auerbach.
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
 Emanuele Antonelli
Per molto tempo si è ritenuto che la traduzione migliore del lemma
greco mimesis fosse rappresentazione (tradizione già affermata nel 
sec., e.g. Fracastoro ). Il fatto che la parola immaginazione portasse
con sé la medesima radice sembrava confermare l’esistenza di una
relazione essenziale tra la capacità di creare immagini e la mimesis,
e così rassicurare sulla bontà della traduzione invalsa. Accettare tale
soluzione linguistica comportava inoltre abbracciare, in confortevole
continuità, le considerazioni di Platone, Aristotele e Husserl tra gli altri,
in merito al ruolo che il plesso semantico espresso dalla radice mimos
era chiamato a ritagliarsi nell’esercizio della conoscenza mediante
giudizi: il minore possibile.
Se è fin troppo noto il bando energico di Platone, forse non lo
è altrettanto il dibattito che intercorre tra Edmund Husserl e Franz
Brentano al medesimo riguardo. Il primo infatti rimproverò al secon-
do di aver concesso uno spazio inopportuno all’immaginazione nel suo
studio sull’intenzionalità e il tema del tempo. Brentano ragionò in
effetti sulla nozione di associazione originaria nel tentativo di fare luce
sull’esperienza di ciò che sta passando, per esempio una melodia (Fu-
gali ). Secondo Husserl il problema si poneva nella misura in cui
Brentano faceva della ritenzione primaria un passato che l’immagina-
zione era chiamata a associare alla percezione presente: tale soluzione
appariva inammissibile poiché implicava che la dimensione temporale
dell’esperienza — il caso di scuola verte sulla melodia, un oggetto
temporale che scorrendo coincide con il flusso della coscienza (HUA
, p. ; trad. it. p. ) — fosse in fin dei conti immaginata. Husserl
propose invece di considerare la ritenzione primaria, cioè il ricordo
del non appena passato, in opposizione al ricordo propriamente detto,
cioè la ritenzione secondaria, proprio al fine di tenere separati imma-
ginazione e percezione, garantendo a quest’ultima il suo pieno valore
epistemico. Per distinguere ritenzione primaria e ricordo, fece della
prima l’estremo passato dell’estensione temporale dell’intenzionalità,
arrivando così a concepire la nozione di intenzionalità longitudinale
(Ricoeur , p. ). Husserl proporrà di considerare l’intenzionalità
come una tensione estesa nel tempo, i.e. contrapporrà all’idea di per-
cezione puntuale una sintesi originaria di presente, non–appena (la
ritenzione primaria) e non–ancora (la protensione). È questo il dibatti-
to a cui Bernard Stiegler si rifà per fondare la propria articolazione del
problema, nella serie La tecnique et le temps (–).
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Nel terzo tomo, in particolare, Stiegler ha chiarito che il nucleo del
proprio interesse giace proprio nel rapporto che si ritiene di dover isti-
tuire tra ritenzione e percezione, ovvero dello spazio che siamo costretti
a lasciare all’immaginazione. A suo avviso, la distinzione analitica tra
ricordo, un prodotto dell’immaginazione, e ritenzione primaria, una
sezione dell’esperienza intenzionale del presente, va confermata; ciò non
deve però implicare la negazione dell’esistenza di una mutua influenza,
a cui va invece sostituita la consapevolezza che la «percezione non sia
mai pura da ogni immaginazione» (, pp. –, n. ). Per sostenere
questa tesi a suo modo rivoluzionaria, Stiegler ha rivolto l’attenzione
su un terzo tipo di ritenzione, il ricordo esternalizzato.
La nozione di ritenzione terziaria, plasmata sulla coscienza d’immagine
husserliana, ha una prima funzione metodologica, ovvero mette in luce
le condizioni di possibilità di ogni analisi fenomenologica dei vissuti e de-
gli oggetti temporali: perché lo studio di una melodia possa dischiudere
osservazioni rilevanti sulla relazione tra ritenzione primaria e ritenzio-
ne secondaria è necessario che l’oggetto temporale in questione sia a
ogni ripetizione uguale a se stesso. Resasi disponibile la tecnologia per
garantire l’esistenza di una ripetizione perfetta dell’identico, il fonografo,
si è anche offerta l’intuizione del fatto che la coscienza che fa esperien-
za del medesimo è sempre diversa, proprio nella misura in cui è già
sempre il risultato dell’esperienza precedente. A ogni ascolto, la melodia
ci si darà in modalità diverse, non già perché essa sia diversa (cosa che
il fonografo ci permette di escludere con certezza, a differenza delle
esecuzioni dal vivo), ma perché la coscienza che seleziona le ritenzioni
primarie è stata modificata dall’esperienza trascorsa. La ritenzione ter-
ziaria, il disco, rende così evidente che l’immaginazione — mediante
il ricordo — interviene al cuore stesso della percezione, ovvero condi-
ziona la trama dell’intenzionalità longitudinale. La ritenzione primaria,
in quanto processo di selezione del ritenuto e dell’obliato, è influenzata
nei propri criteri procedurali dalle aperture nella griglia delle selezioni
precedenti, in modo tale per cui «le ritenzioni secondarie abitano in
anticipo il processo di ritenzione primaria» (Stiegler , p. ). Altresì,
la ritenzione terziaria diventa per Stiegler elemento teoretico fondativo
di un nuovo modello di funzionamento della coscienza.
La ritenzione terziaria è il ricordo riattivabile di qualcosa che non
è stato vissuto direttamente dalla coscienza; la totalità, o quasi, degli
oggetti che popolano il nostro mondo, cioè le immagini, statiche o in
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movimento, i libri, la musica, i monumenti, hanno questa caratteri-
stica. Dal punto di vista genetico, si tratta di oggetti che comportano
la presunzione di realtà di un passato che però non abbiamo vissu-
to noi. Il passato che non abbiamo vissuto e che tuttavia dobbiamo
fare nostro — la Weltgeschichtlichkeit — è veicolato dalle ritenzioni
terziarie (tracce mnestiche per lo più tecniche) che ci circondano. Da
Heidegger, Stiegler riceve inoltre la consapevolezza della centralità
del problema della finitudine umana, e nella fattispecie della finitudine
ritenzionale, ripercorrendo la strada che porta a Kant.
Il terzo tomo de La tecnique et le temps è infatti un sostenuto corpo
a corpo con la filosofia kantiana e in particolare con la questione dello
schematismo trascendentale e del suo rapporto con l’immaginazione.
Ispirato dalle riflessioni di Adorno e Horkheimer sulle industrie cultu-
rali e il loro rapporto con lo schematismo (Id. , pp.  ss.), Stiegler
propone di affrontare la questione del rapporto tra immaginazione
e percezione ritornando all’argomento con cui Kant analizza l’unità
della coscienza nella prima versione della Deduzione trascendentale e
del ruolo che vi attribuisce all’immaginazione. Egli sostiene che la de-
scrizione fenomenologica della sintesi temporale della coscienza, per
la quale la percezione del presente è sempre tramata da ritenzioni e
da protensioni, primarie secondarie e terziarie, corrisponda all’analisi
proposta da Kant, e che renda più perspicua l’oscura dottrina dello
schematismo.
Sarà utile mettere in parallelo la presentazione kantiana della tri-
plice sintesi (d’apprensione, riproduzione e ricognizione) della prima
versione della Deduzione trascendentale con l’articolazione fenomeno-
logica dell’esperienza del tempo in ritenzioni e protensioni. Stiegler
ritiene che l’impasse in cui era scivolato Kant sia la stessa in cui, secon-
do Husserl, era rimasto bloccato Brentano: nessuno dei due sarebbe
riuscito a rilevare la distinzione analitica tra apprensione e riprodu-
zione. Descrivendo la sintesi della riproduzione, Kant sta parlando
della ritenzione primaria. Gli esempi analizzati, caso per altro raro
nella Critica e indice della difficoltà che la materia gli presentava, sono
rivelatori.
. Il malinteso in cui era incorso, induce Kant a rinunciare a questa prima esposizione
della Deduzione trascendentale per presentare, sei anni più tardi, una nuova versione in cui le
sintesi descritte sono due, la prima delle quali, che genera le rappresentazioni, è definita
speciosa o figurata (A , rigo ).
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Se il mio pensiero perdesse sempre le rappresentazioni precedenti (le prime
parti della linea, le parti precedenti del tempo, oppure le unità rappresen-
tate successivamente), e se io non le riproducessi mentre procedo verso
le rappresentazioni seguenti, in tal caso non potrebbe mai sorgere una
rappresentazione completa. (B –, corsivo nostro)
Tenere distinte le due sintesi confuse da Kant permette a Stiegler
di evitare il vicolo cieco da cui Kant era uscito solo con la stesura della
seconda versione della Critica. Salva la distinzione analitica tra sintesi
dell’apprensione, i.e. ritenzione primaria, e sintesi della riproduzione,
i.e. ritenzione secondaria, Stiegler può recuperare la relazione anali-
ticamente chiara ma proceduralmente complessa per cui la sintesi
della riproduzione in effetti accompagna sempre quella d’apprensione,
i.e. per cui il ricordo accompagna sempre, come criterio di selezione,
la ritenzione primaria. La terza sintesi, di ricognizione, assicura, in
quanto proiezione protensionale, la coerenza della coscienza con se
stessa, l’unità della coscienza in quanto flusso: il processo complessivo
garantisce l’unità dell’appercezione, la quale può così accompagnare
ogni rappresentazione.
Dopo Husserl, Stiegler rimprovera anche Kant di non essersi reso
conto che l’unità dell’appercezione, del flusso di quella coscienza che
è la coscienza dello stesso Kant, gli si mostrava solo grazie al testo
scritto su cui stava annotando la propria esperienza; un testo mediante
il quale noi stessi possiamo riattivarla come un passato che non abbia-
mo mai vissuto e che tuttavia, imparando a pensare come Kant, siamo
in grado di assumere come nostro. La finitudine ritenzionale non
gli impedì di concepire il proprio lungo argomento perché supplita
dal testo che egli stesso stava stendendo, ovvero da una ritenzione
terziaria, una versione esternalizzata e tecnicamente unificata del suo
flusso di coscienza. Senza il testo vergato su carta, Kant non avrebbe
potuto tenere a mente la lunga sequenza di rappresentazioni di cui
si compone il suo argomento. Anzi, senza il sostegno di sintesi ester-
ne che contenessero la sua finitudine ritenzionale, Kant stesso non
sarebbe stato nient’altro che un costante fluire di rappresentazioni.
. Per limiti di spazio, lasceremo da parte le considerazioni relative al ruolo della
terza sintesi, della ricognizione, e del suo rapporto con le protensioni, ovvero con la
terza estasi temporale (Stiegler , c. ). Ci permettiamo di segnalare che l’unità della
coscienza è supportata da tutte le memorie esternalizzate con cui il soggetto commercia
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L’unità della coscienza, che è condizione di possibilità di ogni giudizio,
è resa possibile dalla ritenzione terziaria, che svolge dunque il ruolo
di quarta sintesi, tecnologica.
Il commercio della coscienza con il mondo degli oggetti e delle trac-
ce mnestiche che la circondano non le garantisce solo il supplemento
necessario a contenere la finitudine ritenzionale del fluire costante;
l’analisi di Stiegler mette in luce una seconda funzione della ritenzio-
ne terziaria, ancora più rilevante. Dopo aver trattato della Deduzione
trascendentale, Kant si dedica allo schematismo: secondo l’autore della
Critica della Ragion Pura, lo schema è quel prodotto dell’immagina-
zione che media tra la sensibilità e l’intelletto, proiettando le categorie
pure a priori sul molteplice dell’intuizione (Stiegler , par. ). Lo
schema è una regola, una procedura, con cui la coscienza mette in
forma i dati sensibili, categorizza le intuizioni, sussume il particolare
sotto l’universale. È lo strumento con cui le categorie dedotte nella
sezione precedente vengono applicate al molteplice dell’intuizione,
con cui il sensibile riempie il concetto:
Lo schema è in se stesso ognora un prodotto dell’immaginazione; ma in
quanto la sintesi di questa non ha in vista alcuna singola intuizione, bensì
solo l’unità nella determinazione della sensibilità, lo schema è pertanto
da distinguere dall’immagine. Così, se io metto cinque punti uno dopo
l’altro: •••••, questa è un’immagine del numero cinque. Invece, se io penso
soltanto a un numero in generale, che può essere poi cinque o cento, questo
pensiero è piuttosto la rappresentazione di un metodo, per rappresentare
in una immagine una molteplicità (per esempio, mille) in conformità di
un certo concetto, che non questa immagine stessa, che io in quest’ultimo
caso difficilmente potrei contemplare e comparare al concetto. Ora, questa
rappresentazione di un processo generale dell’esperienza rivolto a procurare
a un concetto la sua immagine, è quella che denomino lo schema per questo
concetto (A ).
Kant pare non considerare che i cinque pallini, il numero cinque,
e ogni altra rappresentazione grafica dipendono, a pari merito delle
immagini, dalle ritenzioni terziarie tecnologiche. Senza una storia delle
tecniche di computazione, dalle dita alle righe sulla sabbia ai computer,
nessuno avrebbe potuto, all’epoca di Kant come alla nostra, immaginare
quotidianamente, basta pensare all’esperienza di straniamento e frammentazione che
prende chi sia costretto di punto in bianco a rinunciare a tutte le proprie cose.
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il numero mille. Pur avendo funzioni diverse e dunque dovendo essere
distinti analiticamente, gli schemi, i.e. “i metodi per rappresentare in
immagine”, e le immagini sono co–originari, e sorgono dal commercio
con le ritenzioni terziarie disponibili a ogni momento storico dato.
Da questa breve presentazione della lettura stiegleriana della ma-
teria kantiana abbiamo conquistato un elemento fondamentale della
nostra riflessione: la ritenzione terziaria, e.g. il testo scritto, supplisce
la finitudine ritenzionale e contiene il fluire dell’unità dell’appercezio-
ne; inoltre essa condiziona e media, in quanto criterio di selezione e di
associazione, la produzione della rappresentazione, ovvero l’esercizio
della facoltà di giudizio (Stiegler , par. ).
Sulla base di quanto mostrato, vorremmo ora mettere in luce un’analo-
gia formale che lega la prima Critica e il testo sacro della tradizione cri-
stiana, nella convinzione che tale operazione possa portare maggiore
chiarezza alla lettura di entrambi. Lo strumento con cui proponiamo
di aprire questo percorso analitico è la nozione di figura. L’osservazio-
ne elementare da cui partire concerne non solo l’uso che Kant fa del
termine, in un contesto così delicato come quello richiamato, ma il
fatto che esso traduca in latino il greco schema. Il pretesto linguistico
lascia aperte molte possibilità di fraintendimento, ma la funzione e
la natura dello schema nella dottrina kantiana chiarita dall’interpreta-
zione stiegleriana, e della nozione di figura nell’ermeneutica e nella
tradizione biblica e romanza ci permetteranno di avanzare con mag-
giore sicurezza. La materia su cui imbastire il confronto tra le due
nozioni è la seguente: lo schema svolge la funzione di mediazione tra
il molteplice dell’intuizione e la categoria, tra sensibilità e idealità. La
nozione di figura ha assunto nell’ermeneutica già neotestamentaria
e segnatamente paolina, poi patristica e soprattutto agostiniana e in
generale biblica, la funzione di mediazione tra la vicenda mondana,
mortale, corporale e l’ordine provvidenziale, divino, trascendente;
. «Les sélections dans les rétentions primaires que je fais depuis mes rétentions
secondaires sont [. . . ] elles–mêmes soumises à des processus de sélection issus d’un passé
que je n’ai pas vécu, dont j’hérite comme rétentions tertiaires qui constituent le monde
dans lequel je vis, ET QUE J’ADOPTE» (Stiegler , p. ). Cfr. anche Stiegler  (par.
) e Beaubois .
. Vedi nota .
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tra la peripezia terrena e la vita eterna; tra la storia individuale e la
storia universale della redenzione.
Pur contando maggiormente sul valore probatorio dell’analisi fun-
zionale, sarà nondimeno opportuno ricordare i tratti essenziali della
storia del termine, perché da essi emerge la natura intermedia dell’ente
denotato dal termine figura. La storia antica del termine oscilla tra
i significati che il greco, già più strutturato e differenziato, esprime-
va mediante i termini μορφή, εἰδος, τυpiος, σχημα. Pur affermandosi
autonomamente, in latino il termine figura manterrà rapporti di sino-
nimia con i termini latini forma, umbra, imago. La prima occorrenza
censita è dovuta a Terenzio che la usa con il significato di “formazione
plastica”. Il senso della vista nella determinazione del plesso semantico
perde presto la sua preponderanza; già in Varrone si presenta «l’idea
che ci siano figure anche per il senso dell’udito» (Auerbach , p.
); inizia anche a presentarsi l’uso del termine figura per definire una
formazione grammaticale o sintattica — così per altro già Aristotele,
che parla di schemi sillogistici. In Cicerone il termine verrà poi utilizzato
per definire i tre livelli dello stile, figura gravis, mediocris, attenuata (Id.
, p. ). Si passa a un uso tecnico che trova fortuna nel campo
della grammatica e della retorica in cui ancora oggi vede il suo uso più
frequente. Al di fuori di questo campo, la nozione mantiene la sua
fondamentale rilevanza nel campo dell’ermeneutica biblica e dantesca.
Secondo Auerbach, «l’interpretazione figurale stabilisce fra due
atti o persone un nesso in cui uno di essi non significa soltanto se
stesso, ma significa anche l’altro, mentre l’altro comprende o adempie
il primo» (Ivi, p. ); l’adempimento è definito in genere “veritas”,
mentre la figura è umbra o imago.
Auerbach ha a cuore l’analisi dell’interpretazione figurale in con-
trapposizione a quella allegorica e esalta lungo i suoi scritti la com-
piuta storicità di entrambi i poli della relazione messa in luce. Per
esempio: «la figura ha una realtà storica pari a quella di ciò che essa
. Non sarà superfluo ricordare che il significato principale della nozione di stile è modo
di fare: le figure retoriche non sono dunque altro che modi sin–tattici, modi di comporre
versioni esternalizzate delle proprie esperienze del reale. In questo senso va anche l’uso
aristotelico del termine schemata per descrivere gli atteggiamenti mimetici dei danzatori:
sempre di modi si tratta; cfr. Arist., Poetica, a. È per altro già stato messo in luce il fatto
che con tali schemi «il corpo si fa immagine e supporto di memoria» (De Min , , corsivo
nostro): un modello di azione pronto per essere imitato.
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profetizza. [. . . ] è un fatto storico–concreto, ed è adempiuta da fatti
storico–concreti» (ivi, p. ). Ricorda altresì Agostino:
Anzitutto, fratelli, vi ammoniamo e ordiniamo in nome del Signore, che
quando udite l’esposizione del mistero delle Scritture che narra di cose
avvenute, crediate effettivamente nella verità storica dell’avvenimento di
cui leggete. (Agostino, Serm., ,  ss. [cit. in Auerbach , p. ])
Tuttavia, il senso del nesso ermeneutico si comprende solo nella
misura in cui, forti della precisazione analitica offerta da Auerbach, ci
si concentri sul ruolo di intermediazione offerta dal principio figurale. A
una umbra, o imago storico–concreta — e.g. i profeti dell’Antico Testa-
mento — San Paolo per primo e la patristica poi, associano le vicende
della storia di Gesù, della Chiesa, della salvezza. Ancorché storica, la
figura è sempre al tempo stesso ideale; mondana, essa partecipa già
della storia divina; questa è la caratteristica che le permette di garanti-
re il nesso tra due vicende che potrebbero sembrare incompatibili o
incommensurabili e che invece assicurano una compiuta esperienza
di verità proprio in forza del legame che le unisce.
Per rendere pienamente pertinente l’analogia formale che ab-
biamo individuato è necessario mettere in luce un dettaglio su cui
Auerbach sembra sorvolare (così anche Maine ), ovvero il fatto
che la Bibbia sia un testo che pretende, esattamente come la Critica
della Ragion Pura, di offrire gli strumenti per comprendere il mondo.
La relazione triangolare su cui si fonda la dottrina dello schematismo
trascendentale non deve dunque essere cercata solo nell’interpretazio-
ne intratestuale della Bibbia, ma nella relazione tra il lettore, la Bibbia
e il mondo — questione che domina, pur rimanendo sullo sfondo,
Mimesis (Auerbach ). Il molteplice sensibile di cui il lettore della
Bibbia trova gli strumenti per fare esperienza sensata e vera non è
dunque l’Antico Testamento, ma la propria stessa vita, storica, con-
creta, reale. La figura, ricordo esternalizzato, cioè tramandato dagli
autori della Bibbia come ritenzione che il lettore non ha ovviamente
vissuto in prima persona, agisce come schema mediante il quale il
fedele può sovrascrivere il nesso intenzionale e imporre la categoria
. Ci limitiamo a ricordare, in nota, che è proprio Agostino ad anticipare il discorso
husserliano relativo alla distensione temporale dell’io, questione su cui per altro finirà per
convergere anche il tardo Brentano, definendo la nozione di proterestesi.
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opportuna alla propria esistenza, molteplice, caotica. Il testo media,
in quanto ritenzione terziaria che condiziona le sintesi dell’appren-
sione e della riproduzione, l’esercizio della facoltà di giudizio del
lettore nei confronti della sua realtà.
In altri termini, perché si dia giudizio valido, secondo l’interpreta-
zione e la metodologia figurale e analogamente a quanto sostenuto
da Kant, è necessario associare al prodotto dell’intuizione storicamen-
te determinata l’opportuna categoria della vicenda divina; ciò che
rende possibile la mediazione tra sensibilità e idealità, è lo schema;
tra mondanità e storia della salvezza è la figura. Il tratto essenzia-
le, analogamente a quanto ci spiega Kant in merito allo schema, è
proprio la doppia omogeneità, tanto alla vicenda umana del lettore,
quanto a quella divina, fonte della rivelazione e trascendentale di ogni
esperienza di senso per il cristiano. L’essenza intermedia della figura
svolge dunque un ruolo analiticamente analogo a quello dello schema
kantiano e ne condivide la genesi.
La materia esposta nella dottrina dello schematismo trascenden-
tale è il cuore della Critica della ragion pura e viene introdotta da un
paragrafo che ci ricorda quale sia lo scopo fondamentale dell’intera
opera. L’“Introduzione” all’Analitica delle proposizioni fondamentali, di
cui lo schematismo dei concetti puri dell’intelletto costituisce il primo
capitolo, reca infatti il titolo Della capacità trascendentale di giudizio, in
. In questo contesto, rimaniamo fedeli a esempi biblici ma l’interpretazione del
figuralismo che proponiamo rende chiare anche le vicende di Don Quijote o di Mathilde
de la Mole, o di Madame Bovary: i loro schemi, tratti dai testi di cui si sono letteralmente
infarciti la testa, mediano i loro giudizi in modo anacronistico, cioè slegato dall’enciclope-
dia di esempi e figure invece condivisa tra i membri della loro comunità di riferimento
(Géfin ). Cfr. anche Ankersmit il quale, a proposito di Don Quijote, nota che «the
knight’s mind is excellent, but things tend to go awry somewhere between reality and his
perception of it. In other words [. . . ] Don Quixote’s confusion is not merely psychological
but rather epistemological» (Ankersmit , , corsivi nostri). Insomma, come già Auer-
bach, è «meglio essere legati al proprio tempo consapevolmente che inconsapevolmente»
(cit. in Mazzoni , p. ).
. Come fatto in precedenza (v. nota ), accenniamo al fatto che così come lo schema e
la figura corrispondono alla forma passata, la ritenzione terziaria, la sintesi della ricognizio-
ne, i.e. del concetto, è parallela alla protensione, è l’attesa, la profezia, l’anticipazione. Il
suo compimento è la veritas. Auerbach insiste sul fatto che il tema della finitudine è ben
presente agli autori che affrontano la questione del figuralismo. A differenza di quanto si
possa dire di Dio, che vive fuori dal tempo, la veritas per il cristiano è sempre rimandata a un
momento a venire: il compimento dell’idea di giustizia è d’altronde rinviato al momento
in cui si realizzerà il regno dei fini (Auerbach , pp. –).
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generale. Qualificata l’analogia formale tra le condizioni di possibilità
del giudizio in generale per come sono esposte da Kant e per come re-
stano implicite ma evidenti nell’interpretazione figurale, ci si presenta
un’ulteriore elemento di analogia.
Ritradotte senza eufemismi né ritrosie, le terminologie bibliche e
kantiane solo in parte richiamate in questo articolo rendono infatti
trasparente il fatto di condividere un comune riferimento scenografico.
Le figure principali della vicenda neotestamentaria richiamano in ef-
fetti alla dimensione tribunalizia a cui lo stesso Kant fa risaputamente
riferimento nell’imbastire la scena del suo lungo argomento. Se il
filosofo critico parla di Tribunale della Ragione, utilizzando non solo
il gergo del giudizio, ma ricevendo dalla tradizione la centralità del
termine categoria — il cui etimo ricorda l’accusa e la cui traduzione
perifrastica darebbe come risultato: «condurre verso la pubblica piazza
[per accusare]» —, la Bibbia mette in scena il dibattimento tra una vit-
tima, un accusatore (questo il primo significato dell’espressione Satan),
un avvocato difensore (questo il significato dell’epiteto dello Spirito
Santo, il Paracleto) e un giudice.
Esplicitato il comune scenario, possiamo desumere dal nostro pa-
rallelismo un’implicazione ermeneutica. Kant ci spiega che la capacità
di giudizio è un talento particolare, non proceduralizzabile, frutto di
addestramento e esercizio, coadiuvati dall’esposizione a esempi op-
portuni (A , righi –). Il figuralismo sembra condividere questa
consapevolezza e utilizza il medesimo accorgimento: l’Antico Testa-
mento è un florilegio di esempi di giudizi emessi da un popolo che
ha già da sempre iniziato a ragionare sulla questione dell’accusa, della
categoria, e che il Nuovo Testamento (convinto di portare a termine
l’esercizio intrapreso dalla propria tradizione) si propone di sottopor-
re a un nuovo esame critico, nella speranza di farne uno strumento
di veritas per tutti i lettori. Per realizzare questo obiettivo, la soluzio-
ne individuata è logicamente analoga a quella proposta, quasi suo
malgrado, da Kant. Perché il molteplice sensibile — le esperienze
dei soggetti storici, i casi — possa essere connesso all’idea (di giusti-
zia) secondo veritas, è necessario poter contare su di una mediazione,
un’immagine, uno schema, uno stile sin–tattico — cioè su un modo di
. Possiamo appena ricordare che la fama di Auerbach è dovuta, oltre che alla sua
interpretazione del figuralismo, alla riflessione sul contributo offerto dal testo biblico al
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comporre l’accusa, o la difesa. Non si può giudicare senza esperienza
diretta, ma neanche senza gli schemi forniti sotto forma di ritenzioni
terziarie, ovvero l’esperienza indiretta. È questo il punctum biblico:
«Guardate, è già successo, questo è il modo giusto per capire che sta
succedendo di nuovo e giudicare secondo verità e giustizia». La Bibbia,
almeno secondo coloro che si batterono per il trionfo dell’interpre-
tazione figurale, sembra aver accettato che l’esempio differito tratto
da un’enciclopedia condivisa tra i membri della comunità dei giudi-
canti–aventi–esperienza sia il migliore degli schemi disponibili; forse
perché, almeno secondo l’interpretazione che ne ha fornito René Gi-
rard (), è anche consapevole che la mimesis, cioè l’immaginazione,
ha una parte preponderante nell’esercizio della facoltà di giudizio, e
che è dunque meglio essere guidati dalla figura–schema, esempio ter-
ziarizzato e già criticato, che non dalla massa dei prossimi, da sempre
persecutori.
superamento della Stiltrennung classica (Auerbach ). Questa tesi conferma, e ne è a
sua volta arricchita, il senso della nostra operazione: perché la figura potesse svolgere il
suo ruolo di mediazione tra la vita e il divino, fu necessario liberare il testo, mediatore
intenzionale del giudizio, dalle strutture rigide a cui era ancora ancorato. Solo così «i luoghi
e gli oggetti comuni, gli aspetti assolutamente privati della vita interiore, l’imperfezione dei
corpi, tutti quei lati del mondo che per l’arte classica erano senza interesse, o degni tutt’al
più di un interesse comico, vengono riscattati da questo nuovo orizzonte teologico, dove
ogni individuo ha un significato universale e il divino si manifesta in circostanze quotidiane»
(Mazzoni , pp. –). Non sfuggirà per altro il fatto che l’origine della Stiltrennung non
è altro che la sclerotizzazione di modi di fare creati per affrontare la finitudine ritenzionale
dell’aedo, così anche Bakker (, p. ). Lo stile è insomma un criterio con cui tagliare il
continuum dell’esperienza al fine di metterlo in forma per la rappresentazione. Lo stile è uno
schema. Troviamo nelle ricerche recenti di Fabrizio Desideri un’interessante convergenza
con le tesi qui elaborate: lo schema estetico — e le funzioni che egli vi attribuisce: a) indice
di auto–orientamento; b) pattern di riconoscimento per oggetti, aspetti, proprietà, eventi; c)
dispositivo euristico — anticipa gli schemi categoriali. In questo senso, lo schema estetico,
la cui origine è indagata in profondità da Desideri, rivela un’affinità con il meccanismo
grammaticale (Desideri , p. ; ). Desideri ci permette anche di fuggire dal rischio
del relativismo a cui la nostra tesi potrebbe richiamare: lo schema infatti non è né innato,
né storico. La sua origine epigenetica — superveniente — è il frutto di un processo di
adattamento nutrito da una sorta di Wechselwirkung con attrattori oggettivi (Von Foerster
, p. , cit. in Desideri , p. ).
. Anche in questo caso il parallelo è illuminante: Kant apre la stagione della filosofia
critica proprio nella misura in cui si rende conto che la filosofia oramai non può fare altro
che mettere al vaglio, criticare, si dirà poi in seguito ma convinti di essere fedeli alla linea
tracciata, sospettare, decostruire.
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 : Semiotics and Extended Consciousness
: The present article stems from the deep conviction that the
main concept of the Lotmanian epistemology — “the semiosphere”
—, if reconceived from an anthropological perspective as a cognitive
pattern of extended mind (following Semenenko’s suggestion), can offer
a unique epistemological framework, fundamental for the development
of an interdisciplinary dialogue, especially between humanities and cog-
nitive neurosciences. This study is meant to show how the conceptual
framework built on the Lotmanian model suggested here is able to
extend the interrelational dimension to consciousness conceived as inte-
grated information, as suggested by Tononi in the neuroscientific field.
In the same way, also the mirror neurons, discovered by the neuroscien-
tific school of Parma, can be seen as a network of semiotic boundaries
meant, on the one hand, to preserve the specialistic functions of the
different cerebral components and, on the other hand, to allow the in-
formational integration among them and the different consciousnesses
taking part in the cultural semiosphere.
: Semiosphere; Integrated Information; Intentionality; Extended
Mind; Mirror Neurons.
. Semiosi e cognizione incarnata
Nella semiotica della cultura di Jurij M. Lotman, il problema dell’in-
tenzionalità è largamente esplorato. Lotman sostiene che l’origine
della semiosi, non solo quella umana, dipende dalla possibilità, per
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l’individuo, di scegliersi un comportamento davanti a diverse possibi-
lità, superando così le limitazioni della memoria genetica, che tende a
uniformare i comportamenti del collettivo (Lotman , p. ). Ciò
comporta la necessità di prevedere l’effetto delle proprie azioni e di
quelle altrui. Da dove sorge questa intenzione consapevole? Essa è
forse legata all’interpretazione di un comportamento–testo e dunque
alle nostre abilità semiotiche, oppure c’è qualcosa di più “profondo”
nella comprensione dell’agentività come intenzione? La domanda è
legittima alla luce dei recenti risultati delle neuroscienze cognitive, che
ormai mettono in seria discussione la cosiddetta “teoria della mente”
del cognitivismo classico (Ammanniti e Gallese ). I neuroscienzia-
ti della Scuola di Parma hanno scoperto una “cognizione incarnata”,
che precede — essi sostengono — ogni elaborazione mentale dell’e-
sperienza intersoggettiva. Grazie alla presenza dei neuroni specchio
nella corteccia premotoria, il nostro sistema cervello–corpo è in gra-
do di rispondere in modo identico, ossia con l’impiego degli stessi
circuiti neurali, sia quando il soggetto compie un’azione intenzionale
(dotata di uno scopo), sia quando vede un altro individuo compiere
un’azione simile a quella di cui si è fatta esperienza (Rizzolatti e Sini-
gaglia ). I neuroni specchio nell’area F del macaco risuonano sia
quando l’animale afferra una nocciolina per portarla alla bocca, sia
quando vede un’altra scimmia o un uomo afferrare una nocciolina.
Ecco che, osserva Gallese, il sistema motorio non solo partecipa alla
cognizione, ma ne è alle fondamenta. Noi comprendiamo le azioni
altrui dotate d’intenzione perché le mappiamo sulle stesse aree neurali
che presiedono alle nostre azioni intenzionali (Gallese ).
La semiotica è forse in grado, con i propri strumenti, di occuparsi
di tale “simulazione incarnata”? Da un lato, le scoperte sui neuroni
specchio ci dicono che lo sviluppo della cognizione è sempre intersog-
gettivo, e questo apre alla possibilità di un dialogo con la semiotica
della cultura. Qualunque passo in questa direzione, dall’altro lato, deve
risolvere il problema di come l’azione altrui, nella cognizione incarna-
ta, diventi testo che acquista un senso nella vita intersoggettiva (nella
cultura). La cognizione incarnata è di sicuro pre–linguistica, ma è
anche pre–semiotica? Gallese sostiene che il sistema mirror è in grado
di rilevare l’agentività, (di capire chi compie l’azione) poiché sebbene
siano gli stessi neuroni ad accendersi nei casi di atto compiuto e atto
veduto, nel secondo caso la loro risposta è meno intensa (Amman-
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niti e Gallese ). Questo già introduce al problema semiotico del
rapporto fra Soggetto, Antisoggetto e Oggetto, secondo la semioti-
ca strutturale (Greimas ). Il fatto che la vista di un oggetto del
quale io ho esperienza di contatto predisponga all’azione il mio si-
stema motorio m’informa, seppure in modo ancora inconscio, sulla
presenza di qualcosa con cui io potrei essere congiunto (possesso) o
disgiunto. La differenza fra i due stati è evidentemente percepita con
stati emotivi (forici) opponibili, che in relazione al valore attribuito
all’oggetto potremmo definire, usando termini adottati in semiotica,
disforici o euforici (Greimas e Fontanille ). Seguendo Damasio,
a questo livello c’è già una forma di coscienza, sia pure legata ad un
“sé nucleare” (Damasio ). Una coscienza che però non è ancora
in grado, presumibilmente, d’istituire una differenza cognitiva tra
soggetto e oggetto: vivendo interamente nell’automatismo incarnato
la congiunzione o la disgiunzione, il nostro sistema cervello–corpo
presumibilmente non è in grado di costruire in modo speculativo l’as-
senza o presenza dell’oggetto ma semmai di avvertire una mancanza
emotiva che deve essere compensata per reintegrare la condizione eu-
forica del soggetto. Esiste la relazione, che è la relazione fra l’oggetto
prensile e la sua memoria visiva, tattile, ecc. — si veda il concetto di
affordance (Gibson ) — ma non la distinzione conscia.
Per una cognizione evoluta è dunque necessaria una più netta di-
stinzione dei due termini, e la consapevolezza di questa distinzione. A
questo livello sembra indispensabile l’intervento del sistema mirror,
che determina le condizioni per le quali la cognizione incarnata è
integrata da una rappresentazione cognitiva di grado superiore (Da-
masio ; Ramachandran  e ). Il vedere l’azione compiuta
da un altro e il rispecchiarmi in quell’azione come se io la compiessi
di persona, benché si tratti ancora di cognizione incarnata, mi dà più
informazioni rispetto al livello precedente sulle relazioni in gioco: l’og-
getto al quale io attribuisco un valore emotivo può essere disgiunto o
congiunto da me, anche in dipendenza dell’azione di un altro soggetto.
Due cani che si contendono un osso hanno una coscienza incarnata
sia del valore dell’oggetto sia della possibilità che sia l’altro soggetto
a impossessarsene, ed è per questo che essi scatteranno il più veloce-
mente possibile per sottrarre l’osso al contendente. Vi è dunque una
comprensione incarnata dell’agentività, ma non un’attività semiotica
incarnata: l’osso alla vista resta sé stesso, indistinto dal proprio valore
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e non «qualcosa che sta per qualcos’altro» (Peirce, CP , p. ). Ci
sono i presupposti per l’emersione di un sé–in relazione all’altro, ma
non vi è un sé autoriflessivo che è capace di staccarsi dall’azione e dal
comportamento per immaginare, poniamo, una strategia alternativa
di conquista dell’osso.
Sappiamo che una delle differenze fondamentali fra il sistema mir-
ror dell’uomo e quello delle scimmie antropomorfe sta nel fatto che
quest’ultimo è in grado d’incarnare non solo le azioni altrui eviden-
temente dotate di uno scopo (prendere una mela per mangiarla) ma
anche un gesto non finalizzato, in totale assenza visiva dell’oggetto
(ad esempio, far finta di prendere qualcosa con la mano che “mima”
la presa di un oggetto con una certa forma (Gallese e Guerra ). In
entrambi i casi, il mio sistema mirror risuona, ma lo fa in maniera più
o meno intensa a seconda che l’oggetto sia realmente presente o che
sia immaginabile dalla forma della presa della mano. Questa differenza
nel grado di cognizione incarnata potrebbe costituire un meccanismo
importante per l’avvio di processi semiotici. Nell’osservare qualcuno
che fa finta di afferrare qualcosa di palesemente assente, infatti, il mio
cervello è probabilmente obbligato ad attribuire comunque un senso
a quell’azione, e questo è possibile soltanto se il mio sistema cognitivo
è in grado di sostituire a quella presa vuota un oggetto dalla forma
corrispondente alla presa (Gallese e Guerra ).
Per questa attività immaginativa è necessario che io ricorra quanto-
meno alla memoria visiva dei diversi oggetti con i quali sono venuto a
contatto, e scegliere fra quelli che potrebbero stare nella presa della
mano altrui, secondo la mia memoria di azioni relazionate ad oggetti.
L’oggetto potrebbe essere una mela, ma anche un pomo immangiabi-
le o un sasso. Le differenze di presa rese possibili dal nostro pollice
opponibile aprono a infinite possibilità di attribuzione di senso a gesti
che si differenziano anche in piccoli particolari (Gibson ). Per
questo tipo di competenze cognitive è presumibilmente necessario un
“sé autobiografico” (Damasio ). Soltanto distinguendo l’oggetto
dal gesto e astraendo il gesto dall’agente, la mia mente può costruire
la categoria soggetto/oggetto e comprendere in maniera autoriflessiva
che io sono solo un potenziale possessore di quell’oggetto, così come
potrebbe esserlo il contendente. Per sostituire l’oggetto visto con uno
non visto occorre un’astrazione che la sola cognizione incarnata non
è in grado di compiere; occorre un’esperienza autobiografica legata a
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una memoria semantica degli oggetti in sé, o dei loro tratti, staccati dal
loro contesto di azione–conquista. È questo il presupposto affinché
“io” sia diverso da “lui” e contemporaneamente dal valore del nostro
contendere.
Ma questa elaborazione di discernimento nasce in una condizione
d’intersoggettività, dove è in primis la comprensione condivisa del
valore dell’oggetto a rendere possibile il suo isolamento semiotico e
l’isolamento dell’agente dal continuum sensomotorio. Una volta però
che l’oggetto diventa segno, anche il gesto vuoto conquista una sua
autonomia, e può diventare un atto comunicativo convenzionale. Il
“prendere” gestuale senza oggetto può servire da segno per indicare
qualcosa di astratto, un “prendere” generico che può ricevere senso
dalla presa di diversi oggetti immaginari. Ecco che anche l’azione si
distingue dal comportamento finalizzato e si semiotizza. A sua volta,
solo un gesto così astratto dal contesto può servire per un’ulteriore
sostituzione semiotica, ad esempio nel descrivere lo stesso gesto con
un verbo linguistico. Il vantaggio è la condizione di possibilità per lo
sviluppo esplosivo della semiosi e dunque delle forme esclusivamente
umane di attribuzione di valori e significati al mondo esterno.
Lo svantaggio (che è indissolubile dal vantaggio) è che questo siste-
ma intersoggettivo di comprensione del mondo può causare frainten-
dimenti, comprensioni parziali o sbagliate di ciò che un dato soggetto
vuole comunicare a un altro. Io posso mimare il gesto di presa di
un oggetto pensando che sia una mela, ma l’altro, in assenza di lin-
guaggio, può attribuire al mio gesto la presa di un sasso e modificare
completamente il senso dell’azione mimata. Tuttavia, la possibilità
stessa di essere “compresi male”, unita alla consapevolezza di ciò, può
dare luogo a finzioni volontarie dirette a confondere l’interlocutore, a
indurlo a “indovinare”, e così via. Posso far finta di prendere la mela
contesa dal mio avversario per fargliela afferrare e invece colpirlo alla
mano dopo che lui se ne sia impossessato. La memoria di due azioni
immaginarie divenute segno al di fuori del loro contesto pragmatico
mi consente di articolarle in un progetto più complesso, in un pro-
gramma narrativo (Greimas ) mirato alla conquista dell’oggetto
anche con l’uso della finzione e dell’inganno, secondo lo “schema
narrativo canonico” del semiologo francese.
Jurij M. Lotman () pensava che fosse proprio questa nostra
capacità di agire al di fuori delle regole genetiche o dei programmi
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standard del comportamento a differenziare l’uomo dagli animali.
L’animale si attiene a regole precise di comportamento e nell’intersog-
gettività può agire soltanto con una migliore o peggiore esecuzione
di un programma definito geneticamente o comunque interamente
acquisito anche dai suoi consimili (Lotman ). L’uomo può essere
“sleale” rispetto alle regole condivise proprio per la sua capacità d’im-
maginare azioni imprevedibili per l’altro, azioni che non fanno ancora
parte del mio repertorio esperienziale diretto né di quello altrui. Su
quali dispositivi “aggiuntivi” rispetto al sistema cognitivo animale il
nostro sistema cervello–corpo possa contare, è un tema cruciale per
un fecondo dialogo interdisciplinare.
. Il cervello metaforico
Le tecniche di neuroimaging hanno mostrato che il sistema mirror
del soggetto umano, il quale osservi l’azione di un altro, è diffuso
in precise aree del cervello: la corteccia premotoria ventrale, che in-
clude l’area di Broca (deputata alla comprensione e elaborazione del
linguaggio) e la parte anteriore del lobulo parietale inferiore (Galle-
se e Guerra ). Ramachandran () ipotizza che questa piccola
porzione del cervello, che gli esseri umani possiedono in esclusiva,
sia in grado di elaborare contenuti di tipo metaforico–multimodale,
ad esempio associando suoni a forme visive. Nel noto esperimento
del “Bouba Kiki”, persone di lingue e culture anche molto diverse
fra loro chiameranno spontaneamente Kiki il disegno con margini
acuminati e Bouba quello a forma di nuvoletta, e ciò perché, spiega
Ramachandran, i tratti comuni astratti di figure e suoni, anche in
relazione alla conformazione dei nostri apparati fonatori, formano a
un metalivello un sistema univoco (Ramachandran e Oberman ).
Lo stesso accade per la sinestesia, dove si associano, al di fuori di
ogni convenzione culturale, colori a numeri o a note musicali, ecc.
(Ramachandran ). Sempre Ramachandran sostiene che queste
prime forme associative pre–linguistiche siano rese possibili da un
sistema neurale in grado di elaborare le astrazioni, il quale, nel corso
dell’evoluzione, si è poi specializzato per astrazioni sempre più com-
plesse, e individua nel Lobulo parietale inferiore il centro elaborativo
di queste costruzioni. Dapprima questo apparato serviva per le astra-
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zioni del tipo Bouba–Kiki e per la sinestesia “inferiore”, in seguito,
per esaptazione, si sarebbe sviluppata nello stesso modulo cerebrale
una porzione, esclusivamente umana, in grado di elaborare astrazioni
“superiori” con il coinvolgimento del linguaggio. Così, ad esempio,
noi possiamo associare numeri, giorni e mesi dell’anno, grazie al con-
cetto astratto di “ordinalità” (Ramachandran ), oppure inventare
metafore multimodali come “camicia chiassosa” o “sapore pungente”
(Ramachandran , p. ).
Approcciando questi studi con un metodo semiotico, diremo che il
lobulo parietale inferiore nell’uomo è implicato in un sistema cogniti-
vo–semantico che funziona per relazioni semisimboliche (Greimas
e Courtés , ad vocem). Non sono gli oggetti con le loro qualità
a essere assimilati, ma le categorie che essi rappresentano nella rela-
zione. Così, ad esempio, se io esprimo con i gesti del capo un “sì” o
un “no” a seconda che abbassi il mento o ruoti il capo, posso com-
prendere questi messaggi perché un codice convenzionale assegna al
“no” un movimento orizzontale e al “sì” un movimento verticale del
capo (Greimas ). Un altro esempio di queste relazioni riguarda
la distribuzione dello spazio testuale nell’arte visiva, come nell’arte
sacra tradizionale dove la parte alta del quadro è il luogo del “divino”
e quella bassa dell’“umano” (Marsciani ).
Ramachandran ipotizza che la capacità di astrazione di LPI dipenda
dalla sua singolare posizione nel cervello: la giunzione TPO, infatti,
separa e insieme unisce le aree del tatto, della vista e dell’udito, e
LPI con la sua fitta rete di circuiti mirror è situato al centro di questo
incrocio nella corteccia premotoria (Ramachandran ). LPI è in-
somma nella posizione funzionale più adatta per mettere in contatto
fra loro aree sensoriali diverse, probabilmente integrandole con gli
stimoli propriocettivi ed emotivi, e di mediarne la comunicazione
attraverso i neuroni bimodali o plurimodali che contiene. Da qui la
sua capacità di raffrontare i messaggi visivi, motori e tattili e di trovarvi
elementi astratti comuni come nel caso della sinestesia “superiore” o
delle metafore linguistiche.
Questa attività di astrazione in cui si sarebbe specializzato LPI è
distribuita in entrambi gli emisferi: abbiamo il lobulo sinistro capace di
elaborare prevalentemente metafore linguistiche, mentre il destro “le
metafore legate al corpo e al suo rapporto con lo spazio” (Ramachan-
dran ). Assumendo tale ipotesi, per un semiologo è fondamentale
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comprendere se questa attività creativa implichi l’integrazione funzio-
nale dei due emisferi, capire, ad esempio, se una metafora “linguistica”
possa nascere senza l’ausilio di concetti astratti elaborati nella parte
“spaziale–corporea”, e viceversa. Assunto fondamentale dell’episte-
mologia lotmaniana è che nessun linguaggio possa funzionare se
non all’interno di un sistema (semiosfera) dove interagiscano almeno
due linguaggi diversi, i quali hanno l’uno rispetto all’altro difficoltà di
traduzione reciproca (Lotman , pp.  ss.).
Supponiamo di essere un uomo preistorico che osserva un dipinto
sulla roccia, raffigurante un bisonte, appena realizzato da un altro uo-
mo. I tratti impressi sulla roccia, le loro dimensioni, i colori e la stessa
bidimensionalità del disegno sono evidentemente tutt’altra cosa rispet-
to all’esperienza visiva del bisonte “autentico”. Diremo per comodità
esplicativa che il disegno è una metafora del bisonte. Le similarità
dei tratti informativi che giungono al mio cervello nell’osservare un
bisonte vero rispetto a uno disegnato devono essere elaborate sotto
forma di astrazioni in una qualche parte del nostro cervello. Prima
ancora di poter riconoscere certe parti anatomiche caratteristiche, ad
esempio, occorre che l’osservatore padroneggi un sistema di relazioni
spaziali come: alto/basso, davanti/dietro, alla mia destra/alla mia
sinistra, e così via. Riconosco la “testa” perché sta davanti, o la grop-
pa perché sta tra il capo e la coda, prima ancora di “scoprire” che il
disegno raffigura fra le altre cose “testa”e “gobba”.
Già nelle primissime forme d’arte conosciute troviamo inoltre il
tentativo di riprodurre un movimento. Il pittore di Chauvet, per raffi-
gurare una leonessa in corsa disegnò tre teste, una successiva all’altra
e parzialmente coperte l’una dall’altra. L’autore ha cioè introdotto
nel proprio disegno un “prima e dopo”. È probabile allora che qui
entri in funzione l’attività di LPI sinistro, deputato ad astrarre catene
sintattiche a partire dalla cognizione incarnata del movimento. Que-
sto movimento è relativo allo spostamento degli occhi nel vedere un
soggetto in corsa, e si riproduce nel percorso oculare a cui invita il
disegno (Zechi ), un movimento del corpo dell’animale che noi
siamo dunque in grado di avvertire simile al nostro spostarci nello
spazio (Rammachandran ).
Gli esempi fatti mirano a sottolineare la necessità, dal punto di
vista informativo, che le parti complementari di un sistema (in questo
caso, i due LPI) non siano semplicemente artefici di uno scambio di
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informazioni utili ma esercitino un vero e proprio dialogo per poter
comprendere la realtà esterna attraverso il sistema cervello–corpo e
la loro interrelazione. Il problema non è soltanto di capire se le aree
di specializzazione funzionale del cervello comunichino o meno, ma
anche quello di spiegare come queste aree, se comunicano, rendono
possibili i processi astrattivi “superiori” della cognizione. Occorre cioè
un modello che consideri, oltre al messaggio, alla sua produzione e
alla sua ricezione, anche i processi di traduzione delle sue componenti
nei vari formati cognitivi. Un messaggio visivo che viene elaborato
dal sistema motorio mantiene intatto il suo valore informativo iniziale,
oppure questo viene modificato per poterlo adattare al formato pro-
prio del sistema ricevente? Queste riflessioni sui sistemi informativi
sono alla base della teoria semiotica di Lotman.
Immaginiamo due sistemi cognitivi, senza altre definizioni, dei
quali sappiamo che ciascuno ha un proprio modo di costruire le
informazioni che processa, in coerenza con il proprio “formato rap-
presentazionale” (Ramachandran). Il messaggio che proviene da “A”
viene scomposto e ricomposto nel nuovo formato “B”, e viceversa. Se
i contenuti del messaggio “A”, dopo la traduzione nel nuovo formato
restassero identici, ossia ri–traducibili nel passaggio inverso, non si
avrebbe nessun accrescimento d’informazione nel sistema complessi-
vo che include i due linguaggi. Se, invece, la traduzione nel formato
ricevente comportasse una selezione di tratti significativi per quel
sistema e le novità introdotte potessero indurre una riorganizzazione
cognitiva dello stesso, ci sarebbe un significativo aumento d’infor-
mazione. Lo stesso, evidentemente, nel caso inverso. Se, dunque, il
dialogo fra sistemi cognitivi parziali (modulari) è reso difficile dalla
differenza di linguaggio dei rispettivi formati, la stessa difficoltà di
traduzione rende possibile un incremento informativo del sistema
generale che comprende “A”, “B”, e tutti gli altri moduli funzionali
del sistema, riuniti in un sé metacognitivo integrato e autocosciente.
Siamo di fronte allo stesso meccanismo studiato da Lotman per i siste-
mi culturali, secondo il modello della semiosfera (Semenenko ),
dove il fatto che i diversi linguaggi siano solo parzialmente traducibili
l’uno nell’altro arricchisce il sistema e non porta affatto a una Babele
cognitiva (Fabbri , pp.  ss.).
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. Processi d’integrazione e di specializzazione
Un altro neuroscienziato la cui teoria ha ottenuto grande diffusione,
Giulio Tononi (Massimini e Tononi b; Edelman e Tononi a),
ha definito la coscienza umana esattamente come un sistema di infor-
mazione integrata. Seguendo Lotman, l’unico modo per il quale una
tale integrazione possa funzionare è il dialogo delle componenti spe-
cializzate, che — oltretutto — devono aumentare come effetto dello
stesso dialogo la propria ricchezza informativa specialistica (Seme-
nenko ). Potrebbe essere proprio questa tensione fra individualità
semiotiche e loro appartenenza a un sistema, fra specializzazione e
integrazione — che Tononi definisce “improbabile” —, a rendere la
coscienza umana tanto ricca e complessa. Se questi processi di specia-
lizzazione–integrazione riguardano anche la simulazione incarnata,
bisognerebbe riconoscere che anche il sistema motorio, pur nella sua
complessità multimodale, non sia in grado da solo di fungere da “base”
per gli altri formati, ma che esso stesso si forma e si sviluppa nell’in-
terazione e nell’intersezione funzionale con i linguaggi sensoriali, a
cominciare dal tatto che, già nell’utero materno, è implicato nella
comprensione prelinguistica della relazione tra il feto e il suo mondo
di riferimento (Ammanniti e Gallese ).
Nel caso dell’accoppiata vista–motricità, abbiamo però un elemento
ulteriore di complicazione; l’oggetto di cui pure abbiamo avuto espe-
rienza tattile è distante dal nostro corpo, e implica l’intervento di un
sistema rappresentazionale che inscriva il rapporto soggetto/oggetto
in uno spazio di relazioni elaborato a partire da un corpo situato
(Merleau–Ponty ). Siccome l’oggetto può non essere “a portata
di mano”, i due sistemi in dialogo concorrono a formare un siste-
ma semantico astratto di categorie quali: vicino/lontano (a portata
vs fuori portata); in alto/in basso; alla mia destra/alla mia sinistra;
dietro/davanti; e così via.
Se questa ipotesi è plausibile, si potrebbe interpretare in chiave
semiotica (nel paradigma lotmaniano) il ruolo funzionale giocato dai
circuiti mirror nella formazione della coscienza in quanto informa-
zione integrata. Tale compito potrebbe essere quello di “filtrare” i
messaggi utili all’uno o all’altro sistema, permettendo l’ingresso di
messaggi “esterni” ancora da tradurre. Selezionando soltanto tratti
utili all’elaborazione di un dato sistema ricevente, il messaggio che
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proviene dal sistema emittente è evidentemente trasformato. Tutta-
via, per i ragionamenti già fatti, questa distorsione non è affatto un
handicap per l’integrazione: l’introduzione di un elemento nuovo
nel sistema obbliga quest’ultimo ad adeguare il messaggio al proprio
formato di elaborazione, portando non solo ad un’aggiunta quantita-
tiva di dati ma ad un adeguamento del sistema ricevente, costretto a
integrare la nuova informazione nel proprio stile di elaborazione. Lo
stesso accade, evidentemente, nel passaggio inverso, quando il siste-
ma che prima riceveva l’informazione ora la trasferisce al ricevente
passando per il filtro di un circuito mirror.
Visto in questo modo, il ruolo dei neuroni specchio è quello di
formare un confine semiotico che insieme unisce e separa le parti
modulari (individualità semiotiche) in dialogo fra loro (Lotman ,
pp.  ss.).
Potrebbe essere questo processo che ha consentito al nostro cervel-
lo di svincolarsi dalla modularità — che supponiamo incidere assai più
fortemente nella mente degli animali, e tanto più indietro nella scala
evolutiva — e di formare un sistema cervello–corpo completamente
integrato, come presupposto per l’autocoscienza. L’integrazione di
sistemi parziali in un sistema più complesso comporta che, saturata
l’integrazione (nel sistema non circolano più messaggi nuovi), nessun
modulo possa più dirsi indipendente ma al contrario il suo ruolo è
subordinato alla funzionalità del sistema inclusivo di cui è parte. Ciò
significa che non ci sono più diversi moduli situati a uno stesso livello,
perché essi si integrano in un metalivello superiore che è più importan-
te delle parti che include. L’integrazione informativa si mostra dunque
come un fenomeno rivoluzionario nella cognizione umana dal punto
di vista evolutivo, perché il comportamento dell’essere umano, giunto
a questo stadio, comincia a dipendere da una “co–scienza”, e pure gli
automatismi che conserva nelle parti più antiche del cervello, del tutto
attivi, entrano in conflitto con il sistema cognitivo che ora ha preso il
controllo generale. Tutto ciò però non basta per il “grande salto”.
Tononi (Massimini e Tononi ) ha dimostrato che ciascun emi-
sfero sviluppa la propria integrazione dei sistemi interni indipendente-
mente dall’altro. Se noi recidiamo il corpo calloso, con i suoi miliardi
di fasci che collegano sistemi complementari nei due emisferi, il sog-
getto vive e si comporta a seconda che la situazione richieda un tipo
di coscienza o un altro. L’emisfero sinistro comprende i disegni ma
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non sa parlare, e così via. Come si forma, allora l’integrazione delle
due parti che porta a una coscienza unificata?
Secondo quanto detto prima, si avrebbe un identico processo di
integrazione, soltanto che i confini fra i sistemi sono dislocati e messi
in contatto con ponti che passano dall’uno all’altro emisfero, dove l’in-
formazione viaggia in entrambi i versi. Le singole parti di ogni sistema
emisferico dapprima scambiano informazioni con le parti modulari
complementari dell’emisfero opposto, oltre che con quelle modulari
del proprio emisfero. Ma questo non è un processo solipsistico: come
si è detto, dipende dall’interrelazione fra simili. Il problema è allora
comprendere come le coscienze individuali si integrino nel sistema
semiosferico della coscienza collettiva o “cultura”.
Oltre i meccanismi profondi della simulazione incarnata, il mondo
di relazione degli uomini è immensamente più complesso di quello
degli altri animali. La specializzazione emisferica ha reso l’uomo im-
prevedibile agli occhi degli altri nel comportamento, e il vivere comune
deve essere dettato da regole convenzionali. Regole che nascono nelle
menti dei singoli individui davanti al bisogno condiviso. Per istituire
convenzioni occorre un oggetto esterno, che emerga per alcuni tratti
dal continuum in cui è inserito e che nella relazione intersoggettiva
diventi testo della cultura. Nell’intersoggettività, l’oggetto della conven-
zione deve essere interpretato da ciascuna mente individuale e questo
impone dei limiti al successo della comprensione reciproca. Lotman
ha spiegato che l’incomprensione ha svolto un ruolo altrettanto impor-
tante a quello della comprensione intesa come comunicazione classica
(Lotman , cap. “La canna pensante”). Se la crescita dell’informazio-
ne distorta porterebbe immediatamente al caos della comunicazione,
il tentativo comune delle menti d’includere comunque in un sistema
superiore e inglobante informazioni che sappiano adeguarsi al linguag-
gio comune del sistema, compensa l’ambiguità senza poterla risolvere.
A complicare le cose si aggiunge il fatto che il sistema “cultura” è fatto
di sottosistemi costituiti dai diversi sistemi semiotici. Ma anche qui,
il sistema generale, la semiosfera culturale, beneficia in ricchezza di
informazione dai continui dialoghi fra le parti “indipendenti” della
cultura, quali sono le varie forme d’arte e, in genere, i vari linguaggi.
È una forma perfetta d’informazione integrata.
Tutto il lavoro teorico di Jurij M. Lotman è ispirato dal principio
che il testo creativo, proprio per la sua capacità di mettere in con-
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nessione le menti pur lasciando che ogni mente possa liberamente
trarre da quel testo un arricchimento, sia un vero e proprio dispositi-
vo pensante (Lotman ). L’opera d’arte, secondo Lotman, cerca
sempre nuove forme per rendere più complesso il rapporto fra il
mondo immaginato che ha ispirato l’opera e il mondo “reale”. Ciò
non vuol dire assolutamente distorcere il reale, ma semmai scardinare
le convinzioni, le abitudini, i comportamenti stereotipi, che la cultura
ha cristallizzato nelle sue convenzioni. L’artista affida a un testo (che
ha un proprio sistema di segni) la sua liberazione da queste costrizioni
e introduce nella semiosfera elementi di rinnovamento (Semenenko
) D’altra parte, a sopprimere queste forze creatrici individuali ci
sono le forme di gestione politica del potere che nascono dal bisogno
che ha una cultura, per essere riconosciuta nella sua individualità e
unicità, di autodescriversi.
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 : La morte dell’“intento” e la “vita per la morte” dell’autore
: The question of “the absence or the presence of the ‘intent’”
raised by Zhang Jiang has extraordinarily practical significance. The
theory of “the death of the author” or “the intentional fallacy”, as a
modern theory, has its own background of development, which is the
product of the change of the humanities of the th century, and also the
intrinsic need of literary criticism. As a kind of thought of modernism,
it has its inevitability as well as its bias. In fact, even the most radical
theorists of the text, such as Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, have
an indissoluble bond with the authors when they discuss the text. The
critical activities are to locate the position of the authors or poets in
literary or ideological history through explaining their texts, and set up a
kind of thought or idea through elucidating these authors or poets. Even
if it might be hard to understand or grasp a certain author (poet), the
critic still tries to build a complete image of this author (poet) even based
on the fragmented text. The Chinese literature after the s, indeed,
encountered difficulties in the high–lift of thought. At present, to revive
the ideological power of Chinese literature is the responsibility of literary
criticism and it does need literary criticism to analyze the author’s
thought through the text. Thus the renewed emphasis of literary theory
and criticism on the authorial intent becomes a meaningful interactive
creation.
: The Death of the Author; Intentional Fallacy; Text; New Criti-
cism; Deconstruction; Heteronym.
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In , Zhang Jiang published a lengthy paper titled The Absence and
the Presence of the “Intent”, questioning the relationship between the
“author” and the text. This is another paper written by Zhang Jiang
following his article titled Compulsory Interpretation Theory, which
investigates into the fundamental problems of literary theory and
criticism, and has triggered much discussion and undoubtedly had
positive significance. Zhang Jiang said that
no matter how the intent is dispelled or resisted, it always exists in the text,
even if the “author dies”, and the text cannot be altered after being delivered
to readers. The intent — to say exactly the authorial intent, still remains
present, and determines the quality and value of the text, affecting the
understanding and interpretation of the text by the other. This other many
not perceive the influence and decision, or the other can also automatically
resist the intent, but the infiltration and the decisive force of the intent runs
throughout the whole process of the understanding and interpretation of
the text. Whether you admit it or not, accept it or not, it has always played
a role unavoidably. (, p. )
Although what is discussed here is the relationship between the
author and the text, and whether the writing of the author affects
and decides the composition and value of the text, it also contains
the questioning of the radical change of the contemporary literary
theory and criticism, as well as the doubt about the turn from the
subjectivity of literary criticism towards textuality. At present, it is of
great constructive significance as the Chinese literary theory criticism
tries to clarify the premise of all these theories and to find the path
more suitable to Chinese literary criticism. Although it is impossible
for the discussion of this question to reach consensus quickly, or to
form a complete and more desirable theoretical system, the opening
of the problem domain indeed offers a theoretical orientation, and also
a theoretical foundation for the seeking to reconstruct the relationship
between literary criticism and creative literary practice.
.
Separating the relationship between the authorial intent and the text,
and declaring the “death of the author”, are both the products of the
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contemporary literary criticism developing into a radical stage, and
the fundamental symbol of the transformation of the contemporary
theory, which shows that it has entered the stage of textuality. In re-
sponse to Zhang Jiang’s viewpoint, Nan Fan quoted Terry Eagleton’s
exposition and summarized the three stages of contemporary theo-
retical criticism, namely, from the author to the text, and then to the
reader. Nan Fang insightfully pointed out that contemporary Chinese
literary criticism has not undergone these three phases strictly and ex-
plicitly (Nanfan , p. ). To view from the current Chinese literary
theory and criticism, “the death of the author” is merely a theoretical
concept, which began to circulate in the late s, but it did not have
practical effect. Chinese theoretical criticism still pays more attention
to the author, that is, the main body of Chinese literary criticism is
still associated with biography and impression. There is almost no
pure textual criticism which does not pay attention to the author. Even
so, it is important to clarify the question theoretically, as it reflects the
course of contemporary theory criticism, with its radicalization and
extremism.
The author–centered criticism era is also the era dominated by
cultural elitism, and when the discipline of literary criticism as a sort
of cultural type has been established, it is really difficult to make a clear
definition. Since the time of Plato, people have started talking about
literature and art, and the ancient Chinese reportedly began this in
the Preface to Mao Poems. The  poems compiled by Confucius and
his theory of “Xing Guan Qun Yuan” constitute the origin of Chinese
literary theory and criticism. There is no doubt that both Chinese
and foreign literary criticism have long histories. But literary criticism,
as a discipline, is a modern thing. According to the contemporary
French critic, Albert Thibaudet (–), the exact starting year is
, for in this year the courses about literary criticism appeared in
French universities. There were three critics who taught literature as
their profession and they were, namely, Guizot, Cousin and Vihlman.
Thibaudet believes that there are three factors that determine the
emergence of literary criticism: the first is the emergence of the
. For a long time, in the development of the history of Western academic studies,
there was no such term as “literary theory”, so in our statement we will pay attention to
the different era background and carefully use the concept of “literary theory”.
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professions of education and journalism, the second is the need to
summarize due to the increase of the historical sense, and the third is
the diversified writing and appreciative taste.
Apparently, in the beginning of the th century when literary criti-
cism came into fashion, it was related to the profession of journalism,
the new courses set up in the universities, as well as the appreciative
taste towards the writing. And this showed that it was bound to have a
close relationship with authors. During that period, literature began to
produce larger influence in modern society, and authors were highly
valued and paid attention to in the community. Just think about the
time in the beginning of the French Modernism, with only his Enam-
els and Cameos, Théophile Gautier (–) dared to wear a red vest
in the French theater, showing off and attracting the attention of a
large number of ladies and maids. So it is not difficult to understand
that the author holds an indisputable authoritative position towards
his own writings. The influence of authors in society is undoubtedly
the basic reason why literary criticism can never omit the dominant
role of authors, and at the same time, there are many other reasons
that function the same: literature boosts humanitarianism and critical
ideology, and the epistemology and methodology of the historical
doctrine plays a crucial role in literary criticism. All these show that it
is all natural for literary criticism to center on the author and empha-
size the authoritative role of the author. Wilhelm Dilthey (—)
once pointed out:
Autobiography is the highest and most instructive form in which the un-
derstanding of life confronts us. Here is the outward, phenomenal course
of a life which forms the basis for understanding what has produced within
a certain environment. The man who understands it is the same as the one
who created it. A particular intimacy of understanding results from this.
The person who seeks the connecting threads in the history of his life has
already, from different points of view, created coherence in that life which
he is now putting into words. (Dilthey , pp. –)
Dilthey’s remark distinctively elaborates on the superiority of bi-
ographical criticism, revealed the intimate relationship between the
. For the analysis of this problem, see Thibaudet , p. . I have also published a
chapter entitled The History of Criticism and the Mysterious Literariness in my book The Great
Changes of Aesthetic ().
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people who understood the works (as critics) and the authors, and
even viewed the understanding (from the historians or literary critics)
as a complete realization of the authorial intent. They could achieve
the unity in the experience and meaning of life, and complete the
mutual blending of spirit and experience. In Dilthey’s view, a great
historian must be a person who can combine oneself with the living
state of others, and this is undoubtedly people’s expectation of great
critics at that time, as well as later long afterward.
In the long classical and modern periods, literary criticism has
always held the notion of centering on the author, but in the th cen-
tury, with the boom and crisis of literature, this notion was challenged
and shaken. When we discuss the emergence of New Criticism in the
United States and the formation of text–oriented criticism, we need to
focus on a larger historical background. About this large background,
I believe, there are three points that need to be considered:
Firstly, the flourishing of English literature. Terry Eagleton pointed
out in his Introduction to Literary Theory of the th century that
New Criticism flourished while riding on the head of wartime na-
tionalism. This statement shows that English is associated with the
expansion of British colonialism to the world in the First World War,
and the tide of globalization and cosmopolitanism which arose in
the th century. English, this Anglo–Saxon language, also gradually
became the language spoken by the whole world in the th century,
and English literature has become the most widely read texts in the
world. Also earlier, British Industrial Revolution had promoted the
dissemination of English literature to the global public, and the British
overseas colonization also carried out the educational means of En-
glish literature for its culture and value. At the same time, Oxford
and Cambridge became the center of English literature education,
and the criticism of English literature has formed the school of “New
Criticism”. The rise of British and American “New Criticism”, which
was represented by Ransom, Richards, Eliot, Empson, also helped
with the spreading of English literature around the world. Although
these critics may not be consciously compatible with the globalization
of English, “text reading” itself showed the profound beauty of En-
glish. “New Criticism” did not explicitly advocate separating the text
from the authorial intent, but they reversed the mainstream of cen-
tering on biographical criticism, and returned to the text and English
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words, which characterized another period of criticism. As a particu-
lar representative of “New Criticism”, Eliot made it clear: «[P]oetry
is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it
is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality»
(Eliot , p. ). He believes that poets can be good poets only if
they obey traditions and comprehend traditions. Not having poets’
own personality and removing poets’ feelings, actually minimizes a
poet’s subjectivity to the lowest level and lets only words speak for
themselves. He literally analyzed line by line the poems by Algernon
Charles Swinburne (–), and commented that «the meaning
and the sound are one thing. He is concerned with the meanings of
the word in a peculiar way: he employs, or rather “works”, the word’s
meaning» (Ransom , p. ). Eliot maintains that to Swinburn
«[I]t is the word that gives him the thrill, not the object» (ibidem, p.
). Ransom greatly appreciated this opinion: «The poet stops on
the words, not uses the words to go beyond them» (ibidem, p. ).
Later, while evaluating works by T.S. Eliot as a critic, Hartmann says,
«Eliot is not concerned with intellectual revolution or a mediumistic
profaning of the dead, but with purifying the language, with enabling
it to digest — if it must— a “heavy fund of historical and scientific
knowledge”» (Hartman , p. ). The interpretation of English
poetry by New Criticism undoubtedly has helped people understand
the profound beauty of English language. We certainly cannot say that
“New Criticism” helps English become the language of the world, but
the rise of the Anglo–American “New Criticism” is not irrelevant to
English becoming a world language.
Secondly, the rise of scientism. After entering the th century, the
previous human culture affected by great thoughts, turned into one
affected by scientism. The previous study of humanities since Plato,
which has a pedigree of the thought history, has shifted to the lin-
guistics which emphasizes the method of empirical analysis. Freudian
psychology and Saussure’s linguistics strongly influenced literary stud-
ies. Both the Geneva linguistics and the Russian formalism have made
the focus on textual research on the basis of methodology, and thus
formed a trend. With the influence of the doctrines of Semiotics and
Structuralism on literary studies, Structuralism spreads to the whole
field of the social sciences and even leads to the weakening of tradi-
tional philosophy. In the s and s, as a stronghold of post–war
The Death of the “Intent” and the “Life towards Death” of the Author 
European ideology, France was changing quietly. Existentialism had
to give way to Structuralism and the era of Sartre ended. The younger
generation of intellectuals emerged and they expressed other social
concept and professional conviction. In retrospect, Foucault said,
suddenly, and without apparent reason, one realised, about fifteen years ago,
that one bad moved far, very far, away from the previous generation, the
generation of Sartre and Merleau–Ponty — the generation of the Temps
Modemes that used to be the norm for our thinking and the model for
our lives. Sartre’s generation appeared to us an extremely courageous and
magnanimous generation, which passionately invested themselves in life,
polities, and existence. We, however — we have discovered something else
for ourselves, another passion, the passion for the concept and for that which
I would wish to call the system. (Broekman , p. )
More young students cheered on the scientific nature of structural-
ism, and they even cheered about finally having a socialist science
thanks to the structural anthropology. Before this period, the humani-
ties could not be called “science”, and in the heyday of scientism, many
intellectuals even feel ashamed for literature lacking “scientific char-
acteristics”. Now Structuralism changed the situation. Lévi–Strauss
explained that «structural linguistics aims at discovering general laws,
either by induction or [. . . ] by logical deduction, which would give
them an absolute character» (Levi–Strauss , p. ) When asked by
someone about the moral responsibility of intellectuals, Lévi–Strauss
emphasized the authority generated from the intellectual’s writing,
with its strict and precise prudence.
Dominated by this sort of notion and method, the text itself builds
a world of language and symbols, which can only be analyzed by
scientifically empirical methods. As to the issues such as the “authorial
intent”, how to relate to text, how to appear as a system of the text’s
signs and words, because it is difficult to give a “scientific” description,
they are bound to be excluded from the text. Obviously, from the
perspective of empirical analysis, the “authorial intent” is a concept
which can neither be measured nor be clarified, that is, it cannot be
proven false. All the concepts that cannot be falsified are difficult to
be confirmed.
Thirdly, the influence of linguistic analytic philosophy. After the
s, the linguistic analytic philosophy of Europe and the United
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States replaced the traditional metaphysical philosophy. In Cambridge
and Oxford, the ordinary linguistic philosophy became more active,
and then the representatives, such as J.T.D. Weston of the Cambridge
School, and G. Rael, J. Austin, and P.F Strawson of the Oxford School,
swiftly occupied the central position in academism philosophy. Dur-
ing and after the Second World War, logical empiricism evolves out of
the analytic philosophy, and developed further in the USA, and its rep-
resentatives include Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl,
Carl G. Heimpel, Willar Van Quine, etc. who replaced or reformed
pragmatism, and occupied a dominant position in the American philo-
sophical circles. This philosophical background can also explain the
theoretical turn of American literary criticism after the s and
s, and the comprehensive and thorough textual analysis of Yale
School’s Gang of Four, with narratology and deconstructionism which
were more popular than “New Criticism”.
It is worth noting that the philosophy of linguistic analysis is not
concerned with the significance of statement analysis, nor does it
believe that the meaning of statements is important, and they analyze
the logical relationship of the statement. Willard Van Orman Quine
did «feel no reluctance toward refusing to admit meanings» (Quine
, p. ). He argues that «meanings themselves, as obscure inter-
mediary entities, may well be abandoned» (ibidem, p. ), and we do
not need the imaginary entities called as meaning, because it does not
say anything, and «the explanatory value of special and irreducible
intermediary entities called meanings is surely illusory» (ibidem, p. ).
As a logical pragmatic analysis philosopher, Quine denies the meaning
as an independent reality or psychological existence. And if we start
from this philosophical point of view, it is undoubtedly inconceivable
and meaningless for the intent of a modernized author to be linked
with the text. The main idea of analytic philosophy is also not so
advantageous to the definite relationship between the author and the
text.
Of course, it lacks academic buttress trying to explain why contem-
porary theoretical criticism separates “the intent of the author” away
from these backgrounds, but it is more than enough to invalidate the
intent of the author.
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.
The difficulty for the “the intent of the author” to be implemented in
the text is directly related to the viewpoints held by the contemporary
literary criticism towards the text: the linguistic signs of the text
cannot constitute a complete system, and the text does not possess a
central decisive significance. This is of course a typical textual view
from deconstruction, as Jacques Derrida pointed out:
there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of
a present–being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed
locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of
sign–substitutions came into play. This was the moment when language
invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a
center or origin, everything became discourse–provided we can agree on
this word–that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original
or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of
differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain
and the play of signification infinitely. (Derrida , pp. –)
Admittedly, Derrida wrote this passage in refuting Levi–Strauss’s
idea of “incest prohibition” being the basis for the origins of kinship
relations in the primitive society. In  Derrida delivered a paper
titled Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences at
Johns Hopkins University, challenging structuralism and proclaiming
that the system, wholeness and center of structuralism could not
be found at all, which was like a bomb dropped on the field of the
humanities. If the closeness of the text in structuralism could break
the authorial control over the text, then the idea of the decentraliza-
tion and endless difference of the signs make difficult for the author
to establish a meaning system, which could be determined by the
author with an authoritative voice. What deconstruction does is to
analyze the contradiction in the authorial intent, and dismantle the
dislocation between the authorial original intention and the narra-
tion. Both Derrida and de Man have analyzed Rousseau’s Confessions.
Rousseau attempted to vindicate his pious confession in his Confes-
sions, but in the analysis by Derrida and de Man, Rousseau’s text itself
is incomplete, and his narrative is disingenuous in its own.
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Derrida believed that Rousseau’s Confessions was caught in a sub-
stitute game for the lack of origin. It is said that the manuscript of
Confessions had been lost and then edited later, so the completeness of
this book may be questionable. Derrida adopted Rousseau’s strategy
in the book to deal with his narration. Rousseau has said that words are
the “dangerous substitutes” for speech, which means that the author’s
writing is unreliable, not necessarily his true words. Derrida made a
small joke with Rousseau, saying that in Rousseau’s constant expres-
sion of his love and gratitude towards “Mamma”, Madam de Warren,
it contains a long replacement chain. On the one hand, Rousseau him-
self despised the substitution of words, but on the other hand he relied
on such substitutes. It was like his dependence on “Mamma”, which
shows all the hypocrisy of Rousseau. “Mamma” (Madam de Warren)
is not Rousseau’s mother, but his mistress, with Rousseau being 
years old and Madam de Warren  years old. Rousseau’s so–called
“mother” at the same time committed adultery with many servants
and might appear comparatively speaking more enthusiastic towards
Rousseau. The young Rousseau, who was immersed in the bitterness
of masturbation, was naturally grateful to Madam de Warren. His
memoir was filled with his praise of Madam de Warren: he licked
the dishes that “Mamma” used, kissed the curtains that “Mamma”
touched, lay on the bed where “Mamma” once slept and indulged
his fantasy [. . . ]. All of these are the substitutions of “Mamma” being
absent, but they are the substitutions of the alternative. This “Mamma”
is actually a substitute for Rousseau’s desires. Rousseau’s biological
mother was not present (who died in childbirth). This was the substi-
tute chain, and then the emergence of companion Therese became a
substitute for Madam de Warren, and it was also a “dangerous substi-
tute”. Rousseau said in Confessions that the substitution made him
mad because it was neither present nor absent and it destroyed their
happiness and innocence. Everything is a substitute, a substitute of
substitute. Derrida argued that the series of substitutes showed some
inevitability: «That of an infinite chain, ineluctably multiplying the sup-
. There are three versions of the manuscript of the Confessions. The first version, or
the earliest one was incomplete, and the plot suspended in chapter . After his client
Du Beilu died, he handed to the Neuchatre library. The second part is the whole, which
is preserved in the House of Paris Library. Another is the Geneva manuscript, which
Rousseau made the text of this manuscript published finally.
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plementary mediations that produce the sense of the very thing they
defer: the mirage of the thing itself, of immediate presence, of origi-
nary perception. Immediacy is derived. That all begins through the
intermediary is what is indeed “inconceivable” [to reason]» (Derrida
, p. ). The reason for Rousseau’s confession, and his thanking
Madam de Warren, in fact, got trapped in the substitute games of
those descriptions of “claims” (such as “Mamma”, “masturbation”,
“crazy”, “gratitude” and so on). We do not even know what Rousseau
was talking about and Rousseau himself saw no result in this “dan-
gerous supplement” game. Derrida said, «[T]he supplement, which
is neither simply the signifier nor simply the representer, does not
take the place of a signified or a represented, as is prescribed by the
concepts of signification or representation or by the syntax of the
words “signifier” or “representer”» (ibidem , p. ).
Later Paul de Man also commented on Rousseau’s the New Heloise
in his Allegories of Reading, questioning the author’s authoritative
voice and Rousseau’s truth and authenticity? In the New Heloise
Rousseau wrote about two teenagers’ love until they became young
man and woman, claiming that these two young people came from
the Alps. In fact, these two people were fabricated by Rousseau, but
he avoided telling this in the text. He neither admitted nor denied
the authenticity of the letters. The story in the book has no real
scene and its reality points to fiction. It is clear that readers are not
aware of this background, and they are reading the story as a real one,
believing the fictitious fake. Rousseau denies his own identity in the
book deliberately, saying that who the actual author is does not matter,
and that what matters is the logic of the text itself. The true author
who is considered the most authoritative in the traditional reading
system does not possess the decisive power, and Rousseau also admits
that the actual reference of the text cannot be completely mastered
by reading. De Man’s focus is on revealing the “allegorical meaning”
of Rousseau’s work; apparently he tries to get rid of the control of
the author’s authority, and prefers to portray the image of the author
having fear and distrust towards reading, and negate the possibility of
restoring the intent of the author through reading.
Although we could see that the theory of breaking up the imme-
diate relationship between the authorial intent and the text has its
basis in time and the history of thought, it does not mean that the
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theory has permanent rationality in the academic sense, nor does it
mean that it can effectively form a final verdict. In fact, even those
extremists, such as Roland Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, and Paul de
Man would unconsciously talk about the author of the text, whenever
they talk about a text, and they always discuss the text in the name
of the author. Whether de Man is talking about Proust’s In Search
of Lost Time or Rousseau’s the New Heloise, or Derrida is decon-
structing Levi–Strauss’ structural anthropology, or Kafka’s Before the
law, both of them are discussing the works under the author’s name,
in the author’s consistent background of creating their works. Then
why is the “author dead”? The meaning of “the death of the author”
is actually quite limited. Almost all the critical readings of the text,
of course, also including the deconstruction criticism of Derrida and
de Man, have all repeatedly returned to the author’s thought so as
to explain the various practices. As Zhang Jiang pointed out: «[T]he
work or text has a definite existence, and the name of the author is
circulated in the world» (Zhang Jiang , p. ), indeed, the intent
of the author may not run entirely through the text, and the readers
may not follow fully the intent of the author through the story, words,
rhetoric or themes of the text, but this cannot deny the author’s au-
thority in the text. The author, who once lively created the text in his
life must have influenced the formation and generation of the text.
Zhang Jiang emphasized that «[W]riting is the author’s consciously
rational activity, and develops under the restriction and guidance of
definite thinking and logical rules. And the basis is that writing it-
self is a conscious activity, and is the autonomous construction of
conscious behavior» (ibidem, p. ). After conscious rational activities
are transformed into linguistic symbols, narratives and rhetoric, their
intentions would more or less be altered or diminished, but after all,
it is always necessary to discuss the text in the name of this author, so
as to make it meaningful and to release more of its comprehensive
meaning.
Of course, theoretically admitting that there is relationship between
the author and the text is one thing, and determining the dominant
function of the authorial intent to the text is another matter. The
difference lies not only in degrees, but also the theoretical foothold to
clarify the basic meaning of the intent of the author. If the intent of the
author has an effect on the writing and reading of the text, then the
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statement about the author’s death is an exaggeration. Whether the
independence of the text itself is affirmed, or the rhetorical function
of words is emphasized, we cannot deny the authorial influence on
the text.
Although Derrida gives people the impression that he is a decon-
structionist trying to delete the author’s function, his habitual tactic
is to let the text go so close to the author, that the author and his
every word could be actively connected together. He lets the intent
of the author appear and disappear, and makes those words play with
the author a dodging game. When invited by Panorama of French
Literature to comment on the status of Mallarme in the history of
French literature, he first asked himself a question, «[I]s there a place
for Mallarme in a “history of literature”? Or, to begin with: does his
text take place, take its place, in some overall picture of French litera-
ture?» (Derrida , p. ). Derrida’s question means that he is going
to mark the position of Mallarme in literary history by reading his
poetic texts. Derrida said that Mallarme helped with the “rupture” of
many categories in literature, such as literary history, literary criticism,
and various philosophies and hermeneutics. Here at this moment Der-
rida tried to understand Mallarme under Mallarme’s own name and
wrote:
If Mallarme marks a rupture, it is still taking the form of repetition. For
example, it will reveal what the essence of literature in the past is. One
would have to discover, with the help of this text and through it, the new
logic of this double operation; which moreover we could only attribute to
Mallarme by resorting to a naive and self–interested theory of the signature,
the very one which Mallarme (Derrida , p. ).
Even it was to establish the status of Mallarme in an authoritative
dictionary or the literary history volume, Derrida did not talk about
Mallarme’s life experiences, instead he made a thorough cross–reading
of Mallarme’s poems, essays, reading notes and other texts to estab-
lish Mallarme’s deviation from the French literary tradition and his
decoding of the writing rules laid down by the philosophy derived
from Plato. Derrida believed that in Mallarme’s poems, the language
of poetry was no longer the primary ingredient of language. Mal-
larme’s text escaped the representation control, and went back to its
own syllable, mutual rhetoric, with the words addicted to the game
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of their own. This is apparently an example of the most extreme
criticism of there–is–nothing–beyond–the–texts, and even in such a
paradigm, Derrida strangely quoted Mallarme’s prose and notes as
footnotes, which undoubtedly was exploring the intent of Mallarme,
even though arranged by Derrida like games between texts. Derrida
claimed that in Mallarme’s poetry, the missing author was «actively
inscribed, it is not an accident of the text, it is rather its nature; it
marks the signature of an unceasing omission» (ibidem). In order to
strengthen the effect of the disappearance of the authors, Derrida also
quoted Mallarme’s statements in Crisis of Poems and About the Book, as
Mallarme also seemed to believe that he wrote poems and organized
them into a book, «in order to omit the author». He tried to accom-
plish something exceptional or different, such as “the omission of the
author” or “the death of the author” and so on. Mallarme fled away
from his text of poetry, and after many years, in order to prove “the
death of the author”, Derrida turned to Mallarme’s text and proved
“the death” of Mallarme as an author.
No matter whether it is the author who wants to escape from
himself, or whether it is the critic who tries to diminish the imprint of
the author’s signature, the author is always present. All the talks about
the text are all the time attributed to the author’s name and constitute
the author’s countless sayings of this text, which increase the author’s
reputation and artistic vitality.
.
The notion of the “intentional fallacy” is also the greatest challenge to
the “the intent of the author”. Since all readings could be “misread-
ing”, even if the authors have had intent embedded in the text, readers
may not be able to get it. This could be the case from the empirical
point of view, but a considerable number of people can read out the
same theme from the same text and also feel the same emotion. This
may contain certain identity. Human beings have sympathies and shed
similar ideas to the similar things, and if this statement will not be
. This statement comes from the two articles co–authored by W.K. Wimsatt and M.C.
Beardsley: “the Intentional Fallacy” and “the Affective Fallacy”.
The Death of the “Intent” and the “Life towards Death” of the Author 
completely denied, then the author also has his aspect of being an
ordinary person, living in the world, eating cereal grains, behaving and
speaking like every one of us, and language can also to some extent
express common thoughts and emotions. Therefore, the “intent” of
the author might “be misread” in the reading, but also possibly, it
would be conveyed correctly.
However, it is important to note that Harold Bloom’s “misreading”
theory is not so simple, and the theological influence leads Bloom to
see the great authors as a creator next only to the Supreme God, and
this creator distorts or “misreads” the source of His thoughts, espe-
cially the inspiration from God’s thoughts. Though the works created
by the great authors are the “misreading” of God’s thoughts, they are
the classic texts second only to those created by the Supreme God.
Hartmann of the Yale school Gang of Four once analyzed Bloom’s “mis-
reading” theory, and pointed out that “misreading” was a wrongly
named term, which was lively but not quite useful. The term re-
minded people of the fact that reading was not purely a matter of
interest, a reflection or a theoretical matter. It was as practical as
what the British tradition often required. Moreover, by adapting to
a scientific ideal and making it simple, the British tradition made
the practical utilitarian, or something that can be conveyed without
mistake. “Misreading” theory expressed a kind of resistance to British
utilitarianism and scientific idea, and through the creative application
of words, “New Criticism” opened up a literary world, where the
confusion of reality could be eliminated. To Harold Bloom, criticism
was a contemporary form of theology. Critics had the same or even
greater ambition than authors. However, the “New Criticism” exces-
sively indulged in the words in practice and almost completely forgot
Eliot’s ideal of “literary as a substitution religion”.
In fact, no matter how certain theorists claim the “death of the
author” or “the intentional fallacy”, most of the specific critic activities
tend to regard their own reading of the texts as the intent of the author.
The attention people attach to the life subject of a creative work is
far greater than the text. It is evident that the activity of criticism
locates the position of an author or poet in the history of literature
or thoughts through interpreting their works, and set up an idea or
notion through interpretation the author or poet. No matter how hard
it is to understand or grasp the author (poet), the critic always tries
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his (her) best to build a complete image of the author through the
fragmented text.
Alain Badiou once wrote a fairly unique article, titled Philosoph-
ical Task: To Become the Person of the Era Represented by Pessoa. The
paper argues that the current era is still dominated by the trend of
anti–Platonism. As Nietzsche claimed, his greatest task is to cure peo-
ple of their Disease of Plato. The direction that Nietzsche oriented
apparently continues to the th century. Badiou tries to explain that
Fernando Pessoa is neither Platonic nor anti–Platonic. Although Pla-
tonism is mainly viewed from a mathematical perspective, but the
basic meaning is the same, that is, whether there is an objective of the
rationale that constitutes the source of all the truth. It is clear that in
a certain sense the question of the decisive function of the “author’s
intent” is also platonic. Is the “author’s intent” the origin of all the
truth that form the objective understanding of the text? According to
Badiou, the current era of anti–Platonic thought cannot let the intent
of the author exist inside the text as an objective meaning, or deter-
mine all the readings. Badiou carried out an analysis of Pessoa from
a very special perspective. He analyzed the phenomenon of Pessoa’s
“heteronyms”, that is, Pessoa wrote poems with four different names.
In addition to Pessoa, he also often used three distinct names: Alberto
Caeiro, Álvaro de Campos and Ricardo Reis. Surprisingly, these three
different names all had their corresponding real figures and Pessoa
invented for these three different names their own life, so that they
looked like real. Those poems which were actually written by Pes-
soa are now classified under the name of different authors. Because
they have their own different pedigrees themes and styles of writing,
Pessoa treated them as “different authors” rather than the pen names
he used. As for Pessoa, he even believed that he wrote poems under
the incarnations of several people. Since childhood, he always liked
to fantasize about a virtual world around himself. He might imagine
some friends and people who had never existed in real life. Since
he realized his own existence, he always needed some non–realistic
figures with their own image, personality, behavior, and character.
This secretive game was to hide the real author Pessoa himself, and
to keep the author’s name secret, so that it was not void of reality.
These authors with their own “experience of life” wrote out their very
diverse poems. This inadvertently explains that the meaning and style
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of poems are related to the author’s character and life, and the author
would imprint their personality, psychological temperament onto the
text. Even if it were fictional characters, the text and the author should
have some relevance. When Pessoa wrote the poems with other pen
names, he became that person in these particular poems. He imagined
all the things about this pseudo character, letting him merge with his
verses. This is a game in which the author avoids himself and also
reconstructs himself, and it is also a technique of removing as well as
reconstructing the intent. In Hate You, Christ, I Do Not Pessoa wrote:
Life is multiple,
all days different from each other,
And only as multiple shall we
Be with reality and alone. (Pessoa , p. )
Pessoa tried to evade himself and even his own name throughout
his whole life. According to the researcher Teresa Rita Lopes’ research
statistics, altogether Pessoa in his lifetime created  heteronyms. He
has created so many heteronyms and remains lonely still; maybe
because of being lonely, he has created so many heteronyms to accom-
pany himself. The family of these heteronyms enjoyed flourishing
popularity, but Pessoa had remained unknown for many years. He was
almost buried in the history of European literature, but his poems had
been there until one day, to be found again, and to be given under the
name of Pessoa. In , Pessoa died (at age of ), and seven years later
after his death in , Pessoa Anthology in  volumes appeared and
it was collected and filed by Adolfo Casquez Monte. In the same year,
the Complete Works of Pessoa was released, and this –volume col-
lection was painstakingly and carefully collated by Luis de Montalvo
and Joao Gaspar. According to Alain Badiou, for more than  years
after his death, Pessoa became gradually known by the French, and
Badiou himself was also one of these “shameful latecomers”. Until
Pessoa became a figure, with a complete sense of the author or poet,
his poems were valued by people. Pessoa has so many heteronyms,
at least four major ones, and which is his true identity as a poet? Or,
which heteronym expresses his true intent most? Badiou categorized
Pessoa’s philosophical thinking according to his four heteronyms, be-
tween Plato and anti–Plato, «in the interval that the poet has opened
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up for us, a veritable philosophy of the multiple, of the void, of the
infinite» (Badiou , p. ). In this way, Badiou elevated Pessoa to
the position of God: «[A] philosophy that will affirmatively do justice
to this world that the gods have forever abandoned» (ibidem). Pessoa
who had escaped into the infinite heteronyms was brought back to
life by Badiou like a holy figure, to lead us to the future of the world.
Because the author has already been killed, this age is the one in which
the author is needed, but could not be produced. Thus, Badiou tried
his best to rescue Pessoa from the infinite division of heteronyms and
let him become a prophet.
Badiou so confidently exposed the essentials of Pessoa and made it
a solution for salvation, which is undoubtedly an encouraging move.
Of course, we will also have doubts about Badiou’s criticism, because
it links the gist of the text with countless heteronyms, and finally
comes to a conclusion aiming to lead the world, which is indeed a
courageous and respectable action. Of course, this is the usual heroic
behavior of a Marxist critical philosopher, and Badiou’s reading of Pes-
soa puts forward a task of the age, and also a call to literary criticism.
Today’s literary criticism needs to reconstruct the sense of history
and humanism, which is especially important to Chinese literary
criticism. Although Chinese literary criticism has never undergone
rigorous scrutiny of close textual reading, and the authority of the au-
thor towards the text has never been questioned, how to connect the
traditional historical and social literary criticism with textual criticism,
discover and feel the emotion of the authors and the essence of their
thought, or as a reference, to examine the ideological connotation
and emotion of the text by Chinese author, it is a task that literary
criticism should be responsible for.
The return of the author, the rediscovery of the relationship be-
tween the author and the text, the re–confirmation of the ideological
meaning of literature, what ideology that literature of this age is to
expose, what kind of commitment the authors have for literature, and
what responsibilities the authors have for the contemporary society,
all these are the requirements raised by the task of reconstructing the
image of the author and the exploration of the intent of the author.
When people are talking about “the end of history” and the end of
“ideology”, it becomes a sort of extravagant hope to expect literary
works to have great ideas, but it is necessary for the author to lift the
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banner of spirit. Quite possibly, it is because of the tiredness towards
the contemporary thoughts that the textual critics evade to the words
in the text, expecting that the rhetoric reading of the text can over-
take their sense of being lost. Roland Barthes once said that «for the
writer, a language is nothing but a human horizon which provides a
distant setting of familiarity, the value of which, incidentally, is entirely
negative» (Barthes , p. ). In the early s, the Chinese poet
Ouyang Jiangyang also said that poets were the dead souls of a group
of words. Ouyang Jiangyang is also an extremely outstanding poetry
critic, and he is very good at analyzing the rhetoric of language full of
imagination. However, it is of no use to feel sad about this situation, as
Chinese literature after s did encounter difficulties in the high–lift
of thoughts. And today how we can revitalize the ideological power of
Chinese literature does require literary criticism to discover outstand-
ing works, to analyze the intent of the author (poet), which in itself
should generate interaction and excitation. Pessoa said intriguingly in
his poem:
You may not have caught anything. But when the empty
shadows filled in you, you will arrive at the quietness of dusk.
You will be immersed in it as if you had been placed in a foreign place.
Read Aloud in front of the Twilight Mirror
Anyway, we have to seize him — Pessoa and those “empty shad-
ows”. Did not Badiou claim that he had already caught them? We can
seize them because we are rooted on the land of China.
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 : Il senso delle opere letterarie in quanto prodotto del pro-
cesso di trasferimento e accettazione
: The meaning of literary works is determined by the “acceptance
and transfer” relationship between the works and the receptors. This
relationship is the effect of the receptors’ acceptance cultivated by their
empirical understanding. The meaning originates from the process of
transfer and acceptance, on multiple vertical level bases such as per-
ceptual presentation level, the universal and generality level, and the
level of historical extensibility. The meaning is determined by many
factors, which is the presentation of historical structure and context
in the process of acceptance and transfer. The construction of reality
is the deconstruction and reconstruction of historical structure and is
presented in the state of question to draw the attention of the receptor
by appealing to their desires and expectations. In addition, the meaning
is hidden between the lines, which implies meaning is a result of the
mutual understanding and interaction between the author’s intention
and the receptor’s comprehension. This is to prove that the meaning
of literary works is not confined in the verbal text, as the scholars in
the West argued. The generality of nonverbal meaning is produced by
the character of acceptance and transfer of literary works. The implied
meaning of literary works is universally recognized.
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. Introduction
Literary activities, including creation, distribution, acceptance and
criticism, are all purposeful and meaningful. Literary works are the
lingual dictated state of literary activity. All the aspects of literary ac-
tivities, such as creation, distribution, acceptance and criticism, and
the limits on these aspects from even larger social activities and social
relations are embodied in the text to some extent, and represented as
textual meaning. Textual meaning is determined from various angles
by the differences in the relationship such as between creation and
distribution, between creation and acceptance, between creation and
criticism and is realized by the transfer and acceptance of the text.
In terms of textual meaning determined by these relations, the rela-
tion–determined meanings are ignored, weakened and disregarded
in some criticisms on the meaning of literary works and researches
on literary theories that aim at exploring the meaning of the text.
These practices continuously make the meaning of literary works
misunderstood, subjectively understood, isolated and even lost in the
criticisms and theories. Therefore, it is of theoretical significance to
explore the meaning of literary works from the perspective of various
relations involved and that of transfer and acceptance.
. The Meaning of Literary Works Produced by Acceptance Rela-
tionships
Since the th century, researches on the meaning of literary works
in the West can be classified into three approaches: the truth theory
of the classicism, the text–centered theory and the acceptance theory.
According to the truth theory, the significance of the literary works
lies in its exposure of the truth in the world, that is, the meaning
is provided by the reality. Text–centered theory originated from for-
malism, with Saussure and Ransom as its representatives. According
to this theory, textual meaning exists in the text itself. According to
the acceptance theory, the meaning is determined by the process of
acceptance, based on the reception theory, hermeneutics and reading
theory. The three approaches mentioned above are closely related to
linguistics and semiotics, because each approach is dependent on the
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language and signs in the literary works. The meaning theory in this
article focuses on the common core of these three approaches, that is,
the production of the literary meaning. It is highlighted as the basic
approach to explore meaning, with its focus on the relative nature of
literary works. It isn’t difficult to see the relationship between form
and content in truth theory, the relationship of different verbal signs
in the text theory or the text–acceptance relationship in the reception
theory are all reflected in relations and regulated in relations; while
they give no sufficient consideration on textual meaning itself.
Meaning is a concept subject to and formed in relation, and can
be classified as a relational concept. This type of concept was named
«propositions standing in internal relations» (Wittgenstein , p. ).
As for these unsubstantial concepts, sensed in certain relationships,
Greimas proposed a name “ecart differentiel” —
differential temporal distances will not appear in “the material substance”,
they are just results, in which the discontinuance in the world is sensed. We
know nothing about the world. The above mentioned temporal distance is
formed by the relation and difference of the various aspects of matters that
can be compared. (Greimas , p. )
Foucault explained some concepts by their relative attributes from
the perspective of philosophy, and he argued «the sign does not wait
in silence for the coming of a man capable of recognizing it: it can be
constituted only by an act of knowing» (, p. ), that is, signs are
the products of the interrelationship between man and his knowledge
about the subject matter.
In recent years, academic circles in the West have gradually shifted
their attention to understanding the denotation in the above men-
tioned relations and the generality of relations that is accumulated,
discovered and summarized in the discontinuous reality with chang-
ing objects. However, it is no easy task for the Western scholars to
change their thinking habit of hundreds of years in several decades,
giving up their dualistic metaphysical tradition that has originated
since th century and denies the change of roles in certain relation-
ships.
The significance of literary activities, while pursued and researched
as the meaning of a literary work, is generally thought to exist in
the state of the textual meaning. Meaning thus exists in the text. This
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is the approach to explore the meaning of literary works in the first
half of the th century. This seemingly reasonable approach is not
self–evident when the work–object relation is taken into consideration.
In order to explore the meaning of a literary work, a fundamental
relationship is established between the explorer and the explored: to
whom, to what is the work of significance? The work–object relation
is a prerequisite factor to acquire meaning. The meaning, produced
in the relation between different works with the same object or the
same object with different works, will be entirely different. These
differences come from the different understanding of the latter for
the same (different) former(s) or the meaning offered by the same
(different) former(s) for the latter. This is a kind of interaction. Many
Western scholars have followed the hermeneutics principles proposed
by Heidegger and Gadamer, who have also ended the traditional
author–centered and text–centered theories. But some of them would
like to get out of the tendency of unsteady and unclear description
because of their metaphysical tradition, though the tendency itself
is sometimes self–contradicted or drifts off course. Some scholars
confine these relations in a circle, making them a definite research
object. Some scholars take the uncertainty out of the relation, making
them meet a certain standard. Ingarden’s four heterogeneous strata is
an example of the former, while Ransom’s theory of structure and
texture is an example of the latter. Thus they will be fully satisfied
in the certainty. In the end, linguistics and semiotics finds shelter in
language and signs for the changing relations that perplex the Western
scholars who got used to metaphysical thinking way. The relation
theory of Heidegger and Gadamer was shrunk by the recent tendency
of the structural linguistics (some other open–minded structuralists
were against this idea) so that some are eager to announce the death
of the writer and only text exists, following the writer–centered and
text–centered notion. Nonetheless, the meaning of literary works can
not be shrunk or confined in the text itself. It is continuously asked to
whom the work is significant. And once who participates is decided,
meaning is only as what he accepts.
To accept is not to take it as it is, but it is to accept by choice
and after transfer. The choice is based on the expectation, which is
called “horizon of expectations” by Hans Robert Jauss. It is not merely
an expectation, but an expectation that is directed by and subjected
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to some needs. Ferdinand de Saussure tried to limit the sense of
language by his linguistic theory, but unexpectedly, it is his invention
of the concept of “the signified” and “the signifier” that makes “the
signified” open to the audience by “the signifier”. The dual character
of Saussure’s theory makes room for the expectations of acceptance,
which is confined by both “the signified” and “the signifier”. As for
the expected signified, the signifier is just one of the choices; as for the
expected signifier, the signified is also just one of the choices. They are
expected as one of the possibilities in need, and what is in the horizon
of expectations is to be present in the obscurity. Jauss said «it expects
the experience in the future and thus reveals the possible scope of
activities» (Zhu , p. ). The horizon of expectation is empirical,
and it is based on the experience and to be tested by the expected
experience. At the same time, new experience that is related to and
surpasses the past experience is accumulated. The transfer feature
of the text acceptance helps to understand and offer the empirical
difference of the literary receptors. The image in the text might be
changed in the mind of the reader due to his personal experience.
As the poem goes, “flowers bloom and fade”, the “signified” the
author refers to might be “peach blossom”, while the reader may
think of “prunus”. The image of a flower may be thus made and
accepted. In phenomenological terms, there is no experience there
as phenomenon, and experience is not appearance, though it can
not go without appearance. Experience is gained in the past, and is
called up and organized when faced with the reality. Object is the real
organizer of experience understanding object, so the understanding
of the object with experience is always a gegenst and liche activity.
The object becomes object only when it organizes and changes the
reader’s experience and makes the experience become the object
to understand. When talking about the works of art, Hans–Georg
Gadamer said «the work of arts exits when it changes the experience
of experiencer» (Zhu , p. ).
To understand meaning by the relation between text and its accep-
tance is actually not necessarily to be contradicted with the idea of
acquiring meaning from language in the view of linguistics and semi-
otics. The sense analysis based on the internal difference in language
is fundamentally the analysis based on the researcher’s understanding
of the language. In this seemingly closed analysis, they have already
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taken part in the process in advance as a receptor. That accounts for
the following phenomenon: scholars such as I.A. Richards, William
Empson, Robert Penn Warren are obsessed with close reading, but
they are hesitant in the process of acquiring meaning.
Then here comes a tough question, since the meaning results from
the relation between the text and the acceptance, then where does
the meaning lie, in the text or the acceptance? Where the meaning
lies can be declared as the focus of attention. In fact, it will not be
a question if the mode of dualism is broken, with the relation taken
into consideration. With the relation in mind, we can get the textual
meaning if we pursue the meaning from the text, and we can get the
meaning of acceptance if we pursue the meaning from the acceptance.
It is the acceptance meaning of the text, or the acceptance of the textual
meaning. The prerequisites of the above mentioned conclusion is that
the original text and the reader must have their own experiences and
meaning generating system, which is surely different. Their meaning
generating systems are not meaning, but an instrument to generate
meaning, just like peoples’ digestive system is not the nutrition digested.
The meaning system of the text and that of the readers interacts with
each other in the textual meaning, thus meaning is usually produced,
that is to say, meaning results from their interaction. Considering the
relation structure of signs, Jürgen Habermas holds that
Only when a value is inscribed into an utterance that describes a state whose
function establishes the junctive relation between the subject and the object
can we consider this subject and this object as semiotically existing one for
the other. Such as assertion, far from being a metaphysical flight of fancy,
on the contrary serves an eminently practical end: By defining semiotic
existence as a structural relation, it excludes from our considerations the
ontological problematics of subject and object, and by formulating this
relation as constitutive of a canonical utterance describing a state, it gives
us a formal framework and identifying criteria for semiotic facts that are
relevant to any analysis. (Greimas , p. )
. Richards places an emphasis on that language truth has nothing to do with reality,
but later he believes that the truth of language is indispensable to the reader’s attitudes. The
notion of having something with the reality takes the place of that of having nothing to do
with reality. Ransom emphasizes the text–centered theory. His “structure–text” theory is
in accord with the gist of the text –centered theory. Text is the basic vehicle to carry the
nature of the world. Text is open to the world, and judged by the world experience (Zhao
, p. )
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. The Meaning Attributes and Rules of the Acceptance Relatives
Then comes the next question: is what is understood in the reception
relations equal to the meaning we pursue? If the answer is yes, the
empirical understanding is meaning, or in other words, meaning is
the understanding with experience. Under this circumstance, it is
meaning in a wide sense, because some empirical understanding is
not meaningful. For example, when we see a bowl of water or a fly,
it is generally a recognization of objects or facts with personal knowl-
edge. Since there is nothing new produced in this process, there is no
meaning. If meaning is to be acquired from these recognized items,
other requirements have to be fulfilled. Although we want to figure
out the meaning of literary works in the relation of empirical under-
standing, we don’t mean empirical experience and meaning are the
same, we just intend to point out that meaning lies in and is demon-
strated by the empirical understanding. The empirical understanding
based on the relation between a literary work and its readers is the
shelter for and prerequisite of meaning. Meanwhile, the empirical
understanding in the reception relations or the reception relation of
understanding with experience is regulated by the meaning. Then
the question arises: what is the meaning in the empirical understand-
ing? The answer is closely related to the concept of literary meaning.
Then we encounter a series of questions: what is meaning? Where
does the meaning produced in various relations come and go? Is
meaning decided by relation, historically set or changed continuously
and produced in languages? When we judge an activity or something
meaningful, where does the standard come from? What is the differ-
ence between the meaning of literary works and that of the other
activities or things?
The meaning of literary works has a value effect, based on the
judgment in history and reality. This value effect could be the truth
in real life, the saint in the religious world, and the goodness in
people’s communication. It also could be the touching feelings or
interest, as Richards’ “truth in the poetry”. The value effect of this
. By the phrase “truth in poetry”, Richards does not mean to talk about truth, on the
contrary, he believes the statements in poems are pseudo–statement. His “truth in poetry”
is only “acceptability”, or “convincing power”. In this way, Richards introduces an artistic
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type lies in various relations of history and real life, and is saved and
expressed in the elements of literary works. In literary works, what
can be regarded as meaning is just element of value effect. They
become accepted value effect in the process when the work is read,
understood and accepted. Just like gold ore, it contains the elements
to become gold. Only after it is dug out and refined, could it obtain
the value of money. Literary works are made of words. The different
combination of words produces something valuable in literary works.
The value understood in the process of acceptance is expressed as
meaningful elements by various language structures such as plot,
characters, setting, character’s relationship and clue of behaviors. That
is how the meaning of literary works is produced.
The acceptance relations are established when the literary works
are read by the readers. This relation is not only established while
reading, but also before and after reading. The reading process is just
an apparent acceptance behavior. Before or after reading, there has
been a general correspondence between the writer and the reader.
This correspondence is formed by their experience. Writers know
there some readers awaiting them, so that they have to think how
to write for their potential readers, what their reading expectations
are, and what are their experiences and interests. Readers know what
the writers will write for them and want them to understand and
accept. This is the prerequisite for the establishment of the relation
between creation and acceptance. The reading activity shows the
relation between creation and acceptance, which is the presentation
of those invisible relations. The two parties in the reading process
express and accept the values, also called the meaning, made by words
in the literary works. When the reading activity is over, new invisible
relation is established which will lead to the reflection of creation and
acceptance. These relations indicate the formation and existence of the
meaning of the literary works. Although different prerequisites lead
to different acceptances, the meaning of effective value is conceived
in the writing process.
The meaning of literary works is decided by the work–acceptance
relations, not closed or self–evident as Richards believes. Richards,
value that has nothing to do with “reality”, the value that is convincing and touching. This
value from real life is based on the same emotional pursuit. (Zhu , p. )
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Ransom and René Wellek are regarded as the representatives of new
criticism, and they all incline to believe that meaning is set in the
literary works. When the meaning is to be explored, literary criticism
is used to trace the “existing meaning” (Richards , p. ).
The relation between work and acceptance on which meaning is
based, and other relevant relations are virtually related and are influ-
enced relatively. The meaning becomes true because it is acquired by
empirical understanding and subject to the general principal of value
formation (Russell , p. ). We have no intention to deny the
spiritual nature of acceptance relation and other related social relation.
All the relation activities in real life are spiritual; otherwise it is not
a real relation activity. Emphasis is placed on the acceptance activity
and relative activities to indicate that the meaning of literary works is
built on the above mentioned empirical understanding. To understand
with experience becomes the medium of work–acceptance relations
and is constructed by the work–acceptance relations since it helps to
understand the effective value depicted by the words in the literary
works. In such framework, the empirical understanding is subject to
the relations in real life. The real function of other relative relations is
also performed by the work–acceptance relations.
The meaning of literary works is produced in work–acceptance
relation, while the work–acceptance relation is also regulated by the
. In , Richards wrote in his preface to Practical Criticism, «It follows that criticism
itself is very largely, though not wholly, an exercise in navigation». like a compass. However,
they ignore the fact that either in the activities of creation or acceptance, the subjects of
both sides exist in the real life, becoming changing subjects in the relations of various
activities. They are influenced by various relations in the process of their participation in
the activities and thus the audience including them is influenced as well. Hence it becomes
true that the acceptance relation is open and passive. Text reading is closed and isolated in
some research on the acceptance of literary works or on the acceptance of textual meaning
in the past. Apparently, this approach lays emphasis on the acceptance of the text itself,
while this emphasis is not laid on the real and concrete relations, but on the subjective and
imaginative relations. In this approach, the text–centered theory is accepted. According to
the text–centered theory, text becomes the source of meaning, and the reader’s initiatives
are confined not to challenge the text’s status as the center, which makes readers become
mere acceptors, decorations or ornaments.
. Truth is the premise of meaning. The truth is facts that can be proved. When
it comes to the question of meaning, Bertrand Russell points out that the question of
meaning is the question of truth. Its premise must be based on truth, although «factual
premises may not be certain, but there is nothing more certain by which they can be shown
to be false» (Russell , p. ).
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meaning it generated. This regularity that stipulates the meaning of
the relation is formed by the writer’s creation, and functions while the
writers are writing. It is firstly a regulation representing the writer’s
creative psychology. It is not only subject to the writer’s aim of cre-
ation, but to his attitudes, his passion and his experience. It sets rules
for the writer to choose the style, methods, and words. Gustave
Flaubert must be depressed for the misfortune of Madame Bovary,
while Madame Bovary is created for his pain. He writes because of
his sufferings and he suffers while he is writing. Therefore, Madame
Bovary’s pain is created in accordance with the inner part of the
work–acceptance relation and outer psychology. Obviously, the writer
is regulated by the text–acceptance relation in which he is involved.
The regulation for the writer’s creation is exactly the regulation for
the expected meaning of acceptance. As for this regulation existing
before the creation and determining the creative meaning, Allen Tate
once asked “whom is a poet responsible for?” and then explained
What is a poet responsible for? He is only responsible for his virtue as a
poet and his special aretee. He must be capable of using a language skillfully
so that he can express his comprehension of real life accurately. In Yeats’
words, poets have to make the reality a notion. (Zhao , p. )
The meaning of some value effect is produced by the work–ac-
ceptance relation and the work–acceptance relation is also regulated
by the meaning of some value effect. That is interaction of meaning
generation and regulation.
. Multiple Sources of the Meaning of Literary Works
How does the meaning of literary works, as the result of acceptance
relation and other interactions? It is an important question of theoreti-
cal and critical significance. As for researchers and critics, the meaning
of literary works is a new finding and judgment in the acceptance
relation and other interactions. In his book An Inquiry into Meaning
and Truth, Russell regarded it as an important truth proposition, that
is, “warranted assertibility” (Russell , p. ). Meaning originates
from the assertibility of finding and judgment.
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.. Literary Works as Experiences
“Assertibility” is the definite feature of the object, for example, the
sky is blue and water is flowing. If the identifiable feature of an object
is verified to be true, or suit the object, the verification needs such
an object to prove, which is a “warrant”. Therefore, the proposition
of “warranted assertibilithy” by Russell tells us the two factors to
identify the truth of an object: the assertion form expressing truth,
and the causal relation to prove this identified assertion. At that time,
this proposition caused a debate between Russell and Dewey. Russell
insisted that experience is the decisive factor to decide whether a
proposition is true, and the present percept is something beyond
doubt in experience. In this debate, Russell’s view on meaning centers
on the relation between language and facts. He then explores this issue
further and establishes his analytical philosophy. In the exploration of
the meaning of literary works, Russell’s proposition that meaning is
decided by experience could be resorted to explore the origin of the
meaning of the literary works.
As mentioned above, literary meaning is the product of experience,
and experience is the reflection of meaning from life. Experience
comes from life and reality, which guarantees that meaning is not
fabricated. What’s more, the real experience is nourished by percep-
tion when it is involved in the formation of meaning — «at least as
regards empirical assertions, that it is to be effected by their causes. An
empirical assertion which can be known to be true has percepts, or
percept, among its proximate or remote causes» (Russell , p. ).
According to Russell, language is a tool of the perception of experi-
ence, and this theory can be used to understand the literary meaning
by the creation of image. Since meaning is related to experience, lit-
erary works in the perception relations is the iconic representation
of its author’s experience. It is originated from literary imagination,
enters the literary works via words, and forming the plot, character,
settings and images respectively. For the recipient in the reception
relations, the meaningful experience is decided by words in literary
works. The readers’ life experience and literary acceptance experience
are awakened, collected and organized to sense, recognize and accept
the implication by reproductive imagination. They not only judge and
understand the story, characters, settings, emotion and images in the
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text, but take part in the construction of these elements. These expe-
riences are inter–structural in acceptance, as Russell has mentioned
«single events which only happen once» (Russell , p. ). The
non–repeatability in the acceptance of literary works can be explained
by the conclusion that it is not restricted to understanding the literary
work with experience, but interrelated with other related elements.
The interaction occurs repeatedly, which makes the relation change
all the time. The change is not repeatable in the development of the
relation of both sides.
.. The “Universal” and “General” of Literary Works
When the experience that helps to conceive the meaning of literary
works in the acceptance relation is a particular one that can not be
repeated, it can not get the character of assertation as experience, let
alone to be guaranteed. Just as Russell pointed out, this non–repeatable
percept can not exist before and after its presence. It is self–evident
momentarily and disappears soon. But only something that is com-
mon in this moment could exist at this moment, before and after
this moment, in the form of expectation or reflection, to assert the
relevant object. Then what is the common in this moment? Russell
uses “a universal” and “generality” to answer this question “what is
a word?” He takes the word “dog” as an example, and he believes
the word “dog” is “a universal”. He then explained “just as dog is a
universal”, the former dog is a dog in word, and the latter is a dog in
life, a dog running and jumping around. They all bear “a universal”
of a dog. He also explains “universal” in this way «but in fact we utter
two examples of the same species, just as when we see two dogs we
see two examples of the same species. There is thus no difference of
logical status between dog and the word “dog”: each is general, and
exists only in instances» (Russell , p. ). The key in this explana-
tion is “universal” and “general”, the dog in word has the abstract of
“the universal” and “the general” of the dog in life, and the dog in
life has “the universal” and “the general” of the dog in word. In this
way, they are correspondent in meaning while in use, which accounts
for the relationship between language and momentary percept. The
word referred to here by Russell is the same in expressing meaning as
the story or image in the literary works. The image created in literary
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works is perceptible and tangible, and “universal” and “general” at
the same time. “The universal” and “the general” are the perceptible
evidence in experience and in real life, and then becomes the “war-
ranted”. The second source of literary meaning is discovered in this
way; it is not the meaning or significance of a single event, but the
“universal” “general” meaning or significance of many events. The
meaning in various relation sets rules for the creation and acceptance
of literary works, and is warranted in the process.
The realism based on the literary epistemology is frequently related
to the question of “universal” and “general”, generally in the name of
the essence of phenomenon, the phenomenon of essence, the gener-
ality of particularity, or the particularity of the generality. In the s or
s of the th century, the topic of literary typicality was discussed
heatedly among the critics of Chinese literary circle. The particular-
ity and generality is judged by the standard of typification focusing
chiefly on the cognitive value. In this article this topic is discussed
from the perspective of meaning, which is not only an emphasis on
epistemology, but also an extension on the relation in practice. It is
obvious that the significance of a series of events or literary images
to the knowing is different from their significance to doing, although
they both have the problem of being true or false. In epistemology,
meaning is something common, certain, stable or definite, so they are
regarded as truth in philosophy. Text–oriented theory once popular in
China is closely related to the meaning in epistemology, in which text
is the vehicle of meaning. The meaning from the perspective of epis-
temology is not excluded from or limited within what is emphasized
here. While literary works are discussed in the in the view of practice
and acceptance, the significant “universal” and “generality” is usu-
ally temporary not permanent, incidental not inevitable, organic not
isolated. They are found and experienced as changing “universal” or
. In A Coursebook of Literary Theories (Beijing: Higher Education Press,) by Tong
Qingbing, text–centered theory is still popular, though literature is renamed as literary
activity and text is mere result of literary activity. Judged from the framework of the
textbook, the spell of text centered theory is not broken; the arrangement and development
of several chapters are based on text. M.H. Abrams’ “four elements” was introduced in the
textbook. Although the world is mistaken for social life in the textbook, world is a notion
instead of a social life. Therefore, in the four elements of “text–audience–author–world”,
meaning is produced within the relation confined to consciousness. The text–centered
theory, which is based on epistemology, is retaining its livelihood.
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“generality” in the changing reality and other relations. Thus, when
the poem Flames of war have risen higher and higher, letters from home are
worth their weight in gold is read, someone may think of nostalgia and
affinity, others may think of historical transcendence (in digital age,
the feel of “letters from home are worth their weight in gold” has
gone forever), still others may think philosophically of the relativity
of “far or near” and “light or heavy”. Is there some “universal” or
some “general” in this temporary, incidental and organic process?
It is the associational “universal” and the generality of “experience”.
No matter how wild is your imagination, “a letter from home” is
related to home, and “flames of war” is related to war, such as the
balefire of The Crusades, Anti–Japanese War, Kosovo War, and the
Iran–Iraq War. Such “universal” and “general” is not for offering truth
(not excluding from offering truth), but for experiencing life, inspiring
spirits and enlightening. Russell’s fundamental contribution to analyt-
ical philosophy is that he places regularity in changes and seeks the
significance of the regularity of changes in reality. That is why he is
frequently criticized by western scholars who insist that meaning is
absolutely defined.
.. Historical significance of literary works
The reader gets a momentary “universal” and “generality” while un-
derstanding the perceptive meaning, but in terms of duration, mean-
ing has a non–stop journey, what a reader captures is just a temporary
image. What a reader is experiencing is temporary, while the meaning
itself is a product of history.
Without any doubt, no matter what change the accepted “universal”
and “general” may have in the reception relation, they are acquired in
the accumulation of history, and they are handed down from generation
to generation. This process enters the river of the tradition and practice
in history, surpassing the individual acquisition. For the forthcoming
reader, it is not only cognitive, instructive, encyclical, but behavioral,
acceptable, and empirical. Therefore when a reader enters the general
. In the west, some scholars insists that the meaning of languages and signs are
produced at the moment, disregard of historical context, leading to the limit of meaning
and disavowal of value effect.
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acceptance relation before he begins his reading practice, he has already
had a status of some historical background. He has the history accepted
by him and he is the history accepted. He is always modeled by history.
This is a power from history. Therefore, it is not as the semiologists
or linguists believes that value or meaning is produced by words or
signs; on the contrary, the value or meaning presented by words or
signs is produced by history. The historical status is merged into the
literary works by the writers, and extracted by the readers, thus the
meaning of literary works originates. Meaning is originated from its
historical status and gains the status of historical meaning. It is the third
source of meaning: history. The progressive order mentioned here is
a logical order, when the literary works are created and accepted, the
three sources — individual experience, “universal” and “general”, and
history — are functioning simultaneously.
Greimas mentioned the historical structure confined the meaning
when he was talking about the relation between historical structures
and meaning structure, that is, the historical accumulation to produce
meaning has set a limit on the interpretation of the meaning, indi-
cating directivity for proper understanding. Greimas’ explanation on
the historical constraint is meaningful in historical hermeneutics, and
historical comparison, because comparison and interpretation are the
results of mental activities, in which the constraints also exist. From
this point of view, Greimas’ opinion on historical constraints is guar-
anteed in the real thinking process. He says: «History is not, as many
people say repeatedly, something open; on the contrary, it is some-
thing enclosed. There is new meaning in the structure, but the door
to the meaning is latched. It is far from a starter, but a brake» (Greimas
, p. ). The historical constraints mentioned by Greimas, re-
flecting the spiritual activities in the historical reality, offer reasonable
explanation from the perspective of semantics, revealing the spiritual
activities producing meaning. Readers, researchers and critics accept
and inherit historical experience, “the universal” and “generality”
from literary works; what’s more, they also integrate the experience
into the meaning produced. In terms of historical meaning, the recep-
tion relation and the related relations are historically regulated, and the
creation and acceptance are also made in historical context. Greimas
further summarizes the function of historical spiritual activities in
this way: history «always froze structure into normal operation, and
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resulted in the formation of set phrase. Undoubtedly, this inertia can
be regarded as one element to explain the historicity. Some people
have an assertion full of wisdom: it remains the same despite all
the changes. It is quite reasonable» (Greimas , p. ). We can
safely conclude that the constraints by historical spiritual activities
are “predetermined” by historical reality. As for the generation of
the meaning of literary works, the constraints of historical thinking
accounts for the difference of literary meaning caused by nationality,
social culture, and historical stages. Different nationalities, different
social culture and different historical stage are demonstrated by dif-
ference in historical thinking, thus difference in historical thinking is
formed. Besides, in terms of historical continuity, it is the difference
in historical reality, which “predetermines” the historical value and
meaning of the difference.
. The Meaning of Literary Works Made by Various Factors in
Life
The meaning of literary works is determined by the reception relation
and other relations, which makes the meaning of literary works open
to realities. The real state of reception relation and related relation are
continuously presented in social practice.
Being open to reality and being confined by history are two states
of social structures that interact with and form each other. Repre-
sented in every concrete step of social progress, they are integrated in
social practice by understanding, thinking and designing. That is, the
whole process of social practice, from setting goals, choosing methods,
adjusting strategies and realizing aims, to setting new aims and taking
corresponding measures, is an interacting process of being open to
the reality and confined by history. It is the temporary openness in
historical closeness, and historical closeness in the temporary open-
ness. History is the continuity of history and reality is the extension
of reality, which forms contemporary historical practice.
According to different aims, methods and processes, the diversified
contemporary historical practice can be classified into economical,
political, religious, moral, and aesthetic practices which make up the
practice in the spiritual field and social life. Contemporary historical
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closeness and historical contemporary openness are thus developed
respectively in different fields. The social practice developed in various
aspects, enters the reception relation by personal perception in the
efforts by the writers and readers. The meaning of literary works
is comprehensively developed by perception, generality and history.
Thus in the process of realization, the framework of being open to
reality, and having multiple sources were synthetically formed.
It is a process of structuring and contextualization to analyze the
meaning by using the theory of structuralism and contextualism,
which is closely related to the meaning theory. In terms of the struc-
turing of meaning open to reality, it is the structuring of the behavioral
system, verbal system, and psychological system of personal social
practice. In terms of the meaning of literary works, the structuring of
contemporary openness is presented synthetically in the interaction
of reception relation and other relation of literary acceptance, which
forms the historical and contemporary source of literary meaning.
Structuring is historical process, and it is the tendency and contem-
porary situation of history. Reality is always structuralized and in the
process of history; while history always exists in the contemporary
structure, which acts as history by contemporary structure and the
corresponding conscious behaviors. There is no sufficient theoretical
exploration to the structural continuity in western structurology.
The structuring relation of history and reality is not suspended in
an empty social structure, but exists in various real social relations as
a whole and represented by people’s behaviors, languages and psy-
chology. The structuring of historical reality makes every part of any
type of social life and any single personal activity, including conscious
activities related to meaning, regulated by the whole structure of so-
cial life. The representative figure of structuralism, Lucien Goldman
has noticed this phenomenon when he analyzes the integration of
structure of literary works, psychological structure of the writer and
the structure of social life. He said
the concrete essence or the meaning of phenomenon can be reached by
understanding the whole instead of something particular or abstract. Think-
ing is something alive and intact, just part of reality that is not so abstract.
In other words, people are a component of social community. The true
meaning of a thought or a book can be captured only when the receptor’s
life and behavior is taken into consideration. (Zhu , p. )
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There are two opposite tendencies in structuralism: closeness and
openness, which indicate the paradox and complexity of structuralism.
The paradox and complexity of structuralism reflect the paradox and
complexity of social life and social practice it faces.
Reality is not the repetition of history, and current structure of
social life is not the historical one, but the realization and openness
of the historical structure. The occurrence and appearance of new
circumstances of social life and social development is the attack and
deconstruction of the existed social structure, and reconstructed in
the lasting historical structure. Reality is not only the continuity, de-
construction and reconstruction of history, but also the standpoints for
people to understand, control and change life. A variety of meaning
is derived from and judged by reality. As for this point, Goldman has
mentioned «When they place a work into the progress of history and
connect history with social life, the researchers are capable of getting
the objective meaning, of which is frequently unaware by the author
himself» (Zhu , p. ).
The contemporary structure is deconstructed and reconstructed
by reality through raising arresting questions. The question, if truly
meaningful, could not be single and isolated from but connected with
the whole structure. Herbert Marcuse regards the way in which ques-
tions are depicted by Marxism, also called question structure, as the
chief conflict from the whole social structure. From the perspective of
structuring, questions arise when some connecting dots are hindered,
twisted, damaged and broken under the circumstances when some
node in the whole structure influences other nodes and the problem
cannot be solved. The wider and the heavier the influence are, the
more meaningful the answer to the questions is. If the questions of
social structure are reflected in a literary work, and the keys to these
questions are quested in an imaginative and effective way, the literary
work is meaningful correspondently. The meaning is of contempo-
rary and historical significance. It is cognitive and practical, which is
the value judgment of “practice–spirit” mentioned by Karl Marx.
The significance of literary works can be demonstrated by ques-
tions they raised through structuring and contextualization. Context is
different from structure because as a rule of relation, it is vividly called
“word before and after” by Richards. It is an influencing factor, not a
structuralized one. This is a pushing force for a certain direction in
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dynamic social connections, also called context effect or field effect by
some scholars. Examples are in the context of the national salvation
movement in the May th Movement era of China, and the context
of masscult in the new period (in literature it refers to China from
). The rising masscult in the new era witnessed the deterioration
of elitism in literary works. Context influence can be gradually struc-
turalized through various relations, and then establish stable relations.
As for the contemporary significance of context, it is still a flowing
changing pushing force, in which a literary work in a certain context
gains negative or positive impact.
While thinking of the significance of semiotics, Greimas find the
subtle difference of value judgment between structuring and con-
textualization. He proposes a notion of meaning field by imitating
Hjelmslev’s linguistic theory. He believes there are two ways to un-
derstand the meaning of the relation between person and society: one
is a projection style and the other is a grid–like one. The projection
style is different from the language differentiation and analysis of so-
cial structure. «Its operation mode is like a reference frame of life
experience, the projection of a community on an individual’s ‘con-
sciousness’ — one is more or less aware of its existence» (Greimas
, p. ). Grid–like style is related to social typology. «It move an
individual from one grid to another by evaluation, praise or punish-
ment» (ibidem) given to an individual by the community, «as if it is
originally human nature». The value judgment caused by the former
is context determined, while the value judgment caused by the later is
structure determined. Both are realistic.
. The Non–Verbal Feature of the Meaning of Literary Works
It goes without saying that literary works are normally and typically
made of words.
However, that literary works are made of words does not mean ev-
erything described in language is verbal; on the contrary, a lot of things
conveyed are nonverbal. Emotion is a case in point, though it holds
a very important position in ancient Chinese literature. Take poems
as an example, they are the literary style when literature originates in
China. Emotion in poems is of motif significance in ancient Chinese
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literature. It is very interesting to express one’s emotion without words.
It is a great success to express rich emotion without words. Besides
expressing emotion, ancient Chinese also expressed their life experi-
ence without words. «Words fail to carry meaning, therefore image is
constituted to fully demonstrate meaning» is from The book of Changes,
which summarize that meaning can be carried out without words, and
the saints express themselves in a special way, to create image. Thus we
understand the typical state of wisdom in ancient China, the nonverbal
state. Nonverbal state of wisdom is traditional normal state of life wis-
dom and philosophical wisdom, and it is also the normal state of art
wisdom in ancient China, which includes literature. Wen (Writing) is
a vehicle for Dao (the Way), an approach to name Dao. Wen here in-
cludes literature. «Tao defined is not the constant Tao. No name names
its eternal name». The most important content is not expressed in a
literary work by concrete words. The content of the literature can be
expressed, but cannot be expressed directly and merely in words. What
is expressed directly is the surface meaning, the spirit of the meaning
cannot be expressed straightforwardly. The content of a literary work,
including the sceneries, the matters, the characters, the settings and
the plots, is better expressed if not expressed directly. A fundamental
character of ancient Chinese literature is to express without words,
which is called “concrete ration”.
In fact, not only Chinese literature, even world literature is some-
how of non–verbal attributes. Many researchers have tried to find
out the secrets in Hamlet. These secrets are hard to discover, simply
because they are buried between lines, that is, they exist but they are
not expressed directly and clearly. Jaques Lacan has interpreted “bait
heroine” Ophelia in Hamlet in this way
. According to his personal and deep understanding of the western and eastern culture,
Cheng Zhongying called the nonverbal wisdom in China as “concrete ration”. As for this
nonverbal, but universally spead and accepted wisdom, he further analyzes «First, man lays
his eyes on the concrete objects to observe their behaviors and state. Based on a large amount
of empirical observation and experience, Yi Jing is developed into changing philosophy from
the interchange of Yin and Yang. We can find the ultimate entity such as Tian or Dao from
the language used in the Chinese Classics. They are not general or abstract terms in logics,
but common and concrete content, which can be understood by direct and wide experience»
(Cheng , p. ). by famous American Chinese scholar Cheng Zhongying.
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Shakespeare makes her more important in developing the plot. She is used
to “smell out” Hamlet’s secret unexpectedly. She then becomes the most
mysterious elements in the play Hamlet— the play Hamlet in which desire
lost its way. When the hero of the play is approaching his death, unwillingly
and passively, Ophelia is a necessary support. (Zhu , p. )
Lacan finds that the following items are generally not stated di-
rectly: the “secret” unexpectedly revealed, one of “the most hidden”
elements and the “helpless” destination. Therefore many western
scholars are interested in discovering the secrets in the literary works.
Literary work itself is nonverbal, which makes the acceptance of
meaning nonverbal. The reader can gain a lot from literary works,
but he cannot recite it accurately. In his systematic research on British
romantic lyrics and tradition, Harold Bloom found there is no differ-
ence between the original text and the derived text in the process to
get the meaning out of the text. It is not expressed by language, but an
experience of text comparison. It exists in the comparison, influence
and change of a text and other texts, called “intertextuality”. This is
an acceptance process, the nonverbal meaning of acceptance comes
from the inner difference of text activated, and are presented in the
difference. Thus from the perspective of nonverbal meaning, reading
is kind of “error reading” out of text. «All the interpretation is sub-
ject to the comparison of meaning, not decided by the relation of an
assumed text and its sense» (Zhu , p. ).
The meaning of literary works is nonverbal, the acceptance of
the meaning is nonverbal, and the meaning that occurs and demon-
strates in their acceptance relation is also nonverbal. The meaning may
come from the inner expectation of the reader from the work, from
the response to or contrast with the reader’s experience, from the
convergence and divergence of meaning conveyed by the work and
sensed by the reader from other works, from the interaction of some-
thing in the work and the pattern of the reader’s character or even
the reader’s subconscious initial pattern. When Jameson proposes
the “meta–criticism” of literary works, he mentions the nonverbal,
abstract, formless but widespread meaning: «It makes sense by the
sensible appearance, and it could not be extracted, existing in a nor-
mal state. It has to exist in a particular sense» (Wang , p. ). The
nonverbal meaning is of prevailing significance since it is existing, ac-
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cepted in advance, experiencing current life, comparing different text,
and historical continuity. To read between lines is a regular channel
to make sense of a literary works; it is the same when it comes to
acquire meaning in the reception relation of literary works.
Since a lot of nonverbal meanings of literary works can be inferred,
some stiff, straitlaced western theories are not self–justified since they
confine meaning to language and signs, and make language and signs
solidified.
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Text and Intention
The Presentation of Meaning in Literary Texts
J D*
 : Testo e intenzione: la presentazione del senso nei testi
letterari
: Text and intention are two key issues in literary interpretation.
Traditional literary criticism emphasizes the functions of intentional in-
terpretation in texts. With the development of modern literary theories,
intentional interpretation has been criticized by formalists and decon-
structionists. The anti–intention theory insists on the independence of
text from authorial intentions, and denies the validity of author’s inten-
tional interpretation and the possibilities of interpretational standards.
Theoretically, anti–intention theory takes the presence of authorial in-
tention as its premise and basis, and establishes the theoretical target of
intentional criticism based on the multiplicity of literary textual presen-
tations. Its endeavor to deconstruct not only cancels the legitimacy of
the authorial intention in critical interpretation, but more importantly,
implies an anti–essentialist intellectual sharpness which represents an
absolute subjective claim presented in literary text with a clear decon-
structive hue. In terms of the presentation of meaning in literary texts,
text and intention pose no absolute opposition, and thus intention the-
ory and anti–intention theory rely on each other. The conflicts between
these two theories might temporarily be mitigated and balanced con-
cerning intention interpretations. However, the ultimate extermination
of the conflicts is not the reasonable way of textual interpretation. The
interpretation of text and the presentation of meaning in literary texts
still demand a pertinent interpretational approach to further establish
the rationality and validity of intention criticism.
: Text; Intention Theory; Anti-Intention Theory; the Objectivity
of Intention.
∗ South China Normal University.
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. Presence or Absence of Authorial Intention
Authorial intention is a key topic in contemporary literary criticism
and theories. Criticism against authorial intention can always be found
in contemporary western literary theories all the way from formal-
ism, new criticism, structuralism, narratology to deconstructionism and
postmodernism.
In previous studies, such criticisms against the authorial intentions
can be seen as the representation of a turn in western theories to “inward-
ness” and to the “readership”, which was also the climax of theoretical
development. In other words, anti–intention criticism is also a conflict
between different ideas and thoughts within the theoretical “field”, and
even a conflict of innovation. Behind the arguments lies certain logic:
the authorial intention is worthy of debates and anti–intention theory
is reasonable; the former needs to be replaced by the later. Yet ques-
tions like «Why should we argue against authorial intention?» and «Can
anti–intention theory solve all the remaining problems left by the theo-
retical defects of intention theories?» remain untouched. Studies on the
rationality of criticism have replaced those on the theoretical legitimacy
of anti–intention theory.
Why against authorial intention? Prof. Zhang Jiang from Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences put forth the question of authorial intentions
once again in his recent published paper On the Presence or Absence of
Intention, providing both an opportunity to reflect on such a theoretical
topic in contemporary western theories and a chance to rethink the
return to authorial intention in current context. This paper provides a
huge space for reflecting on such a topic. No matter how theories and
criticism develop, such questions as the definition of text, the ways in
which authorial intentions are presented in texts and its functions, as
well as the manner of readers’ interpretation constantly lie in the specific
process of literary interpretation. Abrams’s conception of four elements
in literature and Antoine Compagnon’s five components in literature,
and even Eco’s idea of “the open text”, all center on the basic process of
authorial intention and literary interpretation. As a new theory about
intention and interpretation, it proves the simple fact that no matter what
anti–intention theory argues, the specificity and problem involved in the
interpretation of literary meanings can never be suspended or ignored.
This is the difficulty that the anti–intention theory faces.
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In his paper, Zhang Jiang summarizes the three types of anti–in-
tention theory. One of them is W.K. Wimsatt’s representative of New
Criticism, “Intentional Fallacy”. It denies the influence of authorial
intention on textual interpretation. Another is Clive Bell’s “Signif-
icant Form” which cuts down the connections between authorial
production and textual construction. The third one is French struc-
tural semiotics which stresses that text is the free operation of signs,
the author is just the medium manipulating signs and the presentation
of authorial intention is veiled even cancelled by the self–assembly
and self–structure within sign system. Zhang Jiang analyzes the three
concepts mentioned above from the perspectives of theoretical origin,
development and influence, and explores the way how authorial in-
tention gradually becomes absent in contemporary western literary
theory. On the issue of “Intentional Fallacy”, he argues, «any serious
and responsible theoretician and critics, should study the authors and
their productive intentions in order to understand and interpret cor-
rectly the texts within traditions and contexts, and why “intention” is
taken as “fallacy”?» As for the “Significant Form”, he believes that
for the art of any type or in any form, there always exists the intention of
creation and writing and this intention remains throughout the process of
artistic creation and the aspects of literary text. Art needs understanding
and resonance, and its object is also intention, the forms of intention and
all the contents presented by certain forms.
Finally, Zhang Jiang points out, such questions as classic authors’
knowledge and judgment, their awareness of their writing and inten-
tions and their implementation of intention in writing process can not
be solved by anti–intention theory. He employs plenty of facts and
cases in the history of literature and literary theories only to prove
the presence of intention (Zhang Jiang , p. ). Prof. Zhang Jiang’s
paper On the Presence or Absence of Intention is one of the most important
works of scholarship in his study of coercive critique, and also one
of the most fruitful case studies on the specific issues of contempo-
rary western literary theories. It is of some theoretical constructive
significance. In the process of studying coercive critique, Zhang Jiang
has already proposed a theoretical path of ontological interpretation to
reflect on contemporary western literary theories (Zhang Jiang ).
Thereafter, he has carried deep explorations into intention, authorship,
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presupposition, interpretive context, non–literary theory application,
subjective presupposition, theory–centered studies, etc., which has
brought about frequent academic exchange and dialogue, and trig-
gered heated discussion in the academia. It is self–evident that Zhang
Jiang’s argument provides a pivot to rethink the western literary the-
ories and «puts forward a critical framework of interpretive analysis
for the knowledge universe and practices in contemporary western
theories» (Duan Jifang , p. ). The study of authorial intention
facilitates the theoretical development of the past coercive critique.
To discuss whether authorial intention is present or not, we should
first of all clarify such questions as why authorial intention is present
and why it is legitimate. The existence of the question of the pres-
ence of authorial intention is decided first of all by the core position
of literary creation in literary theories and the subjective function of
literary creation. In the previous studies, authorial intention points to
the study of authorship from both a subjective and social perspective of
literary creations. From the mimetic theory of Ancient Greece, to the
modern representation theories, then to the later romanticism, realism,
Marxism and various kinds of contemporary interpretation theories,
authorial intention has been indispensable in literary theories. Ameri-
can critic Abrams proposes his concept of four elements in literature,
while French scholar Antoine Compagnon puts forward five compo-
nents in literature, namely «author, literary works, reader, language,
signification» (Compagnon , p. ). Authorial intention remains as
an important issue. For such theoreticians, the importance of authorial
intention lies in the systematic quality of literary interpretation. Thanks
to authorial intention, the process and the structure of literary textual
interpretation is established and different kinds of theories on elements
or components of literature are made possible. Some scholars have
pointed out that there are four types of main paradigms for authorial
intention studies in the history of western literary theories: «author as
maker, author as creator, author as producer, and author as scripter»
(Zhang Yongqing , p. ). These dominant paradigms reveal the
fact of authorship as theoretical base in literary theories. «Authorial
intention is the academic or teaching standard to understand literary
meaning in a traditional way. To restore authorial intention is and
would continue to be the main or even the only one requirement in
textual interpretation» (Compagnon ). Besides, whether authorial
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intention is indispensable or not depends on the needs in textual in-
terpretation and critical practices. Authorial intentions are principles
and necessity for the interpretative process between author, text and
interpreter. To be more specific, authorial intention is consciously or
unconsciously seen as the main source of literary works.
For the western theories of interpretation starting from the ancient
hermeneutics to the current theories of interpretation, the source
and direction of interpretation cannot be found without authorial in-
tentions. Western theories of interpretation start from the source of
Hermes philosophy and develop into the modern hermeneutics, laying
an emphasis on the process of interpretation in presenting the “truth”
of author and text in order to «understand it within a relationship
between text and its original intention» (Iser , pp. –). If in the
process authorial intentions have been excluded, the object and direc-
tion of hermeneutics criticism would be lost. Antoine Compagnon also
points out that in literary understanding «only the recognition of autho-
rial intentions can guarantee a meaningful interpretation employing
unity and complicity» (Compagnon , p. ). In this sense, authorial
intention is the guarantee of interpretive process and its meaning, even
as it exists only as a theoretical hypothesis. Yet, only in this context can
the multiple perspectives of criticism and interpretation exist. This is
to say that the meaningful interpretation of literary works should have
a general direction, especially for the researchers and critics. No mat-
ter it is in biographical criticism, formalism, hermeneutics, or other
theories, the questions of authorial intention and of the sources of
meanings always exist. Such masterpieces as Hamlet and Dream of the
Red Mansion have undergone criticism for several hundred years, while
one basic problem remains: either in research or teaching, we first
assume their authorial intention and believe that the texts embody
literary meanings and that its sources presume authorial intentions.
As a result, even Wellek and Warren who argue against authorial inten-
tion and insist on studying literary forms have to admit that “the most
obvious origins for a literary work is its creator, the author” (Wellek
and Warren , p. ).
Theoretically, authorial intention and meaning generation is one
meta–question in literary studies. Meta–question influences the struc-
turing of interpretative framework and the development of interpreta-
tion, as well as also the theoretical orientations. In contemporary west-
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ern theories, there exist various kinds of arguments against authorial
intention and in fact some paradoxical relationship between the two
remains. «Even those critics try their best to expel authorship, have
something of interpreting intentions of literary texts» (Compagnon
, p. ). Antoine Compagnon points out two oppositional stands
in discussing authorial intention: intention theory and anti–intention
theory. Intention theory originates from such facts as: ) we need to
find what the author tries to express in the texts; ) authorial intention
is the only standard for a successful interpretation. Anti–intention
theory believes: ) what we find in text is independent of authorial
intention; ) authorial intention can not explain text, and the standard
of interpretation does not exist (ibidem, p. ).
In the studies of literary theories, especially in the course of the
development of western literary theories, there are various kinds of
anti–intention theories, in which there is one obvious characteristic.
That is, all of them take the presence of the authorial intention as
the hypothesis and basis. It is true even with the most well–known
anti–intention theorists, such as Wimsatt of new criticism, Roland
Barthes of French structuralism, and British critic Clive Bell. For
instance, Wellek and Warren emphasize the study of the inner literari-
ness and deny the outside references of literary texts. However, their
criticism also has a primary theoretical target. That is, the contextual
study is prior, while the biographical criticism has been embraced in
the process of literary criticism. American scholar Susan Sontag who
proposes her idea against interpretation argues that interpretation
cannot completely solve the problems of representation of textual
meanings. Her claim of a literary pornography in fact refers to the
theoretical efforts to decode the authorial intentions.
Besides, regarding the specific ways of representation, anti–intention
theory does not simply deny the authorship. Behind various kinds of
anti–intention theories there hide the ideas of anti–essentialism, repre-
senting the transformation of literary interpretation. This means that
the change of Western theories from author–centered, text–centered
to reader–oriented is not to deny authorial intention. In other words,
anti–intention theory presents only a theoretical position of decon-
struction. What is deconstructed is intention itself other than the
author, and there is a big difference between the two. Compagnon
notes that there is a binary opposition between intention theories and
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anti–intention ones. In fact, besides Compagnon’s binary opposition,
intention theories and anti–intention theories are mutually generative
and mutually dependent. Compagnon’s solution emphasizes the study
of context and he believes that only in contextual studies can inten-
tion theories and anti–intention ones can achieve certain extent of
balance and even solutions. However, this is in reality a compromise
in theoretical construction, and it makes no difference between inter-
nal study and external study in contemporary western theories. The
internal study facing the close reading as methodology and text as
historicity finds no effective solution and results in the termination of
internal study after new criticism. In this regard, the contextual study
of anti–intention theory would eventually face with such problems.
To put it in a more direct way, there are obvious problems or even
defects in both intention theories and anti–intention theory, and the
latter cannot give an ultimate solution to the remaining problems
hidden in the former. This is exactly what Zhang Jiang’s paper tries to
clarify.
. The Possibility of the Death of the Author
Has authorial intention really been denied? In the three theoretical
clues provided by Zhang Jiang, French structuralist Roland Barthes
and his concept of “life on paper” has been thoroughly explored.
Roland Barthes’s An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative
does not only lay the foundation for narratology, but also a framework
for French structuralism. It has exerted great influence on literary
theories after structuralism, along with Bremon Claude’s “Logics of
Narrative possibilities” and Greimas’s “Structuralist Semantics”. An
Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative is an exclusive study
on narratology which serves as a structural analysis of narrative works,
a semiotic analysis of narrative discourses, and a semantic analysis
of narrative elements. With reference to multiple works and theo-
ries, it extends into further exploration of the internal structures, the
semantic organization of narrative works, as well as the formal repre-
sentation of narrative discourses. Barthes employs linguistic method-
ologies to discuss the forms and structures of narrative works as the
object of literary studies. In so doing, Barthes puts forwards the idea
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of “life on the paper” which aims at the authorship in narrative stud-
ies and the authorial intentions. As Zhang Jiang points out, Roland
Barthes argues against the idea of taking traditional narrator as the
author, and believes that a semiotic analysis of narrator should be
conducted because narrators and characters are merely “life on the
paper” and “the (real) author cannot be mistaken as the narrator in
the narrative work” (Barthes , p. ). The idea of “life on the pa-
per” shows Roland Barthes’s insist on formalistic textual analysis and
the typical methodologies of narrative and structuralism which are
against authorial intentions. Besides, Roland Barthes also expresses
his anti–intention theory in his work Writing Degree Zero. In this
very book, Barthes points out that such writing is a “white writing”
in a direct way without any restraints of language orders: «Correctly
speaking, this is a journalistic writing without any hidden places or
any secrets, so that we can say this is a kind of cool–minded writing,
or an innocent writing» (Barthes , p. ). For Barthes, the purified
writing is in fact a formalistic textual criticism with its own meaning
and value: «all “forms” embody some “value” so that another space of
formal reality lies in the language structure and styles — and this is
writing» (ibidem, p. ).
Roland Barthes’s structuralist analysis of narrative works and his
concept of “writing degree zero” have been influential in western
literary theories. To some extent, “writing degree zero” receives
more critical attention than “life on the paper”. As a more inten-
sive anti–intention argument, the idea has been always seen as a
theoretical turning point from authorship to readership. Admittedly,
Roland Barthes’s strong–mind has left certain regrets in his theoretical
constructions. No matter how much Barthes emphasizes on the struc-
turalist analysis, the issue of narrator always remains in his discourse
as the most complicated part.
Barthes explores the roles of narrator, and disagrees with the past
practices of equalizing narrator with author in a natural or social sense.
For Zhang Jiang, such anti–intention theory is also a “hegemonic
discourse”, because
from the interpretative power, author becomes the supreme interpreter and
producer of the text after the death of author. In the multi–dimensional space
of textual meanings, any interpretation is possible as critics and readers alike
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in their free deduction. From the standard of interpretation, the practices
are no longer subject to any single meaning and any interpretation will be
right, while imagination and experiences clash with each other, if there is
no longer the author and the source of meaning. (Zhang Jian , p. )
Zhang Jiang’s argument is reasonable: if it is as Barthes argues that
the appearance of narrator means the death of the author, then the
study of literary narrative will become meaningless. The so–called
“life on the paper” can only be an imagined aesthetics and illusionary
object of narratological studies. This conclusion is not in accordance
with literary common senses and thus difficult to persuade schol-
ars with disbelieves of the death of author. Before Roland Barthes’s
“The Death of Author”, French Scholar Michel Foucault published his
well–known paper What is the author. He argues that it is not enough
to repeat some slogans, such as the death of author, God and man.
On the contrary, we should re–examine the remaining spaces after
the disappearance of author; we should scrutinize its new boundaries,
relocations and redistribution of its spaces after the death of the author
(Foucault , p. ). For Barthes, «the death of author’ is a conclu-
sion of narratology», and this conclusion has specific significance in
Barthes’s structuralist analysis of narrative works. If deprived of its
reference to context and the signified, it is probably not a reasonable
conclusion. Such idea has been elaborated on in The Author cannot
Die by Zhang Jiang as he points out that «there will be no text with-
out Foucault’s speaking; there will be no meaning in text without
Foucault. So the right relationship will be: Foucault is text, and text
is Foucault. Text does not die as long as Foucault lives» (Zhang Jiang
, p. ). Although in contemporary western theories, “the death of
author” is to some extent transformed into «textual sciences against
humanism» (Compagnon , p. ), such idea receives no deeper
theoretical interpretation in critical practices. In other words, even
if Roland Barthes is right, we could hardly extract any useful idea
from his concept of “the death of author”; or as Foucault argues, what
Barthes’s idea of “the death of the author” leaves for the study of au-
thorial intention has always been empty. Barthes’s conception of “the
death of the author” proves to be positive towards the development of
narrative theories, and to some extent has already become the theo-
retical rationale for textual autonomies in narrative studies. However,
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problems still remain. At the level of theoretical criticism, Barthes’s
reference to structuralist analysis of narrative works is so strong that
it ignores some basic commonsensical knowledge of literary theories,
or makes them questionable. If this is really a hegemonic discourse,
then its direction points to the challenges of theoretical common
senses which are more worthy of critiques.
. The Open Text
In studying literary theories, the text–author and text–reader rela-
tionships involve such issues as authorial creation, authorial intention
and textual interpretation, and the basic concepts and questions in
literary criticism, while the study of authorial intention functions as
the link in the system. It is not so much an emphasis on the impor-
tance of authorial intention but on the structural loss of meaning in
literary interpretation without consideration of authorial intentions.
Before the rise of various anti–intention theory, theorists have not
so much doubts about authorial intentions. Even at the time when
Wimsatt’s “Intentional Fallacy” was popular, not all critics held it as
a theoretical Bible or denied authorial intentions because of its obvi-
ous theoretical tendencies which is too radical and absolute. In his
paper On the Presence or Absence of Intention, Zhang Jiang poses the
questions: Why is there a rise of various anti–intention theory in
contemporary western literary theories? What is the object of theo-
retical study after authorial intentions become the target of theoretical
critique and hence are easily denied? In my opinion, such theoretical
reflections are necessary. As theoreticians of new criticism such as
Wimsatt and Beardsley propose, the so called “intention” is in fact
«the deliberation or planning of the author» (Wimsatt and Beardsley
, p. ). Yet, for a poem in this case, «we do not examine which
part is intention, or which part refers to meaning. Poetry, in this way,
is the existence, the autonomous being» (ibidem, p. ). Such simi-
lar theoretical ideas echo with that of Andrew Bennett, the British
scholar who questions «the indeterminacy of authorship facilitates so
many interests in reading» (Bennett , p. ). With the influence
of such theoretical ideas, it seems to be old–fashioned to interpret
authorial intentions in a text. Accordingly, the anti–intention theory
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deny the necessity of studying authorial intention. In this case, the
interplays between text and society, and between text and author have
undergone an obvious break, and various kinds of textual autonomy
start to prevail. Within it, formalism stands for a theoretical school,
while reader–oriented theories are also typical models. Besides, there
are also other important theoretical ideas which inspire textual au-
tonomies, and text–centered theories grow to be dominant in the
development of western theories.
Theories of this type cut off both the relations between text and
society and between text and readers, attempting to turn to critical
autonomies at the level of textual science. This is not to say that text
is closed or is producing meaning automatically without any inter-
pretation, but it points to an openness which leads to its autonomous
interpretation of meaning without any social or biographical criti-
cism in a traditional sense. In this regards, Italian scholar Eco puts
forward his concept of “the Open Text”. In his book, Eco provides a
new artistic theory based on his idea of “the Open Text”, which is
also an important anti–intention discourse. For Eco, the so–called
“openness” is to redefine the new relationship between works and
the interpreter, and «to explore the “definiteness” and “openness”
of art» (Eco , p. ). The open text is flexible and open in its com-
bination of grammar, semantics and words. Eco takes French poet
Mallarme’s work The Book as an example, and believes that it is a
“work in movement” which is also an open text. The Book is the last
book of Mallarme. As Eco points out, Mallarme has spent his lifetime
writing this book and it is not only the ultimate goal of the poet but
also the purpose of the world, as «the world exists for this single
book» (ibidem, p. ). This book, having embraced a wide range of
ideas, is profound in meaning and flexible in language, grammar
and structure, and even the pages are not ordered in numbers but
different booklets in different orders according to certain rules. You
can turn at random to any pages. However you move, the meaning
on the paper is complete. Eco argues that
obviously, the poet is not aiming for any definite meaning from any com-
binations, but looks after inspirations in each of this combination of words
and sentences, which makes each meaningful so that there will be new
relations and new understands for new inspirations. (Ibidem, p. )
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As for the textual interpretation, Eco once argues for the concepts of
textual interpretation and over–interpretation of anti–intention theory.
The open text better presents Eco’s concept of text–centered theo-
ries. This textual concept has obvious characteristic of anti–intention,
which is quite different from other anti–intention theory, especially
“Intentional Fallacy” of new criticism. First, “Intentional Fallacy” in-
sists on textual autonomy which is to some extent text–centered while
Eco believes that «the author’s production itself is closed and could be
understood and appreciated in the way when he creates» (ibidem, p.
). But such closure is a combination of autonomy and dynamics of
textual forms and structures. The open text is in reality the aesthetics
of formalism, as its openness is not unconditionally free but has to
return to the formal values of textual forms, semantic meanings and
etc. Second, the aesthetics of formalism does not only insist on textual
autonomy but also emphasize its dynamics of meaning interpretation
which leads to the possibilities of understanding and interpretation.
«In essence, only when a form can be understood in different ways
can it be recognized as aesthetically valuable with various types of
outlook and resonance» (ibidem). Compared with “Intentional Fal-
lacy” of new criticism, Eco’s concept of open text clearly embodies
deeper theoretical significance and more obvious effort to redress
the authorial intention. As texts are open, the issue of authorial in-
tention is naturally not the core of textual interpretation. And this
goes farther than new criticism and its “Intentional Fallacy”. As Eco
points out, the first theoretical self–awareness of the open text idea is
symbolism in the late nineteenth century, and the Irish writer James
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake is a typical case. In this book, we can find a
world unfolding in an Einsteinian way, «the initial word connects the
last one, and it is indefinite when it ends. Every event, every word
is possible to relate to other events and the choice of words decides
the method to understand other events »(ibidem, p. ). This text is a
typical structural text, and the interpretation of authorial intentions is
limited. To put it simpler, authorial intentions cannot help to decode
the textual meaning.
Eco also points out that the concept of open text cannot solve all
the problems of contemporary art. In the movement of open text,
we still need to examine the textual characteristics and their specific
contexts. In works like Finnegans Wake, the internal structure of text,
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language and semantic meanings are the core elements of textual
interpretation, but not all the work has its structural elements. As a
result, the natural open text is difficult to find, and it is safe to say that
specific method of interpretation has to return to the contextual con-
ditions in a complicated relationship between open text and textual
interpretation. However, once the target and direction is definite in
textual interpretation, authorial intention cannot be denied. There-
fore, it is bold to deny the relation between authorial intention and
text, which is also a problem that Eco’s concept of open text cannot
ignore.
. Return to Authorial Intention: Possibilities and Challenges
After Russian formalism, new criticism, structuralism, deconstruc-
tionism, issues of authorial intention have been replaced by aesthetic
formalistic studies, linguistic and semiotic studies and semantic nar-
rative studies. Authorial intention has been marginalized in literary
criticism, which leads to a dislocation of intention and anti–intention
theory. In current context, the proposal of anti–intention cannot solve
the theoretical gap and aporia of what intention theory leaves behind.
Efficient criticism in either intention theory or anti–intention theory
is not possible without a deliberation of returning authorial intention
to the commonsensible understanding of intention and interpretation
and a confrontation with challenges in multiple significations of liter-
ary meanings. It requires various adjustments for literary criticism,
a vehicle of the key concepts of humanity studies, to fully and quite
possibly return to the talk of authorial intention, but not to the pure
literary criticism and aesthetic judgments. The pure aestheticism is
confronting with the theoretical issues of absolutism and professional-
ism brought by the break between form and history, which should be
reconsidered and reflected on by contemporary theories.
Contemporary western literary theories always attract theoretical
challenges for its frequent transformations. From the early th cen-
tury on, various theories have embraced differences in their patterns
of thinking, conception of ideas and discourses of critique, but all
have certain overlooks or problems in theoretical or knowledge con-
struction. Formalism and the ideas of “life on the paper” or “Open
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Text” of Eco are examples. Many scholars criticize the theoretical
tendencies. But among them there is one thing we should pay close
attention to: even though western theories include many developing
theories, and some concepts prove to be unique for literary criticism
and theoretical studies, it is still clear that we need constant reflec-
tion and critique. It is the same with western theories and literary
criticism itself. As some researchers argue, «when we dive into lit-
erary theories, we tend to find something useful for us, while we
don’t want to be its slaves» (Barry , p. ). As for the authorial
intentions in contemporary literary theories, we should keep our
theoretical insights and critical spirits. Anti–intention theory insists
on its autonomous identity but its validity is based more on the sub-
version of the past theoretical ideas and in this way achieves its goal of
anti–intention. However, this is not the ultimate goal of theories, nor
the theoretical liquidation of the author, but only alternative way for
theoretical studies. What needs further consideration is its rationality
in approaching practical issues.
From the perspective of theoretical rationality, anti–intention the-
ory emphasizes the autonomous identity of textual interpretation
and this theoretical standing first of all targets at the idea of histori-
cism in literary studies. Historicism builds up the reliability of textual
interpretation on «certain principles and relations between historical
phenomena of the period and the time of evaluations», and tends to
«place art in history and interpret its meaning in history» (Fokkema
and Ibsch, p. ). Anti–intention theory denies historicism in literary
criticism with the reason that textual criticism of historicism eas-
ily leads to relativism and causes an ignorance of textual specificity.
However, anti–intention theory’s challenge of historicism returns
to formalism, which over–redresses the problems by insisting on an
universal principle of literary criticism of possibilities of textual sci-
ence. Formalism had led to a popularity of close reading and scrutiny
of textual meanings. It had played a positive role in studying textual
forms, but the closure and science of textual forms cannot avoid the
destiny of the decline of new criticism. Even though Eagleton asks
for «“a rewriting” of all the literary works by the societies in which
they are read» (Eagleton , p. ), it is still too bold to reach such
a conclusion. New criticism has been replaced by deconstruction,
which proves that the textual autonomy may not be eternal. It is
Text and Intention 
probably safe to say that most anti–intention theories feel frustrated
in textual analysis.
Among them, some ideas are worthy of close deliberation. The
frustration encountered by anti–intention theories does not mean a
return to authorial intention. First, authorial intention is not equal
to textual meaning as there is a richness of interpretation between
authorial intention and textual meaning. If we equalize them in a sim-
ple way, we would have a reduction of criticism and a cancelation of
critical values. In simpler words, it is not proper to say that in literary
study the presence of author accounts for all meanings. Second, to
return to authorial intention is not to return to authorship as the two
differ in a unitary interpretation. This single interpretation presents
a lineage of criticism, and this is not the case of literary criticism
because theories of authorship are multiple existences and multiplied
interpretation. That is to say authorial intention can be denied but
authorship cannot, which means the two cannot be the same on the
issue of the absence of critique. In conclusion, text interpretation is
about both methodology and ontology.
In textual interpretation, both form and history have multiple
significations and thus cannot be reduced simply to such issues as
language, structure, metaphor, irony and other linguistic questions.
In fact, form has certain ontological connotations, and there is a com-
plicated and dialogic relationship between form and other elements
of literature such as history, society, politics and etc. At the same
time, “history” in textual criticism is not equal to “biography”, “so-
cial context” or “historical background”, but to the origins of literary
meanings. Dream of the Red Mansion has its own form and history,
so do Shakespeare’s works. Heidegger’s explanation of Vincent van
Gogh’s work The Shoes poses the question of art and its essence
which refers both to its form and function. On issues of authorial
intention, an emphasis on the binary opposition between form and
history is only replaced with another problem, instead of solving it. It
is the same with the understanding of authorial intention. There are
rich findings in studying both authorial intention and anti–intention
theories Whether it is for or against authorial intention, the binary
oppositions should be avoided and we should turn to the richness
and multiplicity of theories and ideas instead. In this case, relativism
in interpretation should be rejected. It is true that one thousand
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readers have one thousand Hamlets, but it does not make any sense
except for a wordplay.
The French scholar Compagnon notes that «the whole literary the-
ories more or less relate to the premise of the death of the author»
(Compagnon , p. ). British scholar Andrew Bennett also men-
tions that «once you start to examine the authorship, you will find
them everywhere in western literature and culture» (Bennet , p.
). In studying literary theories, reflections on authorial intentions
are necessary. Yet, whether to argue for or against author’s presence or
intention, the binary oppositions should be avoided. To achieve that,
we should hold the belief that the basic issue of existence is suspended
or even denied without some exploration of the origins of literary
meanings, no matter how open the texts are and how multiple the in-
terpretations can be. Therefore, the origin of meaning in literary works
cannot be separated from the authorial intention, text and the process
of interpretation. Maybe it starts an entirely new cycle, but without
this dynamic cycle the target and task of literary criticism is deprived
of a basic platform of meaning production. Anti–intention theory has
many problems, but to return to authorial intention is certainly not
the ultimate solution to literary interpretation. Interpretation of liter-
ary meanings has to deal with the complicated relationship between
authorial intention and text. Authorship should not be overlooked, but
the credibility of authorial intentions and textual interpretation also lie
in various methods of presentation of meaning and interpretation of
intention. It is the very complicatedness of both theories and criticism
that decide the meanings and values of textual interpretation. Thus,
how to avoid coercive interpretation and return to the “truthfulness” of
text has always no fixed answer. That is why the process and paradigm
of the literary critical practice should assume greater importance.
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On the Sources of Meaning of Literary Works
from the Perspective of Hermeneutics
L Z*
 : Sulle fonti del senso delle opera letterarie dal punto di
vista dell’ermeneutica
: In our attempt at studying the sources of literary works’ meaning,
hermeneutics occupies a quite significant position among all possi-
ble perspectives. Since the mid–th century, there are two important
theoretical trends within western hermeneutics: one is the philosoph-
ical ontological hermeneutics from Heidegger to Gadamer, bringing
forward the reader–centered theory; the other is represented by the
Italian philosopher Betti, his Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of
the Geisteswissenschaften, asserting that the author (subject) is one of the
important sources when interpreting literary works. Owing to complex
reasons, Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics has been occupying a
prevailing position in European and American academia, while the latter
hermeneutic tradition of Betti is less influential. Since the s, the Chi-
nese academia of literature and art have been largely influenced by the
theory of hermeneutics of Heidegger, Gadamer and receptive aesthetics,
while Betti’s theory is still negligible. Therefore the reader–centered
theory is widely accepted in terms of studying literary works, whereas
the author’s role in conferring the initial meaning of works is heavily
weakened or even negated. Since Zhangjiang advocated the theory of
“Coercive Interpretation” in the the year , there has arisen a re-
flection on the one–sidedness of reader–centered theory in the study
of literary works in China, and scholars have begun to refocus on the
undeniable role authors play in the process of generating literary works’
meaning. This article draws on the methodology of Betti’s hermeneutics,
and takes the practices of literary creation into account, so as to explain
that the meaning of literary works is not only entrusted by the author,
nor arbitrarily created by the reader. It’s rather an interactive dynamic
process, where the author and the reader coin the meaning together,
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and the three cardinal elements, author, text and reader work together,
so as to keep the meaning of literary work in an open, continuously
generating status.
: Ontological and Methodological Hermeneutics; Author; Text;
Reader; Generation of Meaning.
Where does the meaning of literary work come from? This is an old
and continually renewed issue. For a long time, it’s widely accepted
in western academia of aesthetics and literary theories that the au-
thor entrusts the work with its meaning. And it is the author who
expresses and therefore infuses the meaning into the work via literary
language. This view is highly affirmed in romanticism of the th and
th century when the overall social atmosphere of elevating genius,
emphasizing self–expression is prevalent. And with the development
of psychological aesthetics and the popularity of Freud’s psychoanaly-
sis in the late th century and the early th century, the influence of
this assertion is further expanded. As a result, most literary theorists
and critics put their emphasis on studying the author’s life, experi-
ences, biographies and so on in an attempt to seek, conjecture or
conceive the author’s genuine intentions and attribute the sources
of the meaning of the work entirely to the author’s projection and
endowment. This is the “author–centered theory” in a general sense.
However, in the first half of the twentieth century, with the “linguistic
turn” and the rise of Russian formalism, Prague school, new criticism,
linguistic analytic aesthetics, semantic criticism, structuralism, semi-
otics and so on, the inquiries of the meaning of literary works have
also undergone a shift, from the emphasis on author to the address
of the text. Hence, a new view has emerged, that is, once the work
completed, its meaning is independent of the author and presented in
the language structure of the text, and the meaning of literary works
can only be obtained from the independent text itself (its language
structure and form). This is the so–called “text–centered theory”.
Almost in the same period, the movements of phenomenology and
existentialism have appeared on the stage with an overwhelmed mo-
mentum, and the modern hermeneutic philosophy has come into
being and made a huge impact in thezz s with the representative
figures such as Heidegger and Gadamer. Later on, the receptive aes-
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thetics has given extra impetus to the emergence of this new theory,
namely, the meaning of the literary works is derived from the reader
(including critics) and carried out with their reading experience. At
the same time, the theoretical trend of post–structuralism holds the
similar opinions with modern hermeneutics in terms of studying the
sources of the meaning of the work, which puts more emphasis on
the reader. The convergence of the above two trends has brought the
reader–centered theory into its full blossom, which has became the
mainstream discourse of contemporary western literary theory. In a
general retrospect of the theoretical development of the past century,
it is interesting to notice the significant shifts western literary theory
have undergone, namely, “author–centered theory→ text–centered
theory → readers–centered theory”, corresponding directly to the
three fundamental constituents of literary activities, that is, the logical
process of “creation→works→ acceptance”. Though there maybe
more complicated historical reasons, and their own rationalities re-
spectively, there are also one–sidedness and theoretical mistakes for
the above three theoretical “centers” to reflect on.
In my humble view, the two major shifts offer the very possibility
of a comprehensive, open vision in response to the issue of studying
the sources of literary works’ meaning. Though this issue can be
investigated from different perspectives and studied in various dimen-
sions, considering the significance of modern hermeneutics and the
given historical debate, this paper intends to inquire into the issue
from the perspective of hermeneutics so as to bring the issue to the
table again.
.
First of all, the above two major shifts are closely related to the mod-
ern transformation of hermeneutics. In the th and th century, the
“general methodological hermeneutics” represented by Schleierma-
cher and Dilthey was still in the pre–modern stage or the romantic
stage, that is, the epistemological and methodological stage. Schleier-
macher argues that the original meaning of the work can only be ob-
tained from the author, the goal of our interpretation is to draw close
to and reveal the author’s intention and meaning. While Dilthey’s
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hermeneutics of “experience”asserts the view that understanding is
to restore, experience and rebuild the psychological procedure during
the author’s writing, so as to reveal the “original intention” of the text,
that is, the original meaning of the author. In terms of attributing the
meaning of the work to the author, Schleiermacher and Dilthey hold
the same view, but Dilthey emphasizes the ambiguity of understand-
ing caused by the interpreter’s individuality, and subjectivity. Since
the middle of th century, the general methodological hermeneu-
tics represented by Schleiermacher, Dilthey has been surpassed, with
other two important modern theoretical trends coming into being.
One is the philosophical ontological hermeneutics from Heidegger
to Gadamer, the other is represented by the Italian philosopher Betti,
his Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften.
Both breakthroughs and inheritances have made compared with the
general methodological hermeneutics represented by Schleiermacher
and Dilthey. But among the two, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneu-
tics surpasses more and inherits less, whereas Betti’s Hermeneutics as
the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften hasn’t took the path
of ontological transformation. These two different modes of modern
hermeneutics bring new values into being, which will be elucidated
as following.
Gadamer has inherited and developed Heidegger’s phenomenolog-
ical “hermeneutics of facticity” (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), and trans-
formed the previous epistemological and methodological hermeneu-
tics into ontological hermeneutics, bringing forward a fundamental
transition from the pre–modern to modern period. In the first place,
he argues that understanding is not the way in which the reader (the
interpreter, the subject), by some means, seeks and interprets the
meaning of the text (object) and author which is external to himself,
but the mode of being of Dasein itself. He asserts that: «Heidegger’s
temporal analytics of Dasein has, I think, shown convincingly that
understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviors of the
subject but the mode of being of Dasein itself». (Gadamer , p.
) Therefore, the concept of understanding goes beyond the scope
of epistemology, elevated to the fundamental prescription of the exis-
tential category of human kind (The Dasein). Accordingly, the subject
and object of understanding are not in a preexistent , fixed, divided
status, but constructed in the process of understanding activities. In
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this sense, on the one hand, Dasein (person) as the subject, has being
constructed, generated and presented in the process of understanding
activities. On the other hand, text (in a general sense) as the object
of our understanding, is not just a fixed text or the finished product
(Endprodukt) constituted by language, but constructed and generated
in the understanding activity, acting as part of that process of under-
standing. In this way, the meaning of the text is neither the immediate
meaning as a certain object of knowledge beyond Dasein, nor the
fixed meaning entitled by the author of the text. It’s rather generated
in the understanding activity, namely, the dual constructed process of
the text and Dasein (Human). Hence it’s the fundamental mobility
of Dasein that determines the generating, mobility and fluidity of the
meaning.
Secondly, according to the perspective of ontological hermeneutics,
Gadamer puts forward the theory of “historically effected conscious-
ness”, that is “understanding” (Verstehen) is never a kind of subjective
activity towards a given “object”, but belongs to the effective history
(Wirkungsgeschichte). That is to say, understanding is the being (Sein)
of things to be understood” (Gadamer , p. ). It seems to
him that the “history” (in whatever form) unfolded before people can
not be purely objective historical facts (reality). The influences of the
interpreter and factors of interpreter’s own understanding of history
always count. Therefore Gadamer puts that,
The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and
the other, a relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the
reality of historical understanding. A hermeneutics adequate to the subject
matter would have to demonstrate the reality and efficacy of history within
understanding itself. I shall refer to this as “history of effect”. Understanding
is, essentially, a historically effected event. (Gadamer , p. )
In other words, the kind of history of effect is essentially an un-
derstanding activity, and it is in the process of understanding that
the historical Dasein (the self ) and the historical reality (the other)
have achieved an fusion of horizon, that is, the interpreter places the
present horizon of the self into the specific historical (other) horizon.
It is neither the coercive self–assimilation of a particular historical
horizon by dint of the present horizon, nor discarding and dissolv-
ing the horizon of the present completely in the historical (other)
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horizon. It’s rather the fusion of both horizon so as to overcome the
particularities of both and rise to the understanding of “a higher uni-
versality” (Gadamer , p. ). The present horizon is placed in the
process of understanding and plays its role together with the historical
perspective in the construction of effective history. Therefore it also
re–prescribes and reproduces history to some extent. Therefore in my
humble view, the historically effective consciousness constitutes the
theoretical core of Gadamer’s modern hermeneutics.
For Gadamer, the present horizon of the subject (the interpreter)
of the effective history is primarily the pre–understanding and the
fore–structure, namely, the fore–meaning (Vormeinung), fore–sight (Vor-
sicht), or prejudice (Vorurteil), which the interpreter brings into his own
understanding. For him, the interpreter inevitably harbors some kind
of their own prejudices in any kind of understanding activities, and
the prejudice is the basis and premise of any understanding and inter-
pretation. This is a fundamental point where Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics differs from and transcends traditional hermeneutics. It’s
a direct continuation of Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics. On the
one hand, Gadamer criticizes the traditional hermeneutics, in particular
the attempt to «eliminate all prejudices as the general requirement of
the Enlightenment». For example, Schleiermacher prescribes that “all
tasks” of hermeneutics as “to avoid every misunderstanding”, and the
goal of interpretation is clearly to eliminate the prejudices in search of
“the original meaning” (quoted in Pan , p. ).
Gadamer believes that the prejudices in the process of understand-
ing can not be denied, overcomed and eliminated. And the proposition
of eliminating all prejudices itself is a prejudice. On the other hand,
he clearly affirms the rationality and legitimacy of prejudices in our
understanding. He emphasizes that, «if we want to do justice to man’s
finite, historical mode of being, it is necessary to fundamentally re-
habilitate the concept of prejudice and acknowledge the fact that
there are legitimate prejudices». This is quite essential for the modern
transformation of the perspective of hermeneutics. Therefore, the
prejudice and pre–understanding are not something that have to be
overcome or eliminated, on the contrary, «the primal condition in
hermeneutics is always prejudice». He argues that the prejudice not
only limits and prescribes the interpreter’s understanding in terms
of its province, scope and focus to a certain extent, so as to make the
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understanding express some inclinations, but also help stimulate the
productivity and creativity of the understanding. In Gadamer’s view,
«the interpretation is to re–create (Nachschaffen) in a particular sense»
(Gadamer , p. ), namely, the process of the production and
construction of meaning.
In terms of how prejudice plays the role and constructs the mean-
ing in the process of understanding, Gadamer offers an elaborate
exposition of Heidegger’s thesis,
a person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting [. . . ]. The
process that Heidegger describes is that every revision of the fore projection
is capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning; rival
projects can emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of
meaning is; interpretation begins with fore–conceptions that are replaced
by more suitable ones. This constant process of new projection constitutes
the movement of understanding and interpretation. (Gadamer , p. )
Here, prejudice (“fore projection”, “fore conception”, “expectation
of meaning”, “projection of meaning”) is not fixed or unitary, but in
a process of diverse competitions. It’s constantly chosen, modified
and updated in the interaction with the contents of the text, leading
to the movement of meaning in the entire process of understanding
and interpretation. It can be seen that prejudices and expectations of
meaning play a significant role in the process of continuous creation,
construction, production of meaning .
But Gadamer doesn’t come to the extreme of completely attribut-
ing the production of meaning to the recreation of reader’s prejudices.
He points out that in the process of understanding, it’s essential to no-
tice the prejudices (fore–conception and the expectations of meaning),
which is elucidated as following:
The rules of such textual criticism can be left aside, for the important thing
to note is that applying them properly depends on understanding the con-
tent. The fore–conception of completeness that guides all our understanding
is, then, always determined by the specific content. Not only does the reader
assume an immanent unity of meaning, but his understanding is likewise
guided by the constant transcendent expectations of meaning that proceed
from the relation to the truth of what is being. . . so also do we understand
traditionary texts on the basis of expectations of meaning drawn from our
own prior relation to the subject matter. (Gadamer , p. )
 Liyuan Zhu
This passage contains three meanings: a) Prejudice is only a kind
of the expectation of meaning, it guides, instructs and even dominates
the process of reader’s understanding of the text (historical tradition)
and the process of producing meaning. There can’t be understanding
and the interpretation of the text’s meaning without prejudices; b)
There’s no determinate content of the reader’s expectation of meaning
in the understanding. It is on the basis of the content of the text and
in the process of understanding that the indeterminate is transformed
into the the determined again and again. The content of the text
is the sources of the production of meaning; c) The content of the
expectation of meaning which guides reader’s understanding comes
not only from the historical tradition (text), but also the reader’s
own historical situation (prior relation to the subject matter). It’s
the mutual interaction and unification of the above two aspects that
counts. Understanding is therefore described as
the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the inter-
preter. The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text
is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds
us to the tradition. But this commonality is constantly being formed in our
relation to tradition. Understanding is, essentially, a historically effected
event. (Gadamer , p. )
This view is identical to the above discourses of historically ef-
fected consciousness and the fusion of horizon in terms of under-
standing the meaning of the text. Meanwhile, historical, collective and
commonable prejudices gain the fundamental position in modern
hermeneutics.
Again, from the point view of the above theory of prejudices,
Gadamer belittles the role that the meaning of the author plays in gen-
eral. Given the fact that the understanding of texts is a creative activity
of meaning–production, in which the reader participates. Therefore
the meaning of the text must go beyond the meaning of the author,
for example, Gadamer asserts, «the mens auctoris is not admissible
as a yardstick for the meaning of a work of art. Even the idea of a
work–in–itself, divorced from its constantly renewed reality in being
experienced, always has something abstract about it» (Gadamer ,
p. ). One of the reasons why he debases the original intention
of the author is the psychological inclination of Dilthey’s traditional
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hermeneutics. Gadamer is unsatisfied by that kind of confining the
target of interpretation to the search of the author’s intention via psy-
chological experiences. In Gadamer’s view, psychological testimony
proves to be problematic. He questions as following,
Does the original meaning of the text actually lies in mens auctoris? Is
understanding just the reproduction of the original product? Then he con-
tinues, the meaning of reproduction here indeed can’t be limited to the
self–conscious infusion of meaning by the author. As is well–known, the
self–explanation of artists is quite problematic. The meaning of their cre-
ation still poses the one–dimensional approaching task to the interpreter.
(Gadamer , p. )
The kernel of the above refutation is an objection towards author–cen-
tered theory. Gadamer believes that the purpose of interpretation is not
to approach, restore or reproduce the so–called “objective” meaning of
the original product (texts). Meanwhile, the meaning of the text can not
be subsumed merely to the endowment of the author, It should rather go
beyond and transcend the intention of the author. Therefore the author’s
self–explanations are often unreliable and inadequate. The process of
understanding and interpretation, as the activity of reproduction and
recreation, is actually the interaction and fusion of the present horizon of
the recipient and the historical horizon of the text. Wherein the intention
of the author is largely excluded from the understanding process. The
second concern of Gadamer here is to re–interpret the conventional
proposition that «the interpreter may understand the author better than
the author himself». He employs the principle of the effective history so
as to infuse new meaning to the old saying in a quite different historical
context. Gadamer says,
That subsequent understanding is superior to the original production and
hence can be described as superior understanding [. . . ]. The real meaning of
a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not depend on the contingencies
of the author and his original audience. It certainly is not identical with
them, for it is always co–determined also by the historical situation of the
interpreter and hence by the totality of the objective course of history.
(Gadamer , pp. –)
The third concern for him is that, «The meaning of a text goes
beyond its author. That is why understanding is not merely a repro-
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ductive but always a productive activity as well» (Gadamer , p.
).
Though Gadamer’s theory of prejudice does not completely refute
the fact that things to be understood (historical text) are determined
to some extent in its content, the main source of the production of
the meaning of the text is still subsumed to the re–creation of the
reader in the guide of prejudice and the expectation of the meaning.
In this sense, Gadamer does prefer the reader–centered approach.
The listed reasons of debasing the role the author plays in the pro-
duction of meaning above is quite reasonable in the viewpoint of
making understanding ontological. However there is a certain degree
of subjectivism and relativism from the methodological and episte-
mological viewpoint. Gadamer himself also admits frankly that, the
basic position of hermeneutics is the position of every reader (quoted
in Pan , p. ). It is true that, as mentioned earlier, Gadamer
regards the productivity and creativity of the interpretation as the
origin and drive of the understanding. He illustrates the inevitable
ambiguity of interpretation and its rationality. Those views push the
traditional hermeneutics forward dramatically. However, via legit-
imizing the identical accountability of every interpretation, it may
risk the slide into relativism on one hand, and on the other hand the
subjectivity of reader–centered theory run the risk of an uncontrolled
and unlimited subjectivism, and the subjectivity of the interpretation
may be perverted to an arbitrary one, trapped in the relativism as its
results. Gadamer is quite cautious about that, he adds that, «it’s in no
means to legitimize the kind of individual, arbitrary prejudice, be-
cause there is an distinct line of responsibility here» (Gadamer , p.
). However, he doesn’t put forward explicitly the distinct boundary
and objective criteria to help differentiate among various kinds of am-
biguous interpretation. Hence it also paves the way for the relativism
of reader–centered theory.
Receptive aesthetics has developed the basic idea of Gadamer’s
ontological hermeneutics, which emphasizes the viewpoint of reader–
centered theory. The representative figure Jauss directly inherits and
elaborates Gadamer’s theory, saying, “historically effected conscious-
ness”, “fusion of horizon”. Jauss puts forward the basic principle of
the literary history of reception or the literary history of readers.
He regards the reader as the decisive factor of the historical life of
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literary works and the fundamental drive in the construction of lit-
erary history, while the basic role of the author in the composition
of literary history is ignored. Jauss builts the framework of literary
history on the basis of the reader’s activity of acception, thus bringing
the reader’s role to the unprecedent height and posing a powerful
challenge to the traditional theory and research of literary history.
The reader–centered theory emerging in Gadamer’s theory is pushed
forward by Jauss thoroughly to a new stage.
Gadamer thinks that Jauss goes too far in emphasizing the role of
the reader in construction of the meaning of literary works. He criti-
cizes that, «the receptive aesthetics of H.R. Jauss already contains this
view, but his overemphasis makes him slide unwillingly to the edge of
Derrida’s “deconstruction” (Dekonstruktion)» ( Jauss and Holub ).
That is, Jauss slides into the same relativism as deconstructionism.
Interestingly, Jauss is also dissatisfied with Gadamer’s view that the
historical text has some kind of objectivity, and he criticizes the mate-
rialism of Gadamer’s interpretation. Their disputations also reflect the
fact that Jauss goes further in terms of reader–centered theory.
There’s also a theoretical strand represented by the Italian philoso-
pher Emilio Betti, his Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the
Geisteswissenschaften. As early as the year , his book The Ground-
work of General Interpretive Theory (Zur Grundlegung einer allgemeinen
Auslegungslehre) has been published, known as the Declaration of Hermeneu-
tics. And in the year , his two volumes bookBasic Theory of Inter-
pretation has been published, with a greater length than Gadamer’s
Truth and Method. Betti is deeply dissatisfied with the fact that Heideg-
ger and Gadamer’s modern hermeneutics has abandoned the whole
tradition of romantic hermeneutics embodied by Schleiermacher and
Dilthey. He regretfully points out that
Such a glorious hermeneutics (theory of interpretation) of time is no longer
an animated property in human sciences in contemporary Germany. It
seems to be obsoleted. The rich heritage of hermeneutics in today’s Ger-
many seems to have been almost forgotten, and that inheritance of great
romanticism is nearly interrupted (It is difficult to estimate the province of
which has already happened). (Quoted in Bleicher , p. )
Therefore Betti puts forward the methodological hermeneutics in
confrontation with Heidegger, Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics.
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Although at that time it has no obvious influence in Germany where
the profound tradition of hermeneutics takes its root, Betti still shows
his theoretical attempt to develop and revivify the romantic tradition
of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. As the American scholar Palmer points
out, «Betti tried to rebuild the old while meaningful German tradition
in his earlier encyclopedic book Basic Theory of Interpretation (Teoria
generale della interpretazione)» (Palmer , p. ).
Betti does not agree with the view of Gadamer’s ontological hermeneu-
tics that focuses more on the interpreter while despises the author. Betti
insists on the epistemological and methodological view of understanding.
The core concept of his hermeneutics is the “objectivations of mind»,
which is called the “the meaningful form” (sinnhaltige Formen). It’s from
the importance and necessity of human understanding and communi-
cation that Betti conceives his theory of hermeneutics. He puts it as:
«Nothing is of greater importance to man than living in mutual under-
standing with his fellow–men». He regards all kinds of “objectivations of
mind” in the past («from fleeting speech to fixed documents and mute
reminders, from writing to chiffres and to artistic symbol, from articu-
lated language to figurative or musical representation, from explanation
to active behaviour, from facial expression to ways of bearing and types
of characters» and so on) as “meaningful form”. And he asserts that
«through these forms others mind is recounting», and our understanding
and interpretation is to discover and show «the meaning contained within
these forms» (quoted in Bleicher , p. )
Betti emphasizes that, «the condition for our interpretation is merely
caused by meaningful forms». And forms in his view can be under-
stood in a general sense as our homogenous perceptual structure,
which is suitable for preserving the forms of creation and the charac-
ter of the mind (authors and others) that is embodied in it. Due to the
kind of meaningful form, we (interpreters) resort to the reciprocal
mobilization of corresponding perceptual elements in the chain of the
conceptual universe, so as to achieve «the striking of the same chord
on their mental instrument to bring forth thoughts that correspond to
those of the speakers» (quoted in Bleicher , p. ). It is crucial here
that Betti holds the view that the thoughts of others (the author) can
be objectively transformed into “objectivations of mind”, namely “the
meaningful form”. As the object of interpretation for the interpreter,
it has the hermeneutic autonomy external to the interpreter. Given
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the fact that the objectivations of mind or the meaningful form of
others (the author) can be recognized by the interpreter. This is the
main difference between Betti’s epistemologcial and methodological
hermeneutics and Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics.
Betti phrases the process of understanding as the unification of
three elements (author, the meaningful form namely the linguistic
text, the subject of interpretation), and he formulates it as following:
The phenomenon of understanding is therefore a triadic process at the
opposite ends of which we find the interpreter as an active, thinking mind,
and the mind objectivated in meaning–full forms in which an objectivated
mind confronts the interpreter as an unalterably other being. Subject and
object of the process of interpretation, i.e. interpreter and meaning–full
forms, are the same that can be found in every process of cognition; only
here they are characterized by specific traits which derive from the fact that
we are not dealing with just any object but with objectivations of mind, so
that the task of the cognizing subject consists in recognizing the inspiring,
creative thought within these objectivations, to rethink the conception or
recapture the intuition revealed in them. It follows that understanding is a
re–cognition and reconstruction of a meaning — and with it of the mind
that is known through the forms of its objectivations — that addresses
a thinking mind congenial with it on the basis of a shared humanity: it
is a bridging through a kind of arc, a bringing together and reuniting of
these forms with inner totality that generated them and from which they
seperated; it is, of course, an internalization of these forms in which their
content is transposed into the differing subjectivity of an Other. (Bleicher
, pp. –)
Here Betti offers a very clear and accurate description of the
essence and process of understanding. Firstly, He affirms that the
linguistic text is the production of the creative activity of the author
and the meaningful form produced by the objectification of mind. It’s
the irreversible object “other” that the interpreter confronts. Secondly,
he equally affirms that the activity of understanding can not be carried
out without the active participation of the subject (the other), the
interpreter. That is, he not only does not deny the active role of the
reader and interpreter in the understanding activity, but also affirms
the irreplaceable role the interpreter plays. Thirdly, Betti points out
that the linguistic text as the objectification of the mind, is the medium
of the establishment of connection and communication between two
subjects. And the text is the starting point and direct object of under-
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standing and explanation. Only via the text can the interpreter have
access to the author’s mind, therefore making the communication
and understanding of the meaning of texts possible. In this regard,
Betti advocates the text–centered theory, but not the kind proposed
by the structuralism and formalism, which cut off the connection
between text and the author. Fourth, Betti regards understanding as
the interpreter’s re–understanding and re–construction process of the
meaning of the text and the author’s inner world. Hence, the focus of
understanding not only lies in the interpreter and his prejudice, but
also depends on the text and its author. Certainly, the aim is not to
restore the hidden intention of the author, but the kind of reconstruc-
tion with the participation and intervention of the interpreter. It’s
the communication and communion of mind between two subjects,
it’s a kind of inter–subjectivity. Fifth, Betti places the mutual under-
standing of inter–subjectivity on the basis of the common human
nature, which is clearly inherited from the traditional hermeneutics
of Schleiermacher and Dilthey.
Betti carries out the above methodology of hermeneutics to the
operational level, and puts forward the famous “Four canons and
guidelines of interpretation”. The first is the «canon of hermeneutic
autonomy (Autonomie) of meaning or rules of standardized internal-
ity». The second is the «canon of cohesion and integrity» (Kanas
der Ganzheit). The third is the «canon of actuality of understanding»
(Kanon der Aktualitat des Verstehens). The fourth is the «canon of the
correctness of the meaning», or the rules of coherence of meaning
of hermeneutics (Kanon der hermeneutischen Sinn. Entsprechung). The
first two rules are mainly concerned with the object of interpretation,
the basic spirit is that the text is autonomous and independent for the
interpreter. The main criterion of validity of interpretation should
be consistent with the author’s intention, rather than cater to the
intention or purpose of the interpreter (quoted in Bleicher , p.
). This is completely different from Gadamer’s abandonment of the
author’s intention. The latter two rules mainly concern the subject
of the interpretation. Betti affirms the subjectivity of understanding,
its legitimacy and necessity. Without returning to the assertion of
traditional hermeneutics which aims at overcoming the subjectiv-
ity of understanding (quoted in ibidem), Betti criticizes the idea of
completely ignoring the text (meaningful form) and the objective
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autonomy of the author’s intention. Hence he holds a strong position
in terms of maintaining the objectivity of the meaning of the text,
and the idea that understanding should draw “close” to the objective
meaning of the text (quoted in ibidem). Essentially, the two rules that
emphasize the subjectivity are congruent with the previous two rules
of objectivity.
In general, Betti’s methodological hermeneutics is different from the
reader–centered theory of Gadamer, Jauss, and the author–centered
theory of traditional romantic hermeneutics. It may be summarized as
the text–centered theory which combines the author with the reader.
As soon as Truth and Method is published, Betti shrewdly notices the
subjectivism of Gadamer’s hermeneutics which negates the objectivity
of interpretation. Betti makes a quick objection and criticism towards
that tendency. He put it as,
the subjectivist position rests on a shift of meaning which identifies the
hermeneutical process of historical interpretation with a situationally de-
termined meaning–inference (as it is the case in eschatological mean-
ing–inference) as a result, the fundamental canon of the hermeneutical
autonomy of the object is altogether removed from the work of the history.
(Bleicher , p. )
In particular, he criticizes the core concept of Gadamer, such as
“prejudice”, “pre–understanding” and “fore–structure”. Betti points out
that, «the objection to this is obvious: the texts which are approached
with a meaning–inferring “pre–understanding” are not to be used to
confirm already held opinions; we have to suppose, instead, that they
have something independently of our meaning–inference». And it’s
here Betti affirms that the questionable character of the subjectivist
position comes into full light. And Betti points out bluntly that,
It is obviously influenced by contemporary existentialist philosophy and
tends towards the confounding of interpretation and meaning inference
and the removing of the canon of the autonomy of the object with the con-
sequence of putting into doubt the objectivity of the results of interpretative
procedures in all human sciences. (Bleicher , p. )
Gadamer responds to and objects to Betti’s criticism. Considering
the length of this article the long disputation can’t go into details,
but it should be pointed out that the essence of their theoretical
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divergence lies in whether recognizing the autonomy of the object
of interpretation or not. Palmer has an objective comment on this
issue, and he points out the fact that Betti proposes «to understand
the objective factor in accordance with the object itself», whereas
Gadamer asserts the subjectivism of understanding. In other words,
«the nature of “objective” interpretation has been Betti’s concern».
Meanwhile, Palmer stresses that
Betti argues, however, that recent German hermeneutics has so occupied
itself with the phenomenon of Sinngebung (the interpreter’s function of
conferring meaning on the object) that this has come to be equated with
interpretation. Betti asserts that his main purpose is to clarify the essen-
tial distinction between Auslegung (interpretation) and Sinngebung. Precisely
because this distinction is ignored, the whole integrity of objectively valid re-
sults in the humanities (die Objektivitat der Auslegungsergebnisse) is challenged.
(Ibidem)
Therefore, Palmer emphasizes that, «it is fundamental and is the
first canon of all interpretation to affirm the essential autonomy of the
object» (Palmer , pp. –). This assertion is particularly pertinent.
Now we can see that methodological hermeneutics represented by
Betti is irreplaceable in the history of western hermeneutics. It is radi-
cally opposite to Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics. However, they
should be considered as two distinct directions of complementary
progress and development of the hermeneutics in Schleiermacher
and Dilthey’s tradition. Thus, the significant influence from Betti’s
hermeneutics to Gadamer’s should not be overlooked. Firstly, in mod-
ern hermeneutic theories, it is not a subjective overestimation but a
theoretical fact that only Betti’s methodological hermeneutics, which
is so completed and rigorous in its philosophical basis, system, idea,
category, method, etc., that is a matched rival and in a comprehen-
sive dialog with Gadamer’s hermeneutics. The expert in history of
hermeneutics, Palmer, in his famous work Hermeneutics, puts a
whole chapter under the title of “The Contemporary Battle over
Hermeneutics: Betti Versus Gadamer”. He argues explicitly that,
The fundamental contrast between Betti and Gadamer is clear. We are
confronted with two very different conceptions of the scope and purpose of
hermeneutics, the methods and kinds of thinking appropriate to it, and the
essential character of the discipline as a field of study. (Palmer , p. )
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However, Palmer also contends that
The two positions are not totally antithetical. Rather, the two thinkers
are working on different aspects of the hermeneutical problem [. . . ] for
hermeneutics as a whole, both the philosophical positions yield important
approaches to the hermeneutical problem. (Palmer , p. )
Moreover, Betti is not alone in the history of contemporary phi-
losophy. His thoughts have been attached great importance, assim-
ilated and developed by many theorists. For example, the distin-
guished French hermeneutic theorist Paul Ricœur advocates the tex-
tual hermeneutics. He describes Betti as «devoted to offer applicable
and rigorous rules to hermeneutics of objectification of the mind»,
and at the same time reserves its applicability. He thinks that «the
scope of application for Betti’s systems is limited to the hermeneu-
tics of written “texts”, rather than all objectification of the mind,
i.e. all forms of civilization and culture in human societies» (quoted
in Pan , p. –). What’s more, even for Gadamer, despite his
great disagreement with Betti, still takes the theoretical significance
of Betti’s methodological hermeneutics seriously and speaks highly of
it. Gadamer thinks that it is Betti who completely avoids both the risk
of naïve historical objectivism and the overestimation of arguments
suggested by subjectivism. Gadamer comments that,
Betti seeks the mean between the objective and the subjective element
in all understanding. He formulates a complete canon of hermeneutical
principles, at the head of which stands the text’s autonomy of meaning
(Sinnautonomie), according to which the meaning—i.e., what the author
intended to say—can be gained from the text itself. But he also emphasizes
with equal clarity the principle of the currency of understanding—i.e., its
adequacy to the object. This implies that he views the interpreter’s being
inevitably tied to a particular perspective (Standortgebundenheit) as an
integrating element in hermeneutical truth. (Gadamer , p. )
Thus, Gadamer admits that his hermeneutic theories and that of
Betti’s are interrelated to some extent rather than merely antithetic.
In my opinion, Betti’s great theoretical contribution to hermeneu-
tics seemingly haven’t been fully valued and affirmed from the per-
spective of a longer historical period. Its position in the academic and
theoretical history should be re–valuated. The seemingly “injustice”
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phenomenon is closely related to the main academic trend of Europe
in the first half of last century, especially in Germany. At that time,
the phenomenological movement which initiated by Husserl and
propelled by Heidegger, swept across Europe and occupied the pre-
vailing position in philosophy. Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics
was under the influence of this trend and pushed it to the climax in
turn. Challenged by the strong impact of the ontological hermeneu-
tics, Betti’s methodological hermeneutics was marginalized. With his
death in , it’s impossible to further his controversy with Gadamer
and make a development of his unique interpretation theory. Hence,
there’s no chance for Betti to expand his influence in the Western
academia. With his influence gradually fading away, Gadamer’s onto-
logical hermeneutics has firmly occupied the prevailing position in
European and American academia.
.
Since s of last century, the academia of Chinese philosophy, aesthet-
ics and literary theory has been significantly affected by Heidegger,
Gadamer and hermeneutics of the receptive aesthetics, while Betti’s
influence is almost negligible.
The reasons for the formation of such a selective acceptance of
Western Hermeneutics in China in the new period are likely to be
complicated. But the main two aspects can be divided into subjective
and objective: the objective aspect of what has been mentioned above,
Heidegger and Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics always occupy
the mainstream status in the western countries, while the influence
of Betti’s methodological hermeneutics is very limited. Consequently,
the academia in our country will naturally put the main focus on the
former when making the introduction and translation. The subjective
aspect, in my opinion, is the ideological liberation movement during
the initial stage for reform and opening–up, which formed a specific
acceptance context in our ideological and academia.
Most notably in this context, firstly, is the humanitarian discus-
sion at the beginning of s in philosophy, aesthetics and literary
theory academia, which is a beautiful landscape in the liberation move-
ment of academia in early s. The background of the discussion is
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as follows, since the Third Plenary Session of the th CPC Central
Committee, with the gradually deepening universal criticism and re-
flection towards the doctrine of the personal worship and absolutism
during “Cultural Revolution”, with the return of the Enlightenment
spirit of May Fourth, humanism, there has been a general consensus
among the people and intellectuals about the humanitarianism that
values human and human value. Artistic creation and outstanding
works, which show the humanitarian spirit, continue to emerge, the
proposition «literature is about human knowledge» had also been
reintroduced
The great discussion of humanism and the proposition of the the-
ory of subjectivity are the two representative achievements of the
ideological liberation movement and cultural modernity transfor-
mation in s. The internal cause of their emergence is an urgent
internal demand in the field of cultural and academic studies based
on criticizing and reflecting on the “left” line of the Cultural Revo-
lution and absolutism. The external cause is the tide of reform and
opening–up to break the long–term seclusion of the situation. Foreign
thoughts, especially western academic culture and literary thought
. Qian Gurong  (); written in October , , it is a statement for his
On “Literature Is About Human Knowledge” (“Literary Monthly”, , ()), which received
a long–time criticism. (Qian ), and generally accepted by the literature and theory
academia, all of which became a social psychological and cultural basis of the discussion. At
the same time, through careful study and discussion on Marx’s Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts in , there was a boom of discussions on Manuscript in academia, which
won the recognition of Marx’s humanitarian ideas, and made this discussion reach an
unheard–of depth and width. According to incomplete statistics, from the second half of
 to the end of , around  papers were published on issues of human, human
nature, human rights, human feeling, human alienation, and humanitarianism, half of
which concerned literary and aesthetic. The second aspect of the background is, at the
end of , the emerge and the development of the discussion of Liu Zaifu’s literature
subjectivity theory can be recognized as the continuation and deepening of the great
discussion of humanism and the concept of “literature is about human knowledge” in a
sense. However, its direct theoretical source is Li Zehou’s subjective practical philosophy.
The main content of this concept is that the literary and artistic creation should put human
beings into the main body of the practice in the historical movement, which means that
treat human as ends, not means. Besides, the true meaning of this immortal proposition,
“literature is about human knowledge” is that the writer should be aware that the destiny of
literature is up together in a common cause with the destiny of human beings, which means
not only to restore the people as the subject of practice in the literary field, but also to
extend the “inner space”, and admit that «literature is about pneumatology, characterology
and noology of human beings» (Liu –).
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come in a continuous stream. Contemporary western literary aes-
thetics and literary theory, especially modernism literature theory
comes in flocks (Gao , p. ). And postmodern literature and
literary theory has gained a certain number of translation and intro-
duction (Zhu ). They brought a lot of foreign culture in academia
of new ideas, new conceptions, new methods, which not only have a
certain impact on the inherent thinking habits in Chinese academia,
but also provide many enlightenments for us to answer and deal with
current practical problems in Chinese ideological and cultural field
through a critical reference and absorption. To effectively promote
the further liberation of thought in literature and art and culture of
academic, strengthen the collision, communication and exchanges
between western and Chinese cultural and academia, promote the
transformation and innovation of the research methods and the tran-
sition state of our academic discourse system. This ideological and
cultural atmosphere also contributed to the prosperity and diversity
of literature, art, aesthetics and literary theory in the ’–’ of the
last century. In the late s, Mr. Qian Zhongwen and Mr. Tong
Qingbing once said:
Under the guidance of reform and opening–up, the literary theory has
introduced the theory of foreign literature on a large scale, and introduced
the western literary thoughts in the past hundred years. In the past few
years, people have cheerfully done imitation, propaganda and experiment,
almost practiced again all European and American literary trends in the
past hundred years, and all of the literary thought was very active. (Qian
and Tong )
This is true in literary theory. We have introduced the translated
many genres’ work and thoughts, such as expressionism, Russian
formalism and intuitionism, psychoanalysis, semantics, new criti-
cism, phenomenology, existentialism, archetypal criticism, structural-
ism, semiotics, Western Marx doctrine schools, hermeneutics, recep-
tive aesthetics, deconstruction, feminism, new historicism, postmod-
ernism, post–colonialism, space theory, cultural studies and cultural
theory, all of which have been referred or tried to be used in different
degrees in Chinese literary research and criticism practice, although
this application is not always successful, and often be misread, dis-
torted or deformed.
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According to both internal and external factors and forces above,
on the one hand, it gradually shaped the practical needs and new
context that we accept the external ideology and culture; on the other
hand, it would correct, adjust, change, or accept this reception context
based on the practice of reference and application. However, the intro-
duction and reference (not entirely westernized) of such a wide range
of (only on the scope, without criticism) foreign cultural academic
(mainly western) was mainly happened in the beginning of the first 
years. After the mid–s, the consciousness and selectivity of reference
was improved, the scope is gradually concentrated instead of scattered,
and the focus is prominent. In retrospect, since the new period, Phe-
nomenology and Existentialism which are initiated by Husserl and
promoted by Heidegger, Merleau–Ponty and Sartre as well as the
Philosophical Hermeneutics by the successor Gadamer — as one
of (not the only one, the Marx doctrine also had a big impact) the
western academic thoughts — gained the most and longest attention
in our academia (including literary theory and aesthetic academia).
The reason is very complex, while in my opinion, there are two main
reasons: one is the modern Chinese academia’s re–understanding on
the major issues of humanitarianism, subjectivity and their theory
demands has an intrinsic correlation with the thought of phenomenol-
ogy and existentialism. For example, Husserl’s transcendental phe-
nomenology holds that the intentional structure of consciousness and
the recognition of consciousness and the ability of subjectivity can be
grasped intuitively through phenomenological reduction; Heidegger
stressed that “Dasein”, “being in the world” and “Sein” structure, is
essentially continuous with the intentional structure of conscious-
ness of Husserl’s ideas, but more basic and takes more priority over
Husserl’s intentional structure of consciousness; His hermeneutics,
which stated that an activity of understanding is premised on the basis
of the interpreter’s subjective pre–understanding and pre–structure,
was in full swing and ascension in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneu-
tics, all of which are a certain internal fit to the theoretical pursuit of
our academia. This is the internal mechanism and the ideological and
cultural context of the translation, the introduction and acceptance
of the foreign ideological trend, which is driven willingly or not will-
ingly by the Chinese academia. Secondly, the mainstream Chinese
academia always treat the Marx doctrine as a guide, since the new
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period, we break the shackles of dogmatism of “Western Marxism
is not Marxism” and studied systematically and critically reflection
on the various schools of Western Marxism thought for more than
 years. And Recognized that the contribution of Western Marx
doctrine’s contribution to historical development in western coun-
tries, made a lot of innovation and progress in theory, and produced
a tremendous impact and had large significance to our country in
the construction of contemporary Marx theory research. And the
phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics have overlapping
relations with western Marx doctrine in many aspects. For exam-
ple, Lukács constructed the ontology of social being according to
phenomenological intentional analysis and constructive method. Mar-
cuse, one member of the Frankfurt School, absorbed Heidegger’s
ontological thoughts of Dasein phenomenology, criticized economic
determinism that completely negate the subjectivity of human being,
and alleged to the comprehensive understanding of Dasein (subjec-
tivity) from the two aspects of material and spirit at the same time.
Sutter’s phenomenology of existentialism tried to restore the human
being inside the Marx’s doctrine — the freedom of the individual.
Merleau–Ponty interpreted Marx’s “real–life man” as the “history of
the body” (that is, “body–subject”), which made a dialectical unity of
the spirit and flesh, spirit and material in order to make a new inter-
pretation of historical materialism, and so on and so forth. Chinese
scholars would be more accessible to exploring phenomenology and
Existentialism theory through the introduction and study of Western
Marx doctrine. Heidegger has a profound understanding of the rel-
evance of phenomenology, existentialism and Marxism and Marx’s
Transcendence of them, he said:
Because Marx went to the essence of the history when realizing the alien-
ation, so the historical point of view of the doctrine of Marx is superior
than other history. But Husserl does not, it seems to me that Sutter is not
aware of the nature of the history in existence, so neither existentialism
nor phenomenology has reached to this stage, and only in this stage can be
qualified to make conversation with Marx. (Heidegger , p. )
These two aspects constitute the internal mechanism and the ideo-
logical and cultural context of the selective translation, introduction
and reception of foreign thoughts consciously and unconsciously in
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Chinese academia. As one of the earliest (late s) scholars to intro-
duce the receptive aesthetics (Zhu ), I have practical experience
with the specific context, that why the theory of meaning of literary
works — from Heidegger and Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics
to receptive aesthetics and to reader–centered theory — would be
widely accepted in China. And I realize that is also the main reason
why the effect of the work’s original meaning given by the author is
imperceptibly reduced, dilute in that period.
.
This situation saw a significant change until , when Zhang Jiang
published an essay named Coercive Interpretation (Zhang ), which
makes a significant impact on the the literary theory academia of
our country. In Zhang Jiang’s Coercive Interpretation and a series
of papers, he points out one of the major (not the first or only)
defects in critique of Contemporary Western Literary Theory: the
coercive interpretation, and at the same time, also deeply reflects on
reader–centered theory that exaggerates the decisive role that reading,
criticism and interpretation creates the meaning of work in Gadamer’s
and receptive aesthetics. It should be noted I do not fully agree with
Zhang Jiang’s theory, but I quite approve the main point of his view.
His critical reflection, in fact, helps me to reflect on the one–sided
emphasis on the views of meaning in Gadamer’s hermeneutics and
the reader–centered theory. Needless to say, this is also very important
for my future academic research.
Zhang Jiang criticizes the reader–centered theory of ontologi-
cal hermeneutics, and points out trenchantly that «Heidegger and
Gadamer pushed it to the top, “the interpretation is to supplement
meaning, not to find meaning” (Gadamer , p. ). As a result,
the understanding of the text is always a drift, not fixed». This makes
the exploration to the text meaning (including author’s meaning),
completely excluded from the function of interpretation and criticism,
so only the readers and critics’ “supplement meaning” makes up the
understanding and explaining, which is obviously contrary to com-
. Mainly included in Zhang , , a, b, c, d, .
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mon sense. When it comes to the relationship between the historical
understanding (which means to be interpreted in the historical con-
text that the text produced) and the current understanding, Zhang
Jiang says,
the understanding of the history of the text, that is, the understanding of
the native discourse of the text, is the premise of all understanding. Only
on this basis, will the current understanding have attachment, and will the
current understanding of the text exist. The current understanding of the
text can be built on the original intention of the text, but it cannot distort
the original meaning of the text, or impose the current understanding of
the interpreter upon the text.
Here Zhang Jiang uses several concepts like “the native discourse of
the text”, “the original intention of the text” and “the original meaning
of the text” to emphasize that the original meaning of discourse and
the primary text has its autonomous nature, which is undeniably
independent of the readers and critics. And besides, the author’s
meaning is objective, therefore, the current theory cannot displace
the original text or the author’s dominant idea (by «I think that refers
to the original intention of the author») or even redefine the work.
Zhang Jiang stresses that, it is the power of critics to understand
the original text with the new theory, however, not rewrite. The
existence of the text is different from others’ interpretation. Once
rewritten, the understanding is not the understanding from the text,
but from the interpreter. The relationship between them should be,
the existence of the text comes first, the understanding comes later;
the existence generates the understanding, and the understanding
attaches to the existence; «without the existence, the understanding
will also be lost» (Zhang ). It is clear that the text always comes
before the understanding from the epistemological point of view, not
the other way around from the hermeneutical point of view”. In my
opinion, although it is common sense, it has initially put forward the
textual meaning–centered theory, which also includes the author’s
meaning.
This point of view has further developed in Zhang Jiang’s recent
research. He finds another branch theory of hermeneutics, which
is different from Heidegger and Gadamer’s ontological hermeneu-
tics—Betti’s hermeneutics of epistemology and methodology. Zhang
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Jiang says, «I am more in favor of the view of the Italy philosopher
Betti, specifically, I agree that “the text or works, is the objectification
of the spirit of the author”»,
in Betti’s position, the text is firstly the author’s creation, which is the
objective product of the author’s spirit. The author, with ideological and
spiritual power, provides us with a very personalized spiritual product,
which cannot be copied, recycled or replaced by others. The author and
text get fusion and refining in such a personalized product, and the author
gives the text his mind and spirit, while the text carries them and becomes
the material author. The denial of the author is equal to the denial of the
text, and makes the existence of the text totally a different meaning. (Zhang
)
Zhang Jiang makes a brilliant and concise analysis of Betti’s view-
point,
the writer’s spiritual demands are all in the text. Text is the object of the
author, the materialized object of the author, the way or method for the
author to achieve and retain himself. He uses this text to talk with the later
generations, and to express himself and extend his thought immortally. The
author can die physically, but the spirit will be perpetual. And the text is
rooted in the spirit of the author, or the text exists because of the spirit.
(Zhang )
This is to improve the irreplaceable status of author, who does the
creation and gives the works’ original meaning, also further expounds
the textual meaning–centered theory, which includes the author’s
meaning, and has re–affirmed the important role and status of the
author in the theory of hermeneutics.
Borrowing from Betti’s theory, Zhang Jiang not only criticizes
the reader–centered theory from Gadamer and receptive aesthetics,
which belittle the status of the author, but also criticizes the “the
author was dead” of structuralism and deconstruction. In fact, the
contemporary western literary theory overemphasizes readers’ sta-
tus of creating meaning, and this tendency to deny and abolish the
significance of author’s meaning, is the results of interaction between
phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics and formalism, struc-
turalism, deconstruction, which consequently becomes the dominant
idea of the contemporary western literary theory. Roland Barthes put
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forward the famous proposition of «when the author is dead, the writ-
ing begins» (Barthes , pp. –), and draws the conclusion from
the intertextuality and the multiplicity of the text, «this multiplicity
is concentrated on one place, that is the reader, not the author. [. . . ]
We know that in order to give writing a future, we must overthrow
this myth (by “the writer is the only person in literature”): the birth
of the reader must be at the expense of the author’s death» (Barthes
, pp. –). This is obviously an extremely violent, one–sided
interpretation theory both eliminating the author’s and raising the
reader’s status.
In this regard, Zhang Jiang criticizes profoundly from the perspec-
tive of the power of utterance interpretation, that Barthes’ «“the death
of the author” is just a metaphor, a question raised. Behind “the death
of the author”, it is the anti–subject, anti–center, anti–rationalism
proposition of deconstruction, which is the expansion of deconstruc-
tion in the field of literary theory and hermeneutic», «From the per-
spective of hermeneutics, what is the basic purpose of these slogans
and theories? [. . . ] We can judge that the core of the problem is the
power of discourse and the standard of text interpretation». From the
power of interpretation, if the author dies, the reader becomes the
highest interpreter and the creator of the text. In the multidimensional
space of the text meaning, any interpretation can be generated, and
the critic, as well as the general reader, randomly generates his own
conclusion. From the standard of interpretation, if the text loses the
author, its meaning will no longer have a source, interpretation will
no longer be dominated by a single meaning, all imagination and ex-
perience will have conflicts with each other, and all the interpretation
will be correct. Zhang Jiang finds the root of “coercive interpretation”
from the perspective of hermeneutics,
it is this kind of thought and theory of the author, makes “the coercive inter-
pretation” of the western literary theory become popular since the middle
of the twentieth century. And interpretation has become the experimental
field of the various theories to play in and compete in. (Zhang )
In addition, he also reveals that the reader–centered theory (whether
the ontological hermeneutics or the theory of author’s death of Decon-
struction) is bound to fall into the trap of relativism and subjectivism.
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Thus, the tendency for the contemporary western literary theory to
overemphasize the status of the readers for meaning and deny or even
abolish the significance of the author, to some extent, is the combina-
tion of phenomenology, existentialism, claims of part of hermeneutics
schools and theorists, formalism, structuralism and deconstruction, and
gradually become the main trend and dominant idea of contemporary
western literary theory, which is also one of the main causes of the
prevalence of coercive interpretation. A series of Zhang Jiang’s papers
cuts the popular main stream, which belittles the meaning of the author
in domestic literary theory academia, and gives more attention to the
author’s meaning in literary activities again. Although this change has
just begun, it is of great significance, which is a theoretical turning point
for the reconstruction of a comprehensive and dialectical view of the
meaning of literary works.
.
Now let’s return to the discussion of the source of literary works’
meaning. I think, in general, the meaning of literary works should
be generated in the dynamic process and bilateral interaction of the
author, the text and the reader, which is not wholly endowed by the
author, or entirely created by the reader, but in the interaction and
co–creation in the author and the reader, and it is the two subjects’
“inter–relationship” of author and readers, and produces in the three
elements’ dynamic process of both the author, the text and the reader.
It can be said that this is a generative theory of meaning.
Among the three elements, we should first be sure that the author’s
creation is the source of the original meaning of the work, which
shouldn’t be ignored. For a long time, we have been greatly influenced
by the reader–centered theory of meaning, so it is necessary to focus
on the importance of the author’s meaning.
Does the writer have any intention of writing and creation (author’s
meaning)? A general overview weakens or even denies the existence
of the author’s intention in the works because the writer’s intention
is not conscious or clear. I don’t think that is scientific. In fact, Zhang
Jiang once asked Mo Yan if there is intention when writing a fiction,
Mo Yan clearly answered “yes”, although it is not very clear in writing,
and often change a lot. According to this, Zhang Jiang says,
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I am in favor of the creativity of literature, and it is impossible to have one
unchanging purpose from beginning to end, [. . . ]. But we should make
one thing clear that if the writer is rational and sober, it’s impossible for
him to write a novel without knowing what he has wrote about [. . . ] if
a novelist doesn’t know what he has written, how could he make other
people understand what himself write about? (Zhang )
I should admit that Zhang Jiang’s argument is very powerful. I can
also take Mo Yan’s example for his work named Red Sorghum. He once
made it clear that his “Red Sorghum”
is not described as a certain kind of plant in the novel, but as a symbol.
A long time ago it was said that the red sorghum in the north is natural,
healthy and upward, just like the young people in the northern countryside.
In this novel, sorghum does not present as one by one, but endless, as
vibrant and mighty. When I create this image, I know that such a way of
writing and description will make the image of sorghum to get a promotion,
and makes it become a literary, philosophical image in my writing. But as
a writer, I think it’s not necessary to think too well on its meaning. This
is also a problem, which often be faced with in our novel creation that if a
writer especially gives a clear symbolic meaning to something in his novel
in the description, then it will be very thin. A description of chaos may
be possible to produce a broader, deep symbolic meaning only when the
writer feels something but does not particularly clear. (Mo Yan )
Mo Yan’s speech is a true description of the chaotic state of mind,
that the author does have ideas and intention, although always not
too clear when doing creation, which can be used as a footnote to
Zhang Jiang’s argument. It is obvious that the author’s idea, which is
“not too clearly”, is the source of the meaning of literary works, and
should not be ignored or denied by readers and critics. Give another
example of “root–seeking literature” in s. Wang Anyi recalls that
the Hunan writer Han Shaogong, who is the initiator of root–seeking
literature, once wrote an article named “the root of literature”, and
put forward that we should find the root of our culture. It represents
the common pursuit of a group of writers,
it seems that there is a commotion. Zheng Yi, who comes from Shanxi, rides
a bike to go along the source of the Yellow River to find traces of civilization;
Li Hangyu, from Hangzhou, makes up a river called Gechuanjiang, which
reflects Jiangnan history; Han Shaogong writes a novel titled Ba¯ Ba¯ Ba¯
(which literally means “Dad Dad Dad” in Chinese), intends to explore the
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ancient space of Chu. These writers, either doing fieldwork or searching
a heap of musty old books or papers, ask themselves that where we come
from, how our nation forms, what regulates our character, and where and
when we have our fate [. . . ],
«As if on cue, we all form a story in a virtual space, for me it is “the
little Bao Village”, Li Hangyu’s Gechuanjiang, Han Shaogong’s Ba
Ba Ba makes up an ancient village where witchcraft and totem are
in prevalence», «There’s also a fictional village in Shandong writer
Zhang Wei’s novel The fable of September» (Wang ). In my opin-
ion, the authors of “root–seeking literature” do have the intention of
writing, moreover, the intention is very conscious and clear, that is
seeking our cultural root, although they express in different ways. The
original intention of the author can be said to be a blend of collective
consciousness and collective unconscious, the cultural root seeking is
the basic meaning that the collective consciousness gives their works
in origin, and when they start to write, the collective consciousness,
presented as the collective unconscious way, dominates his distinc-
tive writing process, and their creation is the “spiritually objectified
substance” which embodies their personality. But in any case, it is
the collective consciousness of seeking cultural root that consists the
common creative intention of the writers in this group, that is, the
original intention of the author. This is an objective fact. Literary
criticism cannot arbitrarily interpret their works in a powerful and un-
constrained style, completely ignore or abandon the author’s original
intention.
People may wonder, «is it true that “there are a thousand Hamlets
in a thousand people’s eyes”?» Does this truth still effects? I think
it is of course still effective. But truth is conditional and limited. Be-
cause this old maxim implies another layer of meaning that often
overlooked: in one thousand minds of the audience can exist one
thousand Hamlet, but although there’s one thousand, or even ten
thousand Hamlet, it must still be the Hamlet, rather than other ir-
relevant person. Here Hamlet can be understood as Shakespeare’s
creation of the spiritually objectified substance, namely, the text of the
works. And this text is the limits and the boundaries of interpretation
that the audience (reader) can make, which cannot be broken. Italian
writer and critic Umberto Eco once said:
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The authors provide to the appreciator a kind of work to be done: he does
not know exactly how his works will be done in certain way, but he knows
that the completed work will still be his work, not another work. After the
end of the deduction of a conversation, the form will be specified, and this
form is still his form, though the form is made up by others in a way that
the author is not completely predictable of. (Eco , p. )
Acknowledged that readers (appreciators) have the right to add
their understandings in different ways to increase the value of mean-
ing, in order to complete the “to be done” works that the authors
provide, Eco stresses that «the finished work will still be his works»,
the author’s power of dominating the meaning of the work should not
and cannot be deprived. The meaning from the author is a guidance,
direction and restriction to the reader’s reading and reception.
Secondly, the text of the works is one of the three elements in literary
activities, and also the second one of the three–links in the activities. On
the one hand, it is the achievement that the writer uses artistic creation
to objectify his own thoughts and feelings through literary discourse,
namely, spiritually objectified substance of the author, which should
contain the author’s original meaning; But the text, as an intermediary
connection between the writer and the readers, is an important part
of the meaning chain in literary activities, it is not just an extension
of the original meaning from the author, but much more than (not
be equal to) the author’s original meaning. Because the literary text,
which consists of literary discourse, has its relative independence when
breaking away from the author, whose meaning filed has great expansion.
Especially the excellent literary works had great possibility of being
explained for its contemporary and late–era readers and interpreters.
On the other hand, the text does not exist in isolation, and it exists in
the contact with the reader, and in the reader’s reading, appreciation
and creative interpretation. However, for the reader, the text is the basis,
premise and starting point of reading, appreciation, understanding and
interpretation. Without the text and its meaning, reading, appreciation
or interpretation will be out of question. Therefore, although the text has
independence, it is a relative independence. It cannot be said that the text
has nothing to do with the author after being created as structuralists
claim. Meanwhile, it cannot be isolated from the reader, or it is just
a lifeless language symbol, and its meaning cannot be presented and
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realized. Here, text takes intermediary role between authors and readers
in literary activities, which is a necessary part of literary meaning chain
in value–added transition from author to reader, and it is after all given
by both the two subjects.
It should be noted that, although the meaning of literary text comes
from the author, it is much more than (not be equal to) the meaning
that the author gives to. The literary text has its relative independence
after being separated from the author, and its meaning field must be
expanded, particularly the outstanding literary work, which leaves
a huge space for interpretation for the readers of different ages. For
many reasons, I just mentioned three points: one is the rhetoric of
literary language in literary works, the reader is bound to have some
deviation, change or development from the author’s meaning when
reading, the range of their interpretation may not be completely
confined to the original meaning of the author. One argument in
Chinese classical poetry that «Poetry has no absolute interpretation»
(Dong, p. ) shows that the meaning of poetry is beyond (much more
than) the meaning of poet. Secondly, the literary works, especially the
Chinese classical poetry pursues implied meaning and image out of
images in the relationship between the language, the meaning and
the image. There’s one thesis in the Book of Changes that «words don’t
convey all its connotation, establishing lively and concrete images to
express abstract meaning». For this, the Confucian Ethnics in the
Song dynasty Zhu Xi said that the language of poetry should convey
the meaning of the poet with lively and vivid image. Consequently,
it shouldn’t take a lot of linguistic reasons to analyze the poetry, or
the poet’s own living meanings will be killed. Here means that the
“meaning” and the “image” is more than “language”, especially the
whole lively image can contain endless implication. The literary text,
through language building and the construction of the literary image
of every figure (image), expresses rich connotation which is greater
than the language symbol refers to, and certainly beyond the author’s
writing intention and purpose in specific context and certain state of
mind. Thirdly, the literary work itself leaves huge space for the reader
to hermeneutics. As Roman Ingarden, an expert of phenomenological
aesthetics once said, literary works are a whole organic structure
composed of four levels, among which the “represented object” and
“schematized aspect” often contain some “uncertainty” and “blank”
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(Ingarden ), which need to be filled, determined and re–created
by the reader. Hereon, the text of the works, as the product of the
author’s intentional activities, of course, contains the meaning of the
author, which is one of its potential elements; However, it remains
unfinished and cannot be self–sufficient, the viewer must «“explain”
the work as usual, or [. . . ] reconstruct the work according to its
effective characteristics through the common creative activities of
appreciation» (Ingarden , p. ), so the meaning of the works
must be greater than the original intention of the author.
The above three points, illuminate that the meaning of literary
text, which is a bridge between the author and the reader, should
firstly contain the meaning of the author. But compared to the au-
thor’s meaning, it has expansion and development; while compared to
the reader’s meaning, it has a relative independence, objectivity and
freedom, and cannot freely manipulate by the reader. Literary text
should be an important link and inevitable extension of literary works’
meaning. It is the premise and starting point of reading, interpretation
and criticism. It is the intermediary and link between the author and
the reader. It is one of the indispensable aspects and main sources that
consists the whole meaning of literary works.
In the next place, the third meaning source of literary works is the
reader’s reading, interpretation and criticism. According to the social
and historical context and the individual literary experience, the readers
and the critics will have a creative interpretation of the literary texts with
certain objective freedom, which must lead to accretion of implications:
including creation, development, supplement, expand, modification, ad-
justment, and so on.it may also be correction, part–change, transforma-
tion with the change of the times. The foregoing has been made more
elaborate on this point, I will no longer repeat here.
In a word, we can say that the meaning of literary works, must
include the author’s meaning, but it is not only endowed by the author;
must contain re–creation meaning from readers, but not completely
created by the reader; It should be created by the author and the
reader to interact with each other, and continuously generated in the
dynamic process among the three elements of the author, the text and
the reader. In short, on the source of the meaning of literary works, I
hold a generative textual meaning–centered argument, which includes
the meaning from the author and open to the reader’s re–creation.
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The Subjective Intention in the Historical Entity
and Its Objective Interpretation
X W*
 : L’intenzione soggettiva nell’entità storica e la sua interpre-
tazione oggettiva
: In response to the discussion in the field of literature about
whether the author’s intention is present in the interpretation, this es-
say proposes to investigate the universal “historical entity” in order to
grasp philosophically the actual existence of the subjective intention in
such entity and the ways in which the objective interpretation of the
historical entity encompasses and transcends the subjective intention.
My basic point is that various intentions of the historical agent can-
not but be present in the truly objective interpretation of the historical
entity, but it is insufficient and sometimes misleading to orient the inter-
pretation simply toward the subjective intention, because the “author”
and her intention are themselves rooted in specific conditions of the
time or historical circumstances. The problematic facing contemporary
hermeneutics is the interrelation between the circumstances of the au-
thor of the “text” and those of the interpreter herself. The development
of contemporary hermeneutics, especially the reassessment of the sig-
nificance of “prejudice”, the explication of the concept of the “fusion of
horizons” and the establishment of the principle of “effective history”,
enables us to carry out the inquiries into this topic in a more profound
and more productive way.
: Historical Entity; Subjective Intention; Objective Interpretation;
Conditions of the Time; Hermeneutics.
∗ Fudan University.
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The discussion about the appreciation and interpretation of the work
(or text) seems to attract much interest in recent times in the field of
literature. Due to Jiang Zhang’s zealous advocacy and sharp ques-
tioning, such questions as whether the “author” is dead and whether
the “intention” is present will perhaps become the focus of debate,
thus encouraging in–depth studies on the realistic appreciation and
objective interpretation of the artistic work and the search for a road
that can truly avoid any relativistic or nihilistic conclusion. It is ob-
vious that, with the progression of such inquiries and debates, their
subject matter will not be limited to the field of literature but develop
gradually and inevitably into philosophical and hermeneutic issues
that are of broader significance. The present essay thus attempts to
) investigate the universal “historical entity” in order to ) grasp
philosophically the actual existence of the subjective intention in
such entity and ) the ways in which the objective interpretation
of the historical entity encompasses and transcends the subjective
intention.
.
The truly objective interpretation of the historical entity must first
and foremost incorporate in itself man’s subjective intention, because
the historical entity establishes itself first in its contrast and confronta-
tion with the natural entity, and such contrast and confrontation are
always and fundamentally defined by whether or not there is the
engagement of man’s subjective intention. The relatively crude ideas
of history in early times, on the one hand, only achieved objective
interpretations of history through the cancelation and obfuscation
of man’s subjective intention in favor of Providence or the divine
will; on the other hand, they were totally unable to command and
settle man’s subjective intention and could only linger in merely con-
tingent and subjective understandings of history. Vico’s great vision
of historical reason at the beginning of the th century only comes
into full bloom in the era of classical German philosophy, especially
Hegel’s philosophy, before which people still «believed history to be
built on an unfathomable stream, on the summit of an unforesee-
able volcano, so that any attempt to find in it some kind of law, idea,
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divinity or eternity would be legitimately and harshly rejected as a
boastful display, a priori nonsense, or empty imagination» (Gans ,
p. ).
The true difficulty occurring here consists in the fact that philos-
ophy, science and even what is generally called knowledge are all
characterized by the basic «exhortation to objectivity /Sachlichkeit/»
(Gadamer , p. ), which in general means their separation from
subjectivity or the subjective intention; however, the fundamental
characteristic of the historical entity is precisely that it is premised on
subjectivity and permeated by the subjective intention. It is as impos-
sible to imagine a historical entity not permeated by the subjective
intention as it is to constitute a natural entity premised on subjectivity.
What is essential in the objective interpretation of the historical entity
is therefore that such interpretation cannot be truly objective unless
it manages to encompass adequately and grasp firmly the subjective
intention involved in the historical entity. H.–G. Gadamer rightly
deems Hegel «one of the greatest champions» (ibidem) of the objec-
tivity of thinking because Hegel not only demands philosophically
that “history” be raised to a principle but also demands on the basis
of “the thing that matters” that the objectivity of history be grasped
with reference to the encompassment of all subjectivity or subjec-
tive intentions. The achievement of such objectivity certainly relies
on major development of philosophical thinking, but for the sake of
convenience, we may directly refer to Hegel’s renowned formulation
“the cunning of reason”.
For Hegel, it is reason that rules the world and hence history. Rea-
son is not only powerful, developing and actualizing itself in the guise
of the infinite capability, but also crafty and cunning, always achieving
its own end through man’s subjective intention and finishing its own
work through man’s subjectivity (desire, passion, opinion, etc.).
Thus, what we have called the subjective element—i.e. needs, impulses,
passions, particular interests, and opinions or subjective ideas—is immedi-
ately present to itself from the beginning in the shape of natural being or
natural will. This vast conglomeration of volition, interests, and activities is
the sum total of instruments and means which the world spirit employs to
accomplish its end, to make this end conscious and to give it reality. (Hegel
, p. )
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Every individual (or nation) is ignorant of reason’s own end, but she
actualizes it through her subjective intention and act without being
conscious or aware of it. Reason completes itself precisely by virtue
of such “cunning”, and only by virtue of such passage through the
subjective intention can reason manifest itself as the concrete reality
of history. We can then see that Hegel indeed incorporates man’s
subjective intention in the objective interpretation of history.
Such incorporation is so resolute and explicit that Hegel on the
one hand sums up as the “idea” the principles, ends, missions, etc. of
reason that still remain on the level of abstract universality, and on the
other hand sums up as the “passion” man’s subjective aspects such as
needs, impulses, interests and intentions. The term “passion” used
here denotes the subjective aspect of any act of the will. Hegel claims
that, but for the “passion”, no great project in world–history would
succeed. The abstractly universal “idea” remains merely in–itself or
a kind of latent possibility without passing from its “inwardness” to
true “existence”. Therefore,
a second moment is necessary before it can attain reality—that of actuation
or realization; and its principle is the will, the activity of mankind in the
world at large. [. . . ] The activity which puts [ideas] into operation and
endows them with real existence has its source in the needs, impulses,
inclinations, and passions of man. (Ibidem, pp. –)
Since Hegel comprehends the universal idea and the act of man’s
will as the warp and weft of world–history respectively, since only
through the interweaving of such warp and weft can the concrete
reality, i.e., the unity of essence and existence, begin to be actively
constituted, then, just as the majestic ebb and flow of the historical
process contain and reside in the act of man’s will in the most ex-
tensive way, only through incorporating rather than canceling man’s
subjective intention and act can the interpretation of the historical
entity be truly objective. It can be said in a metaphoric way that the
severance of either the warp or the weft will make the historical
image crisscrossing the textile fall apart and thus render illusory any
objective depiction of that image.
A preliminary conclusion presents itself accordingly: although the
“world spirit” as world–historical reason has its own end that is dis-
parate from man’s subjective intention, such subjective intention and
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its act nevertheless participate and reside ubiquitously in the histor-
ical reality; it is in this sense that the realistic grasp of history has
to contain the subjective intention of man’s act, or alternatively, that
such subjective intention has to be “present” in the objective inter-
pretation of the historical entity. The attempt to reject and banish
completely man’s subjective intention in order to shield the objective
interpretation of history amounts to none other than advocating a
kind of crude, naïve and unthinking objectivity or, to borrow J.G.
Droysen’s words, “eunuch–like objectivity”. A vivid analogy referred
to by Hegel can help us illustrate the ways in which man’s subjective
intention participates in the objective process of history. Say a man
driven by some perhaps not groundless motives for revenge sets fire
to his foe’s house. With respect to his subjective intention, what he
wants is to take vengeance on his foe, so that he merely applies a small
flame to a certain beam; however, it results in a big fire ruining the
entire block and causing vast casualties and economic losses, which
certainly goes far beyond the arsonist’s subjective intention. The first
point this analogy indicates is that this fire is a “historical event” and
the arsonist’s subjective intention is essentially related to it, which is
why the arsonist’s subjective intention cannot but be incorporated or,
alternatively, present in the objective interpretation of this historical
event. If this destructive fire were regarded as effectively far beyond or
at odds with the arsonist’s subjective intention, so that such intention
should be totally removed from the objective interpretation of this
event, then this event would no longer be a historical event but a
natural one, e.g., a wildfire or a fire caused by lightning or drought. It
follows that man’s subjective intention must be integrated adequately
into the objective interpretation of the historical entity.
However, this analogy at the same time indicates the principle
that, precisely because this historical event goes beyond and deviates
from that man’s subjective intention significantly, because this event
involves something outside the agent’s will and consciousness, the
objective interpretation of the historical entity cannot consist of man’s
subjective intention alone. For the subjective intention is insufficient
for such objective interpretation—rather, it is precisely due to such
insufficiency that the decisive significance of some kind of universal
. Quoted in Gadamer , p. .
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is revealed. «The perpetrator may not have been conscious of» the
big fire mentioned above, «and it may not have been his remotest
intention, but it is nevertheless the universal and substantial essence
of the deed itself, and a necessary consequence of it» (Hegel ,
p. ). Hegel is right insofar as the subjective intention is necessary
and yet insufficient for the objective interpretation of history, and
such insufficiency nevertheless makes visible what is “universal and
substantial” in history. For the objectivity and objective interpreta-
tion of the historical entity can in no way be attributed entirely to
man’s subjective intention: what has to be recognized here is not
someone’s or certain people’s subjective intentions, nor the sum or
average of all people’s subjective intentions, but something substantial
and universal. Hegel understands this as reason or the spirit that is
absolute, and thus ultimately calls his philosophy of history “the real
theodicy”, the verification of God in history; Marx certainly destroys
such speculative theological idea decisively, but this does not mean
that Marx ascribes the objective interpretation of the historical entity
either to nonhuman Providence or to man’s subjective intention (or
the sum of such intentions). In this regard, K. Löwith rightly says that
what is distinctive of Marx’s thought lies in that «he defends Hegel
against Feuerbach because he has grasped the decisive significance
of the universal; he attacks Hegel for casting a veil of philosophical
mystery over the universal relationships of history» (Löwith , p.
). In brief, the universal that is of decisive significance is for Marx
not the speculative absolute spirit but the changing structure of the
mode of production.
Therefore, in order to articulate the historical entity in a truly
objective, that is, concrete and realistic, way, one must on the one
hand grasp in depth the universal that is of decisive significance, and
on the other hand render man’s subjective intention actively present
in the objective interpretation of history and link it intrinsically to the
fundamental orientation of the universal. For it is precisely such link
or what I call the interweaving of the warp and weft that determines
how or in which ways the orientation of the universal is actualized, as
well as how and to what extent man’s subjective intention participates
in the project of that fundamental orientation. For example, as a
major historical event, the collapse of the Roman Republic was clearly
connected to Caesar’s acts and subjective intentions; it was also easy
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to discern among his various subjective intentions his great thirst for
the supreme power and fierce ambition. Even though such intention
was an «individual interest and egotistic desire», it had its place in the
objective constitution of this historical event. Only when a specific and
intrinsic link came into being between the fundamental orientation of
the universal and Caesar’s subjective intention could this fundamental
orientation be actualized “promptly and resolutely” as an objective
historical event, and Caesar’s desire, ambition, etc. become part of this
objective event instead of simply falling into mere dreams or illusions,
as was often the case for others. In this sense, what made Caesar’s
intention come true «was at the same time an inherently necessary
determination in the history of Rome and of the world. Thus not
just his own personal advantage was involved, for his work was the
product of an impulse which accomplished the end for which his age
was ready» (Hegel , p. ).
.
In the previous section I only deal with the subjective intention in
the historical entity and its objective interpretation in the most gen-
eral sense, and thus arrive at a most general view: the subjective
intention of the historical agent cannot but be present in the truly
objective interpretation of the historical entity, but an interpretation
derived from such subjective intention alone is inadequate and even
misleading. Moreover, as is known to all, there are different forms
of historical entities and different scales of historical interpretations,
and the subjective intentions of historical agents can also be classified
into disparate levels and types, from the simplest intentions originat-
ing from individual interests and egotistic desires to those oriented
by specific political or social goals and even such inherently “divine”
intentions as morality, ethos and religious piety, as well as various
ideals such as those of “rationality”, “good”, and “truth”. There is no
doubt that the objective interpretation of a specific historical entity
is contingent on the concretization of these differentiating factors
under the guidance of the aim of interpretation — I, however, only
intend to indicate the necessity of such concretization of the objective
interpretation instead of making any accurate classification.
 Xiaoming Wu
What needs considering now is the problem of the objective in-
terpretation of the “work”. In connection with the discussion above,
what is involved here is first the problem of the relationship between
the “author” and the “work”, of the position of the author’s subjective
intention in the objective interpretation of the work. Just as “work”
itself has extremely numerous meanings (one can even refer to any
historical entity as a “work”), the numerous objects in the work that
are most closely related to the task of interpretation constitute the
domain of the so–called “text”. The author of the text is a writer in a
broad sense, and just as such writers are varieties of people existing in
history, the text is itself a historical entity. In this most general sense,
the relationship between the writer and the text, or the inclusion of
the writer’s subjective intention in the internal constitution of the
text, on the whole parallels the position accounted for above of the
subjective intention in the objective interpretation of the historical
entity; however, we must be aware that the text is such a special type
of historical entity that not only does the writer’s subjective intention
in general differ from common types of intentions, but it is necessary
to carry out a differentiation of that intention according to the topic
and distinctive content of the text itself.
In most historical texts, for instance, the author’s political intention
and the political situation in which that intention is located always
manifest themselves explicitly or implicitly. This is the case even when
historical consciousness strongly demands to “extinguish the individ-
ual” in order to maintain the “neutral” objectivity of the historical
narrative. As we know, L.V. Ranke famously provides a celebrated for-
mula for the ideal of historical thinking by saying that the true task of
historical consciousness consists in understanding all evidences from
a previous time on the basis of the spirit of that previous time, that is,
those evidences must be freed from the prejudices of our own present
life and thus the past be known as a human phenomenon. Obviously,
this formula requires our own present prejudices (let alone those
which can be called “intentions”) to be strictly contained in order to
achieve the objective account of the historical entity. However,
even in those masterworks of historical scholarship that seem to be the
very consummation of the extinguishing of the individual demanded by
Ranke, it is still an unquestioned principle of our scientific experience
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that we can classify these works with unfailing accuracy in terms of the
political tendencies of the time in which they were written. When we read
Mommsen’s History of Rome, we know who alone could have written
it, that is, we can identify the political situation in which this historian
organized the voices of the past in a meaningful way. (Gadamer , p. )
In regard to the topic discussed here, such fact suggests that, first,
in such a historical text, the author’s intention—her political intention
in particular—is always present in a certain sense, for it would not be
possible to discern it in the text if it were not present at all. Second,
such political intention, whatever direction it points toward, is always
essentially related to the political trend and political situation of a spe-
cific time, or alternatively, is grounded in and feeds on the underlying
political conditions of that time. Third, even though it may be a rea-
sonable demand to contain one’s own intention or prejudice (in order
not to misinterpret past evidences), the Rankean exhortation does not
seem successful: on the one hand, texts striving to comply with this
exhortation still let out signs of intentions or prejudices in one way
or another; on the other hand, is a historical text completely purged
of what belong to the individual, especially the intention and preju-
dice, really possible? The moment such question arises, it is justifiable
that philosophical hermeneutics demands to reassess the position and
significance of “prejudice” in the writing and understanding of the
text.
In major historical events and eminent philosophical texts, we
can also observe similar circumstances, namely the ways in which
the “author’s” sociopolitical intention participates in the event or
the text and constitutes one of its substantial components. Socrates’s
death and Plato’s Republic are two well–known examples. Concerning
the former, it is easy for us to regard the death penalty imposed
on Socrates as a tragedy that was brought about by ignorance and
imprudence and could have been avoided, the philosopher being
the wronged protagonist. There were two charges against Socrates:
first, he seduced the youth into disobeying their parents; second, he
disbelieved the old deities and promoted a new deity. While the
old deities existed in the ethical world of Greece and served as the
guardians of its divinity, the new deity could not but come into fierce
conflict with that still existent ethical world and become its dangerous
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saboteur. The new deity was subjective freedom, self–consciousness
or the inwardness of thinking disclosed through the aphorism “know
thyself ”, and Socrates’s articulation of this new principle evinced his
genius; however, it was therefore justifiable that the national spirit
of Athens accused Socrates in order to «[rise] against the principle
which became fatal to him». «In place of the oracle, the personal
self–consciousness of every thinking man has come into play. This
inward certainty, however, is undoubtedly another new god, and not
the god of the Athenians existing hitherto, and thus the accusation
of Socrates was quite just». It follows that, in this great historical
event, not only was Socrates present but his intention that might
be called a sociopolitical one was decisively present, and it was this
philosophically articulated intention that acted as a justifiable party
in opposition to another equally justifiable party, namely the ethical
spirit of Athens.
What about Plato’s Republic, then? This text is often viewed as a
utopian fiction and even synonymous with such fiction. It is, however,
all too superficial only to regard it as Plato’s arbitrary fabrication or
subjective imagination. The time of this text was basically Socrates’s
time, the quintessence of which was the slow yet forceful emergence
of the principle of particular subjectivity and its progressive invasion
of the ethical world of Greece. Although this undoubtedly consti-
tuted the sociohistorical conditions of the writing of the Republic, we
should at the same time spell out how Plato’s sociohistorical intention
was embodied in that text. While Socrates recognized and articulated
the new principle, it was indeed Plato’s Republic that accounted for
the nature of the Greek ethos. «Plato was conscious that there was
breaking into that life a deeper principle which could appear in it
immediately only as a still unsatisfied longing, and so only as a source
of corruption. To combat it, he had to seek aid from that very longing
itself» (Hegel , p. ). It is this explication that should become the
pivot of the objective interpretation of the Republic, the phrase “to
combat it” pointing directly to Plato’s sociopolitical intention. Were
such intention totally dismissed, the “republic” would at most amount
to the thinker’s mere fantasy, and no truly objective interpretation
. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, eng. trans. by E.S. Haldane,
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpsocrates.htm.
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would be possible at all. Since the new deity, i.e., subjective particu-
larity, appeared in the Greek ethos immediately only as a source of
corruption, since the author of the text explicitly intended “to combat
it”,
in his Republic, Plato presents substantial ethical life in its ideal beauty
and truth; but he could only cope with the principle of self–subsistent
particularity, which in his day had forced its way into Greek ethical life, by
setting up in opposition to it his purely substantial state. He completely
excluded such particularity from his state. (Ibidem, p. )
We can see most clearly from this that the objective interpreta-
tion of the text of the Republic has to unambiguously incorporate
Plato’s sociopolitical intention, regardless of our attitude toward such
intention.
However, it is precisely here, when we demand to integrate the
“author’s” subjective intention into the objective interpretation of “the
thing that matters”, be it an event or a text, that the interpretation
oriented merely toward the author’s subjective intention immediately
and unmistakably gives away its most serious insufficiency—this is
the case even for those great thinkers and great philosophers who are
extraordinarily creative. On the one hand, the substantial content of
the event or the text, which can be regarded as the evolution of the
zeitgeist or the process of historical practice, transcends to a great
extent the “author’s” intention and can by no means be created by
that intention. While the objective interpretations of Socrates’s death
or Plato’s Republic have to include the “author’s” intention, the possi-
bility of the functioning of such intention lies in none other than the
situation of the time, namely the vital turning point faced by the ethi-
cal world of Greece invaded by the principle of subjective freedom.
On the other hand, therefore, neither the author as such nor her inten-
tion as such counts as the ultimate and thus no longer questionable
ground for the objective interpretation of the work. Although it is the
author and her intention that foster the comprehensive concretiza-
tion of the work and actualize it, only the universal that is of decisive
significance and can be briefly called “the situation of the time” con-
stitutes the realistic foundation that has substantial content. In this
sense, just as the work is to be seen as the product of the situation
of the time, the author and her intention are also to be deemed such
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products. Only in the situation in which the principle of subjective
freedom invaded and threatened the ethical world of Greece could
there be Socrates’s death and Plato’s Republic as well as Socrates’s
intention of proclaiming firmly the principle of subjective freedom
and, by contrast, Plato’s intention of attempting to reject that principle
in favor of the substantial state.
.
Now that the general relationship between the subjective intention in
the historical entity and its objective interpretation has by and large
been clarified, we are faced with some more complicated and more
profound problems that are to be addressed as distinctively hermeneu-
tic problems. The key issue is first the enormous “gap” between the
situation of the text and that of the interpreter herself, and thus the
task of hermeneutics is «the bridging of personal or historical distance
between minds» (Gadamer , p. ). Despite their aspiration to
achieve in specific ways the objective interpretation of the text and its
author, early hermeneutic schemes nevertheless neglected or even
dismissed the historical situation in which the interpreter’s objectivity
was rooted. In this regard, such schemes were naïvely oriented toward
the elimination of the interpreter’s own situation. For example, Plato’s
situation when writing the Republic and the situations of today’s inter-
preters in the st century are as different as heaven and earth, but the
objective interpretation of the Republic was alleged to consist in to-
tally forsaking the interpreters’ present situations and being immersed
in the situation in which Plato’s intention took shape and operated.
Such a scheme was already brought forward even in Spinoza’s biblical
exegesis, which held that we must deduce the author’s own intention
or mens from historical materials, that our basic task was to grasp
historically the author’s mind and what she had meant, and to over-
come our prejudice. Similarly, although it is the incomparable merit
of F.D.E. Schleiermacher and W. Dilthey to establish the prototype
of contemporary hermeneutics, they still believe the knower’s (inter-
preter’s) own present situation to be merely negative. That is to say,
such situation is at the root of prejudice and distortion that hinder
the achievement of the correct understanding, and is thus what the
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interpreter must transcend. Such a hermeneutic scheme is admittedly
right in a preliminary and partial sense, and is in line with people’s
common sense, but is soon vehemently challenged in philosophical
terms.
Thanks to Heidegger’s ontological critique of the philosophy of
subjectivity (of cogito or self–consciousness), and thanks to Gadamer’s
reestablishment of philosophical hermeneutics on that basis, the po-
sition that seeks to locate the objectivity of the interpretation of the
historical entity (especially the text) merely in the situation of the au-
thor’s intention, and to thoroughly forsake or banish the interpreter’s
own situation, becomes deeply problematic. To put the question sim-
ply: is it possible for us to thoroughly escape our own sociohistorical
situation and to utterly dwell without prejudice in the situation of
the author’s own intention? Or in more philosophical terms, is the
self–determining subject of transcendental philosophy that is essen-
tially without a situation and non–historical possible? Can the objec-
tive understanding of the historical entity be achieved by means of
the subjective act that removes each and every situation and hence
prejudice of the interpreter?
Despite certain preparations made by earlier philosophical giants,
particularly Hegel, Marx and Heidegger, for the solution to the ques-
tion, it is Gadamer who gives a systematic response to it in the form
of universal hermeneutics. He calls the position that supposes the
interpreter or knower to be capable of escaping and departing from
her own historical situation “methodological alienation”, and points
out critically that the historical situation in which we exist may be
cast aside only when it is no more than a purely contingent and sub-
jective condition for our understanding or interpretation; but if the
interpreter’s own present situation is the ontological condition for
the unfolding of all her acts, such situation is already involved essen-
tially and antecedently in the entire process of her understanding or
interpretation. Therefore, the interpreter can in no way get rid of
and leave her present situation merely by means of adopting some
attitude. We understand such situation to be the conditions of the
time determined in a concrete sociohistorical manner, from which
neither the author of the text nor its interpreter can be separated, and
it cannot be otherwise. As Hegel states, «it is just as absurd to fancy
that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to
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fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes»
(Hegel , p. ).
Consequently, we are faced with a far more complicated issue.
While our previous discussion already confirms that the objective in-
terpretation of the historical entity must include, but not be limited to,
the “author’s” (agent’s) subjective intention, and such non–limitedness
is because the historical entity itself, the agent and her subjective in-
tention are transcended and endowed with meanings by their specific
sociohistorical situation, what should also be attended to now is the
interpreter who exists and interprets in a quite different sociohistor-
ical situation, along with her intention determined in that situation;
moreover, due to the huge gap between the author, her work and
the conditions of her time, on the one hand, and the understander or
interpreter and the conditions of her time, on the other, it becomes
necessary to grasp the relationship and construct a communication
between the two parties. Contemporary hermeneutics clearly works
and makes achievements mainly in this field, and such problematic
will immediately enable us to considerably enrich and meaningfully
enlarge our discussion about the subjective intention in the historical
entity and its objective interpretation. The following three hermeneu-
tic topics are particularly relevant to our discussion.
First, the significance of so–called “prejudice” is to be reassessed.
When Schleiermacher and Dilthey equate the meaning of the text
or the deed with its author’s subjective intention, thus regarding the
task of understanding or interpretation as recovering the meaning
of the text or the deed that belonged to the original author herself,
the interpreter’s own historical situation is totally castrated, and she
becomes an abstract, supra–sociohistorical subject as a result—it is
alleged that only such subject’s neutral and unprejudiced conscious-
ness can guarantee the objectivity of knowledge. However, Gadamer
asserts that such subject and objectivity of knowledge do not exist at
all, for the actual interpreter who exists in a specific historical situa-
tion is a finite subject (in contrast to that kind of abstract and infinite
subject) who is only able to constitute “prejudiced” objective knowl-
edge insofar as it cannot be rid of its own situation and become the
author’s own consciousness. “Prejudice” thus by no means implies
the possibility of arbitrary interpretation but, on the contrary, implies
that the interpreter’s own intention should be recognized as having
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its real source in the interpreter’s own concrete historical situation. In
this regard, instead of being an obstacle or negative factor that needs
removing, “prejudice” is precisely a positive premise on which the
finite interpreter existing in a specific situation is capable of historical
understanding. «In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that
prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial direct-
edness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our
openness to the world» (Gadamer , p. ). In a nutshell, prejudice
is here derived from the interpreter’s existence in her own historical
situation; we call the interpreter “prejudiced” because she and her
intention work within the bounds of such situation. Reversely, only
things without consciousness, i.e., natural entities, and that which is
not bound by any situation, i.e., God, can be unprejudiced.
The second point concerns the concept of the “fusion of horizons”.
Since there exists a huge gap between the text and its author, on the
one hand, and the interpreter, on the other, since it is impossible for
the interpreter to wipe off her own historical situation and subject
herself without prejudice to the intention of the very author of the
text, how can the communication between the two parties be pos-
sible? What is called for here is an active “dialogue” between them,
between the text and the interpreter. Like every genuine dialogue,
the hermeneutic dialogue taking place between the text and the inter-
preter involves a kind of mutually penetrating interplay and has the
dialectical feature of altering both the orientation of the meaning of
the text and the exercise of the interpreter’s understanding. Such dia-
logue is guided by questions, so that what the interpreter must recover
and discover are the questions the text attempted to answer and at
the same time posed constantly to its interpreters. While this point of
view has its source in Hegel’s description of the acquisition of knowl-
edge in his Phenomenology of Spirit (that is, the consciousness that is
taking cognizance of its object and that object itself are simultaneously
transformed and reunited with each other at a higher and broader
stage), it is in our continual dialogue with the text that, for Gadamer,
we may continually transcend the historical horizon of the text and
fuse it with our own horizon that is at the same time changed. The ex-
ercise of understanding together with the interpretation founded on it
is always the fusion process unfolding through the dialogue between
different horizons. In this sense, understanding and interpretation
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are by nature not only dialogical but also supra–subjective—the fu-
sion and transformation of horizons occurring in understanding and
interpretation transcend the interlocutors’ subjective consciousness.
The last point concerns the principle of “effective history (Wirkungs-
geschichte)”. This principle basically consists in that, when historical
thinking seeks to grasp some historical object, it must also be aware
of its own historicity, of its being itself located, as is the case for
its object, in a concrete historical situation. «The true historical ob-
ject is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a
relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the real-
ity of historical understanding» (Gadamer , p. ). Thus, true
hermeneutics must reveal the entire reality of history precisely by
means of understanding, and understanding or interpretation by na-
ture pertains to “effective history”. Heidegger’s articulation of the
ontological significance of “understanding” establishes the foundation
of such principle of “effective history”. For Heidegger, understanding
is not some subjective “act” but a mode of being. It is the historicity
of Dasein itself that evinces the utter impossibility of eliminating the
understander’s own participation in the historical present by means of
ever more refined methodological reflections; all interpretations, in-
cluding scientific ones, are indeed bound by the interpreter’s concrete
situation. Gadamer hence comprehends effective history as an onto-
logical condition that precedes every new possible dialogue between
the interpreter and the text or the event she attempts to understand.
In this sense, so–called effective history not only provides multiple
possibilities for different understandings and interpretations of the
historical entity, but also equips supra–subjective understanding and
interpretation with the realistic foundation on which they can rest:
All self–knowledge arises from what is historically pregiven, what with
Hegel we call “substance”, because it underlies all subjective intentions
and actions, and hence both prescribes and limits every possibility for
understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity (Andersheit).
(Ibidem, p. )
We cannot in this short essay elaborate and explicate all this in
greater detail. The gist of this essay is that the developments and
achievements of contemporary hermeneutics offer some principal
lines of thought that enable us to carry out the inquiries into the
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subjective intention in the historical entity and its objective inter-
pretation in a more profound and more productive way, and along
which our basic conclusion can be expressed more clearly. There is
no doubt that the positive progress of contemporary hermeneutics
and its authentic inheritance follow and continue the path beaten by
classical German philosophy, especially Hegel’s philosophy, so that its
achievements prove the heir to a great heritage, namely the concept
of “objective spirit”—it is the objective spirit that aufhebt subjective
consciousness, subsuming the latter within itself. With regard to the
objective interpretation of the historical entity, hermeneutics funda-
mentally acknowledges the presence and importance of the subjective
intention (without being so naïve as to seek to totally exclude subjec-
tivity), but is at the same time fully aware of the severe inadequacy
of interpreting the historical entity through the subjectivity of the
act of meaning. When hermeneutics claims that understanding or
interpretation can transcend — and this is always necessarily the
case — the “author’s” subjective act of meaning, it already locates
antecedently such subjective act in the objective understanding of the
historical entity; since, however, the “author’s” subjective intention
is not likely to be no more and no less than the historical meaning
of her act, the objective interpretation must not confine itself to the
“author’s” subjective plan or subjective intention. At any rate, the true
progress of contemporary hermeneutics always involves the demand
to further the objective interpretation of the historical entity that, far
from eliminating the subjectivity of the act of meaning, discovers via
such subjectivity the realistic foundation in which it is grounded, and
thus arrives at the domain in which the objective meaning of history
resides.
For the real task of historical study is not to understand the subjective inten-
tions, plans, and experiences of the men who are involved in history. Rather,
it is the great matrix of the meaning of history that must be understood and
that requires the interpretive effort of the historian. (Gadamer , p. )
It may be provocative to abandon this basic task and fundamental
orientation, and to derive extremist and eccentric views simply from
a bricolage of hermeneutic doctrines in a fragmented way, but this
gesture goes astray from the outset.
 Xiaoming Wu
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On Emotion
Judgement of Narrative under the Pressure
of Affective Intentionality
G T*
 : Sull’emozione: il giudizio della narrazione sotto la pres-
sione dell’intenzionalità affettiva.
: Emotion is the judgement of a narrative transformation from ten-
dentiousness to purposiveness through “co–feeling” on the part of the
subject and the physical and mental reactions elicited by thisjudgement
under the pressure of affective intentionality. The “faculties endowed
with feelings” are a priori, while the feeling itself is empirical and sym-
bolic. Emotion can be symbolisedbybeing and happiness, both located
at a higher level. Emotion is only one phase in the quest for meaning.
The semiotic feature of emotion is relative: it is neither the onset nor the
end of the pursuit of meaning.
: Affective Intentionality; Tendentiousness; Purposiveness; Judge-
ment; Emotion Semiotics; Happiness.
. Emotion and Narrative
Many analytic studies have focused on the causes of emotion. Zhang
() summarised the perspectives on the semiotics of emotion as
) «carrying a sense of “structural” trait», based on Roland Barthes’
analytic perspective in A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments; ) Algirdas Julien
Greimas and his student Jacques Fontanille’s semiotics of passion based
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on modal theories; and ) Barthes’ narrative perspective in the “Jour-
nal of Mourning”. Moreover, Sartre () proposed a perspective
«founded on the passionate subject, the opposite of the judgemental
subject», and Anne Henault offered a textual perspective by “feeling”
emotionless expressions. Each perspective conveys a fundamental
matter overlooked by most philosophers: the underlying cause of
emotion is narrative. For instance, when someone is afraid of a hand
in the dark, that person feels fear only after turning it into a narrative
of an experience threatening one’s personal security. A simple sign
has no effect on emotional status. Narrative ability is a prerequisite for
emotion. If we consider “flower” as a sign, the sign itself evokes no
feeling in the recipient. It can only trigger emotions after becoming a
narrative. In tragic contexts, it is an emblem of sorrow, like Lin Daiyu
shedding tears at the sight of a flower. In happy contexts, it becomes
a symbol of joy, as flowers are an indispensable part of festivals. In
horror movies, it is the embodiment of fear, as represented by Li
Kelong’s film Flower’s Curse. In short, emotionis derive from narrative.
Narrative ability is essential for triggering emotions. In turn, people
with emotions are able to create narrative.
According to several studies, there are two types of narratives: “objec-
tive narrative” or “zero–emotion narrative” and ”emotional narrative”
or “subjective narrative”. Abrams (, pp. –) argued that
anobjective work is one in which the author (or the narrator) presents the
invented situation or the fictional characters and their thoughts, feelings,
and actions and undertakes to remain detached and noncommittal [. . . ]
[In contrast,] a subject work is one in which the author (or the narrator)
incorporates personal experiences, or projects into the narrative, his or her
personal disposition, judgements, values, and feelings.
In short, narrative focuses on emotional involvement rather than
emotions. In terms of narrative outcomes, the “injected” emotions
may affect the recipient’s emotional response, but not to a degree
of domination, as different recipients may report varied responses
for the same narrative. The emotional gap between the narrator and
the reader, even among readers themselves, is due to emotions being
incorporated not in a narrative but in the secondary narrative of the
recipient–related text. Even for the narrator, the emotions injected
into the text are developed in the secondary narrative.
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Lloyd (, pp. –) listed several definitions of emotion from
different perspectives, all relevant to signs, meaning and narrative:
Human emotion is conceived to be a motivation–laden feeling resulting
jointly from shifts in arousal and from the meaning attached to those arousal
shifts; [. . . ] Emotion is seen as a sensory–feeling state that acts as a motivator,
categorizer, and selector of perceptual and cognitive events and behaviors;
[. . . ] Emotion is held to be a differentiated action set, often context bound
based on a specific information structure in memory; [. . . ] Emotion is an
integrated unit of experience consisting of: ) a distinctive perception; )
an implicit wish and implied action (motive); and ) a typical expression
(facial and/or postural) that is species–specific (and in man also culturally
adapted).
The first definition relates to two points, “shifts” and “meaning”,
both referring to narrative. The second definition addresses the “cog-
nitive events and behaviors”, both also relevant to narrative. Although
vague, by mentioning “action set”, the third definition is undoubtedly
narrative–related. Finally, the fourth definition highlights the “implied
action (motive)” and the wish of the subject, emphasising its con-
nection to narrative. In other words, these various perspectives on
emotion further illustrate that emotion is derived from narrative.
In conclusion, emotion is the tendentious reaction to a certain nar-
rative in which the emotional subject isinvolved by way of co–feeling.
“Co–feeling” is essential to emotion generation. If one is prone to
“co–feeling” and considers possible outcomes by putting him/herself
in the character’s position, he/she will have emotional responses.
Mundane emotions must be completely uprooted if one wants to
be “nonchalant”. As the saying goes, “fellow sufferers commiserate
with each other”, with “commiseration” resulting from “similar suffer-
ings”; this makes it easier to co–feel, as resemblance is its foundation.
Here “co–feeling” means “transference”. The term “transference”
was coined by American scholar Robert Visher and Carl Gustav Jung,
who wrote a book titled The Psychology of the Transference. Chai
and Qing (, p. ) proposed that «both the “angle of shooting”
and “perspective taken by a narrator” fall into the early extension
of transference, which requires the interlocutors to really “co–feel”
with each other by being in the other’s shoes to arouse emotional
resonance». Thus, “co–feeling” is the first step towards “transference”,
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indicating that the recipient can only register emotions through ten-
dentiousness by envisioning him/herself as one of the characters. As
Wang (, p. ) proposed in her interpretations of Ji Kang’s On the
Absence of Sentiments in Music, «music knows nothing about sorrow
or joy; it all rests upon the susceptibility of the listener and the degree
of proficiency of the performer».
Neither “transference” in psychology nor “empathy” in art dis-
cusses the mechanism of emotion generation, which is often consid-
ered an established fact. “Empathy” in art refers to the projection of
one’s feelings on the object, by «shifting my own feelings to other
beings, so as to become part of their experience» (Zhu , p. ).
Conversely, “transference” in psychology is a “psychological schema”,
referring to «an enduring symbolic framework that organizes constel-
lations of thought, feeling, memory, and expectation about self and
others» (Grant & Crowley , p. ). The semiotics of emotion differs
from these two terms as it is based on the mechanism of emotion gen-
eration, suggesting that emotion carries meaning whose underlying
principles are analysed. By “co–feeling”, one substitutes him/herself
for the character in the narrative and makes tendentious judgements
whose outcomes and responses are emotions.
. Intentionality and Affective Intentionality
“Intentionality” and “affective intentionality” are two connected but
nuanced concepts. Intentionality is the nascent point of Edmund
Husserl’s school of phenomenology, which is itself based on Descartes
(Stumpf & Fieser , p. ). Simplifying and clarifying this notion,
Thompson (, p. ) wrote that «in a narrow sense, they define
intentionality as object–directedness. In a broader sense, they define it
as openness to the world or what is “other” (“alterity”)». According to
Husserl, intentionality illustrates the relationship between expression,
meaning and object. Zhao (, p. ) proposed that «intentionality
is the tendentiousness of consciousness to search for and acquire
the meaning of an object, as well as the main function and mode
of existence exhibited by consciousness», which involves not only
the “object” but also the “meaning”. Velarde–Mayol (, pp. –)
also argued that «expressions have not only meaning but a reference
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to an object», in other words, «the physical part of an expression is
completely indifferent to what it means». In short, intentionality hasat
least two implications: object– and meaning–directedness. Moreover,
when summarizing Husserl’s ideas, Spiegelberg (, p. ) defined
intentionality as “directing activity to object”. In addition to inten-
tionality, many scholars have paid attention to “object”, such as Bara
(, p. )who argued that intentionality has two layers of significant
connotations: “intention is always object–directed” and “intentionality
is always deliberateness”. Other scholars have focused on “meaning”;
for instance, bonlarko (, p. ) proposed that «intentionality
can be regarded as the nature of various linguistic meanings». Regard-
less of its various interpretations, intentionality invariably relates to
“directedness”.
As a specialty of the mind, intentionality serves to distinguish
between human and machine (Thagard , p. ). John Searle’s
thought experiment, known as the “Chinese Room”, and Alan Tur-
ing’s “Turing Test” shed light on this issue. Yet, prior to intentionality,
there is “agency”, which allows primitive macromolecules to «have
enough complexity to perform actions», as «there are reasons for
what macromolecules do, but the macromolecules are unaware of
those reasons» (Dennett , p. ). In other words, agency allows
intentionalityto grow. From a micro–level perspective, agency is the
product of directedness; without the latter, agency would not exist.
Therefore, directedness is the precondition of intentionality, which
leads our consciousness to incorporate the object in conscious ac-
tivities, whereas affective intentionality guides our consciousness to
immerse the object in affective ones.
This paper does not mix affective intentionality with tendentious-
ness. The term “tendentiousness” is unclear in Western languages or
in Chinese. Based on common sense, tendentiousness is a possibility
rather than an established fact. Ryle (, p. ) argued that «to possess
a dispositional property is to be bound or liable to be in a particular
state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is
realized». According to Ryle, tendentiousness is close to “dispositional
property”. In other words, it refers to the possibility of achieving a
certain outcome rather than the outcome itself.
Thompson (, pp. –) contended that the “dynamics of affect”
came from a primordial fluctuation of the body’s feeling and move-
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ment tendencies. «This fluctuation manifests in any given instance as
a particular movement tendency or motion disposition inhabited by a
particular affective force». The fluctuations of “valences” are analysed
as follows: as movement tendencies, they exhibit habit movement
and posture valences — “toward/away, approach/withdrawal, en-
gage/avoid, receptive/defensive”; as feeling tendencies, they exhibit
affective and hedonic valences — “attraction/repulsion, like/dislike,
pleasant/unpleasant, and positive/negative”; as socially situated, they
exhibit social valences — “dominance/submission, nurturance/rejec-
tion”; finally, as culturally situated, they exhibit normative and cultural
valences — “good/bad, virtuous/unvirtuous, wholesome/unwhole-
some, worthy/unworthy, praiseworthy/blameworthy”. Although
complicated, this classification highlights the fundamental problem
of the dynamics of affect: all emotion is the product of two opposite
judgements (positive and negative). The analysis of emotional tenden-
tiousness cannot escape the “bipolarity of feelings”, which refers to
positive and negative attitudes (Feng , p. ). Here, tendentiousness
indicates the orientation of emotions.
In the semiotics of emotion, the term “affective intentionality” re-
lates to the directedness exhibited by the subject of value who makes
judgements by connecting object and meaning with “personally as-
sociated” experiences. Emotion refers to the physical and mental
reactions provoked by such judgements. Thus, as a unique intention-
ality of consciousness, affective intentionality refers to the judgements
about the ego and the object. Although some scholars have attempted
to reduce affective intentionality and the intentionality of familiar
intentional attitudes, such as desires or cognitions, Montague ()
viewed it as sui generis and unreducible. In other words, affective
intentionality remains a controversial concept.
Summarising Dufrenne’s ideas, Deng suggested that «intention-
ality boils down to the affective intentionality» (, p. ), con-
sidering emotion as a priori serving as not only the premise of our
getting–to–know–the–world acts, but also the essence of intentional-
ity. Similarly, Dufrenne (, p. ) proposed that emotion «should
be realized at the outset that affectivity is not invoked here merely as
the means by which the a priori is revealed. The a priori can itself be
affective in nature just as the a priori of understanding is rational in
nature». In addition to Dufrenne, both Heidegger and Merleau–Ponty
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«had made emotion the original mode of existence for human beings»
(Zhang & Hu , p. ). Unlike Husserl, Max Scheler’s phenomenol-
ogy focused on the emotional side of consciousness or the rational side
of the unconscious mind. However, he also contended that «compared
to other behaviors, the affective intentionality is bestowed before-
hand» (Frings , p. ). Sartre (, pp. –) adopted a similar
stance on desires, suggesting that «desire cannot posit its suppression
as its supreme end nor single out for its ultimate goal any particular
act, it is purely and simply the desire of a transcendent object». He
associated desire with Scheler and Husserl’s discussions on affective
intentionality, demonstrating that desire cannot be theorised. Despite
many discussions about intentionality and affective intentionality,
studying these concepts remains a priority because of our limited
knowledge of their generation mechanisms. Indeed, Boden (,
p. ) admitted that «we have sufficient reason to believe that the
neuro–protein carries intentionality, but we know nothing as to how
does it, as neuro–protein, develop such kind of ability». Cognitive sci-
ence has not yet properly addressed this issue, leaving it temporarily
to philosophy.
Acknowledging affective intentionality, Roland Barthes (, p.
) found it elusive: «Affect was what I didn’t want to reduce; being
irreducible, it was thereby what I wanted, what I ought to reduce the
photograph to; but could I retain an affective intentionality, a view of
the object which was immediately steeped in desire, repulsion, nos-
talgia, euphoria?». Although difficult to grasp, affective intentionality
remains a subject of interest in philosophy.
Dufrenne (, p. ) considered (affective) a priori as «a capacity
of the subject to open himself to the object and to predetermine its
apprehension; as constituting the subject as subject, [. . . ] a priori char-
acterizes both the object and the subject (as well as specifying their
reciprocity)». Deng (, p. ) summarized affective intentionality
as «resting on our personal experiences and subjective imagination».
In other words, affective intentionality involves the subject and the
object and their reciprocity. According to Scheler,
the affective intentionality boils down to behaviors of love; [. . . ] affective
intentionality lies in the preference for behaviors of high (or low) value over
those with imparted value, [in which preference]is the voluntary attraction
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to a certain object, residing in the heart and the order of love, [and good
and evil] are no correlates with the affective intentionality. (Frings , pp.
–)
Here “love” and “preference” highlight the attitude of the sub-
ject towards the object, while “good” and “evil” represent judge-
ments without “love” and “preference”. This definition explicitly
distinguishes between intentionality and affective intentionality, the
latter focusing on the “ego” as the starting point, whose targets of
intention are the judgement and attitude of the subject towards the
object. Dufrenne (, p. ) also emphasised «the difference be-
tween a judgement which makes a representation explicit and one
which articulates a feeling», which can be interpreted as the difference
between intentionality and affective intentionality.
In short, affective intentionality is the cause of emotion and exerts
pressure, similar to the pressure that intentionality exerts on meaning
acquisition behaviors. Wang (, p. ) brilliantly inferred that
as is recorded in The Book of Rites, «those filial offspring who love their par-
ents dearly are supposed to have congenial temperament, which registers
gaiety on their face; in turn, those with gaiety are bound to have fair coun-
tenance». Deep love serves as the premise for those natural modifications.
This chain of affective reactions from “congenial temperament”
to “gaiety” to “fair countenance” is rooted in “deep love”, which
denotes affective intentionality, also called tendentiousness. In short,
intentionality is engendered by affection and indifference, which in
turn incite tendentiousness. With “deep love” as the root of affective
intentionality and tendentiousness, the generation of such feelings is
only natural and certain.
. Tendentiousness, Anticipation and Judgement
The main difference between intentionality and affective intentional-
ity is their targeted object: the former deals with signs, the latter with
narrative. For instance, Zhao (, p. ) remarked that the object of
meaning–acquisition actions was “presented by signs”, with meaning
as the goal of intentionality. Based on the above analysis, one can
On Emotion 
conclude that emotions do not exist without narrative and that the
basic unit of the object of emotion is narrative rather than signs; thus,
the object of affective intentionality can only be narrative. Narrative
may be left unfinished if it constitutes a potential, as the target of emo-
tion must include the relationship between the subject and the object.
Conversely, the target of meaning may only include the object, as both
emotion and meaning require a subject for intention generation.
This explanation, like our understanding of “flower”, can be divided
into two parts. First, if the intentional subject is to acquire the concept
of “flower”, one simply has to register the intention behind the asso-
ciation of the sign and the entity “flower”. Indeed, connecting oneself
with the flower is unnecessary. In contrast, when considering one’s
feelings towards the flower, one must generate another intention so
as to assess whether one is willing to take the flower as an object
and whether one will experience gaiety by associating oneself with
the flower. In other words, the a priori condition of emotion is the
transformation of the subject’s tendentiousness towards the object to
the target of intention. An intentional object involves a causal relation
between the intentional subject and the intentional object, rather than
a pure object. As Hume (, p. ) remarked, «when we have the
prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent
emotion of aversion or propensity». In this example, “we” relates to
the subject, and we “have the prospect” to behaviors and “pain or plea-
sure” to changes, consistent with the definition of narrative proposed
by Zhao (, p. ) as «a text of signs, composed by certain subject by
encompassing character–involved incidents, which is permissible to
be interpreted as demonstrating both time and meaning». Emotion is
still directly related to narrative.
We can define the purpose of the tendentiousness of emotion as
“anticipation”, suggesting that the potential of emotional tendentious-
ness is more important than the outcome itself. The “pain or pleasure”
mentioned by Hume denotes anticipation. Anticipation is the basis of
narrative, just as acts are the “aspect of meaning” of emotion. Without
anticipation, there is no aspect of meaning, and therefore no emotion.
The aspect of meaning of emotion is based on a supposition: «As soon
as I discover the falsehood of that supposition, they must become in-
different to me» (Hume , p. ). In this way, longing ceases, and
thus no action can be derived by emotion. Gunther (, p. ) also
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argued that «based on their phenomenology, emotions differ from
higher cognitive and motivational states in that their force (attitude)
is an indissoluble aspect of their contents». Thus, tendentiousness
and anticipation are two integral parts of emotion. An unfinished
narrative often leaves the reader in an awkward situation, as all stories
are expected to have an end. Affective intentionality is the longing for
emotional experiences, while tendentiousness is the supposition of a
certain ending, tragic or happy, which in turn generates anticipation.
If we realise the impossibility of an end, emotion will not be available.
Tendentiousness for the outcomes of narrative varies with each
individual, so does anticipation. The Chinese idiom «that which causes
the ones close to you pain causes joy in your enemies» reveals how
emotions generated by one identical incident differ due to different
stances and perspectives, leading to different tendentiousness. A per-
son’s emotional attitude towards another individual or matter may
change as a result of tendentiousness transformation. For instance,
reading Lu Xun’s novel Kong Yiji, most readers show sarcastic feel-
ings (negative emotion) towards Kong Yiji at the beginning; however,
they often feel more compassionate (positive emotion) with his tale
of woe as the narrative continues, as he is a victim of society. As a
result, by rereading the first half of the story, readers are more prone
to sympathy. The reason for this change is that readers are more
inclined to co–feel with Kong Yiji when they understand him bet-
ter. The more intense their co–feelings, the more likely they are to
make positive judgements. People are generally prone to judge posi-
tively, thus “co–feeling” increases this compassion by emphasizing his
resemblance to the readers.
If one skips intentionality and tendentiousness to directly reach
the end–purpose of anticipation, is this a valid emotional experience?
The answer is self–evident. Considering the scenario in which we are
vaguely informed that “finally they got married” with little knowledge
of the story (is it a tale of woe or weal, for instance), no emotional
response can be elicited. Furthermore, if one directly registers an emo-
tion by skipping intentionality and tendentiousness, such as using
drugs without getting ready for euphoria, it will be hard to conclude
that one actually experiences euphoria. Conversely, if one achieves
euphoria through reading or mental preparations, it is fair to conclude
that one really experiences this feeling. For instance, a mentally re-
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tarded neurosis patient may feel happy or sorrowful for no reason
in an instant, which does not suggest that he/she truly experiences
this feeling. In short, anticipation is a prerequisite for emotion, but
anticipation alone is not sufficient.
However, even when all conditions are satisfied, the affective pro-
cess still misses one essential factor — judgement. The object of judge-
ment is the relationship of tendentiousnessand anticipation. Lloyd
(, p. ) supported the idea of Chrysippus, an ancient Greek
philosopher, that «passions do not just incorporate judgements (Kri-
seis): they are judgements», which is a clear overstatement. Being only
one part of the affective process, judgement differs from emotion,
like a killer making sorrowful judgements about his prey while being
nonchalant about killing. Yet emotion depends on judgement whose
minute variations can lead to disparate emotional experiences. For
instance, from Yan Jiayan’s (, p. ) point of view, the character
Third Fairy in Zhao Shuli’s novel Xiao Erhei’s Marriage “presents as
a comic figure”, while Lei (, p. ) interpreted her as a tragic
figure. These different judgements may result from tendentiousness
or may be caused by “misreading” or “misjudgement”. Based on
“deconstructive reading”, Eco (, p. ) strongly advocated that the
pattern of misreading be a «parody’s mission: it must never be afraid of
going too far». Various modes of deconstruction and judgement can
lead tomeaning discrepancies, which in turn elicit different emotional
responses.
The trends exhibited in modern novels, such as concealed narrative
intention and emotional intention, advocate for misreading on the
part of the reader. Mo (, p. ) argued that
those novels with full–length are capable of being misread by later gen-
erations [as] the charming thing about literature lies in its potential for
misreading, [. . . ] [therefore], I also intend to befriend those who have mis-
read or misunderstood my novels, for they proved that the images in my
novel have transcended its thoughts.
In short, judgements about literary works are left to the reader, re-
lieving these works of attached emotional connotation, simultaneously
vindicating the idea that emotion is derived from judgement.
In conclusion, emotion is the judgement of a narrative transforma-
tion from tendentiousness to purposiveness through “co–feeling” on
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the part of the subject and the physical and mental reactions provoked
by thisjudgement under the pressure of affective intentionality.
Based on experiments, Kunda (, p. ) inferred that «our judge-
ments tend to be congruent with our emotions». His research in-
tended to prove that feelings or emotions could affect our judge-
ments, contrary to the above discussion suggesting that judgement
modifies our emotional responses. In fact, interplay lies between emo-
tion and judgement. For instance, in experimental philosophy, Knobe
and Nichols (, p. ) revealed that «there is no sharp separation
between the way we ascribe mental states and our values, and that sug-
gests that two mental capacities (theory of mind and moral cognition)
may interact in interesting ways». This argument further demon-
strates that judgement is not only closely related to emotion but also
strongly contributes to the affective process.
The above discussion tackles the domain of discourse of one of the
three faculties of the mind defined by Kant ( p. ): the three a
priori faculties — cognitive faculties, feelings of pleasure or displeasure
and the faculty of desire — corresponding to three cognitive faculties
— understanding, judgement and reason, respectively — which apply
to nature, art, and freedom [. . . ]. Emotion, relevant to aesthetics, falls
into the second category. Regarding the relationship between emotion
and judgement, Kant argued that the representation is referred to the
subject if one is aware of an accompanying sensation of delight, «and
what is more to its feeling of life — under the name of the feeling of
pleasure or displeasure — and this forms the basis of a quite separate
faculty of discriminating and judging», suggesting that feelings affect
the category of judgement. In contrast, the
given representations in a judgement may be empirical, and so aesthetic;
but the judgement which is pronounced by their means is logical, provided
it refers them to the object. Conversely, even if the given representations be
rational, but are referred in a judgement solely to the subject (to its feeling),
they are always to that extent aesthetic. (Ibidem, p. )
According to Kant, feelings are not judgements but the a priori
faculties and conditions for making a judgement. In other words,
judgement is not the prerequisite for feelings of pleasure or dis-
pleasure; rather, feelings are intuitionistic, and thus «those who are
always intent only on enjoyment (for that is the word used to denote
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intensity of gratification) would gladly dispense with all judgement»
(ibidem, p. ).
This paper does not intend to overthrow Kant’s domain of dis-
course, but rather seeks to illustrate that studies of “emotion a priori”
can go further. Affective intentionality can be seen as a priori; feelings
of pleasure and displeasure as anticipation, which is the purposiveness
of emotion; and preference and partiality as tendentiousness. None
of these concepts can be considered as emotions; thus, emotion is not
intuitionistic but the product of judgement. The difference between
this paper and Kant’s idea lies in the interpretation of “emotion”. In
Kant’s definition, feeling is «what we shall call that which must always
remain purely subjective, and is absolutely incapable of forming a
representation of an object» (ibidem, p. ), whilethe representation is
«referred solely to the subject and is not available for any cognition,
not even for that by which the subject cognizes itself». The emotion
evoked here is pure feeling, while the emotion discussed in this paper
involves their formation process.
Kant’s emotion–related case referred to «the green color of the
meadows [that] belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of
an object of the senses; but its agreeableness belongs to subjective
sensation, by which no object is represented: i.e. to feeling» (ibidem).
If emotion is truly a priori, then it should not differ much between
individuals. However, as the foregoing chapters demonstrate, “the
green color of the meadows” may not delight different individuals and
feelings may evolve into pleasure, displeasure, fear or nothing at all
because of the potential effect of accompanying emotions, misreading
or partiality. In other words, the “faculties endowed with feelings” are
a priori, while the feeling itself is empirical and symbolic.
. The Symbolic Nature of Emotion
Kant regarded emotion as pure feelings free of any object. However,
the connotations of signs defined by Saussure or Pierce always imply
an object. In this case, emotion would have nothing to do with signs.
Zhao (, p. ) defined the sign as “the meaning–carried percep-
tion”. Although Kant referred toemotion as sensation (or perception),
the meaning of emotion is emotion itself. Hence, emotion is mean-
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ing–free, and therefore cannot be viewedas a sign. Nevertheless, the
following section demonstrates that this pioneering definition can
help to symbolise emotion.
Langer (, p. ) attempted to define art as “the symbol of
feeling”, suggesting that the “form” of art belonged to the sign and
“feeling” naturally denoted meaning (later revised as “significance”)
and, thus, that significance was the essence of art. However, she also
proposed that the meaning of the art symbol was the intrinsic nature
of any artistic work. According to Tang (, pp. –), Langer was
trapped in the paradoxical “Langer’s dilemma”, whose solution was
the replacement of Saussure’s semiology by Pierce’s semiotics to break
the referential theory of the significance of the symbol and the organic
theory of the art symbol. «Not all forms of art belong to the symbol of
feeling, [. . . ] [although] undoubtedly, feeling accounts fora major trait
of art symbol, but not the whole package» (ibidem, p. ). Feelings are
examined by incorporating them into the category of “meaning” and
“interpretant” in Langer’s limitation and related defence. Feelings are
formless, unrepresentative yet perceptible; thus, emotion, not being
a sign itself, can be seen as the meaning or interpretation of signs.
In short, Langer’s aesthetic theories are based on Kant’s theoretical
framework.
If Langer’s statement that the meaning or significance of the art
symbol only resides in the artwork is true, then the meaning or
significance should share the structure of the artwork. Based on Liu
Daji’s defence that a is an artwork and b anaffective concept, Langer
(, pp. –) argued that “art work and human’s feeling are not the
same thing, thus a does not identify with b, rendering a valid semiotic
relationship between them”, thereby relating artwork and affective
concept to Saussure’s semiology featuring two components of the
sign: concept and sound–image. Therefore, the sign is not an artwork,
but its integration into an affective concept, with the artwork as the
signifier and the affective concept as the signified. In any case, the
affective concept itself is not a sign.
Conversely, according to Zhao (, p. ), signs are “the mean-
ing–carried perception”. Given that a sign is necessarily perceptible
or a perception itself and emotionis also perceptible but not an ob-
ject, emotion is fully equipped with the requirements to be a sign.
Therefore, the question is whether emotion is a meaning carrier.
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Mankind invented signs in the pursuit of meaning, as «meaning
can only be conveyed by signs» (Zhao , p. ). According to Aris-
totle (), mankind lives in the pursuit of happiness, which is our
final goal and the final good, «happiness, then, is something final and
self–sufficient, and is the end of action» (p. ), as «happiness has been
said to be a virtuous activity of a soul, of a certain kind. Of the remain-
ing goods, some must necessarily pre–exist asconditions of happiness,
and others are naturally co–operative and useful as instruments» (p. ).
In short, emotions are not necessarily the final end of mankind, but the
means to pursue happiness. Therefore, the significance of emotion lies
in being and happiness. Emotions are neither the end nor the meaning
itself, but a pure sign. According to Tang (), “sign is the medium”,
“symbolization is mediumlization” and artwork is nothing but “medi-
umlization”, that is, the symbolisation of emotions. In addition, a sign
can be interpreted as “the meaning–carried perception”, and hence
the symbolisation process can be conducted in ideology. In this way,
discussions on the affective sign enter the field of pure abstraction.
Emotion cannot be the ultimate goal of humanity; otherwise, we
would never need so many feelings. In other words, our various emo-
tional experiences serve as intermediaries to other meanings, those of
being and happiness, themselves only acquired through various emo-
tional experiences. As Gao (, p. ) suggested, «happiness itself,
devoid of concrete joy or pleasure in daily lives, would descend into
hollow nothingness». In addition, being and happiness are generated
not only through joy or pleasure, but also through sorrow, hope, fear,
melancholy and other emotions, which is the point advanced in Li
Shangyin’s Jeweled Zither. In search of lost times, both our perplexed
dreams, like Chuang Tzu, and our immersion in wishes and woes, like
Emperor Wang, are the spring of our happiness. The tears (sorrow)
shed by mermaids become precious pearls. Similarly, if viewed from
afar or on a beautiful day (in a good mood), everything exudes beauty
and happiness. We can be ignorant and puzzled by experiences that
later become happiness in moments of recollection. What we call
“recollection” is the symbolisation of experienced feelings to bask in
ethereal yet inaccessible feelings, that is, happiness, the meaning of
life. Indeed, happiness, «which is dynamic and stratified» (Tan , p.
), has no end. Old blessing or woe can be later symbolized as the
object of “recollection”.
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In other words, the semiotic feature of emotion is relative rather
than absolute. In one situation, emotion is the meaning, in another,
the sign. For instance, in one life stage, we acquire emotion by the
“narrative” of our past “experiences” (practice), with “narrative” as
the sign and emotion as the meaning. Conversely, in another, we
“recall” or “recollect” these faded feelings, which serve as the sign and
happiness and being as the meaning, consistent with Pierce’s principle
of “infinite semiosis”. According to this principle, «the sign process,
by definition, boasts no end for one interpretant linked to a sign
generates another» (Zhao , pp. –). In short, the interpretation
of a sign calls for another sign; hence, we can define the “interpreted
sign” as the sign and the “interpretant sign” as the meaning. The
flow of the interpretation process in which the meaning of a sign is
viewed as a new sign is infinite, as the new sign can itself generate
another meaning. When searching for “meaning”, we may encounter
a temporary end, which will stop our ultimate pursuit.
In conclusion, the affective process is one stage in our quest for
meaning. It is neither the onset nor the end, but both the meaning and
the sign, the purpose and the tendency, the interpretant and the repre-
sentation, and the signified and the signifier. Only when we examine
emotion in this context can we realise that it is not only the object of
study in semiotics but also an inevitable issue in the humanities, such
as philosophy, aesthetics, psychology, phenomenology, and cognitive
science.
Bibliographic References
A M.H. () A Glossary of Literary Terms, ch. trans., Peking University Press,
Beijing (or. ed. A Glossary of Literary Terms, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, ).
A () Nicomachean Ethics, ch. trans., The Commercial Press, Beijing (or.
ed. Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [MA] ).
B B.G. () Cognitive Pragmatics: The Mental Process of Communication, Zhejiang
University Press, Hangzhou.
B R. () Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, ch. trans., Cultural and
Art Publishing House, Beijing (or. ed. La Chambre claire: Notes sur la photographie,
L’Etoile, Gallimard, Le Seuil, ).
On Emotion 
Bonlarko A.B. () The Theory of Meaning in Functional Grammar System, ch.
trans., Peking University Press, Beijing (or. ed.TEORIZNAQENIVSI
STEMEFUNKCIONA^LOGRAMMATIKI ).
B M.A. () The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, ch. trans., Shanghai
Translation Publishing House, Shanghai (or. ed. The Philosophy of Artificial
Intelligence, Oxford University Press, ).
C G. and L. Q () A Critical Research into the Contemporary Western Rhetoric,
National Defense Industry Press, Beijing.
D X. () Lectures on the History of Western Aesthetics, Hunan Education Press,
Changsha.
D D. () Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, ch.
trans., Shanghai Scientific and Technical Publishers, Shanghai (or. ed. Kinds of
Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, John Brockman Associates,
Inc., ).
D M. () The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, ch. trans., Cul-
tural and Art Publishing House, Beijing (or. ed. Phénoménologie de l’apparaître
Esthétique, Presses Universitaire De France, Paris ).
E U. () Misreadings, ch. trans., New Star Press, Beijing (or. ed. Diario Minimo,
Bompiani, Milan ).
F A. () Identification of Positive/Negative Implicit Sentiment at the Document
Level, Henan University Press, Zhengzhou.
F M.S. () The Mind of Max Scheler, ch. trans., SDX Joint Publishing
Company, Shanghai (or. ed. The Mind of Max Scheler, Marquette University
Press, ).
G Z. () Mind Order and Life Order: Interpretation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,
The Commercial Press, Beijing.
G J. and J. C () Transference and Projection, ch. trans., Peking Uni-
versity Medical Press, Beijing (or. ed. Transference and Projection, McGraw–Hill
Education, McGraw–Hill Companies, ).
G Y.H. () The Phenomenology and Intentionality of Emotion, “Philosophi-
cal Studies”, : –.
H D. () The Treatise of Human Nature, ch. trans., The Commercial Press,
Beijing (or. ed. The Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford ).
K I. () Kant’s Aesthetic Discourse, ch. trans., Gold Wall Press, Beijing (or. ed.
Kants Schriften, Walter De Gruyter GmbH, ).
K J. and S. N () Experimental Philosophy, ch. trans., Shanghai Trans-
lation Publishing House, Shanghai (or. ed. Experimental Philosophy, Oxford
University Press, ).
 Guanghui Tan
K Z. () Social Cognition: Making Sense of People, ch. trans., Post and Telecom
Press, Beijing (or. ed. Social Cognition: Making Sense of People, MIT Press, ).
L K.S. () Feeling and Form, ch. trans., China Social Sciences Publishing
House, Beijing (or. ed. Feeling and Form, Routledge & Kegan Paul, ).
L D. () Chinese Literature Thinking over the Past Three Decades, Lanzhou
University Press, Lanzhou.
L G.E.R. () Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of
the Human Mind, ch. trans., Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, Nanjing (or.
ed. Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human Mind,
Oxford University Press, ).
M Y. () Defend the Dignity of Novels. About Mo Yan, Liaoning People’s Publishing
House, Shenyang.
M M. () The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion, “Philo-
sophical Studies”, : –.
R G. () The Concept of Mind, ch. trans., The Commercial Press, Beijing (or.
ed. The Concept of Mind, Barnes & Noble Books, ).
S J.P. () Being and Nothingness, ch. trans., SDX Joint Publishing Company,
Beijing (or. ed. L’Être et le Néant, Gallimar, Paris ).
S H. () The Phenomenological Movement, ch. trans., The Commer-
cial Press, Beijing (or. ed. The Phenomenological Movement, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, The Hague ).
S S.E. and J. F () Socrates to Sartre and Beyond: A History of Philosophy,
World Publishing Corporation, Beijing.
T G. () Semiotic Study on Happiness: The Status Quo and Future, “Guizhou
Social Sciences”, : –.
T X. () Saussure’s Limitation and Langer’s Dilemma, “Literature and Art
Forum”, : –.
——— () On Signs and Their Medium, “Signs& Media”, : –.
T P. () Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive Science, ch. trans., Shanghai
Lexicographical Publishing House, Shanghai (eng. trans. Mind: An Introduction
to Cognitive Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge
[MA] ).
T E. () Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and Sciences of Mind, ch.
trans., Zhejiang University Press. (or. ed. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology,
and Sciences of Mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge [MA] ).
V–M V. () On Husserl, ch. trans., Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing
(eng. trans. On Husserl, Wadsworth, ).
On Emotion 
W J. () On the Absence of Sentiments in Music and Peircean Phenomenology,
“Signs & Media”, : –.
W Y. () The Full Translation of the Record of Teaching and Practising, Guizhou
People’s Publishing House, Guizhou.
Y J. () Collected Works on Knowledge Acquisition: Self–statement by Yan Jiayan,
People’s Daily Press, Beijing.
Z Z. () The Semiotics of Passion, “Signs & Media”, : –.
Z Y. and Y. Hu () The Ontology of Aesthetic Object: The Phenomenological In-
terpretation on Dufrenne’s Phenomenology of Aesthetic Object, China Social Sciences
Publishing House, Beijing.
Z Y. () Semiotics, Nanjing University Press, Nanjing.
——— () A General Narratology, Sichuan University Press, Chengdu.
——— () Formal Intuition: The Start Point of Semiotic Phenomenology, “Literature
& Art Studies”, .
Z G. () On Beauty andthe Psychology of Art, Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing.

Lexia. Rivista di semiotica, 29–30
Intenzionalità
ISBN 978-88-255-2568-7
DOI 10.4399/978882552568718
pag. 303–317 (dicembre 2017)
Ignorant Design
L’universo della Moda
M L*
La mode n’est pas quelque chose qui existe
en robes seulement. La mode est dans le ciel,
dans la rue. La mode peut avoir quelque chose
avec les idées, la façon dont nous vivons, ce
qui se passe.
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. Est moda in rebus
“Moda” è un termine emotivamente ambiguo. Abbinato agli indu-
menti, può suonare euforico. “Vestire alla moda” è un obbiettivo di
molti, sebbene possa dispiacere ai dandy, o agli snob. Traslata in altri
ambiti, tuttavia, “alla moda” è locuzione perlopiù derogatoria: se qual-
cuno, nell’ambiente accademico, sostiene che abbiamo pubblicato
un libro pieno di concetti “alla moda” sicuramente non è un nostro
amico. Chi ricerca la creatività, e di conseguenza l’originalità, rifugge
in effetti la moda, se non nel tentativo di inaugurarne una nuova, non
seguendo gli altri, dunque, ma essendone seguito. In generale, allora,
la moda è un valore in quei contesti nei quali si perseguano insieme il
sentimento di una distinzione e uno di appartenenza, mentre diviene
un disvalore in quelle circostanze in cui la prima risulti di gran lunga
più rilevante della seconda.
A ben vedere, tuttavia, la moda non è mai espunta neppure dagli
ambiti più esclusivi ed elitari. Chi guardi con attenzione e un po’ di di-
stacco al mondo accademico, per esempio, si accorgerà che le ricerche,
i convegni, le lezioni, etc. ma anche gli articoli, i saggi, le monografie,
etc. tendono ad assomigliarsi tutti attraverso il rivolgere delle stagioni.
Il fenomeno è particolarmente macroscopico nell’università statuni-
tense, ancora molto influente anche a livello globale, in cui esistono
quelle che Umberto Eco definiva le “magic words”, vale a dire corte
espressioni di una o due parole che, improvvisamente, calamitano
l’attenzione di tutti i ricercatori, vengono poste al centro di mille ini-
ziative, delineano uno spartiacque: chi le usa è in, chi le trascura è
out. Ve n’è una approssimativamente ogni uno o due anni, con un
ritmo non molto dissimile rispetto a quello delle collezioni di moda:
“storytelling” nel –, “fake news” nel –, chissà che cosa
nell’annata successiva. Anche in questo caso, alcuni centri e alcuni
nomi sono più importanti di altri nel far girare la ruota della moda
intellettuale: Harvard invece di Milano, questo o quell’accademico
statunitense invece di Giorgio Armani.
L’analogia però non finisce qui: anche in ambito intellettuale, chi
segua pedissequamente le mode, e ripensi al proprio operato con
senno di poi, avrà, se si guarda con lucidità, la stessa impressione di chi
rimira vecchie foto che lo ritraggono con gli abiti ridicoli che erano
alla moda dieci o vent’anni prima. “Ma come ho fatto a organizzare un
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convegno sullo storytelling?”, ci si chiederà, con la stessa incredulità
con la quale ci si chiede “ma come ho fatto a portare le giacche con
gli spallini?” Però vi è anche il rischio opposto: chi giochi sempre
il ruolo del “maverick”, come lo definiscono gli americani, senza
mai nulla cedere all’imperio delle mode, guardandosi indietro avrà
l’impressione opposta di essere dolorosamente vissuto fuori dai tempi
e dalle epoche, di essere rimasto un po’ fuori dal mondo, isolato.
. In moda stat virtus
In questo ambito, però, la mediocritas di chi segue sì, le mode ma
cum grano salis non è necessariamente l’ideale. L’ideale è essere come
Picasso, varare un linguaggio apparentemente incomprensibile che
però tutti si ritrovano dopo un po’ a seguire quasi in automatico, come
se fosse l’elisir della creatività. Ma i Picasso della storia sono pochi.
Sorgono inattesi nei luoghi più disparati, inventano un nuovo percorso,
lo battono con tenacia, raggiungono frustrazione dopo frustrazione
il centro nevralgico della cultura del loro tempo, e lì esplodono, in
vita se sono fortunati, oppure postumi; comunque esplodono, e fan-
no deflagrare un terremoto che ha in loro stessi l’epicentro, e che
rapidamente cambia tutto il paesaggio circostante, il modo di sentire,
vedere, rappresentare.
Una semiotica del genio, tuttavia, non è impossibile, anche se ri-
schia di sortire gli effetti di quella semiotica del comico tanto agognata
da Umberto Eco: filosofare sul riso non fa ridere per nulla, e smontare
i processi della creatività di solito li smorza. Però è chiaro che anche
Picasso non sorge dal nulla, ma da un humus creativo di cui si possono
identificare alcuni ingredienti, come l’apporto di culture provenienti
da un lontano e incompreso altrove, per esempio. In ogni modo, se
questi scoppi di creatività sussistono, e si comportano come terremoti,
le culture evolvono invece perlopiù secondo la metafora che Ferdi-
nand de Saussure utilizzava per descrivere il cambiamento linguistico:
placidamente, impercettibilmente, lungo lentissimi scivolamenti delle
placche tettoniche che mai completamente si arrestano, che sempre
producono micro–alterazioni nella crosta terrestre, ma che nessuno
percepisce, se non i sismologi a mezzo dei loro sofisticati strumenti.
Muta infatti la lingua tutto intorno a noi, muta in noi, e muta anche
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per causa nostra, a seguito delle micro–variazioni che, giorno dopo
giorno, parola dopo parola, introduciamo nella langue attraverso la
nostra parole; eppure noi perlopiù non ce ne accorgiamo, o ce ne
accorgiamo di rado, per esempio quando un terremoto linguistico ha
luogo, producendo stravolgimenti immani, allorché l’instaurazione di
un nuovo regime politico, vedi la Turchia, cambia il sistema di trascri-
zione di un’intera lingua, ovvero lesionando l’edificio della lingua già
nota, come accade quando emergono dei neologismi.
In generale, però, noi sediamo sulla lingua come sulla superficie
terrestre: tutto si muove sotto di noi, ma con tale lentezza che ne
deriviamo una sensazione d’inamovibile stabilità. L’arco temporale
delle nostre vite funge infatti da parametro per accorgerci in maniera
più o meno perspicace del mutamento. Come della persona amata,
che vive accanto a noi giorno dopo giorno, e le cui fattezze osser-
viamo quotidianamente, non ci avvediamo che il tempo le segna il
viso, le ammacca la pelle, le imbianca la chioma, per non parlare di
quel decadimento degli organi interni che solo gli esami diagnostici
riescono a rilevare, così, di ciò che ci è vicino e familiare, come la
lingua, per esempio, o come la stessa cultura, non ci accorgiamo che
cambia, se non quando ce ne allontaniamo per un periodo piuttosto
lungo, e nel ritornarvi la ritroviamo mutata proprio come il viso di
una persona amata da cui per qualche motivo fossimo stati costretti ad
allontanarci. Se ad esempio dopo lungo tempo che ciò non ci accade
ci troviamo a chiacchierare con un ragazzino, allora ci renderemo
conto che questi preferisce con ogni spontaneità parole ed espressioni
inusitate, che risveglieranno in noi l’idea del tempo che passa.
Di altri mutamenti più profondi, però, non nel lessico ma nella
sintassi, o nella semantica di una lingua, di solito non ci capacitiamo,
perché mutano con lentezza eccessiva rispetto all’arco delle nostre
vite e all’acutezza della nostra percezione. Se però, come in quei video
che mostrano accelerandole le immagini di una pianta nel tempo,
dimostrandoci che essa si muove quasi come un animale — sebbene
noi non ce ne accorgiamo perché tale movimento avviene troppo
lentamente — fossimo in grado di accelerare la nostra appercezio-
ne della sintassi, allora ci renderemmo conto non solo di fenomeni
macroscopici e perlopiù sotto gli occhi di tutti, come il progressivo
recedere del congiuntivo nella lingua italiana, per esempio, ma anche
di evoluzioni più sottili, di fatto quasi impercettibili a occhio nudo.
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. Moda propria
A guisa di sismologi, gli studiosi di culture, e dunque pure i semiologi,
osservano invece questi mutamenti al microscopio, e ne scorgono
indizi e tracce. Sono dunque capaci di descrivere come la lingua e la
cultura mutano, ma restano invece perlopiù silenziosi quanto a una
seconda, più ambiziosa domanda, quella che si chiede non solo il co-
me, ma anche il perché di questo mutamento. Perché la lingua muta?
E perché muta la cultura? Sospinta da quali forze, da quali agentività?
Di fatto, Ferdinand de Saussure non risponde a questa domanda, e
perlopiù non se la pone. Intento ad edificare una linguistica di ambi-
zioni scientifiche, epurandola dalle scorie di soggettività della filosofia
romantica del linguaggio, egli rifugge da ogni considerazione che
non rimanga confinata in una concezione sistemica della lingua, in cui
nessuna forza esterna ad essa sia vista come in grado di esercitarvi
una pressione.
La filosofia della storia romantica e post–romantica, invece, for-
mula ipotesi sull’etiologia del cambiamento culturale, fino a sfociare
in quella che, più di tutte, segna e influenza il pensiero novecentesco
sull’argomento. In Marx, la cultura evolve in maniera ancillare, co-
me sovrastruttura il cui mutamento non è appunto autonomo ma
legato a quello, più profondo e vero, della struttura economica. Le
mode vestimentarie, per esempio, in quest’ottica non hanno una loro
dignità e autonomia fenomenologica ma sono solo il portato tessile
di cambiamenti più rocciosi nel sistema di produzione del valore e di
formazione delle classi socioeconomiche.
Per quanto affascinante nella sua semplicità, tuttavia, questa pro-
spettiva, sia pure edulcorata da tentativi culturologici alla Althusser,
risulta sempre più problematica agli occhi dello studioso di culture,
al quale risulta viepiù evidente che l’economia stessa, a inclusione di
certi suoi fondamentali come il concetto stesso di valore o di plusvalo-
re, non permangono immutati attraverso le epoche ma sono invece
soggetti a mutamenti che li configurano piuttosto come fenomeni
linguistici, o meglio ancora come configurazioni semiotiche. Mentre
nella produzione novecentesca del valore, perlopiù legata all’attività
industriale pesante, si poteva in effetti essere tentati di spiegare l’at-
taccamento di un operaio della Fiat alla Juventus come fenomeno
sovrastrutturale in cui una classe socio–economicamente egemonica
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infondeva e inculcava una passione sportiva nel proletariato al fine di
fidelizzarne l’operato, oggi che il fatturato dell’industria dell’immagi-
nario eguaglia e in certi casi supera quella dell’automobile si è quasi
mossi a rovesciare il ragionamento, e a pensare che l’attaccamento
sportivo produca passioni e valori–guida anche per i comparti più
tradizionalmente strutturali di produzione del valore.
La critica semiotica alla filosofia romantica o post–romantica della
storia consiste, più in generale, nel ravvisare che il mutamento cultu-
rale non ha niente al di fuori di sé, e dunque non può essere spiegato
con riferimento a un’agentività esterna, sia essa economica, sociale,
o religiosa. Persino il cambiamento naturale, che parrebbe poggiare
su uno zoccolo duro e inamovibile, fuori dalla portata del linguaggio,
a ben vedere non può essere recepito dalla specie se non attraverso
il filtro della cultura. Il fatto di vivere in un territorio estremamente
tellurico, per esempio, senza dubbio incide sull’ideologia religiosa
delle culture nipponiche, eppure questa incidenza non è mai diretta,
ma si esplica tramite il filtro della rielaborazione culturale, una riela-
borazione così insistente che finisce con il prendere il primo piano
della scena del mutamento, sostituendosi in quanto seconda natura
culturale alla prima natura. In effetti, tanti sono i territori tellurici
abitati dalla specie umana, ma non in tutti si manifestano gli stessi
tratti culturali, a riprova del fatto che la natura delle conformazioni
geologiche o delle plaghe climatiche fornisce il quadro ma non la defi-
nizione delle concrezioni culturali che vi si manifestano, e che anzi
finiscono con il condurre i soggetti a letture a volte diametralmente
opposte dello stesso dato “naturalistico”.
. Moda vult decipi
Ma cosa resta se, come nel modello di semiotica delle culture proposto
da Jurij M. Lotman, nulla, né l’economia né la natura, risulta ester-
no alla semiosfera, e invece tutto vi resta inesorabilmente racchiuso,
confinato nello spazio omogeneo della significazione, con la necessità
dunque di esservi spiegato nei termini a esso interni, senza ricorso
al nesso causale che ancori l’effetto culturale a un’origine eterologa?
Di fatto, nonostante Lotman s’ispiri a Saussure ma se ne distacchi nel
tentativo di “dinamizzarlo” — operazione del resto indispensabile dato
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il passaggio da una semiotica del linguaggio a una della cultura — lo
studioso russo, al pari di quello svizzero, sembra porsi il problema
del come del cambiamento culturale, ma non del perché. Il sofisticato
metalinguaggio della semiotica della cultura cattura con acribia i pro-
cessi minuti del mutamento culturale, sottolineando, fra le altre cose,
il bisogno di pensare la frontiera culturale come dispositivo dinamico
di traduzione e dunque di generazione di senso. Questo metalinguag-
gio però non spiega né formula ipotesi sull’origine del vento che,
spirando lieve ai margini della semiosfera, poi prendendo forza man
mano che un meme culturale viene riprodotto, fino a sospingerlo con
veemenza verso il centro e il cuore di una cultura, muove e rimuove
l’universo del senso; non spiega, dunque, da quale gioco di masse
d’aria fredde e calde esso si sprigioni, e come mai a un certo punto si
sollevi, o scemi.
Forse però non è la risposta a costituire un problema, ma la do-
manda. Forse la distinzione fra come la cultura cambia e perché essa
cambia non è poi così rilevante. Lo è se si proietta su di essa un quadro
epistemologico di tipo causale, che è quello che quasi spontaneamente
adottiamo quando cerchiamo di decifrare le nostre vite. Tuttavia, più
abbracciamo con lo sguardo non tanto gli accadimenti minuti che ci
concernono, e che riusciamo a leggere secondo questo schema, in
fondo narrativo, di cause ed effetti, quanto le grandi linee dell’esisten-
za nostra, allora il perché di questo o quel rivolgimento comincia a
sfuggirci come in una nebulosa, perdiamo i fili sottili e spesso invisibili
che ci hanno condotti fino a un certo segno, stentiamo poi infine a
cogliere il perché delle cose, sovente disperandocene.
Ma se cambiassimo prospettiva, se cambiassimo radicalmente pro-
spettiva, e considerassimo invece che questa condizione del non poter
scorgere le cause di ciò che ci accade non è l’eccezione nell’universo,
ma la norma, e che il nostro ravvisare cause ed effetti, esso sì è invece
un’illusione, prodotto di uno schema cognitivo utile senza dubbio,
ma relegato nell’ambito locale della nostra cognizione, allora forse
capiremmo che l’universo e la cultura, giù giù fino alla lingua, sono
ambiti troppo vasti per essere sorretti da un perché, da una causa che
ne sospinga i mutamenti, e che tutto invece vi si manifesta in base
a interazioni perlopiù casuali, che divengono cause solo se viste in
un ambito d’osservazione ristretto e limitato, quale la psicologia di
un’interazione, per esempio.
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Il sogno filosofico di tradurre la casualità in causa andrebbe allora
rovesciato nel suo opposto, ovverosia nel quietismo filosofico che
accetta la causa come illusione ottica limitata all’interno di un univer-
so essenzialmente casuale, ove direttrici del senso sia naturale che
culturale emergono, ma a seguito di interazioni perlopiù non inten-
zionali, perlomeno non sorrette dal progetto preciso di creare “quel”
senso. Nuovi astri, nuovi pianeti, nuove specie, ma anche nuovi stili
pittorici, nuove parole, nuovi racconti, emergerebbero dunque non
in virtù di un’agentività determinata ma per impulso di un’agentività
diffusa, ove micro–agenti seguono perlopiù logiche locali, o quelle
che essi ritengono esser tali in virtù di un’illusione prospettica, ma
poi, sommandosi le loro azioni su larghissima scala, danno luogo ad
alterazioni strutturali di portata globale, il cui sprigionarsi non è affatto
riconducibile alle micro–intenzionalità che vi hanno condotto.
. Moda semper certa est
C’è allora una parola sola che catturi questo passaggio dall’intenzionali-
tà microscopica all’emergenza macroscopica, dalla causalità apparente
delle interazioni locali alla casualità strutturale del lungo periodo, e
dunque al manifestarsi di linee di tendenza, nello sviluppo diacronico
del reale, inspiegabili nei termini di una logica puramente causale.
Questa parola è “moda”. L’universo segue la moda. La cultura segue
la moda. Il linguaggio segue la moda. Non si deve dunque proiettare
lo schema causale che sorregge la nostra lettura locale del mondo
su scala universale, come propone la teoria dell’intelligent design, ma
invece propendere per l’idea che le sacche di causalità che scorgiamo
nell’universo non siano che concrezioni limitate nel tempo e nello
spazio, fenomeni locali sui quali una logica causale riesce ad avere una
presa solo se li considera isolati dal lunghissimo periodo in cui essi pu-
re si collocano, e rispetto al quale, invece, sarebbe più giusto adottare
una teoria dell’ignorant design, ovvero di uno sviluppo cieco, casuale,
ma comunque efficace, dell’universo. In effetti, non è difficile spie-
gare Picasso causalmente, ma è invece difficile accettare di spiegarlo
casualmente, come prodotto che emerge dal tempo lunghissimo della
cultura esattamente come una nuova specie animale attraverso gli
eoni dell’evoluzione biologica. La moda, dunque, sarebbe il concetto
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chiave non per spiegare, ma per accettare di non spiegare le pieghe
della cultura.
Per una sorta di legge dei grandi numeri, la forza del caso che si
esercita attraverso la storia e le culture vi produce delle polarizzazioni,
e dunque delle dialettiche. Sarebbe però forse fuorviante, e sintomo
di un ritorno surrettizio a una logica causale, interpretare queste dia-
lettiche in modo hegeliano, come opposizioni destinate a produrre
una sintesi finale, un equilibrio. Invece, come pare che l’universo si
espanda a partire da un iniziale big bang solo per poi contrarsi succes-
sivamente in direzione diametralmente opposta, e così via all’infinito
senza alcuna possibilità di storytelling che non sia quello della mera
constatazione di tale movimento, così anche le culture danno luogo a
dialettiche, ma queste non si ricompongono in uno stato di equilibrio,
bensì si traducono in mere oscillazioni: le culture tendono casualmen-
te verso l’esaltazione di una certa caratteristica, poi raggiungono un
frangente di saturazione, e allora si ripiegano su sé stesse per inse-
guire dapprima timidamente, poi in maniera sempre più decisa una
direttrice culturale opposta, fino al rallentamento e alla stasi dall’altra
parte dello spettro.
. Moda ponens, moda tollens
Una delle caratteristiche che il metalinguaggio della semiotica riscon-
tra nelle semiosfere è proprio la tendenza a un certo grado di opacità,
in quanto contrapposto al polo diametralmente simmetrico della tra-
sparenza. Opacità e trasparenza sono fatti di moda in senso stretto,
nel senso che la moda essenzialmente si fonda anche sulla decisione
di ostendere od occultare a sé stessi e agli altri porzioni più o meno
ampie della superficie corporea, ma sono anche fatti di moda in senso
lato, nel senso che tutta la cultura, e non solo quella vestimentaria,
deve regolare al proprio interno ciò che la semiotica greimasiana de-
nomina “attante osservatore”, vale a dire il modo in cui tutti i testi, e
non solo quelli tessili e vestimentari, decidono di far circolare oppure
di bloccare la circolazione d’informazione. È solo in virtù di questa
concezione per così dire allargata della polarizzazione tra trasparenza
e opacità che si possono cogliere le relazioni strutturali che intercor-
rono fra vari regimi discorsivi dell’ostensione o dell’occultamento,
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all’interno di configurazioni testuali anche molto distanti in termini
di media, generi, formati, stili, e contesti. Il giudizio sulla misura della
trasparenza o dell’opacità in vigore non può dunque dipendere che
dalla relazione con lo spettro di questa polarizzazione, senza mai la
possibilità di stabilire misure né tantomeno standard assoluti. Una
cultura è più o meno trasparente rispetto a un suo stadio passato o
futuro, e mai in assoluto. Il semiotico della cultura deve comunque
attingere i suoi materiali da più sfere discorsive, cercando di compiere
carotaggi quanto più pertinenti e rappresentativi ma poi sforzandosi
di ricollegarne i risultati al fine di maturare una comprensione oli-
stica della semiosfera, del punto in cui essa si trova in relazione alle
polarizzazioni strutturali che la caratterizzano.
È abbastanza evidente che, dal disfacimento dell’Unione Sovietica
in poi, la trasparenza sia diventata un elemento essenziale di ogni
retorica di cambiamento politico. Lungo una direttrice che ha radici
antichissime, ma che ha trovato una sua coagulazione essenziale, al-
meno per quanto riguarda i tempi attuali, nella decisione di Mikhail
Gorbachev di adottare “glasnost” come parola–chiave della sua opera
di riforma della politica e della società sovietiche a partire dal , la
trasparenza, che è una delle traduzioni possibili di glasnost, appunto,
guadagna rapidamente il cuore della semiosfera globale e diventa per
ciò stesso oggetto di moda. Non solo nei Paesi dell’ex blocco sovieti-
co, ma anche nell’Europa occidentale, accumulare consenso politico
richiede un riferimento sistematico a questa magic word, i cui riverberi
poi all’interno dei gangli della semiosfera sono multipli, nel senso
che non riguardano solo l’operato delle gerarchie politiche o degli
apparati burocratici, ma cominciano a “contagiare” anche altre sfere
della produzione culturale, a cominciare da quelle legate ai sistemi
politico–burocratici.
Quando, a distanza di una decina d’anni dalla caduta del muro di
Berlino che seguì alla politica sovietica della glasnost, la Germania
decise di dotarsi di un nuovo Reichstag, la sua manifestazione architet-
tonica parve incarnare, nella struttura stessa dell’edificio oggi visitabile
nella capitale tedesca, e una delle sue massime attrazioni, il passaggio
da una moda dell’opacità a una della trasparenza, non solo in politica,
ma anche in altri ambiti di produzione culturale, primo fra tutti quello
dell’architettura che traduce la politica in edifici e palazzi istituziona-
li. Da un lato, nel , la coppia di artisti Christo e Jeanne–Claude
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impacchettò l’edificio secondo loro costume, quasi a segnalare cosa
la politica tedesca era stata prima della caduta del Muro: un luogo di
opacità estrema, impenetrabile a uno sguardo esterno, che del palazzo
del potere conservava la stazza imponente e la forma austera, ma che
nulla offriva a un desiderio di trasparenza (Fig. ).
Figura .
Dall’altro lato, quando nel  si completò l’opera di ristruttura-
zione del Reichstag guidata dal progetto dell’archistar inglese Norman
Foster, parve inevitabile aggiungervi un dettaglio che non era in effetti
contenuto nel progetto iniziale, ma che divenne in seguito l’elemento
più riconoscibile e di fatto scatenante della nuova identità politica e
architettonica del landmark berlinese: una splendida, immensa cupola
di vetro. Lì dove regnava un’opacità assoluta, denunciata dall’impac-
chettamento di Christo, avrebbe regnato una trasparenza assoluta, una
visibilità della politica esposta allo sguardo e al controllo da parte dei
cittadini (Fig. ).
Come spesso accade nelle semiosfere, i tracciati delle polarizzazioni
strutturali devono tradursi in manifestazioni sensibili, nelle quali la
scelta della specifica materia adottata non è affatto indifferente, ma
si traduce nella configurazione culturale dei materiali. È evidente
che, imperando una retorica politica improntata alla trasparenza, essa
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Figura .
debba incarnarsi in un materiale diafano, quale appunto il vetro, che
insieme traduce tale retorica e al tempo stesso se ne impregna.
L’andamento delle polarizzazioni strutturali della semiosfera è
tuttavia tale che esse non solo tendono alla saturazione del flusso
di moda prima di ripiegarsi lentamente su sé stesse e dare luogo
alla tendenza opposta, ma comporta altresì un continuo strabordare,
per contagio, in ambiti discorsivi paralleli a quello in cui prendono
abbrivio. Dopo che “glasnost” diventa parola d’ordine nell’ambito
della politica e ne caratterizza finanche i palazzi, la trasparenza pian
piano comincia a pervadere anche domini discorsivi tradizionalmente
votati alla discrezione, alla segretezza o persino alla menzogna, quali
la diplomazia, per esempio. In altre epoche culturali non si sarebbe
messo in dubbio che, per difendere gli interessi nazionali del proprio
Paese, un ambasciatore si attenesse al basso profilo, all’understatement,
alla riservatezza, o persino praticasse la diceria e la menzogna per
depistare i governi ostili. L’avvento di Wikileaks, che un filo storico
ma soprattutto retorico sottile collega al varo sovietico della Glasnost,
sconvolge nel senso della trasparenza anche il reame della segretezza:
pare normale a tutti, a un certo punto, che si rivelino e diffondano
dispacci diplomatici, così come sembra legittimo, a pochi anni di
distanza, che i segreti militari di una superpotenza vengano esposti
attraverso l’opera dei whistleblowers Snowden e Manning.
Interpretare questi fenomeni come segno di puro progresso del-
l’umanità nel suo destino sempre più ravvicinato di una democrazia
compiuta significa travisarli, o almeno trascurarne la componente
estetica, ugualmente fondamentale. La trasparenza s’impossessa del
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discorso globale, dalla politica all’architettura, dalla diplomazia agli
affetti, non perché sia giusta in sé, ma perché viaggia e si gonfia sulla
cresta dell’onda della moda. Ciò suonerà forse dissacrante, ma non co-
gliere l’aspetto modaiolo di certi fenomeni di estetica politica significa
illudersi rispetto al fatto, molto probabile, che questa tendenza a una
sempre maggiore trasparenza non sia destinata a continuare all’infini-
to, ma a raggiungere un estremo al di là del quale essa è inevitabile
che si configuri come problema più che come risorsa, con il risultato
di dar luogo a fenomeni culturali di rottura, nel senso dell’opacità
piuttosto che della trasparenza.
. Moda capta est
A dire il vero queste controtendenze si manifestano già proprio nel-
le mode vestimentarie, le quali raccolgono e istituzionalizzano nelle
pratiche del marketing, della pubblicità, della commercializzazione,
e ovviamente anche del design una tendenza globale che ha le sue
radici essenzialmente nello stesso evento che segna, dal punto di vista
politico, la rottura della tendenza a una sempre maggiore trasparenza
inauguratasi con la Glasnost nel . Tale evento è senza dubbio l’
settembre , il quale da una parte segna la fine della pax americana
post–sovietica: a partire da questa data, l’Occidente dovrà sempre più
rivedere i suoi standard di trasparenza nella necessità di collocarsi e di-
fendersi in relazione a nuove forze ostili, riconsiderando per esempio
l’operato dei servizi segreti nazionali e il loro furtivo monitoraggio
delle “vite degli altri”; dall’altra parte, questo evento sancisce anche
l’arrivo, sulla scena della storia e della cultura globali, di forze culturali
ed estetiche prima minoritarie o marginali, le quali prendendo piede
all’interno delle semiosfere occidentali vi impongono nuovi standard
di trasparenza non solo politica ma anche estetica, obbligando le se-
miosfere dell’Occidente a un’azione che è volta a volta di contrasto o
di assorbimento.
Il velo islamico, per esempio, chiaro dispositivo di occultamento e
di opacità, prima si manifesta come pietra d’inciampo delle estetiche
occidentali della trasparenza corporea, le quali cominciano a mani-
festarsi in Occidente già con l’inizio della secolarizzazione ma che
esplodono con la riscoperta del nudo nel ’; il velo islamico in Occi-
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dente “fa problema” perché mette in crisi questa concezione ormai
affermata del corpo femminile e della sua carica erotico–sessuale. In
seguito allo shock, però, quando la novità culturale si afferma sempre
più, fa nascere fenomeni semiosferici di accomodamento, come quel-
lo che si manifesta nella recente campagna pubblicitaria del brand di
moda italiano Versace (Fig. ).
Figura .
Da accessorio–cardine del codice vestimentario islamico, impre-
gnato del valore di opacità proiettato sul corpo femminile, il velo viene
sdoganato in quanto indumento alla moda, rivisitato in chiave vintage
recuperando il fazzoletto della donna occidentale, condiviso con il
maschio strizzando l’occhio ai modi di vestire dell’uomo della peni-
sola arabica, e soprattutto, in posizione centrale, valorizzato proprio
in quanto hejab, di cui Versace però inverte la polarità scopica da su-
perficie tessile occultante a tessuto esibito, accentuando il paradosso
erotico di fatto già insito nel velo.
. Conclusione: moda in mobili
Il vento che agita l’universo, che muove le particelle subatomiche, che
incita gli astri alle loro rivoluzioni, che battezza nuovi pianeti, quel
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vento che spira attorno a una nuova specie di pianta, o alla forma
inusitata della pinna di un pesce, e che soffia altresì nei teatri, quelli
dell’invenzione greca, o nella nuova fattura dei mosaici bizantini, o
nell’emergere della prospettiva, fino alla miriade d’interazioni che
incoronano un meme come campione di viralità, e sotto a tutto questo,
da che la vita è senso, sospinge in avanti il linguaggio, i sistemi di segni,
e soprattutto la lingua, che ognuno parla e che ognuno cambia, ma
senza avvedersi dei refoli sottili che ne animano il mutamento, ebbene
questo vento non è un vento reale, non si sprigiona da un motore
lontano, dal contrasto epocale di freddo e di caldo, ed è solo per un
attimo, attraverso l’istante delle vite nostre, quando per un mistero
l’universo finge di allinearsi con le volontà del pensiero e dell’atto, che
ci pare di sentirlo, mentre poi ne diverge in maniera catastrofica e ilare,
tanto che se avesse un volto riderebbe continuamente del pensiero
degli uomini, e del loro giocare con i simulacri vuoti di cause ed effetti,
in quanto questo vento è un vento apparente, è quello che si anima
dall’animarsi stesso delle cose, che non sono mosse dal vento ma che
invece sono vento, noi siamo vento, e tu che leggi queste parole, e
queste parole stesse, che a te sembra abbiano un qualche senso, ma
sono solo un grumo di polvere di una qualche bellezza in un turbinio
insensato.
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Sciences. In  he obtained a PhD (Doctorat) in Communication and
Information Sciences, with specialization in Semiotics, at the École des
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (France); he also completed a two
years postdoctoral research program at Indiana University (Blooming-
ton, USA), where he was a visiting professor. From  to  he was
professor and researcher at the University of Zulia (Venezuela), where
he taught Semiotics at the Anthropology Department, founded the
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Research Laboratory for Semiotics and Anthropology, and the peer
reviewed journal Opción, of which he was the first editor. He also led
the team that founded the editorial project Latin–American Collec-
tion of Semiotics. From  to  he was a Prometeo researcher in
Ecuador; and currently he is an appointed researcher at the University
of Lima in Peru. He has published seven books and more than one
hundred and fifteen peer reviewed articles. He was president of the
Venezuelan Association of Semiotics, the Latin American Federation
of Semiotics, and currently is vice–president of the International Asso-
ciation for Semiotic Studies. He was a two terms dean at the Faculty of
Sciences at the University of Zulia (Venezuela). He also was president
of the Modern Art Museum in Maracaibo (Venezuela). Doctor Finol
was a member of the Regulation and Development Council for Com-
munication and Information in Ecuador. He has won several scientific
awards, and in  was awarded a Honoris Causa Doctorate.
Nan Gao (also named Gao Kaizheng) is a Professor of Literary Stud-
ies and PhD supervisor at Liaoning University, China. He was born in
 and graduated from Chinese Department, Liaoning University
in . He is currently the pace–setter in scientific research of the
Chinese Language and Literature Discipline at Liaoning University.
He is an expert granted with Special State Allowance for his excellent
academic performance. He is the vice–chairman of China Society of
Sino–Foreign Theoretical Studies in Literary and Arts and executive
member of Chinese Association of Literary and Art Theory. He has
 works published since the s. His representative works includes:
Psychology of Art (), Daoism and Aesthetics (), Interpretations
on the Chinese Ancient Literature and Art from the Perspective of Culture
(), Life in the Perspective of Aesthetics (), Literary and Art Theory:
Tradition and Modernity (), Research on the Development of Chinese
Literature across the Century (), Sinicization of Western Literary The-
ories and the Subjectivity of Chinese Literary Theories (), The Con-
struction of Chinese Literary Theories in the  Years after Opening up and
Reform (), Literature and Morality () and so on. Research on the
Development of Chinese Literature across the Century was granted
the th Luxun Literary Prize. Literature and Morality was selected
as one of the works in National Achievements Library of Philosophy
and Social Sciences. Please contact him at chunfeiwang@.com.
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Remo Gramigna is junior research fellow in culture and cognition
studies at the Institute of Cultural Research, University of Tartu, Es-
tonia. His research interests include cognitive and culture studies,
history of philosophy and semiotics, film and aesthetics studies. He is
the author of Augustine and the Study of Signs and Signification ().
His articles appeared in “Journal of Communication Studies”, “Sign
Systems Studies”, and other international journals.
Massimo Leone is Full Tenured Professor (“Professore Ordinario”)
of Semiotics, Cultural Semiotics, and Visual Semiotics at the Depart-
ment of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Turin,
Italy and Permanent Part–Time Visiting Full Professor of Semiotics
in the Department of Chinese Language and Literature, University of
Shanghai, China. He is a  ERC Consolidator Grant recipient, the
most important and competitive research grant in Europe. He grad-
uated in Communication Studies from the University of Siena, and
holds a DEA in History and Semiotics of Texts and Documents from
Paris , an MPhil in Word and Image Studies from Trinity College
Dublin, a PhD in Religious Studies from the Sorbonne, and a PhD in
Art History from the University of Fribourg (CH). He was visiting
scholar at the CNRS in Paris, at the CSIC in Madrid, Fulbright Re-
search Visiting Professor at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley,
Endeavour Research Award Visiting Professor at the School of English,
Performance, and Communication Studies at Monash University, Mel-
bourne, Faculty Research Grant Visiting Professor at the University of
Toronto, “Mairie de Paris” Visiting Professor at the Sorbonne, DAAD
Visiting Professor at the University of Potsdam, Visiting Professor at
the École Normale Supérieure of Lyon (Collegium de Lyon), Visiting
Professor at the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Mu-
nich, Visiting Professor at the University of Kyoto, Visiting Professor
at the Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University, Visiting Profes-
sor at The Research Institute of the University of Bucharest, Eadington
Fellow at the Center for Gaming Research, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, Fellow of the Käte Hamburger Kolleg “Dynamics in the History
of Religions Between Asia and Europe” (Bochum, Germany), Visiting
Senior Professor at the Internationales Forschungszentrum Kulturwis-
senschaften, Vienna, High–End Foreign Expert and Visiting Professor
at the University of Shanghai, China, Visiting Senior Professor at the
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Centre for Advanced Studies, South Eastern Europe (Croatia), and Se-
nior Visiting Professor at the Polish Institute of Advanced Studies. His
work focuses on the role of religion in modern and contemporary
cultures. Massimo Leone has single–authored ten books, Religious
Conversion and Identity: The Semiotic Analysis of Texts (London and
New York: Routledge, ;  pp.), Saints and Signs: A Semiotic Read-
ing of Conversion in Early Modern Catholicism (Berlin and New York:
Walter de Gruyter, ,  pp.), Sémiotique de l’âme,  vols (Berlin et
al.: Presses Académiques Francophones, ), Annunciazioni: percorsi
di semiotica della religione,  vols (Rome: Aracne, ,  pp.), Spiri-
tualità digitale: il senso religioso nell’era della smaterializzazione (Udine:
Mimesis, ), Sémiotique du fundamentalisme : messages, rhétorique,
force persuasive (Paris: l’Harmattan, ; translated into Arabic in ),
and Signatim: Profili di semiotica della cultura (Rome: Aracne, , 
pp.), A Cultural Semiotics of Religion (in Chinese) [Series “Semiotics
& Media”] (Chengdu, China: University of Sichuan Press, , 
pp.) and On Insignificance (in English by Routledge; in Chinese by
Sichuan University Press), edited thirtyfive collective volumes, and
fifty articles in semiotics and religious studies. He has lectured in
Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, and the Americas. He is the chief edi-
tor of Lexia, the Semiotic Journal of the Center for Interdisciplinary
Research on Communication, University of Turin, Italy, and editor of
the book series “I Saggi di Lexia” (Rome: Aracne) and “Semiotics of
Religion” (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter). He directed the
MA Program in Communication Studies at the University of Turin,
Italy (–) and is currently vice–director for research at the De-
partment of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Turin,
Italy.
Marco Sanna obtained a PhD in Semiotics from the University of
Studies of Sassari in . He is now independent researcher in Semi-
otics of Culture, professional journalist, and scientific communicator.
He has published articles on RIFP and Mathesis.
Bruno Surace obtained his PhD in Semiotics and Media at the Uni-
versity of Turin, where he lectures in semiotics; he is a member of
AISS (Associazione Italiana Studi Semiotici), CUC (Consulta Univer-
sitaria Cinema), and CIRCe (Centro Interdipartimentale di Ricerca
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sulla Comunicazione, Turin). He has written articles for numerous
peer–reviewed journals, participated in European summer schools,
and given lectures in conferences and seminars in Italy, various places
in Europe, and China. He edited the book I discorsi della fine. Catastrofi,
disastri, apocalissi (Aracne ) with Vincenzo Idone Cassone (Univer-
sity of Turin) and Mattia Thibault (Tampere University of Technology)
and he is editing a book about the Japanese imaginary in Western
society with prof. Frank Jacob (Nord University). In the first semester
of  he was a Visiting Scholar at UCC (University College Cork,
Ireland), in the Department of Film and Screen Media. He participates
in a weekly radiophonic Italian show where he talks about cinema.
Bianca Terracciano is adjunct professor of Digital Culture and Social
Media at the University of Tuscia and postdoctoral researcher in
Semiotics at Sapienza University of Rome. She writes for Doppiozero,
with which she published in  the ebook Mitologie dell’intimo. Her
latest books are Social Moda. Nel segno di influenze, pratiche e discorsi
(FrancoAngeli, ) and Geoaffetti. Narrare la nostra terra (CMEA,
).
Ugo Volli, nato a Trieste nel , laureato in Filosofia a Milano nel
, è professore ordinario di Semiotica del testo presso la Facoltà
di Lettere e Filosofia dell’Università di Torino, dove insegna pure
Sociosemiotica. Fino all’anno accademico – ha insegnato
Filosofia del linguaggio all’Università di Bologna. È presidente del
Corso di laurea specialistico in Comunicazione multimediale e di
massa dell’Università di Torino, dove dirige anche il Centro Interdi-
partimentale di studi sulla comunicazione e partecipa al collegio dei
docenti del Dottorato in Comunicazione. Fa parte anche del collegio
dei docenti del dottorato ISU di semiotica presso l’Università di Bo-
logna. È membro della commissione comunicazione dell’Università
di Bologna e di quella della CRUI. Ha tenuto corsi e conferenze in
numerose istituzioni e università italiane e straniere fra cui l’ISTA
(International School of Theatre Anthropology), di cui è membro del
comitato scientifico, la New York University e la Brown University di
Providence – R.I. (USA), in ciascuna delle quali stato visiting professor
per un semestre. Inoltre ha svolto varia attività didattica alla Columbia
University, Haute Ecole en Sciences Sociales (Paris), Brooklyn Col-
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lege, Universidad Nacional di Lima, Universidad Nacional di Bogotà,
Università di Genéve, Bonn, Madrid, Montpellier, Augsburg, Vienna,
Zagabria, Helsinki, Sofia, Kassel oltre a numerosi atenei italiani. È
professore a contratto di Semiotica, presso il Corso di laurea in Scienze
della Comunicazione dell’Università Vita Salute di Milano.
Wu Xiaoming (born ) is a Chinese philosopher. He is a profes-
sor of philosophy at Fudan University and one of the Yangtze River
Scholar Award winners. Since the s, he has been a central figure
in Marxist philosophy, German Idealism, philosophical hermeneutics
and philosophy of history. He has made influential and original con-
tributions to Marxian materialism, referring mainly to Marx’s critique
of Hegel in his  Manuscripts, Heidegger and Gadamer’s critique
of Platonism or the tradition of Western metaphysics, and various
strands of Chinese thought. Another of Wu’s major achievements is a
careful study of the development Marx’s early thought with particular
emphasis on the ways it differed from his contemporary thinkers,
especially the Young Hegelians. Wu is also a leading scholar in formu-
lating a Marxian sociopolitical philosophy centered on the concept
of social reality or, in Marx’s own terms, das reale Subjekt. In this
light, he not only criticizes both liberal visions of the transformation
of Chinese society, i.e., of the rise of bourgeois society in China, and
Romantic or cultural–conservative ideologies favoring premodern
social formations, but also conceives of the contemporary develop-
ment of China, with its conscientious and creative assimilation of the
Chinese and Western traditions, as capable of offering a new type
of civilization that may help open a way out of the current global
predicament.
Zhang Jiang, Ph.D. and Professor of Literary Studies. He is cur-
rently the Chief Vice President of the University of Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (UCASS), Editor–in–Chief of “Social Sciences in
China Press” (SSCP), “Social Sciences in China”, “Chinese Literary
Criticism”, “Social Sciences in China Review”, and “Chinese Social
Sciences Today”, and former Vice President of the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences. He is also Chairman of Chinese Society for Literary
Criticism (CSLC) and the expert of the Review Committee of The
National Social Sciences Fund of China (NSSFC). He has long been
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engaged in research on literary theory and criticism. Many of his
articles were published in “Social Sciences in China” (both Chinese
and English edition), “Oktyabr” (Russian literary magazine), “Lexia”
(Italy), “Comparative Literature Studies” (US), “Literature & Art Stud-
ies”, “Literary Review”, “Philosophical Researches” among presti-
gious academic journals, and in “People’s Daily” and “Guangming
Daily” among the best–known newspapers in China. Some articles are
re–printed in “The Xinhua Digest”, “Chinese Social Sciences Digest”,
“Reprinted Data of Renmin University of China” and other periodicals.
In recent years, his concepts “Imposed Interpretation” and “Public
Hermeneutics” have aroused intensive and extensive discussions and
received enthusiastic responses in academia both domestic and abroad.
Some of his representative works are: Theses on Public Hermeneutics,
Imposed Interpretation: Querying Contemporary Literary Criticism, Iden-
tification of Issues Concerning Contemporary Western Literary Criticism:
With Concurrent Reflections on the Reconstruction of Chinese Literary Crit-
icism, On Theory–Centric Literary Theory: A Discussion Starting from the
So–called Literary Theory without Literature, Discussion on the Periodiza-
tion of the History of Western Literary Criticism (series), The Presence or
Absence of “Intention”, etc.
Zhao Yiheng, Professor of Semiotics and Narratology, Director of the
Institute of Semiotics & Media Studies, Sichuan University. His recent
books include A General Narratology (, Sichuan University Press),
Semiotics: Principles & Problems (rd Edition, , Nanjing University
Press), Philosophical Semiotics: The Coming into Being of the World of
Meaning (, Sichuan University Press). His research areas are semi-
otics and narratology.
Zhu Liyuan, born in , Master of Arts, Fudan University, a senior
Professor of Fudan University in liberal arts, doctoral tutor. He was
Chair of the Department of Chinese Language and Literature in Fudan
University (–), Dean of the School of International Cultural
Exchanges (–) and in January  by the national Ministry
of personnel awarded the title of Outstanding Mid–Aged Expert. He
was member of fifth and sixth Committee of Social Science in Chi-
nese disciplines. Academic Employment: vice–chairman of Chinese
Society for Aesthetics; vice–chairman of Chinese Association for the
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Chinese and foreign literary theory; vice–chairman of Chinese society
of literary and artistic theory; president of Shanghai aesthetic society.
Majoring in literary theory and aesthetics. He published  works
such as The Introduction to Hegel’s Aesthetics, The Introductory Theory
to Reception Aesthetics, The perception to Reality, To Unveil the Enigma of
History and Aesthetic, Between Speech and Meaning: The View of Language
in Pre–Qin Era, The Perception to Aesthetics, Aesthetics and Practice, On
the Way to Practice Ontology Aesthetics, etc. Editor–in–chief of several
monographs like Unity of Man and Nature: The Spirit of Aesthetic Culture
in Ancient China, Western Aesthetics History (seven–volume), History of
Western Aesthetic Category (three–volume), Discussion of Literary The-
ory Tendency of Postmodernism (the first and second book), etc. And
also published some textbooks named Contemporary Western Literary
Theory, Aesthetics, History of Western Aesthetics, etc. His three kinds
of translations include A Map Of Misreading, etc. And has published
more than  thesis, won  national or provincial prizes. The English
edition of the book Contemporary Chinese Aesthetics, co–authored by
American scholar J. Block, which was published in America by Peter
Lang Publishing in , is the first famous work to introduce Chinese
contemporary aesthetics to western countries.
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